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The Labor parties in Australia belong to a small group of political 
parties which are characterized by having trade unions directly concerned 
with their organization, administration, and selection of candidates. If the 
federal Labor party is included, there are in fact seven Labor parties 
operating in Australia. Despite the greater importance which has been 
increasingly attached to federal, as against state, pohtics since the first 
decade of this century it is in the state parties, known since 1918 as state 
branches of the Australian Labor party, that the real power resides. 
While these state parties have close ties in their political attitudes and in 
their platforms, each one developed independently and has been con-
ditioned by the economics, geography, and industry of the colony and 
state concerned and by the personnel who formed its executives and 
parliamentary parties during its first thirty years. For a number of years, 
tlrose studying the Labor parties in Australia have assumed similarities 
among the parties which were not always there. In many cases the 
organization and tactics of the New South Wales party have been taken as 
the model on which it was assumed that other colonial parties developed 
and operated. Thus Louise Overacker, when discussing the New South 
Wales party, wrote: "While these institutions [pledge, pre-selection ballot, 
union affiliation] were being forged in the 'mother colony', parallel 
developments were taking place in Queensland, South Australia and 
Victoria. The same problems arose, although not always in the same order, 
and for the most part the same solutions were found."' It was not so 
much parallel developments that were taking place in the other three 
colonial Labor parties, as independent, though similar, developments based 
on the type of party being formed there. 
A similar generalization has grown up about the relationship between 
the 1890 maritime strike and the formation of the Labor parties. In its 
simplest form, the thesis has been stated in this manner: there was a great 
deal of optimism and utopianism in the Labor movements of the colonies 
in the 1880s; this came to a head in a direct confrontation with capitalism 
in the maritime strike of 1890; the unions were defeated in the industrial 
field and turned to politics; the Labor party was therefore born out of or 
finally launched by the strike. Not all historians have accepted this thesis. 
What is revealed by a study of the separate colonies and the Labor move-
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ments at the time of the strike is that the simple causal relationship 
between the strike and the formation of the Labor party is open to doubt. 
It is argued in the chapters on Queensland and Victoria that the establish-
ment of a Labor party and the nature of the party in each colony was 
unaffected by the maritime strike and in Queensland by the shearers' 
strike that followed. Since it was to be a further ten years before Labor 
parties were estabUshed in Tasmania and Western Australia, the simple 
thesis does not hold good there. Only in New South Wales and South 
Australia, it is argued, did the strike bear some relafionship to the develop-
ment of the poUtical party. Where the strike seems to have had some 
significance is in the interest it generated in the elections immediately 
following the strikes, when Labor parties in New South Wales, Queensland, 
Victoria, and South Australia nominated candidates, for the first time, as 
organized poUtical bodies. The hopes for the new Labor parties were 
reflected in the donations received for these election campaigns, which 
contrasted sharply with the poor response in subsequent elections. In 
further suggesting that the influence of the strike in the formation of the 
Labor parties has been exaggerated, it needs to be pointed out that far 
from encouraging unions to turn to political action, the effect of the 
strike, combined with the depression, was to reduce drastically the number 
of unionists in the colonies and, in their endeavour to survive, to turn 
many unions away from political associations which seemed costly, both 
financially and in the harsh retribution from employers that these associa-
tions had brought. The fact that the strikes, the depression, and the first 
organized attempt by Labor to enter politics all occurred within a few 
years should not be taken as concrete evidence that there was a causal 
relationship between the three events. The introduction of salaries for 
members of parliament in all colonies (except Western Australia) by 1890 
was a mundane but crucial factor leading to Labor in politics. 
Labor parties in Australia were the successors to the radical liberal 
political groups of the nineteenth century, but were not simply political 
organizations that carried on the traditions of liberalism. They had a 
different concept of society from that of the predominantly middle-class 
liberals. Geoffrey Marginson, in his study of Andrew Fisher as a colonial 
politician, demonstrates this difference. To Fisher, perhaps one of the 
most typical of the significant figures in the Labor parties in the 1890s, 
society was divided into two groups: the "labouring classes" and the 
"speculating classes". The first group constituted the majority who 
received nothing like their fair share of the wealth produced nor of the 
opportunities to share in the other advances in society. The "speculating 
classes" he defined as: "The systematic swindlers, who promote land 
booms and mortgage banks, water the capital in prosperous times by 
multiplying it on paper by two or three, call it prosperity then rob the 
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poor to pay the interest thereon . . . the commercial men who in this 
commercial age do things they would revolt from in another age . . . the 
squatters and western landlords who exploit and manipulate the nomad 
western worker."^ Liberals could look down to the working classes and 
suggest reforms; the Labor parties, on the other hand, were a part of the 
working classes and looked out to the reforms that they sought to achieve. 
Their second major difference from the liberal political organizations was 
that poUtical Labor parties represented a whole new dimension of political 
activity. A very broad historical analysis of western European government 
would show dominance by landholders, churchmen, and soldiers until the 
emergence of a commercial middle class from about the fourteenth 
century. By the close of the nineteenth century, this second group, in 
most of Western Europe at least, was reaching the height of political 
power; but at the same time the lower orders were beginning their move-
ment towards poUtical expression and the exercise of governmental power 
in their own right. In the Australian context, they channeUed these desires 
almost wholly through the Labor parties. Again there was a difference, 
here, from the nineteenth-century liberal organizafions. The one strength 
that the Labor parties commanded was their ability to present a united 
front to their opponents, the speculating classes. They had no economic 
power to carry them through. Consequently, the party organization 
became more important and though, in practice, the individual had ample 
room to move and to express his individualism, the theoretical freedom of 
the classical liberal to roam at will was not there. 
The colonial Labor parties were primarily concerned with reforming the 
society in which they grew. They certainly contained socialists and 
through their influence adopted policies that were considered sociaUstic. 
But despite this they maintained their original character of working men's 
political reform parties. In this regard, both the trade unions and the 
political Labor organizations reflected the influence of British practices 
and of British migrants who had gained experience in the trade union 
movement or in the Liberal party and who transplanted these political 
ideas to the Australian colonies. There is not much evidence to support the 
thesis that somewhere in the past there was a golden age when the Labor 
parties were pure and socialist, but that they lost this purity when they 
came under the control of scheming politicians bent on achieving their 
own personal power by crawling over the backs of the workers. In retro-
spect, what the various Labor parries sought may not appear to have been 
very radical or socialistic, but to contemporaries and to political 
opponents it was both of these. Certainly the parties were never revolu-
tionary in their methods or demands, yet what they sought was a revolu-
tion in the social values of the colonies and tliey hoped to use the power 
of the state to achieve this. In the value they placed on state intervention, 
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whether by insfituting state business enterprises or by the state assuming 
the role of provider for the aged, invalid, and orphans, they were undoubt-
edly assisted by the Australian national acceptance of the state as having a 
greater positive role than would have been accepted m Britain or in the 
United States. 
Both the colonial Labor parties and their political opponents regarded 
the establishment of state enterprises as socialism. What became confusing 
when the term sociaUsm was raised was the vague and imprecise meanings 
given to it. To William Lane, writing in the Wagga V^agga Hummer in 1892, 
it was the "desire to be mates'';^ to the Queensland Worker of 1903 and 
1904 it represented any and every desirable reform required; while to the 
Victorian Socialist party (which was a part of the Victorian Labor party) 
in 1907 "socialism means that the land, the railways, the shipping, the 
mines, the factories, and all such things as are necessary for the production 
of the necessaries and comforts of life should be public property".^ What 
the Labor parties were seeking was not so much a vague socialist society, 
but large significant changes in the economic and social organization of the 
colonies. In making some attempt to define the nature of the parties, 
however, it is worth recalling a paragraph of Henry Boote, who certainly 
was a socialist, in the manifesto he prepared for the Queensland Labor 
party at the 1912 state election which followed the general strike: "The 
Labour Party aims at no sudden revolution; no dramatic breaking dovm of 
existing institutions, but at such a gradual transformation of the evil 
features of our social system as will bring to pass a better state of things, 
more worthy of human nature and human genius."^ On the other hand 
the Labor parties wanted much more than a mere acceleration of liberal 
reformism even though they were to become the inheritors of nineteenth-
century radical liberalism. 
If anything, the Labor parties placed too much faith in the power of 
the state and understood too litde the power of capitalism, bureaucracy, 
and the restraining conservative influence in each colony. In assuming that 
having a majority in the lower, popular house of parliament necessarily 
meant holding power, the colonial Labor parties sadly overestimated the 
real power which such a majority conferred. Labor in office did not mean 
Labor in power, though it did represent the opportunity for a significant 
advance by working people in the influence they could wield in their 
society. Labor governments did not mean the millennium had come, but 
they were to represent the means by which long-sought social reforms 
could be propagated and to a degree implemented. 
The constitufional method of reform was slow and was to require more 
thought and hard, duU work flian numbers of the parties' founders had 
contemplated. Moreover the speed with which changes could be imple-
mented bore an obvious relafionship to the practical fact of being in or out 
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of government. The seeds were sown very eariy for the continuing debate 
about how fu&y Labor should press its demands. In very simple terms the 
question was: should the Labor parties proceed with all possible haste on 
their quest for a socialist society or should they drop all efforts to obtain 
this ideal and merely continue to operate the mechanisms of the existing 
state? In practice the needs of the trade unions and others for unmediate 
practical reforms provided for a middle road as the answer and for an 
agreement between propagators of the two points of view to maintain a 
single Labor party. Though the socialist groups established themselves as 
the guardian of Labor ideals, it was generally only in times of crisis that 
they were to try to take control of the administration of the parties. 
Organizationally the Labor parties were to produce a new alignment of 
political groups. While political factions and groups in the colonial pariia-
ments had been groping towards more cohesive party structures, it was to 
be the new Labor parties which formed the closely knit units in the lower 
houses. It became apparent to all the Labor parties as they moved into the 
parliamentary system that the one strength they each possessed was the 
capacity to present a single united front. Hence the necessity for a formal 
pledge from Labor politicians and a detestation of any who "ratted" or 
left the party, a feeling which seems to have been bitterly and heartily 
reciprocated. 
There were other factors beside this need for soUdarity which were 
common to the Labor parties. They were all concerned with the practical 
questions of politics, and all wanted practical reforms instituted by men 
from their own social group (this is the clearest point to emerge from the 
debates at the six intercolonial trade union congresses between 1879 and 
1889); they were suspicious of people of education but nevertheless pre-
pared to accept these once their commitment to the broad social and 
political objectives of the party had been proved; the composition of the 
executive reflected the less than equal place accorded to women in Aus-
tralian society; they were concerned to keep church and state separated 
and to make the provision of education a function of secular government; 
they accepted the belief in the superiority of the white man and were 
nationaUst raflier than internationalist in their outlook; and initially they 
had little interest in foreign affairs except where this involved White Aus-
tralia or "the Chinese question". It was not surprising therefore that on 
the issue of conscription, which had nothing to do with the practical 
political questions of the state parliament, tlie party should find itself 
divided. Labor leaders had a faith in their ability to persuade potential 
supporters througli pamphlets and newspapers and their members were 
prepared to accept high levies and personal financial sacrifices to try to 
provide Labor daily newspapers in each state. Temperance and the 
rejection of liquor figure prominently among the early goals. This 
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stemmed from a strongly held belief, perhaps Utopian in its origin, that the 
working man drank liquor only to drown out the horrors of his surround-
ings. The more a Labor man felt himself committed to socialist ideals, the 
more he was likely to be a strong teetotaller. However the parties did not 
consist exclusively of either socialists or teetotallers and the liquor 
question was to become, until the 1920s, a pinpricking source of internal 
friction. The colonial Labor parties inherited the Austrahan dream of land 
setflement and in addition saw in this a further means of overcoming 
unemployment, the greatest fear of the working man. In their desire to 
prevent strikes and lockouts, the other major problem of employees, the 
parties turned easily and quickly to the idea of govemment-insfituted 
conciliation tribunals and arbitration courts which would provide a fair 
solution to industrial disputes. 
The nature of the parties depended in the long and short term on the 
capabilities of the pariiamentary candidates, of the parliamentary leaders, 
and of the men who were to wield power as administrators. The parties 
had high ideals and high ambitions which could not always be matched by 
the calibre of those who were selected to translate the poUcies into 
practical legislation. This, as much as anything, was the source of the 
continuing debate, at times heated and violent, about the role of politi-
cians in the party and whether these should be the masters or servants of 
the party. Few of the parliamentary leaders found they had the ability to 
be electorally successful, maintain good relations with the party organiza-
tion, and implement totally the platform when in government — all of 
which were demanded by the Labor movement. It was one thing to pass 
resolutions at Labor conferences, but another for the Labor poUticians to 
implement these when confronted by the broad power of capitalism and 
with intransigent Legislative Councils, only one of which has ever been 
abolished. 
Much of the trouble with pariiamentarians in the pre-Worid War I 
period must be related to the Labor parties' internal debate about the 
nature of their role in politics. All the parties, except perhaps that in 
Victoria, were concerned to obtain office as soon as possible in order to 
effect Labor reforms. The questions which the parties consequently faced 
were: Should the party sit on the cross-benches and give support to one of 
the factions in return for concessions to the party? Should it attempt to 
form some working alUance or coalifion with liberals, or should it per-
severe until it could obtain office (only in flie Legislative AssembUes) in its 
own right and with a clear majority? Althougli Labor parries were formed 
and operating as independent political units in the nineties, it was not until 
about 1910 that they had answered these quesfions and decided to stand 
alone; it was then that Australian politics became based on Labor versus 
non and anti-Labor parties. 
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While the normal order seems to be to look from the state Labor parties 
to the federal Labor party, in fact the reverse should occur in at least three 
of the states, Victoria, Western Australia, and Tasmania, where it was the 
influence of federal pariiamentarians and the needs of Senate votes which 
assisted in the growth of these three state parties. J.C.Watson, 
W. G. Spence, G. F. Pearce, KingO'Malley, and other federal politicians of 
the first decade of this century were as important in building the party in 
Tasmania, Western Australia, and Victoria as were state politicians and 
union organizers in Queensland, South Australia, and New South Wales. In 
the same way the cross-pollination of Labor ideas through itinerant 
miners' and shearers' organizations was of tremendous significance in 
building the political organizafions (as had been the intercolonial trade 
union congresses (ITUCs) of the eighties). The miners and bushworkers 
were the roving organizers of the new Labor parties and provided the 
finance, often through the Australian Workers' Union (AWU), for news-
papers and paid political canvassers. On the other hand although tlie role 
of the urban-based craft unions has not been seen as being so significant, it 
was the secretaries of the carpenters, printers, and similar unions in the 
capital cities who often provided the leadership for organizing the new 
parties. Nor should the role of the main urban centres in providing the 
ideas, newspapers, and administration of the new parties be under-
estimated. But in looking broadly at the unions' role in forming the Labor 
parties it would seem to be the case that those who had a skilled trade 
with which to bargain did not see Labor in politics as being so important 
until the 1900s when the Labor parties were well founded. 
The Labor parties were never to become exclusively trade union parties, 
though the unions had the greatest voice in determining policy and choos-
ing political candidates. From the beginning tlie parties aspired to a broad 
base incorporating unionists, liberal radicals, mild reformers, lower pro-
fessionals, farmers (often seen as mral workers), and small businessmen in 
urban and rural areas — in short, welcoming any person who agreed with 
the broad reform goals. Often the parties were to become the battleground 
for conflict between unions, but in the main the unions formed the sheet 
anchor of the parties, providing the finance and organizers needed in 
campaigning in local electorates or for state elections. From Labor govern-
ments, the unions obtained the substantial practical reforms they sought 
either dirough legislative or administrative actions. At the same time it 
should be noted that it was not a one-way path of unions assisting the 
Labor parties, for, as the various chapters show, the Labor parties in turn 
assisted in the growth of unions and, in government, provided the atmos-
phere for unions to expand their industrial strength. 
In making any assessment of the Labor movement's entry into politics 
there are two ways of viewing the Labor party. A tlieoreUcal model may 
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be set up showing how a trade union, working-class, or socialist party 
should act and the Labor party may be judged against this standard; or it 
may be judged on what it set out to achieve, the personnel who joined and 
were avaUable to represent it at conferences and in parUament, and the 
environment in which it had to operate. The Labor parties became the 
only mass working-class parties in Australia to succeed because their re-
forming, radical, and nafionalist aspirafions, combined with a willingness 
to use state power, coincided with the aspirations of the urban and rural 
working man. Austrahan working men were not educated for the higher 
adventures in socialism (though the Labor press hoped to provide this 
education) and did not appreciate the power which they held industrially 
and politically. This power was avaUable only when used in unity, but 
because of the diversity of views in the parties, and the uncertainty of the 
speed at which the parties should proceed with reforms, it was compara-
tively easy for their opponents and those who held economic power to 
play the poUtical game of divide and conquer. 
While there are characteristics which were common to the six parries, 
there were also differences. Labor in Politics attempts to reveal, in more 
detail than has been possible in eariier books, the separate development of 
each party. It has therefore not attempted to explore the relafionship 
between the federal and state parries except where this has a bearing on a 
particular state at any one time. What becomes clear is that each state 
Labor party developed a character and structure that were dependent on 
the geography, type of migrant, and economics of the colony concerned, 
and on the aims and capabilities of those who sat on its executives and in 
its parliamentary Labor parties (PLPs). Consequenfly there was no one 
reaction to each significant issue like conscription or One Big Union 
(OBU), but six separate ones. Similarly there was no one method of trying 
to overcome the obstacle of the Legislative Council, but six separate ones, 
each ultimately dependent on the state constitution. 
During the First Worid War, the Labor parties took a considerable 
beating. The depth of their roots in the state poUtical systems was revealed 
by the swiftness of their recovery in the early 1920s when they were again 
forming state governments. It will be worth the efforts of later historians 
to see whether the characteristics ouflined here continued for the follow-
ing fifty years. 
DJM 
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The Labor party in New South Wales came into existence after the 
defeat of the trade unions in the maritime strike of 1890, but before that 
it had a prehistory stretching well back in the nineteenth century. Between 
1890 and 1920, three or four stages in the history of the party can be 
distinguished: a tumultuous formative period between 1890 and 1895; 
fifteen years of consolidation and considerable achievement from then 
until 1910; six years in which, after attaining power for the first time and 
discovering the limitarions it had to face in the exercise of it, the party 
split; and finally a period in which the party recovered lost ground and, for 
the second time in its short history, tamed or slouglied off its more radical 
sections before regaining power. 
The term, a Labor party, was evidently used before the party as a 
pohtical organization came into existence,' but in the sense that a party 
existed when there were distinct working-class interests and perhaps Labor 
ideals at the electoral if not at the pariiamentary level of politics. Before 
1890 these interests and ideals were formulated and translated to the 
pohtical arena by individual representatives, by ephemeral organizations 
such as the Working Men's Defence Association and above all by the 
Trades and Labor Council (TLC). The prehistory of the party is the story 
of these first strivings towards representation, influence, and power. 
Workingmen's organizations played a small part in New South Wales 
politics before the gold rushes. One of the earliest, "the closest approxi-
mation to working-class political organization" before 1850,'^  was the 
Mutual Protection Association formed in Sydney during the depression of 
1843. It consisted chiefly of working men who were unemployed or 
anxious for their jobs; they thought colonial manufacturing should be 
encouraged, the land laws reformed, public works launched, and the im-
portarion of convicts and cheap labour stopped or restricted while free 
immigrants were out of work. The association had its newspaper for a 
short time, ran an employment agency, and helped to get six of its 
members elected to the city council before it went out of existence after 
about a year's activity.^ 
From then until the 1870s working men in the colony took political 
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acrion almost wholly in conjuncrion with and under the leadership of 
citizens of oflier classes, providing some of the members and the less 
prominent activists in the committees of candidates in elecrions and in the 
agitations and organizations, all of them ephemeral, for such things as land 
reforms, constitutional changes, and electoral reforms. More tlian thirty 
years after the Mutual Protecrion Associarion was formed, working-class 
political acrion was still of the same kind. The Working Men's Defence 
Associarion formed in 1877 at the height of dissatisfaction with assisted 
immigrarion was as short-lived and ineffective as its predecessor. It was too 
disunited to survive and was absorbed into the newly formed Protection 
and Political Reform League of the 1880s.^ 
In the early years working men did not often attempt to get into 
parliament and were rarely successful. One of the eariiest elected as a 
representative of his class was James Hoskins, a miner, returned for the 
electorate of Goldfields North in 1859. Three of these goldfields elector-
ates were set up in 1858, superimposed on other electorates, and only 
miners had votes in them. Since salaries were not paid to members of 
parUament at that time (they were not introduced until thirty years later), 
Hoskins's constituents undertook to pay him an annual stipend.^ These 
electorates did not always choose working men as their representatives and 
even those they did choose, like Beyers - with Holtermann the discoverer 
of Holtermann's nugget at HiU End ~ or Buchanan, had ceased to be 
working men by the time they represented the miners. 
Four other early working-class members of pariiament may be noted at 
greater length: D. C. Dalgleish, Angus Cameron, Jacob Garrard, and 
E. W. O'Sullivan. Dalgleish won a seat in West Sydney in 1860, standing as 
a self-announced representative of Labor. Supporters in his electorate gave 
him a purse and a testunonial in which they said he had been "called from 
the ranks of Labor to represent [his] own class in the people's House of 
Pariiament."^ He had come to Australia from Britain after refusing to 
renounce his membership of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, a 
condition of re-employment imposed by the employers after a lockout of 
the union. His views in the election were radical by contemporary stand-
ards: he favored "free selection, an elective Upper House, universal and 
purely secular education, [and] no state aid to religion" - all of them 
causes popular amongst radicals of a variety of classes and occupations -
and in matters of more direct interest to working men, courts of concili-
ation in industrial matters and payment of members of pariiament. Once 
elected, of course, he was relatively powerless to do much for the working 
class which he represented and had to take his place in the predominantly 
middle-class faction politics of the day. 
The next representative of Labor to be elected was Angus Cameron, a 
carpenter by trade, secretary of the Progressive Society of Carpenters and 
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Joiners and its delegate to the New Soutii Wales TLC. In June 1874 the 
council decided that it should be directly represented in pariiament and 
Cameron, a member of the council's pariiamentary committee set up to 
handle political organization for the elections of that year, was eventually 
elected for West Sydney. The councO paid him £3 ($6), soon raised to £5 
($10) per week, as its representative. "He was expected to follow a broad 
undefined Labor policy, to report regularly to the council and follow its 
wishes on specific issues, a novel type of political control opposed to 
accepted colonial notions of a pariiamentarian's independence. Cameron 
himself subscribed to these general views and soon realized the ambiguity 
of his dual role as a representative of West Sydney and of the Trades and 
Labor Council."^ In addition to that he said that he "deprecated class 
legislation and maintained that Labor representation was not of that 
character"^ and this, as Nairn comments, was "the kernel of the problem" 
of labor representation at this time. In 1876 Cameron renounced his con-
nection with the TLC after disagreements with it about his course in 
pariiament, but he maintained his interest in Labor causes and worked 
with the council from time to time, though not always harmoniously. 
The third member who may be regarded as an early representative of 
Labor was Jacob Garrard, elected in 1880 for Balmain, after standing 
unsuccessfully for West Sydney in 1877. In that contest he said that 
though he was "no railler against capitalism . . . it was class legislation to 
have a House composed of capitalists and squatters". Garrard was a 
member of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers and its delegate to the 
TLC, but unhke Cameron he was not advanced by the council to be its 
representative in pariiament, was not supported by it in his campaign, and 
did not depend on it for his election. After his defeat in 1877, he 
"widened his electoral appeal by his teetotalism and Orangeism and by 
serving on the Balmain Borouglt Council" of which he was mayor in 
1880. ^ In pariiament he played a leading part in promoting legislation of 
interest to trade unions with the co-operation of the TLC, but when the 
Labor party did enter pariiament in 1891 he refused to join it. Like 
Dalgleish and Cameron before him, he had become absorbed in faction 
politics, and then as the factions were transformed into and displaced by 
the Free Trade and Protectionist parties he continued as a member and 
organizer of the Free Trade party. 
E. W. O'Sullivan must be contrasted with these three men. He was a 
journalist, one-time editor of the St. Arnaud {Victona) Mercury and over-
seer of the printing room of the Sydney Daily Telegraph. After returning 
to Sydney from Victoria in 1882, he was soon leader of the organized 
printers and became the delegate of the Typographical Association to the 
TLC. He stood unsuccessfully for West Sydney in 1882 as a self-
proclaimed representative of Labor and aired all the themes that he was to 
17 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
PETER LOVEDAY 
take up during the eighties: "political democracy, anti-teetotalism, anti-
immigration, trades unionism, industrial legislation, labor representation in 
Pariiament and land reform in the interests of farmers and settlers"." As 
a member of the TLC and its president for six months in 1883, O'Sullivan 
argued from time to time that it should be engaged in broad social and 
pohtical activity against the opposition of F. B.Dixon who replaced him 
as president of the Council. But what gave O'Sullivan his stepping stone 
into parHament was the Land and Industrial Alliance, not the TLC. In 
1885 he was elected for Queanbeyan after a couple of years of work as a 
"moving spirit" in organizations such as the Democratic Alliance, intended 
as a workingmen's poUtical party; the Land and Industrial AlUance which 
was designed to bring farmers and workers together in a democratic move-
ment; and the Protection and Political Reform League, a body intended to 
weld farmers, manufacturers, and labourers into a solid movement under 
the protectionist banner.''^ Once in pariiament he attached himself to the 
Robertson faction for a time and then set about organizing a protectionist 
group in the house and building up its support through protectionist 
organizations outside it. Throughout this period he saw himself, in Mans-
field's words, not "as the delegate of a single section, the trades unions, 
but as the spokesman of a wider people's movement of which the trades 
unions were part". "To the more single-minded defenders of union 
interests, he would seem, as a union advocate, too wide-ranging and at the 
same tune, in his anxiety to avoid a clash of capital and labor, perhaps too 
accommodating."' ^ 
From the late seventies onwards it was increasingly clear that, though 
men could still get into pariiament with the most rudimentary and 
ephemeral electoral organization, others were beginning to reach it who 
were prominent in and had the support of political associations of one 
kind or another. O'Sullivan's political career illustrates the point. These 
associations were usually intended to do more than win elections for a 
given candidate; they were usually public bodies and they attempted, 
seldom successfully at first, to maintain more or less continuous activities 
and to develop a branch structure to build support for their causes across 
electoral boundaries. Between 1887 and 1889, party organizations had 
come into existence, primarily but not wholly for electoral purposes.'"* 
The TLC was different from associations of this kind and much more 
important for the future history of tiie Labor party. Nairn has given us a 
detailed account of the council from its formation in 1871 to 1891 when 
it played the leading part in launching a separate pariiamentary Labor 
organization in the colony. One of the main themes in his story is that 
thougli the council rapidly became more than an industrial body it had the 
greatest reluctance to accept die implications of the political activities 
which it undertook or had thrust upon it. Early in its life, the council 
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Stated its industrial objective: "to endeavour to harmonize tlie various 
conflicting interests of the whole body of workmen; and, . . . to endeavour 
to establish that reciprocity of action so essential at all times between the 
employer and employees; and, in the event of any misunderstanding 
arising, to endeavour to settle the same by arbitration in an amicable 
manner, if possible."'^ Nairn comments that the Council was designed to 
speak with more authority than individual unions, to be better equipped 
than any one of them to handle industrial quesrions in an expanding 
economy, to get more general and uniform industrial conditions, and to 
obtain wider support for unions in industrial disputes. It did not see itself 
remaking society; it was the champion and spokesman of labour in 
industry; it saw the advantages of arbitration in settling disputes but 
accepted that strikes were sometimes necessary. 
In its first years, the council rapidly gained the support of the unions as 
its reputation grew. By 1874 it had decided that its effectiveness as a 
political pressure group could be increased if it had parliamentary repre-
sentation and in that year it succeeded when its candidate, Cameron, was 
elected. This experiment faded, but not wholly; it showed that the council 
"was not yet organized to cope with politics in the widest sense. It could 
get a Labor member elected. But the separation of the unions had thrown 
doubts on whether it ever could maintain control and discipline over him 
(or them). . . The Council turned inwards to 'industrial' matters: 'politics' 
were to be abhorred. [But in time it was to discover again] that a firm 
distinction between industrial and political matters was impossible."'^ 
Throughout the eighties the council devoted itself to industrial questions: 
the extension of the eight-hour day, conciliating in disputes, setfling 
strikes, promoting the formation of unions, helping to obtain alteration of 
the patent laws, arguing for the development of a system of technical 
education, and urging various clear-cut industrial reforms on the pariia-
ment, such as workers' compensation and safety regulations. In all tliese 
activities it discovered it could also develop public opinion in ways more 
favorable to unionism. From time to time in the eighties, it cooperated 
briefly with other political organizations, notably through O'SuUivan's 
activities, but by 1887 it decided it must remain aloof from them. Yet in 
1887 the council could no longer confine itself to industrial action; the 
"limits of successful lobbying were being reached" and at intercolonial 
trade union congresses there was increasing pressure for direct Labor repre-
sentation in pariiament.''' The council was the organization best equipped 
to take the steps necessary to secure this representation and it had already 
begun to do so when the strike of 1890 and then the depression of 1891 
to 1895 occurred, each drastically changing the environment within which 
the council was formulating its ideas. 
The depression was the more drastic in its effects because of the long 
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period of prosperity and expansion which preceded it and formed the 
background to the growth of unionism in the seventies and eighties. From 
1870 to 1890 all sectors of the economy prospered but in particular 
manufacturing and mining for both metals and coal. Factory employment 
rose steadily from 16,000 to 51,000; capital outiays by government on 
developmental works were large and about two-thirds of them went to 
wages, providing powerful support for the labour market; unemployment 
appears to have been low; it was relatively easy to obtain increases in 
wages; wage differentials for skOI were low and the wages for unskilled and 
semi-skiUed workers were extraordinarily high; average wages and prices 
fluctuated but the index of effective wages rose during the seventies, and, 
apart from some small variations, maintained a high level throughout the 
eighties.'^ In the last two or three years of the eighties there was some 
reduction in general public expenditure and a slackening in constmction 
and commercial activity, the effects of which were modified by good 
seasons, but "1890 opened with a bright outiook and a growing feeling 
that a general upswing was not far away". When this upswing began, 
although it was confused to some extent by the economic effects of the 
strike in 1890, it continued until the later months of 1891, and then the 
depression began,' ^ just as the new Labor party in parUament was stmggl-
ing to retain its unity and effectiveness. 
II 
"The little issue that is now dividing us, when the history of this Pariia-
ment comes to be written, wiU appear very small compared with the other 
great questions which will have been dealt with."^" So spoke Cook, one of 
the thirty-six Labor members returned in the elections of June 1891, in 
the course of a debate shortly after the new parliament met. But it was not 
until 1895 and after two more elections that a united party existed with 
agreed rules for its collective action in pariiament and in elections. The 
party soon became more deeply divided than Cook expected and its 
achievements were at first much smaller than he had hoped. The first split 
occurred in 1891 when, confronted with the tariff question, the newly 
elected Labor members failed to maintain their soUdarity in parUament; 
the second, which developed late in 1893, was primarily between the 
parliamentary and extraparUamentary wings of the party. 
The first step towards the electoral success of 1891 was taken in 
October 1889 when Brennan, a member of the pariiamentary committee 
of tUe TLC, moved that the councfl should make arrangements to obtain 
pariiamentary representation. A few months before this, a bill for payment 
of members had been passed. Brennan's motion was agreed to by thirty-
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five votes to three in January 1890,^ '^ and the parUamentary committee 
then drafted a platform which the council accepted in April. The council 
sought approval of the platform by its affiliated unions but by May only 
seventeen had replied and only six of them approved it even though it 
consisted of typical trade union proposals.^ ^  
The council had discovered by 1889 "that it could no longer carry out 
efficiently its essential reform tasks by means of its deputations, lobbying 
and general industrial policy",^ ^ but lack of enthusiasm displayed by the 
affiliated unions and the opposition of some of them to the proposal 
suggest that it might have had much more modest beginnings than it had in 
1891, if the maritime strike had not occurred. 
But this is not to say that the strike was essential to the formation of 
the party, although the argument that it was has been attractive to those 
who have attempted to interpret the formation of the party in Marxist 
terms. Arguments of that kind must face two obstacles: the evidence that 
there was a growing demand for party political action in the interests of 
workers in both the intercolonial conferences of the trade unions and the 
TLC before the strike, and the lack of evidence of clear class-
consciousness, of organization and action on class lines, and of any widely 
accepted assumption that there was an irreducible class conflict in society 
at this time. The strike began on 16 August 1890 and ended on 3 
November with the defeat of the unions. For the time being the TLC gave 
Uttle further consideration to its proposal for pariiamentary representa-
tion, even though it was not in control of the strike. Many of the unions, 
which had been only recently formed, especially those of factory and 
service workers, were not as strong as the unions of miners and shearers 
and one immediate effect on the strike was to weaken them further or 
destroy them. More generaUy, as GoUan and Nairn have noted, it weaken-
ed or removed the "elements not conforming with the Trades and Labor 
CouncU" and exposed to the unions the "highly inflated view [they had] 
of their own strength"^'* to make gains solely by direct industrial action. 
The immediate effect of the strike on the shearers was to convince them 
that all workers should be in unions and all unions united in one large 
organization and that unionism would be secure only if the Labor move-
ment was established in pariiament.'^ ^ Finally, whatever long-term 
significance may be attributed to the strike in sharpening the collective 
understanding of the working class,^^ its main ideological effect was to 
weaken the idea that class cooperation was possible which had long been 
popular with many working-class leaders, especially those who had pro-
tectionist notions. Those with free-trade or socialist inclinations saw an 
opportunity to discredit protectionism and, emphasizing the class conflict 
character of the strike to the point of exaggeration, tried to discredit their 
opponents. But at a less intensely ideological level of argument, and one 
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much more plausible to the rank and file of the movement, the bitterness 
aroused by the strike, and the feelings of increased class antagonism that 
Labor leaders and publicists expressed, meant that when parUamentary 
representatives were elected they would be regarded as much more than 
the delegates of the TLC sent to parliament primarily to enhance its effect-
iveness as an industrial pressure group. 
In October 1890, before the strike was over, a by-election was held in 
West Sydney which demonstrated the existence of a Labor vote, even 
though the candidate (Brennan) put up by a committee of representatives 
of the TLC and maritime unions not affiliated to it withdrew and the 
Council declared its neutrality in the campaign. The winner, A. G. Taylor, 
thought he was successful because he had championed "the holy and 
divine cause of labor as against capital". 
But this kind of individualistic representation was already outdated and 
not what Labor men wanted. The Australian Workman, organ of the 
council, and later of the Labor Electoral Leagues, argued two weeks later 
that "nothing less than the return of at least ten or a dozen staunch, 
educated and inteUigent Labor candidates, who should form a third and 
neutral body, heedless of the claims of party, determined to obtain at any 
cost consideration for the justiy discontented, can be of the slightest 
utility." It went on to say that what was wanted was a group like the 
Home Rulers in the House of Commons, and that where the balance was 
neariy equal between the two fiscal parties, the "balance of power would 
be theirs, and they could demand and would obtain from both parties 
(equally desirous of their support) concessions on their own terms."^^ 
In the meantime the pariiamentary committee of the TLC advised that 
Labor electoral leagues be set up and that it should be asked to work 
out a plan of organization for them so that candidates could be chosen for 
the elections falling due in 1892. Council agreed and by March 1891 the 
committee had both rules and a platform ready for consideration and 
adoption by council. But already during January and February there was 
conflict in and out of the council between single-taxers on the one hand 
and protectionists and socialists on the other, and the argument, centred 
on one of the planks of the proposed platform, number 13, caused long 
debate in the council. Eventually the plank was adopted at an adjourned 
meeting and then the platform and rules and objects of the new organiza-
tion were endorsed by a conference of union delegates.'^ ^ 
What was at stake was not merely the plank, but the general course that 
the projected party would adopt on the fiscal question and in particular its 
tactics in relation to the Free Trade and tiie Protectionist parties and to 
ministries formed by them. The single-taxers were prepared to accept free 
trade as compatible with or an instalment towards what they wanted and 
were convinced that protection was a totally mistaken doctrine for the 
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working-class movement. The protectionists and socialists, whatever their 
own differences, thouglit that the doctrine of the single-taxers was un-
sophisticated and played into the hands of the conservative upper classes 
who, they believed, were most strongly represented in the Free Trade 
party. The future implications of the conflict were not cleariy seen and a 
wordy and imprecise plank on land policy was adopted which later proved 
to be open to differing interpretations and provocative of strife in the 
party. 
The new organization was called the Labor Electoral League (LEL), and 
its objects, as Black quotes them,'^^ were 
1. To secure for the wealth-producers of the colony such legislation 
as will advance their interests, by the return to Parliament of 
candidates pledged to uphold the Platform of the League. 
2. To secure the due enrolment (on the electoral lists) of all 
members of the League who may be entitled to vote in any 
electorate. 
3. To bring all electors who are in favour of democratic and progres-
sive legislation under one common banner, and to organise 
thoroughly such voters with a view to concerted and effective 
action at all Parliamentary elections in the future. 
These objects in short proposed a colony-wide permanent electoral 
organization designed to select and pledge candidates and to arouse and 
lead the Labor voters. 
The organization consisted of two parts: the branch structure in the 
electorates and a central committee. For the time being the pariiamentary 
committee of the TLC acted as the central committee, but once branches 
had been set up one delegate from each of them and sbc from the TLC 
constituted the central committee. The treasurer and trustees of the TLC 
were to act as treasurer and trustees for the league. 
Wherever possible a branch was to be set up in each electorate, and its 
work was to enrol voters, select candidates, and canvass and campaign for 
them. Each branch would choose its own officers (members of pariiament 
could not be chosen for branch office) and enrol voters as members pro-
vided they accepted the platform. Membership was at the rate of two 
shillings (20 cents) each six months, and sixpence (5 cents) per member 
was to be sent annually to the central committee for its use. Candidates 
were to be selected by ballot of the members, and they had to accept die 
platform of the League, and to pledge that, if elected, they would sit on 
the cross-benches in pariiament as an independent third party and resign 
when called on to do so by a two-thirds majority of electors. 
The platform consisted of sixteen planks, and, althougli it was not the 
first,^'' it was the one on which Labor candidates first stood in an 
election. Several of the planks proposed quite specific legislation, most of 
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it of an industrial nature: an eiglit-hour day; a workshop and factories act 
for various purposes; amendments of the Mining Act, die Master and 
Apprentices Act, and the Trades Union Act; repeal of the Master and 
Servants and Agreements Validating Acts, and extension of the Employers' 
Liability Act to seamen. The proposed reforms of the electoral system 
were specified in detail in the first plank. Other planks put more general 
proposals of an industrial or democratic character: for free, compulsory, 
and technical education for all; the election of magistrates; the reform of 
local government; the establishment of a depariment of labour, of a 
national bank, and of a national system of water conservation and irriga-
tion; the execution of all government contracts in die colony and the 
stamping of all Chinese-made furniture. The twelfth, thirteenth, and 
sixteenth planks were declarations of principle rather than proposals for 
legislation: that the wage earner should get a fair and equitable return for 
his labour; that federation should be on a national not an imperial basis 
and with a volunteer defence force, and that the "natural and inalienable 
rights of the whole community to the land" should be recognized in 
legislation by "taxation of that value which accrues to land from the 
presence and needs of the community". 
The reactions of many Labor men, especially the leaders and more 
active among them, to the strike of 1890 were summarized in the organiza-
tion and platform. They clearly thought that they had not been given a 
fair deal and were now convinced that political as well as industrial action 
was necessary to secure it. The strike had convinced Labor men that 
neither governments nor parliaments could be expected to give their claims 
a fair hearing, let alone a sympathetic one, unless pressure were applied to 
them similar to that which unions had learned to apply to employers. 
Political representation of an ad hoc kind was not enough; it had to be 
organized both in and out of pariiament, based on a platform and large 
enougli to be a threat to any government that ignored it. Although there 
was a growing, if not wholly new, feeling of distinctness and intransigence 
in the movement, which socialist propagandists and organizations 
attempted to build on, this feeling was expressed more sUarply in the 
rhetoric of public meetings than in the platform. It dealt with both 
industrial or trade-union demands and with others of interest to the 
working class which could not be obtained either by industrial action or 
by the pressure group activities of the TLC, but all its more or less specific 
planks were moderately reformist, negotiable, and, except for the single-
tax implications of the thirteenth plank, devoid of abstract or large 
doctrinaire theories which miglit provoke hysterical reactions from their 
opponents and especiaUy from those whom they expected to apply 
pressure to in parUament. 
The platform and the organizational plan had scarcely been adopted 
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and a beginning made on the formation of League branches when in May 
1891 the Parkes government, in office since 1889, was saved from defeat 
only by the casting vote of the Speaker. Parkes obtained a dissolution and 
the elections were set for the period 17 June to 3 July 1891. 
Forty-eight Labor candidates went to the polls and thirty-six were 
returned, but not all of them were League candidates. Three or four un-
successful candidates were reported to have had support from LEL 
branches although not selected by them; another was selected but not 
pledged. In Bourke, Langwell was selected and pledged, but to a platform 
which had been locally devised and which was a litrie different from that 
of the league.^' Many branches were set up in haste and even then the 
organization outside the metropolitan area appears to have been mdi-
mentary and did not exist in many electorates. There was very littie 
money for electioneering.^^ In the city, the Australian Socialist League 
(ASL) put up some of its own members as LEL candidates and decided, 
after a "warm discussion" to support other Labor men. This "scared the 
moderate section at the Trades Hall who endeavoured to have us officially 
repudiated"^^ but failed. Single-taxers did likewise. Disagreements 
between protectionists, socialists, and single-taxers in the branches; the 
haste with which selections were made; the attempts of some candidates, 
first advanced under other labels, to obtain LEL selection as well, and the 
claims of some unselected candidates to be Labor men all make an 
enumeration of the members returned as properly selected and pledged 
candidates imcertain. Consequenfly estimates range from thirty-one to 
thirty-seven, but, since thirty-five were admitted to the first caucus of the 
party,^^ that may be accepted as the number of properiy selected 
members, whatever the process was by which they received endorsement 
and support in the campaign. Most of those returned were trade unionists, 
according to Ford, and only two were members of the Single Tax League 
and three of the ASL.^^ As the returns came in and the success of the 
party was clear, Brennan forecast at an excited meeting of the TLC that 
"Labor would make itself heard in the next pariiament with no uncertain 
sound . . . we were at the dawn of a new era and happier era for the 
workers of New South Wales.^^ The Workman editorially reminded them 
that the system of government aUowed a smaU and determined party - of 
faithful men - to hold the balance of power between two parties and to 
mle both. 
The Assembly at that time consisted of one hundred and forty-one 
members, and Labor's thirty-five, with Langwell, gave the party a quarter 
of the members. The Free Trade party took forty-seven and the Protect-
ionists fifty-one seats. Labor won just under 22 per cent of the valid votes 
cast,'''' althougli Labor men contested only forty-eight seats, many of 
them in multi-member constituencies. 
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The new members held their first caucus meeting before pariiament 
assembled and their second after the governor's speech. In these two 
meetings the first decisions were taken on the organization and tactics of 
the pariiamentary party. A credentials committee was appointed to settle a 
dispute over the admission of members to caucus — Langwell was the only 
one refused - and the committee also had the newly devised pledge, 
acceptance of which would be a condition of admission in the future, 
referred to it for its opinion. The first caucus also decided not to choose a 
leader, but to appoint a managerial committee instead, consisting of 
Fitzgerald, Gough, McGowen, Sharp, and Houghton who was also 
appointed secretary to caucus. Davis was appointed whip. 
The most important decisions were those conceming the pledge of 
solidarity and the tactics of the party in the coming session. The pledge, 
according to Black's recoUection of it, was "that in order to secure the 
solidarity of the Labor Party, only those will be allowed to assist at its 
private deliberations who are pledged to vote as a majority of the party, 
sitting in caucus, has determined, [and] Therefore, we, the undersigned, in 
proof of our determination to vote as a majority of the Party may agree, 
on all occasions considered of such importance as to necessitate Party 
deliberation, have thereto affixed our names."^^ Eiglit members, all pro-
tectionists, protested that they had pledged themselves to their constitu-
ents to vote for protection if the question arose, and they might be pre-
vented from doing so by this pledge if a majority of caucus voted for a 
free-trade policy. The difficulty was temporarily shelved by a proposal to 
move in the house that the fiscal policy of the colony remain unaltered 
until a referendum had been held. This was intended mainly as a promise 
that the party would try to avoid taking a coUective decision on the fiscal 
question in order to get protectionists to sign the pledge. 
The party also decided to support the Parkes ministry in the house, 
because the governor's speech had promised legislation to enact seven of 
Labor's sixteen planks. 
The disagreement in these first two caucuses between the protectionists 
and the others foreshadowed a division in the party which was soon to be 
made public by the members themselves and to reduce its effectiveness in 
the house. One member - Mackinnon — left the party at once when he 
refused to accept the proposal to move that the fiscal question he referred 
to a referendum. 
The election had made a major change in the situation of the two older 
parties in the house. The Protectionists and Free Traders both needed 
some support from Labor - the Free Traders under Parkes to remain in 
office, Dibbs's Protectionists to displace them - and at first it seemed that 
Labor would vote solidly for one or tUe other. Eariy in the debate on the 
address-in-reply Dibbs moved an amendment of no-confidence in the 
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ministry and Labor members, including some who were protectionists, 
made it plain that they intended to support Parkes. Black himself 
announced that Labor would remain independent of both parties but 
would give its support to either, depending on whichever offered the best 
terms - the tactics advocated by the Workman — and other members 
echoed his views. But Edden said he felt he was pledged to his constituents 
to vote for protection and Gougli that, having been opposed to Parkes's 
ministry in the preceding parliament, he could not now support it. Davis, 
the whip, said that the party intended to remain solid even if one or two 
litde branches, like Edden, had to be stripped from the main trunk. 
The Protectionists in opposition had another tactic open to them 
besides bidding for Labor's solid support - namely, to try to divide Labor 
members on the fiscal question. If they could be split, the question was to 
discover how much support the Protectionists could draw away from the 
ministry. Garvan, a Protectionist, moved an amendment to Dibbs's motion 
that was designed to find out, and Parkes announced that it too would be 
regarded as a motion of censure evidently in the hope tliat Labor men 
would stand by their caucus decision to support him even though the fiscal 
question had been raised. Garvan's manoeuvre succeeded; Morgan, 
Sheldon, and Scott said they were pledged to their constituents to vote for 
protection and that they would therefore vote with the opposition despite 
the caucus decision to support Parkes, Scott adding that he had originally 
intended to support the ministry in the division on Dibbs's amendment. 
Eight Labor men voted for Garvan's amendment and five for Dibbs's 
amendment, including LangweU on both occasions. Three who voted for 
Garvan's amendment - Scott, Sheldon, and Edden - voted with the main 
body of caucus against Dibbs's amendment. Since there is some obscurity 
about who left the party at this time, we may assume that they were those 
who voted on the opposite side from the main body of caucus in motions 
that raised the fiscal question in the rest of the session:"*' namely Edden, 
Gough, KeUy, Morgan, Scott, Sheldon, and Vaughn, in addition to 
Mackinnon. Throughout, Langwell also voted with tiiem. This left twenty-
seven in caucus. The decision in caucus had been not only to support 
Parkes against both Dibbs's and Garvan's amendments but also that those 
who did not had "severed their connection with the party"."*^ This 
established the principle that only fliose who stuck by the decisions of 
caucus could claim to be regarded as the true Labor party. 
When Parkes was displaced a few weeks later, it was not as a result of a 
successful manoeuvre by Dibbs to divide the Labor party further but as a 
result of the refusal of the party to agree to Parkes's demand that his Coal 
Mines Regulation BiU be recommitted so that an eight-hours clause that 
had been inserted in it in committee might be removed. When defeated on 
this, the Parkes government resigned and Dibbs took over on 23 October 
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1891. From Parkes's point of view the support of the Labor party must 
have seemed totally unsatisfactory: die party had shown that it could be 
divided by motions from the opposition but that it could not be coerced 
by the leader of the party it supported. 
Dibbs promised Labor a programme of legislation similar to that which 
Parkes had offered but made it clear fliat he intended to increase the tariff. 
Caucus decided to support his government and agreed that it would give a 
solid vote one way or the other when the tariff came up for consideration. 
When it did, the Labor party in caucus voted sixteen to eleven in favour of 
not altering the tariff."*^ By now Parkes had resigned as leader of the Free 
Trade party and had been replaced by Reid, who moved that the tariff 
question should be held over until a referendum on it could be held under 
the amended electoral law. This manoeuvre had perhaps been suggested 
not only by the original caucus decision to submit the question to a 
referendum, but also by the request of the central committee of the LEL 
to its branches to say whether or not they favoured the submission of all 
questions of national importance to a plebiscite for decision, leaving the 
details to be worked out in pariiament.^^ Reid's motion put pressure on 
Labor to block Dibbs's proposal to raise the tariff. Consequently it was 
treated as a direct attack on the ministry. 
This threw the Labor party into turmoil both in caucus and in the 
house. According to Hutchinson, the party was "about ten days trying to 
come to a decision as to what we should do"^^ and in the house Labor 
men attacked one another bitteriy. Scott tried to argue that, because 
Labor had not put forward its referendum proposal when Garvan's amend-
ment was before the house, they could not now be expected to vote for 
such a proposal when Reid brought it forward. Fitzgerald — one of the 
management committee - said angrily that he would not aUow himself "to 
be dragged at the chariot wheels of any single-taxer".^^ WiUiams, Hutchin-
son, and Johnston said they were protectionists who had supported the 
late Free Trade ministry in accordance with the caucus decision and went 
on to say that now the single-taxers and free traders in the Labor party 
should do the same for the Dibbs government if it meant anything to sink 
the fiscal question. But Black pointed out that caucus had decided by a 
majority to vote for Reid's motion and Rae and G. D. Clark confirmed 
this. In short, those who wanted to continue supporting the Dibbs govern-
ment were arguing from the earlier caucus decision against the later one. 
Sharp announced his withdrawal from caucus and Cann supposed that he 
would put himself out of it by voting for Dibbs. McGowen - a protect-
ionist - voted for Reid's motion and was regarded as a model Labor man 
for it. 
If the vote against Reid's motion did automatically put members out of 
caucus, this meant that the eight who had left the party were now joined 
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by nine more members, or ten if the one paired with them is included. 
This left seventeen members in caucus, or eighteen if Langwell is included 
in the list.'*^ But again, what was particulariy important was that those 
who voted for Reid's motion as caucus had decided could claim that they 
were the true party and that the others were the seceders, a term which 
Nicholson used of himself, indicating that those who voted for Dibbs 
conceded the claim of the others to legitimacy. In two more divisions on 
Dibbs's customs duties bill early in the new year, the split was confirmed 
and Dibbs remained in office with support from eighteen members of the 
party and LangweU. The first session ended shorfly afterwards in April 
1892. 
The split in the parUamentary party was rapidly translated to the LEL. 
The Australian Workman referred to Kelly and Cotton as blacklegs and 
traitors even before the vote on Reid's motion was taken.^^ Meetings in 
branches of the LEL, particularly in the Sydney area, were heated as they 
debated whether to censure their members or to express confidence in 
them. The central committee of the league called for unity in the party 
and asked all Labor members to meet with it eariy in January 1892. 
Twenty-two of them did so but the meeting broke up in disorder, with 
rumours of the formation of a new Democratic party.^° 
In this situation, the LEL held its first annual conference, at which 
delegates from twenty-two of the forty branches and eleven from the TLC 
met and revised the objects, platform, and rules of the league. Eight of the 
branch delegates were socialists "or sympathisers" and seven were single-
taxers.^' 
The objects were materially altered only in one respect - die first 
became: "to secure to the wealth-producers of the colony such legislation 
as will enable them to retain in their own hands the fuU produce of flieir 
labor." The platform was altered by adding to the controversial thirteenth 
plank a prohibition of further alienation of Crown land; by adding some 
details to the plank that government contracts should all be let in the 
colony; and by adding three new planks: for the popular election of all 
school boards, for the abolition of the upper house and its replacement 
with the principle of the referendum, and for the prohibition of the use of 
camels as beasts of burden. 
The mles of the LEL were amended in a number of particulars. It was 
agreed that the central committee of the league would consist of one 
delegate from each branch, that the TLC's representation on the com-
mittee would be reduced from six to three, evidently without tirst securing 
the TLC's agreement to that change, and that the central committee, 
rather than the council, should be the tribunal for the setflement of dis-
putes in the league. A motion to exclude women from membership of the 
league was defeated and aU adult residents were to be eligible, but no one 
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was to belong to more than one branch. The branches were given power to 
write their own rules on the admission of new members. The platform was 
to be altered only at the annual conference, and proposals for alterations 
were not to be dealt with by the central committee but submitted to the 
branches fliemselves through central committee well before the confer-
ence. A lengthy rule prescribed the way in which branches would select 
candidates for elections. The selection was to be made by ballot of 
financial members of at least three months' standing and those selected 
would be required to give a written pledge that they would not only 
uphold the platform and resign if caUed on by a two-thirds majority of the 
electors - the old requirements - but in addition that they would not 
contest the seat if not selected, and that they would vote in pariiament as 
the majority in caucus decided or resign dieir seats. The relatively weak 
provision of resigning if caUed on by two-thirds of the electors was 
retained against a proposal — one which threatened to make members of 
parliament much more manageable by branches — that they should resign 
their seats if called on to do so by a two-thirds majority of financial 
branch members. Finally two motions on the split in the pariiamentary 
party were carried: one for reuniting it on the basis of the platform and 
the agreement to submit the fiscal question to a referendum; the other 
calling on branches to ask their members to resign if they had voted 
against the decision of caucus. In February, Trenwith, a visiting Victorian 
Labor leader, tried to negotiate an agreement between the two sections of 
the pariiamentary party and the extra-pariiamentary organization but 
failed. 
The revision of the rules on the relations of the central committee to 
the TLC and on the pledges required of candidates caused the most dis-
turbance in the organization, althougli there can be littie doubt that at the 
branch level different factions wrangled to use or rewrite the mles to 
benefit themselves. But at the centre a quarrel broke out between the 
executive committee and the TLC over the new rules. Watson, who had 
been in the TLC througliout most of its life and was by now its vice-
president, was anxious that the council - which he thouglit should be 
unified instead of split into single-tax, free-trade, and protectionist 
sections - should sever its connection with the LEL, so that politics could 
be kept out of it and the parUamentary committee again freed to do its 
work.^^ But the council eventually decided that no change should be 
made in the constitution of flie central committee, tried in vain to take 
back the books and funds of the league, and finally, several mondis later in 
July 1892, reached an agreement with the central committee that made 
the President of the TLC the ex-officio chairman of die central committee, 
gave council six other representatives on the committee, and continued its 
power of veto over alterations proposed in the platform.^"' 
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These arguments in the organization outside pariiament made it clear 
that the parliamentary spht was, as Nairn has emphasized, only part of a 
wider and more complex division within the party.^'' Apart from the 
disagreements of free traders, single-taxers, and protectionists about the 
fiscal question and their pariiamentary tactics, there was the struggle 
between what may be called the trade union and the political wings for 
control over the organization. This was settied, for the time being at least, 
both by the agreement which gave the TLC the influence it wanted in the 
central committee of the LEL and by the steady enrolment of unionists in 
league branches. The union movement would remain in politics. And 
finally there was a difference, the full dimensions of which had not yet 
been revealed but which had been touched on in the conference, about the 
position of the pariiamentary party in relation to the league organization. 
The conference had accepted a touglier pledge, and had not only given 
recognition to caucus and the binding nature of its decision but had also 
indicated that when a member broke his pledge to vote as caucus agreed 
the extrapariiamentary organization - evidently at the branch level -
would be expected to deny him preselection. It was the quarrel over the 
pledge and between the parliamentary and extrapariiamentary sections, 
chiefly the branches, of the party that continued the conflict in it dirougli 
1892 and 1893. 
In these two years unemployment was higli and increasing, wages were 
falling steaddy, and both tendencies continued througli 1893 and even 
longer for some sections of the workforce, particulariy the unskilled and 
those in the pastoral industry. The depression of die nineties was as 
important as the strike of 1890 in the early years of the party, particularly 
in strengthening the antagonism which workers felt towards employers and 
in extending its range. Manufacturing employment, particularly in metal 
and railway workshops and clothing and woodworking industries was cut 
by 20 per cent between 1890 and 1893; coal production for consumption 
fell from 4 to 3.3 mOlion tons (ca. 4.1 to 3.4 mOlion tonnes) between 
1891 and 1893; the pastoral and building industries suffered drastic 
reverses with consequent loss of jobs for the unskiUed; public capital 
formation was dramatically reduced, and finally in 1893 there was a 
banking crisis which immediately disrupted trade and commerce in New 
South Wales.^ ^ The depression weakened the union movement and added 
to the pressure on the pariiamentary party. Some of the smaller unions 
coUapsed entirely or withdrew from the TLC. The councU was dissatisfied 
with the "failure of the pariiamentary party to take any effective action to 
deal with the economic crisis" or to protect the leaders of a major strike in 
Broken HiU from arrest and prosecution by the Dibbs government.^^ It 
was too divided to be effective in the house on questions that were of the 
utmost concern to the unions in particular and workers in general. The 
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simple unionist reaction was that those who did not vote to condemn 
Dibbs's actions against die strike leaders when die question was put to 
pariiament were scabs, and the TLC singled out four of them whose 
"execrable conduct" it viewed with contempt. 
The quesrion was put when in September 1892 Reid moved that the 
government did not have the confidence of the house and Labor members 
moved two amendments to this and all three motions were defeated. What 
matters is not to determine how each Labor or aUeged Labor member 
voted but to notice that Labor organizafions outside pariiament thought 
tthatfl«>' Labor man who voted to keep Dibbs in power when he was using 
the power of the state on the side of employers against union leaders had 
betrayed his mates and the Labor movement. The incident hardened the 
determination of the extrapariiamentary organization to have its members 
under close control. And the temper of the feeling was well summarized a 
few weeks later when the Australian Workman editorially castigated the 
LEL branches for not being tough enough with the "Labor rats".^* It also 
showed only too cleariy the poweriessness of Labor pariiamentarians at 
this time as the second session of the parliament dragged on into 1893. In 
December Reid again moved a censure on the financial administration of 
the treasurer and faded by a handful of votes. In the opening months of 
1893 there were three divisions on control of the business of the house 
and one which raised the protectionist question again on the cost of letting 
contracts in the colony for the supply of cast iron pipes. Dibbs survived all 
of them with support from men elected as Labor members, although close 
examination of the divisions suggests that they were not voting as clearly 
defined blocs of the kind that emerged in the first session. But towards the 
end of the session in June 1893 the old spUt in tUe party may be detected 
once more, at least in divisions in which Protectionists and Free Traders 
were opposed most sharply.^ ^  Nonetheless, twenty-one or perhaps 
twenty-four or twenty-five of the original members and Langwell met and 
elected Cook as their leader in October 1893, to the surprise of the central 
executive of the LEL.^° 
But this incomplete reuniting of the party was not to last and it 
collapsed under pressure from tUe organization outside pariiament. The 
second annual conference of the LEL in January 1893 ratified the setfle-
ment of 1892 between the central executive and the TLC and speUed out 
its view that the party in pariiament should "be a distinct party and not be 
aUied to any other party"; it should also "elect a chairman to preside over 
their meerings, the same to be the leader in the House", a point which was 
raised but lost in conference the year before; further. Labor men in caucus 
should "expel any of their members from dieir party who do not abide by 
the rule of the majority in caucus".^' The pledge itself was left as it had 
been decided in the previous conference. 
32 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
NEW SOUTH WALES 
But in August and October 1893 the central executive of the league 
met on the initiative of the country unions '^^  and decided to take matters 
further, in planning what was to be done to prepare the party for the next 
general election. The executive decided to call a special unity conference 
for November, that a fighting platform of six planks would be defined 
within the general platform, and that conference would also be asked to 
deal with a proposal that the pariiamentary party must be solid on aU 
questions. The executive also proposed that there would be no objection 
to a candidate stating his fiscal or any other views, but if he pledged 
himself to the constituents to vote in any other way than as caucus de-
cided he was not to be recognized as a Labor candidate. New branches of 
the league were already being formed, evidently as a result of the decision 
of the executive in August or of country unions like the shearers to send 
roving organizers - men like Hughes and Holman - into the country. The 
executive advised aU branches to increase their membership from unorgan-
ized labor and to accept as members trade unionists who could show their 
union clearance cards and who accepted the LEL platform.^-' 
The unity conference met on 9 and 10 November 1893. Over two 
hundred delegates were present on the first day, but the numbers feU 
slightly on the second as both city and country delegates went back to 
their jobs. All sections of the labor movement were represented: the pariia-
mentary party by Cook; the TLC by four men, in addition to those it had 
on the central executive of the League which was present as a whole. It 
consisted of the president of the TLC, six members of the pariiamentary 
committee, and about fifty delegates from "neariy every Labor League in 
the colony". In addition, each league branch was directly represented by 
up to four delegates depending on its membership, and this added about 
another fifty-five men to the conference. Trade unions were similarly rep-
resented direcriy, sending about sixty-five delegates. Twelve of these were 
members of pariiament — from both sides of the split of 1891, plus 
Langwell and Schey, who had not been in caucus. About a dozen of the 
union representatives were shearers and perhaps a similar number came 
from - or represented — country unions; the rest were from city-based 
unions.^^ And included among these delegates were "almost every man 
whose name is associated with Labor agitation in the city or die country" 
and representatives of the single-tax movement and socialist organizations, 
among them men like Holland and Holman who were from the new, more 
moderate socialist generation of Labor men. Single-taxers were in a 
minority in the conference.^ ^  
The figures are of importance because it was later argued that the 
conference was made illegitimate by the inclusion in it of direct repre-
sentatives of trade unions, of all members of the central committee of the 
league, and by the haste and disorder with which it was conducted ^ or, as 
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Black put it, it was packed with the proxies of unsuspecting league 
branches and delegates of non-existent branches.^^ There was some dis-
order from time to time - at one point Cook insisted that those who were 
not socialists were not to be regarded as "faddists" and the report says 
that this "strong statement" made "the chamber fairly bristle with points 
of order, none of which were, however, successful". The chairman, 
Watson, in fact seems to have managed the debate fairly and firmly, and 
although the gag was moved often enough — and not always by members 
of the central committee — it was not always carried. Holman, one of the 
more important members of the executive at the gathering, attempted to 
reply to the charge that the socialists had packed the conference, but the 
Worker did not publish the letter he sent it because, in the editor's 
opinion, it was too abusive.^^ Holman's defence was, however, detailed 
enough to be plausible, naming six delegates who had no right to be at the 
conference, five of them opposed to the central committee; denying that 
he was himself on the credentials committee, and saying elsewhere that no 
more than four or five of the proxies had been nominated by tiie central 
committee. Holman insisted that the conference had been called for the 
one day, a holiday, and that a minority of delegates had tried to delay the 
taking of decisions to the foUowing day after many of the delegates had 
gone back to work. As he saw it, the question for the future was "simply 
this": "Are the workers themselves, gathered in Conference, to decide 
what the Labor Movement shall be, or are some twenty or thirty of them, 
chosen from their ranks (in most cases by pure accident) some three years 
ago for the purpose of performing one particular part of the duties of the 
cause, to elevate themselves to the position of perpetual dictators of the 
Labor Movement?"^^ It is most likely that the central committee set out 
in conjunction with the TLC to apply the strength, discipline, and 
attitudes of unionists more fuUy within the political organization and that 
this bore fruit at this conference to the discomfiture of those who felt 
themselves secure enougli in the branch structure to insist upon their 
independence or to promote their own particular causes, single-tax or 
whatever it might be. Even if aU the members of parliament who were 
present, aU the representatives of country unions, a half of the remaining 
union representatives and two-thirds of all LEL delegates are counted as 
opposed to the central committee and the TLC, it seems likely that the 
committee and council could count on over sixty votes in a conference in 
which most of the recorded divisions totalled less than a hundred votes. 
Whether that was so or not, the proposals of the central committee were 
put through with only minor alterations. 
A figliting platform of six planks was defined and passed, a ballot being 
taken to decide the order of the planks. The platform was almost identical 
with one die central committee had drafted before die conference. The 
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planks were debated one by one and several times the chairman had to rule 
amendments and motions out of order on the ground that the conference 
was not empowered to alter the platform of the party, but only to deter-
mine the wording of fighting planks drawn from it. Land value taxation 
was one subject which gave rise to considerable debate, and it was finally 
adopted as the first plank and as a summary of the thirteenth plank of the 
general platform. The principle of the eight-hour day caused sustained 
argument between city and country unionists, the latter claiming that legal 
limitation of a working day to eiglit hours was unworkable in the country. 
The city unionists and the central committee wanted it and the plank was 
added - as the sixth in the platform. The other planks caused less disagree-
ment. 
The pledge was the subject of a long debate. Holman, acting for the 
central committee, put forward a strongly worded declaration of principle 
before discussion of the platform and the pledge began. It referred to 
solidarity and traitors to the cause presumably in the hope that die 
discussion of the pledge would be less emotional. The motion was carried 
but later on another motion put by Holman was lost and a much touglier 
motion was carried condemning Sharp, Fitzgerald, Johnston, and Kelly as 
traitors to the cause. The discussion of the pledge, althougli warm, was 
consequenfly reasonable and the proposal of the central committee was 
carried after amendment. The resolution was 
(a) that a Parliamentary Labor Party to be of any weight must 
give a solid vote in the House upon all questions - affecting 
the Labor Party, the fate of the Ministry, or calculated to 
establish a monopoly or confer further privUeges on the 
already privdeged classes — as they arise, and 
(b) that accordingly every candidate who runs in the Labor 
interest should be required to pledge himself not only to the 
Fighting Platform and the Labor Platform, but also to vote on 
every occasion as the majority of the Parliamentary Labor 
Party may in caucus decide. 
The words in clause (a) from "affecting" to "classes" were accepted by 
Holman as an addirion to the central committee's proposal and this altera-
tion liberalized it.^^ A further resolution, intended to tell branches that 
they could not accept any man as their candidate if he gave any pledge to 
the electors except to vote according to the decision of caucus, was 
amended after a fairly heated discussion. The motion was put as a way of 
sinking the fiscal question; the amendment narrowed the range of the 
original motion by specifying that no candidate could be accepted if he 
pledged himself to the electors to vote on the questions mentioned in the 
resolution of conference in any way other than as a majority of caucus 
decided. The amended motion meant, in short, that branches had to 
35 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
PETER LOVEDAY 
pledge candidates to observe the terms of the pledge designed for tiie 
parliamentary party, but that diey could not prevent them making pledges 
to the electors on the fiscal question untU that too was included in the 
subjects on which caucus or conference had declared itself. The amend-
ment may have seemed like a defeat for the central committee but only to 
the extent that the branches were left with a Uttle latitude that caucus 
itself could easdy deny to its members, on pain of expulsion, if it was so 
minded. FinaUy, a proposal from the floor that the LEL incorporate itself, 
in effect, in tiie Australian Labor Federation (ALF) was defeated by being 
replaced with a motion that members of the federation resident in a 
district should be entitied to aU league branch benefits. This was an 
important concession to but not a victory for country delegates, especially 
those from Young, that is, those representing shearers and general 
labourers, who had talked earlier of absorbing the LEL branches into the 
ALF.^" Spence in the Worker and the Australian Workman approved of 
the conference as a whole, although a littie later on Holman and three 
other delegates from the central committee had a hard task convincing the 
annual conference of the Shearers' Union that it should accept the 
decisions made in November.^ ' 
The November conference took place in the middle of the third session 
of the fifteenth parliament. Early in the session. Labor men had been 
divided into three sections by the Australasian rights purchase biU (which 
was intended to give a monopoly, as some saw it, to a private Melbourne 
firm to provide electricity to Sydney from water power in the Grose and 
Colo rivers), but apart from this die members of the party had generally 
been in agreement. The November conference, according to Black,^^ put a 
bombshell amongst them and from then to the end of the session in 
December the party in pariiament was again sharply divided. But by this 
time what the old Labor members were doing in pariiament was of no 
great importance: the party outside pariiament was preparing for the 
election and was determined that the members it elected next time should 
toe the line. 
The most important business of the third annual conference^ ^ of the 
LEL held in March 1894 was to consider the work of the unity conference 
of November 1893 and reach agreement with die branches about it. The 
branches, entitled to one delegate each, sent sixty-nine representatives and 
the TLC seven.^ "^  The pledge defined at the November conference was 
agreed to, after a proposal to go back to the pledge of 1892 had been 
defeated. Country branches, according to one delegate, had accepted the 
decisions of the November conference in other respects but they had 
dissented from its pledge. A proposal to put one representative of the 
pariiamentary party on the central executive for each ten members of the 
party in pariiament was carried, and another, to exclude TLC delegates 
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from it, was defeated. This meant that the executive now consisted of one 
delegate from each branch, six from the TLC, and one for each ten men in 
the pariiamentary party. The power of the executive in the organization 
was enlarged but stiU subject to conference: besides its power to settle 
disputes, it was empowered to interpret the constitution and rules of the 
party, to check on the genumeness of new branches, and to repudiate 
those not working in conformity with the platform and the pledge and to 
grant or refuse endorsement to candidates selected by the branches. The 
secretary - evidentiy without the authority of a rule - told all branches 
they must supply signed duplicates of the candidates' pledges to the 
central office. The eight-hour plank was amended, to concUiate country 
delegates, by adding the phrase "where practicable" to it. 
The decisions of the 1894 conference did nothing to conciliate the 
Labor members, who were reported to be in a furore about them.^^ In 
April 1894 the Labor members pubUshed their own manifesto as a reply to 
the manifesto of the November conference and, in effect, the conference 
of March. Nineteen members signed it, or authorized Cook as leader to 
sign it on their behalf,^^ and thirteen others were said to have refused to 
sign the revised pledge of the LEL. Davis, Kirkpatrick, and McGowen were 
the only ones prepared to sign the revised pledge. The TLC attempted to 
reconcile parliamentary members to the league after a meeting in which 
the central committee had been described as insulting and domineering, 
but the parliamentary members tried to insist that sitting members should 
be entitied to be re-selected as candidates and submitted their own draft 
pledge, and the proposals for reconcdiation faded. Late in May the TLC 
gave up its attempts to mediate between the parliamentary members and 
the central committee.^^ In June the secretary of the central committee 
reported that seventy-two of the eighty-four branches of the League had 
endorsed the pledge of the March conference, that four refused to ask 
candidates to sign it, and that eight gave no reply. The executive 
declared bogus the four refusing to endorse the pledge. The minutes of the 
metropolitan Denison branch, formed a few weeks before the November 
conference, indicate that some of the branches had first to survive internal 
splits and expulsions before their loyalty was accepted by the central 
committee.''^ 
The party went into the election of 17 July 1894 irremediably split but 
now on lines that had litrie in common witU the split of 1891. Ostensibly, 
tUe split was between the parliamentary and the extra-pariiamentary 
sections of the organization, but the situation was more complex than 
diat. The complexities, hinted at in the conferences of November and 
March, were made more obvious in the election. The TLC had not only 
failed in its attempts at mediation; it was also on the point of dissolving 
itself and being re-created as the Sydney district secrion of the ALF: it 
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was increasingly weak and poor, as a consequence of economic conditions 
in the colony and the withdrawal or coUapse of smaller unions and, in 
relation to the pledge, at least as it applied to particular men, it was 
internally divided. Houghton, Black, and Schey were good Labor men in 
the eyes of the TLC and should be supported even though they had 
refused to sign the new pledge.^' The central committee, or rather its 
propaganda committee, which appears to have done much of the election 
work, cleariy had its opportunity; it decided that Schey, Houghton, and 
Black had to be opposed and Cook as weU, and, since they evidently 
commanded the loyalty of their branches, new branches had to be set up, 
prepared to take central committee — that is, "solidarity" — candidates.*^ 
This caused some controversy both at the time and afterwards, country 
branches in particular and the Australian Workman taking the view that 
Black, Houghton, and Schey should not have been opposed. The same 
pattern appears to have been repeated elsewhere: in Ashbumham elec-
torate, a central committee solidarity faction split one of die branches at 
the last minute in the campaign and ran their own candidate after the 
other four branches selected Gardiner and refused to insist that he sign the 
solidarity pledge. In Barwon likewise the committe put up its owoi candi-
date - S. A. Rosa of the Australian Socialist League (ASL) — when the 
shearers there put up their own man and refused to pledge him as the 
committee required.*^ The result was to spUt the Labor vote - a common 
result according to the committee's critics - and let W. N. WUlis win what 
was regarded as a Labor seat. The Barwon people claimed in justification 
that several other candidates ran unopposed as ALF men. 
In the election for a house now reduced to one hundred and twenty-
five members, each returned for single-member seats and elected on a 
one-man-one-vote principle as a result of the new electoral act, passed in 
1893, the central committee claimed to have sbcty-eight candidates. This 
was about twice the number of "other Labor" men, many of whom were 
described as ALF candidates, although by this time many of the sitting 
members had begun to drift into the Free Trade and Land Reform 
League.*'' The central committee claimed fourteen men returned, once 
the results were final, whUe the other or independent Labor group con-
sisted of eleven, or twelve counting Gardiner among them and allowing for 
the disqualification of WUlard. The Free Traders had fifty-eight members 
and the Protectionists forty, including independents of each kind. LEL 
candidates took 16 per cent of the total valid vote, and independent Labor 
candidates 9 per cent, in all 25 per cent of the vote was compared with 22 
per cent in 1891. Only four of the LEL — that is, central committee's -
candidates had been members of the previous parliament: McGowen, 
T. M. Davis, Cann, and Kirkpatrick. All but two of the twelve independent 
Labor men had been members before and most of them were returned by 
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country electorates, whde most of the "solidarities" were returned for city 
and suburban seats. 
In the contests the two wings seem to have avoided — or been unable to 
mount — challenges to one another except in a few constituencies where 
the contest had symbolic value, like Hartley where Cook was opposed by 
one who was probably an LEL candidate who took 1 per cent of the vote 
while Cook took 47 per cent of it. Of the sixty-eight or seventy league 
candidates, only fourteen had contests with non-league Labor candidates, 
and a simdar porportion of the others had no league opponents, even if the 
candidates, like Rosa, wUose cause was Uopeless are counted. In fact only 
four more seats might have been won by the LELs had there been no 
competing Labor candidate and had all the Labor votes gone to league 
men - Barwon, Newtown, Leichardt, and Quirindi. The rest were either 
won by Labor men of one label or the other or could not have been won 
anyway had the Labor vote not been divided. What clearly mattered most 
was that the league branches, with only a few exceptions, had remained 
loyal to the central committee. But the two papers, the Worker (which had 
long since shown its partiality for the parliamentary party in its quarrel 
with the central committee) and the Australian Workman both blamed the 
committee for Labor's defeat by insisting on the solidarity pledge of the 
November conference.*^ Holman and his cUque in the propaganda 
committee of the central committee were thought most to blame. The 
committee immediately declared the Workman bogus. 
Shortly afterwards the plan for a political Labor federation, which had 
been approved at the Intercolonial Trade Union Congress (ITUC) at 
BaUarat in 1891 but not acted on in New South Wales, was revived, 
primarily with the backing of the Australian Workers' Union (AWU), 
which was Spence's Amalgamated Shearers' Union, renamed after it had 
absorbed the General Labourers' Union (GLU). The TLC was absorbed 
into the new Sydney district councU of the ALF. Rae, from the Riverina 
district councU of the federation and a leading figure in the AWU, pro-
posed reorganizing and decentralizing the central committee of the LEL, 
and the district councU later proposed that a new United Labor Party 
(ULP) should be organized to supersede or complement the league. This 
appears to have been a move designed to forestall a drift of country 
members to the Farmers and Settiers' Association (F and SA). Several of 
the early Labor independents with protectionist inclinations and sitting for 
country constituencies, Gough, Sheldon, Vaughn, Nicholson, and Newton, 
had drifted into the F and SA before the 1894 election.*^ But it also 
suggests that the country unions were uncertain of their course, and their 
indecision was bound to be seen by the parliamentarians and the central 
executive as a threat to the future of the pariiamentary party. 
At the next LEL conference, in January 1895, a motion was carried 
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that the ALF take up the same number of representatives on the central 
committee of tiie league as die old TLC had, and that members of die New 
Soudi Wales section of the ALF and of unions not included in the feder-
ation be accepted as members of die LEL branches.^'' This was one of the 
first signs tiiat a reconciliation might be effected. In April and May 1895 
there were further negotiations between the LEL and the country organiz-
ation of the ALF and finaUy, under the guidance of the AWU, tiie two 
organizations were merged and the Political Labor League (PLL) was 
formed.** The breach between the city and country wings of the Labor 
movement was averted and with the merger the dispute over the pledge 
was ended. The new league adopted a modified version of the pledge 
which settied dispute on the question for years to come. 
The new pledge was: "I hereby pledge myself not to oppose the select-
ed candidate of this or any other Branch of the PoUtical Labor League. I 
also pledge myself, if returned to Pariiament, on all occasions to do my 
utmost to ensure the carrying out of the principles embodied in the Labor 
platform and on aU questions, and especially on questions affecting the 
fate of die Government, to vote as a majority of the Labor Party may 
decide at a duly constituted caucus meeting."*^ Although it was accepted 
as a compromise, it meant that now the "parliamentarians were respon-
sible not merely to themselves or their individual leagues but to the move-
ment, speaking through a representative conference".^" It was equally 
important that the central executive was reconstructed, although its 
powers were unchanged. It was reduced in size to eleven members, of 
whom the president and secretary and seven others were to be elected by 
the annual conference and the other two were to be delegates of the New 
South Wales section of the ALF. Membership was extended to include 
members of affiliated unions and other unions with which special arrange-
ments were made. The executive could take part in the annual conference 
but not vote. The leader and secretary of the parUamentary party were 
made members of the executive, ex offico, at the 1896 conference, and aU 
parliamentary members were put on it by the 1898 conference but allowed 
only five votes. 
MeanwhUe it had been apparent that there might soon be another 
election. After the election of 1894 Dibbs resigned without meeting the 
new parliament and Reid formed a ministry which included Cook, who 
had briefly been the leader of the pariiamentary group of Labor men. The 
soUdarity Labor men appointed McGowen as their leader and Griffith as 
secretary. In a house of 125, Reid, with a party of 58, needed support 
which he obtained from both the independent and the solidarity Labor 
men, after offering them an attractive programme. The solidarities main-
tained their cohesion in divisions in the house, but the independents did 
not - Schey and Wood voted much of the time with tiie Protectionists; 
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Brown, Black, Edden, Fegan, and Bavister voted with die solidarities; and 
Gardiner and Newman voted more o''ten with the Free Traders and Cook. 
In May 1895 Reid put forward measures designed to fulfil his election 
promises of reducuig tariffs and introducing direct land and income taxes. 
When the upper house rejected the Land and Income Assessment Bdl, a 
machinery measure, chiefly because die government refused to aUow it to 
lower the level of exemptions, Reid went to the country in July, calling 
for reform of the Legislative Council and insisting on direct taxes. 
The reunited Labor party went into the election on a platform that had 
been revised a Uttie at tUe annual conference. The plank on electoral 
reform was altered to take account of amendments that had already been 
made to the electoral law in 1893; abolition of plural voting, the adult 
male franchise, the registration of voters, and single-member constituencies 
of approximately equal numbers of electors. The plank on camels was 
dropped and an addition recommending the "total exclusion of inferior 
alien races" was made to the one calling for identification of Chinese-made 
furniture. The old land tax plank was rewritten, to make it much less 
doctrinaire: it now read 
(a) abolition of the further sales of state lands 
(b) the destruction of land monopoly by the taxation of the value 
of land exclusive of improvements thereon 
(c) absolute tenant rights in improvements. 
The local government plank had a clause added to it proposing that 
municipalities be empowered to set up industries and institurions as an 
extension of tUe principle of government employment. Apart from re-
wording and rearrangement, the rest of the platform stood substantiaUy as 
U had been in 1892.^1 
The party fielded forty-seven candidates and had eighteen elected, five 
of them without opposition. Country branches had difficulty finding can-
didates and the central executive was unable to help them for want of 
funds.^^ There were, in addition, eleven independent Labor candidates-
none of them opposing PLL candidates - and of them four were elected. 
Shortiy after the election the Labor League gained a further seat in a 
by-election, to give it nineteen members in the seventeenth pariiament. 
The Free Traders had taken sixty-one seats, or sixty-two including an 
independent, and the Protectionists forty-one. Most of the independent 
Labor men of the preceding pariiament who stood again as independents 
and were returned joined either the Protectionist party (Schey, Wood) or 
the Free Traders (Cook, Bavister, Fegan, Hollis, Newman). Black, Edden, 
and Brown rejoined the PLL in time to be elected on its platform. The 
party's share of the vote dropped to l3'/2 per cent, as compared with 16 
per cent cast for LEL men in the preceding election, but since five seats it 
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won were uncontested and U had many fewer candidates than in 1894 the 
results could not be considered a sign of declinmg strength in the elector-
ates. Another 3 per cent of the vote went to independent Labor candi-
dates, a drop of 6 per cent on their figure for 1894. 
Ill 
For fifteen years after the turmoU accompanying its formation the 
party steaddy consolidated its position in die politics of New Soudi Wales 
and managed to avoid any new splits. Its successes were both parlia-
mentary and electoral. The vote cast for it increased in each election from 
1901 onwards and from 1895 it won an increasing number of seats in the 
lower house. It remained in a third party position untU 1904 and then 
took the opposition benches as die second largest party after the deci-
mation of the Progressives in the election of that year and their subsequent 
disintegration in pariiament. Labor's growing strength is demonstrated in 
table 1 
Table I. Labor's Strength in Parliament and in the Electorates, 1891-1920* 
1891 1894 1895 1898 1901 1904 1907 1910 1913 1917 1920 
Labor vote as 
% of total 
valid vote 21.9 16 12.6 11.4 18.7 23 32.9 48.9 46.6 42.9 43.1 
Labor members 
elected 35 14 18 19 24 25 32 46 49 33 43 
Labor members 
as % of all 
members 25 11 14.5 15 19 28 32.5 51 54.5 36.5 48 
* Based on figures given in C. A. Hughes and B. D. Graham, A Handbook of Australian 
Government and Politics 1890-1964 (Canberra, 1968), excluding independent Labor 
candidates. 
And in Labor's view of its own history, its successes in the parliament 
were as unportant as the increases in its number of members and propor-
tion of the popular vote. The Reid ministry, in office from 1894 untU 
September 1899, needed Labor's support to remain in office and obtained 
it by passing much legislation Labor demanded. In 1899, the party decided 
it could expect more from Lyne and withdrew its support from Reid's 
ministry which was replaced by Lyne's and then, in March 1901, by See's 
ministry. The Reid and Lyne ministries appointed five Labor men to the 
Legislative CouncU before the end of 1900. 
George Black, the main pamphleteer of the party and recorder of its 
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contemporary history, argued that "against Eight Democratic Measures 
passed during the thirty-five years which preceded the advent of the 
Walesian Labor Party, we can place diirty Democratic Measures passed 
inside thirteen years after that Labor Party became an active political 
force." In addition to the legislative measures which he claimed it had 
initiated, he listed a string of lesser reforms: the party had 
succeeded in purging Pariiament by killing jobbery and corruption 
to a great extent banished sectarianism from political contests; 
democratised Parliament and its successive Ministries; . . . succeeded 
in bringing about at least nine great Departmental Reforms . . . ; 
greatly improved the tone of elections . . . ; 
gained for Labor an entrance even to the Upper House; 
[and] . . . won for the workers direct representation on the benches 
of the Arbitration Court and on several commissions . . .^^ 
The successes of the party in federal politics were no less important. The 
party had won 18 per cent of the vote in New South Wales and six of the 
state's seats in the House of Representatives in die first federal election in 
1901. In 1903 its vote rose to 21 per cent and it won another seat; in 1906 
it won 38 per cent of the vote and eleven seats. It won none of the Senate 
seats for the state untd 1910 but its share of the vote in that part of the 
elections also rose steaddy in the period.^^ The federal pariiamentary 
party had made as good use of its third party position as the state pariia-
mentary party and took, or was given, credit for much of the Deakin 
government's legislation. These successes gave the party confidence from 
about 1905 onwards that it would soon be able to capture power in the 
state, and it was supposed that then a period of much greater legislative 
and administrative reforming activity would begin. 
In the early years of the party, those who talked of it as part of a wider 
Labor movement which they described in class terms easdy supposed that 
Labor's share of the vote would grow very rapidly and soon become much 
larger than the proportion won by the other parties, provided the electoral 
system was thoroughly democratic. Writing in 1893 George Black argued 
that "when representation is general and voting on an equality, then it 
must be conceded that as the wage-earners, and those whose interests are 
indissolubly bound up with tiieirs, constitute 80 per cent of the com-
munity. Labor cannot be fairly represented with less than 112 out of 141 
members".^^ And he went on to explain that Labor's numbers were lower 
than they should have been even under the old electoral system, because 
the press was antagonistic and unfair. The tasks which the branch organiz-
ation of the party was designed to carry out were to select tme Labor men 
as candidates, to ensure that Labor voters in electorates were identified, 
enrolled, and went to the polls, and to counteract the propaganda of the 
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non-Labor press. 
Neither enrolment nor voting was compulsory before 1920. The 
electoral rolls were prepared by collectors appointed by Clerks of Petty 
Sessions and were brought up to date at annual revision courts, a pro-
cedure which made careful organizational work at the branch level 
essential, even when the police were given the job of compiling roUs 
annually in 1900. The act of 1893 and subsequent amendments removed 
the property qualification for the franchise, ended plural voting, and pro-
gressively eased the residence requirements, although in 1901 many 
itinerant workers were stUI disfranchised by a requirement that they be 
resident six months in a district before registration. The act of 1893 also 
introduced elector's rights current for three years at a time, that is cer-
tificates of the enrolled individual's right to vote. The branches were 
repeatedly exliorted to ensure that their voters had current elector's rights 
because they would be denied their votes if they did not.^^ The rights 
were abolished in 1906. Women were enfranchised by an act of 1902 and 
voted for the first time in 1904. 
The numbers of electorates and of enrolled electors indicate the size of 
the task facing tiie branches. In the 1891 elections there were 141 elec-
torates; for the elections of 1894, 1895, 1898, and 1901 tiiere were 125 
electorates, and 90 electorates for the elections from 1904 onwards. The 
average number of enroUed electors for the period of the elections 
1894—1901 was as set out in table 2 and the number holding valid 
elector's rights was usually about 80 per cent of this figure. 
Table 2. Number of EnroUed Electors 1894-1901 in Electorates Contested by 
Labor 
Averages, to nearest 100, in country, suburban, and city electorates* 
City 
Suburban 
Country 
1894 
2,300 
2,700 
2,300 
1895 
2,300 
2,500 
2,000 
1898 
2,500 
3,200 
2,400 
1901 
2,700 
3,700 
2,600 
* Based on data compiled for Hughes and Graham, Handbook, in Department 
of Political Science, A.N.U. and on a classification of electorates used in returns 
of the convention election, 1897, in which some urban areas, e.g. Newcastle, are 
listed as country. The number of electorates contested by Labor in each group 
varied from election to election. 
Few of these seats could be regarded as safe Labor seats, especially when 
third and even fourth candidates might enter contests and, given first past 
die post counting, make the results quite unpredictable. Only 2 seats -
Broken HiU and Sturt - were won with over 55 per cent of the valid vote 
in each of these elections and only 8 other seats out of the 125 were held 
continuously by Labor men in each of the four elections. 
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In the later nineties and in the foUowing decade, it was a common 
observation that the branches of die PLL were weak and Ul-organized and 
flourished only when there was the excitement of selecting candidates and 
campaigning for tiiem.^* In its annual report to die PLL conference of 
1906, the executive commented that the work of enrolling voters was 
much neglected by botii unions and local leagues, and in 1908 J. H. Catts 
wrote at length on die importance of keeping die electoral rolls up to date, 
arguing diat "anything is possible under voluntary enrolment if leagues 
will do the work efficientiy. There is no party organisation so able to 
undertake this work as the Labor Leagues."^^ EnroUing voters, securing 
new members for die branch, raising funds, and carrying on die propag-
anda work of the party were activities that could all be carried out 
between elecrions and could not be left untd an election was imminent 
without clashing with the work of the campaign, but die reports of branch 
activities in die labor press and the admissions of individuals discussing 
organizational problems at conferences all suggest that in many branches 
this basic work was often neglected untd the last minute and left to be 
done - and consequentiy often not done at all - by a handful of 
enthusiasts. 
The normal cycle of branch activity was to have an annual meeting 
usually with what was reported to be a large or good attendance, at which 
office bearers and delegates to conference were elected and branch 
business conducted, to be followed througliout the year by monthly or 
fortnightly meetings, usually thinly attended, for routine business and by 
occasional socials, dances, fetes, debating, and speech nights, particulariy if 
some Labor notable was visiting the district. Apart from the social aspect 
of these gatherings, they also provided opportunities for fund raising and 
gave members some training in public speaking. Some branches - probably 
a minority of them — took part in municipal as well as state and federal 
elections and so had other occasions to keep their members active, but if 
no elections were scheduled the normal round of branch activity appears 
to have been sluggish. Needless to say, some branches went out of 
existence for quite long periods; others seemed to spring into life only 
when an elecrion was imminent, while others managed to flourish without 
faltering, to judge by reports of their activities in the Worker. The 
membership of the branches shows the same kinds of fluctuation and 
consequendy estimates, even those made by contemporaries in the 
organization, of the numbers of members and branches are higlily unreli-
able.'«" 
But it is nevertheless worth while to attempt to determine the extent of 
die branch structure. Only a few reports exist which give numbers of 
branches: 45 in 1891; 40 in 1892; 84 in 1894 before die spUt, after which 
at least four were declared bogus; 313 early in 1910, and 400 at the end of 
45 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
PETER LOVEDAY 
the year, over a quarter of them new branches; 449 at the end of 1911, 
supplemented by 106 affiliated unions; and 450 at the end of 1913, plus 
100 affiliated unions.'°' The figures for 1910 include many branches 
which were new, smaU, and ephemeral'"'^ and are best taken as an indica-
tion of the upper limit to the number of branches determined at a time 
when the organization was at its peak for the successful election of that 
year. The figures for 1911 and 1913 are equally doubtful. 
The number of candidates fielded in elections once single-member 
electorates were established throughout the state in 1893 is another rough 
indication of the number of branches (see table 3). After selection by the 
branch and endorsement by the central executive. Labor candidates 
normally stood only on the nomination of the branch or of the district 
assembly. A district assembly was created by grouping branches together 
for electoral purposes where there were several of them in the one elector-
ate. The central executive only rarely exercised its right to nominate a 
candidate where no branch existed. Of course branches did not always put 
forward candidates and that, as well as the grouping of branches into 
district assemblies, means that this method of estimation is bound to give 
us too low a figure for the number of branches. 
Table 3. Numbersof Labor Candidates and Numbers of Seats in Elections, 1894-1920 
1894 1895 1898 1901 1904 1907 1910 1913 1917 1920 
No. of electorates 125 125 125 125 90 90 90 90 90 90 
No. of Labor 
candidates 68 47 31(35*) 55 50 72(75*) 90 86 84 88 
* The numbers of candidates are those given in Hughes and Graham, Handbook, for 
the years in question. The figures they have given for candidates in 1898 and 
1907 may be too low: In 1898 according to the Worker, 1 April 1899, there 
were 35 candidates and in 1907, according to the executive report, there were 75. 
Political Labor League of New South Wales, Report of the Executive for the 
year 1907, p.4. 
The representation of branches at annual conferences is also bound to 
give us too low a figure for the number of branches because many 
branches frequently did not send delegates. In addifion to that, the union 
organization must be considered. To some extent the unions made up for 
the weakness or absence of branches of the PLL, even before 1899 when 
unions became entitled to affiliate directly with the league and send their 
own delegates to conference. Their strength was particularly important ui 
country areas and in 1900 the PLL reached an agreement with the AWU 
which recognized that for organizing purposes it was the effective struct-
ure in a large part of the state in the west, central, and southwestern 
areas.'"-' Furthermore, even after unions could be affiUated many did not 
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join the PLL as branches, but existed side by side with league branches 
in the same area. 
Up to 1902 the number of branches represented at conference 
exceeded thirty only twice, in 1894 and 1897. After diat the number 
increased slowly and sixty-two were represented at the 1908 conference. 
Twenty-six unions sent delegates in 1902 and that number also rose slowly 
untd it reached forty-three in 1908. If we allow that representation at 
conference and numbers of candidates nominated both understate the 
number of branches, and that the official figures obtained overstate the 
number, it stUl seems clear that there was a slow growth and consolidation 
of the organization at the electoral level up to 1910; that the party 
probably did not have branches in every electorate until well after 1900; 
and even tiien it was not untd 1910 that almost all branches were either 
able or wiUing to field candidates.'°^ It is also clear that diis consolida-
tion was achieved partly because the unions were incorporated into the 
party's branch structure. 
Branches occasionally reported their financial membership for the year, 
and in the early 1900s these varied between 20 and 500, most of them 
being 100 or less. After 1901 the rules on representation at the annual 
conference were altered so that branches with up to 200 members had one 
delegate, those with from 200 to 500 financial members had two, those 
with 500 to 1,000 had three, and those with more than that had four. This 
gives us one means of estimating minimum membership rouglily for years 
when representation at the annual conference was reported after 1901. 
The numbers of delegates from affiliated trade unions were determined by 
the same rule. Once women got the vote, each branch was aUowed one 
woman as an extra representative, provided it had a minimum number of 
25 financial women members. Assuming that branches and unions entitled 
to and sending one delegate averaged 50 members each; those entitled to 
two, 300 members each; those entitied to three, 700 members each; and 
those entitled to four, 1,200 members each, we may estimate the numbers 
given in table 4 from lists of conference delegations. 
Table 4. Estimate of Party Membership from Lists of Conference Delegates* 
1902 1903 1905 1906 
Branches 2,500 1,700 4,600 4,300 
Unions 12,300 13,400 15,400 16,700 
Total 14,800 15,000 20,000 21,000 
See Political Labor League of New South Wales, Minutes of Proceedings of 
the Annual Conference, 1902 (Sydney, 1902), and Worker, 31 January 1903, 
4 February 1905, 1 February 1906, for the details on which these figures are 
based. 
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The figures are admittedly rough and are an underestimate, since not all 
branches and unions were represented at conferences or sent their fuU 
entitlement of delegates. They may however be checked in two ways. If 
we assume that there might have been 70 or 80 branches of about 100 
members each on the average at this time the number of members might 
have been about 8,000, exclusive of those counted as members by virtue 
of the affiliation of their trade unions. The trade unionists numbered 
60,000 according to one report'*'^ and that too appears to have been a 
generous estimate, because tlie 102 unions that were registered for arbitra-
tion purposes in the state in 1903 claimed only 66,000 members'"^ and 
not all of them, including at least one with 6,000-odd members, were 
affiliated with the PLL. There are in addition a few different estimates of 
the number of members in the branches. The numbers were said to be 
about 20,000 in 1903, 100,000 in 1905, and 40,000 in 1906'°'^ and the 
last of these was probably the most reliable estimate. A few years later in 
1911 it was reported tUat the number of members had grown to 21,000 in 
the branches and 72,000 in 100 affiliated unions. By 1914, the branch 
membership was reported as 30,000 and union membership at 
250,000."'* These figures, like those for numbers of branches at diese 
times, are no doubt inflated. And in addition the numbers reported are no 
more than those on which branches and affiliated unions paid dues to the 
central executive and claimed delegate representation at conferences, and 
most of them, especially those in the unions, would normaUy have taken 
littie or no part in Labor party affairs at the branch level. However, this 
information makes it clear that around 1903 membership of the party was 
probably not less than about 20,000 and unlikely to have been greater 
than 60,000 and that the affiliated unions probably accounted for about 
three-quarters or more of the financial members of the party. The table 
also suggests that party membership grew steaddy up to 1906, and it is 
more likely that it continued to grow than to decUne after that date. 
Of course, branch members were not the only element in the strengtii 
of the party at the electoral level, althougli because of the party's chronic 
poverty they were particulariy important resources for it. Money, propa-
ganda, and organizational capacity were other elements of its strength and 
weakness. 
The cost of election work was normally carried by tiie branches, which 
obtained their own money from both membership fees and fund-raising 
activities, often in pathetically small amounts. The membership fee, not to 
exceed four shdlings (40 cents) per annum in die rules from 1896 to 1901, 
was set at that sum in 1902 and in 1903 reduced to two shiUuigs (20 
cents) per year for men and one shiUing (10 cents) for women with half-
rates for members of unions or, for block union membership, sixpence (5 
cents) per member from 1904 onwards. It stayed at this level until the end 
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of the first decade. This suggests that die income of die branches of the 
party from membership fees in the early 1900s was at most £1,500 
($3,000) p.a. DetaUs of the income of individual branches are as difficult 
to find as detads of their membership, but Narrandera with sixty members 
in 1908 reported receipts of £131 ($262) and expenditure of £109 ($218) 
for the previous year, and Barrier District Assembly in 1904 reported 
half-yearly receipts of £129 ($258) and a credit balance of £17 ($34). 
Scone, with 115 members, had spent £22 ($44) in the election of 1907 
and Corowa £40 ($80). "'^ There is no way of knowing whether that level 
of expenditure by branches on elections was general; if it was, dien for 
ninety electorates the branches alone must have spent two to three 
thousand pounds (four to six thousand dollars) in each election - a sum 
well beyond what was raised by membership fees. 
Small sums were remitted each year by the branches to the central 
executive but this was basically to pay the expenses of the executive and 
little was left in its hands for election purposes.'"' The funds at the 
disposal of the executive for elections were evidendy raised in an ad hoc 
fashion and were probably in very small amounts, at least before 1910. In 
1902 it was reported that city unions had been asked to contribute to a 
fund for election purposes in the city and a little over £10 ($20) was 
donated, and that another £23 ($46) had been raised by a fund started by 
the Worker which paid for a large number of leaflets. At the conference of 
1903 there was some discussion of the need for an organizer, and an 
optimistic forecast was made of the amount that could be raised if all 
members put in sbcpence (5 cents) a year . ' ' ' The subject was again raised 
in 1905, a resolution was passed, a temporary finance committee was 
appointed to coUect the levy, and the post of organizer was advertised. 
There were twenty-seven applicants for the job but none were thought 
suitable and only £78 ($156) was collected for the work so the plan was 
shelved for the time being.' '^ According to Holman, the central executive 
had gone through the last election - presumably the state election of 1904 
- with an income of £500 ($1,000) of which £150 ($300) had been 
accumulated by the Tramway Union over a three-year period at the rate of 
skpence (5 cents) per member.'' ^ In 1906 a major effort was made to 
budd up a fighting fund for die federal elections of that year and in six 
months branches and unions donated a total of £625 ($ 1,250) - "the best 
fund we ever had". '" ' In 1907, another election year, £359 ($718) had 
been raised by donations to a fighting fund.'' ^ The election of 1910 cost 
the party £2,000 ($4,000) according to Watson, of which £400 ($800) was 
provided by league branches and the rest by the unions. Doubt is, how-
ever, cast on Watson's claim by Black's assertion that one of the men 
appointed to the Legislative CouncU in 1912 provided die party with £500 
($1,000) for the election."^ After 1910 reports and balance sheets of the 
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central executive show that its income increased, £1394 ($2,788) being 
reported for 1911; £1,400 ($2,800) for 1912 (of which £200 ($400) came 
from the branches and £900 ($1,800) from the unions), £2,866 ($5,732) 
for 1915 and a littie over £4,000 ($8,000) for 1916. 
Funds supplied by the trade unions were one of the main sources of the 
money of the central executive and many branches. The two main 
branches of the AWU in New Soudi Wales, Central branch and Bourke -
later Western — branch, contributed the largest sums to the party. The 
Typographers' and the Trolly and Draymen's Unions contributed £25 
($50) and £10 ($20) to the fighting fund of 1910 when the Bourke branch 
put in £120(5240) and most of the branches of the PLL donated £1 ($2) 
each.''^ The annual reports of the two branches of the AWU show 
amounts annually allocated for political purposes and usually give a 
detaUed account of how it was spent. The Bourke branch aUocated £939 
($1,878) over eleven of the years between 1891 and 1904, including £3 
($6) in 1897 and £250 ($500) in 1894. The Wagga Wagga branch com-
mitted £246 ($492) to politics in 1894. Table 5 gives die allocations of the 
Bourke and Central branches from 1905 onwards. 
Table 5. Money Allocated to Political Funds, Bourke and Central Branches AWU, 
1905-20 
Bourke 
Central 
Bourke 
Central 
£ 
£ 
£ 
£ 
1905 
97 
46 
1914 
333 
302 
1906 
33 
41 
1915 
535 
859 
1907 
116 
226 
1916 
146 
279 
1908 
229 
185 
1917 
783 
na. 
1909 
77 
61 
1918 
31 
1946 
1910 
389 
500 
1919 
na 
501 
1911 
384 
362 
1920 
na 
1232 
1912 
10 
139 
1913 
524 
710 
SOURCE: Annual reports of the two branches in May annually for each branch in the 
years shown. Archives, R.S.S.S., A.N.U. 
Donations to branches of the LEL or PLL were one of the tiiree main 
ways in which the two branches spent their aUocations for political 
purposes, usually giving eacU branch a sum between £10 ($20) and £30 
($60) p.a. From time to time the conferences of the branches decided to 
send out poUtical organizers, and their salaries and expenses for tours of a 
few weeks accounted for sums ranging between £10 ($20) and £300 
($600) p.a. in each branch. The central executive of the PLL had dona-
tions and sustentation and capitation fees from the two branches from 
about 1905. The sums were small befoje 1910 - about £30 ($60) p.a. -
but diey then increased to about £100 ($200) and more, the largest being 
£528 ($1,056) paid by the Central branch in 1915. An amendment of the 
SO 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
NEW SOUTH WALES 
industrial legislation in 1917-18 prevented unions making grants from 
their funds to the PLL and forced them to organize what the AWU called a 
"political figliting fund voluntary levy" of 2s.6d. (25 cents) per member 
for the year."^ Both branches made special donations to a handful of 
PLL branches for federal elections, and occasional grants to the campaigns 
of particular candidates or to the central executive for referendum 
campaigns. 
The parliamentary party itself was another source of funds for election 
work. In 1894 when the party decided to oppose Cook in the election for 
Hardey each member of caucus subscribed £1 ($2) and later on in the year 
"it was decided to run a man for the Public Works Committee, half his fees 
to be returned to the party".' '^ In 1901, the central executive com-
plained that its funds were "wholly inadequate" and made it "dependent 
upon the charity of the Parliamentary Party" but the parliamentary repre-
sentatives at the conference refused to give any detads of their fund when 
questioned about it.'^° From then on the caucus fund was not discussed 
publicly in conference untd 1914 when Meagher, one of the more radical 
members of the pariiamentary party at that time, explained that they put 
into the fund 20 per cent of all dieir earnings from their official posts as 
ministers, speaker, chairman of committees, and members of the public 
works committee, but nothing from their salaries as members of pariia-
ment,''^' an arrangement which was possible only when the party was in 
power and which evidentiy dated back to March 1913 at least. Black 
claimed he had paid £524 ($1,048) into party funds during his term in 
office.'^^ The money in this fund was used to pay die wliip a salary of 
£437 ($874) p.a., for organizing and other unspecified work, and for 
electoral purposes, £335 ($670) being spent on by-elections in Maifland 
and Liverpool Plains in 1911 and £100 ($200) in Blayney in 1912.'^^ 
Since the funds used in a particular electorate could come from the 
branches and unions in it, the central executive, the pariiamentary party, 
and occasionally from the candidate himself, it is practically impossible to 
determine how much might have been spent on a given by-election, to say 
nothing of a general election. In the Blayney by-election, for instance, the 
central executive put in £96 ($192) in addition to the £100 ($200) fiom 
caucus. In Cumberiand in the general election of 1920 the bill for election 
expenses appears to have been £153 ($306), of wliich £33 ($66) was 
accounted for by three weeks' lost wages, but there is no indication where 
the rest came from.''^'* But it seems likely that the amounts spent on the 
three by-elections, all fought when the party had a very narrow majority 
and was constantiy in danger of losing it, were the exception rather than 
the mle. 
Discussion of ways to raise money for elections was usually linked with 
discussion of the need for an organizer. In 1906 Hughes argued at the 
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annual conference that £30 ($60) sliould be spent on each seat for the 
House of Representatives, £60 ($120) for each Senate seat, and £10 ($20) 
for each of the ninety state seats, and in addition that £200 ($400) a year 
was needed for an organizer's salary.''^^ The temporary finance com-
mittee was made permanent at the conference and it proposed that the 
central executive of the party should have a regular income of £1,000 
($2,000) a year for election work over and above die sums spent by the 
branches. But the difficulty was that the PLL could not levy its members 
and that, although the unions could levy theirs, they needed all the money 
they could raise to fight cases before the arbitration court. As far back as 
1894 the need for an organizer had been recognized: a commentator on 
the elections of that year, Frank Fox, editor of die Workman, writing 
under the pseudonym "Frank Renar", who said he had been to a good 
many districts during the campaign, argued that the party needed an 
organizer like Schnadhorst, the Liberal organizer in Great Britain.''^^ He 
thouglit the branch workers lacked efficient control and direction and 
impUed that candidates were left to organize the local branch members 
into work teams and to make all decisions, large and smaU, about these 
campaigns that the branch secretaries should have attended to, and that 
they consequently wasted time that would have been better spent speaking 
and canvassing. He also felt that branch members who spoke for the 
candidate often stole the Umelight, as if trying out their own future 
candidacies, or bored their audiences to tears by long expositions of the 
platform. 
The non-union help the party had for organizing in its early days was 
probably voluntary and almost certainly dl-equipped for the task. The 
diary of one "honorary organiser" in 1892 captures, even in summary 
form, the futOity of much that he did. 
28 Oct: credentials from central committee 
29 Oct: meeting Mittagong 
2 Nov: walked, arrived Picton, held meeting 
3 Nov: walked to Camden 
4 Nov: open-air meeting near station, reorganised this branch called 
on former secretary, editor of Camden Times friendly, left 
Camden 
5 Nov; arrived Liverpool, open-air meeting, passed hat around big 
crowd, got nothing, local paper friendly - ex-member of 
League . . . 
8 Nov: meeting at Sherwood, branch dead . . . 
10 Nov: last money gone, went to Granvdle, meeting at Birks Hotel 
11 Nov; Parramatta, bad camp, no meeting . . . 
14 Nov; Drummoyne then Sydney; to House of Assembly then 
Public Library and back to Drummoyne; entered into contract 
with Workman to canvass for paper 
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15 Nov: Public Library, nothing to eat; handed in credentials; saw 
Holman . . . 
. . . and so on.'^^ It is clear that although the propaganda committee of 
the central executive of the LEL tried to help branches in the 1894 
election it was less wdth a view to winning votes than to securing the 
loyalty of branches and of candidates wiUing to sign the solidarity pledge. 
"Renar's" analysis was almost certainly correct but the party never managed 
to obtain the kind of organizer he had in mind. In later years the inter-
vention of the central executive appears to have been almost whoUy in 
order to settie disputes in branches and to ensure that the rules of the 
party were upheld, and it admitted by implication that it was unable to do 
more by saying that if it had half a dozen organizers the party would win 
many more seats.'•^^ The general secretary of the PLL asked the AWU to 
organize country districts in 1900 and conference agreed, the plan being 
that it would undertake organizing work in all electorates except in 
Broken HiU and in the coastal regions, but in 1901 and 1902 there were 
remarks at AWU conferences which indicated that littie organizing work 
had in fact been done. As late as 1908 and 1909 the central executive of 
the PLL was stdl unable to employ a permanent poUtical organizer for the 
state and had to rely on branches of the AWU to help it with the work.' ^^ 
In die metropolitan area, the Women's Central Organizing Committee 
began to do much of the work after 1904 and even sent its own organizers 
into the country from time to time. 
Want of money was one of the main reasons why no organizer was 
appointed in the early 1900s, and instead the party made do with a 
temporary organizing committee set up just before the elections in 1906 
and 1907 and even then in the 1907 elections it confined itself to work on 
electorates not yet represented by Labor. In 1908, the president of the 
PLL once more appealed for funds for organizing work and the organizing 
committee, stdl temporary, decided to raise the level of branch activity by 
promoting speaking teams and choirs that would move from branch to 
branch. This was thought so successful it was decided to repeat it again in 
1909, and in addition to hold a special class in economics to remedy the 
ignorance of the subject shown by the speakers in 1908.'^'* These 
activities were confined to the Sydney area of course; in the country 
districts the executive had long depended on state and federal Labor 
members of pariiament to make speaking tours, and relied, as it had in the 
nineties, on the special organizing efforts of a few devoted or aspiring 
individuals who were free to travel, and on the help of the AWU organizers 
appointed to do political as well as union work.'^' In 1907 the confer-
ence of the AWU - a meeting of delegates from branches all over Australia 
- recommended that branches appoint year-round political organizers, 
and the Central branch in New South Wales appointed Alf Gardiner the 
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foUowing year. By 1910 the secretary of the AWU was able to tell con-
ference that this kind of work had produced "splendid results". Gardiner 
and Arthur Rae were the two main political organizers at this time. Rae's 
report of diat year describes the work: it consisted of speaking, with the 
help of Labor's federal prime minister Fisher, reviving defunct branches, 
and distributing pamphlets. In twelve months he addressed over 150 meet-
ings, travelled about 12,000 mUes without covering aU of die state, and, 
although not a young man, he proposed to cycle from Cobar to Broken 
HiU througli Wilcannia and White Cliffs. In 1909 the organizing committee 
of the PLL was able to arrange meetings in all electorates.' '''^  
The trade unions, and above all the AWU, helped the party not only 
with funds and organizers but also by maintaining the Labor press in New 
South Wales at this time. Labor men had an unquestioning faith in the 
power of the press, especiaUy of the capitalist press. In 1904, for example, 
ten years after the electoral system had been made relatively democratic, 
George Black argued that, if there were stiU wage-earners and producers 
who did not vote Labor after aU that the party had achieved since 1891, it 
could only be because they had been fooled and diverted by prejudices 
and false issues: by the fiscal question, federation, sectarianism, or even 
personal ambition, all budt up by the non-Labor press. He described these 
people as the "Judas Iscariots of die labor movement", "traitors" who had 
"sold into Slavery the power which should be Sovereign".'^^ The papers 
maintained by the trade unions as a counter to the biased capitalist-owned 
press were weeklies at first. The Australian Workman, the organ of the 
TLC, was conducted throughout the nineties untd it was taken over by 
and merged with the Worker, the AWU paper, in 1897. The Worker itself 
had begun life in 1891 as the Hummer, then the organ of the Wagga Wagga 
branch of the Amalgamated Shearers' Union. After 1900, the Worker was 
enlarged in size to provide reports of Labor and union, especially AWU, 
affairs in all states. By 1909 it was bi-weekly, and the question, long 
discussed by Labor men, whether the party or one of the unions could 
raise the money to launch a dady Labor paper was once more being 
discussed, this time with more hope of success. 
These papers carried detailed accounts of all the major activities of 
Labor organizations, including many of the trade unions - reports of 
conferences and of meetings of the central executive and of branches; 
news of lectures, debates, demonstrations, and above all of elections and 
current political events. The message conveyed in cartoons and much of 
the editorial and other comment was simple and repeated with littie varia-
tion, to the point of tedium. The workers were all honest, lean, upright 
Australians who would win eventually against their overfed upper-class 
enemies — provided they were solid and true to their own class - although 
they constandy suffered setbacks in the stmggle for freedom and justice. 
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usually because the press and the courts were in die hands of their 
opponents, because non-Labor politicians were a corrupt lot, or because 
the "fat men" (capitalists; land, industrial, and commercial monopolists) 
had the wealth. For variation the cartoons occasionally reminded the 
workers of the yeUow hordes to the north — both Japanese and Chinese — 
who were supposed to be anxious to bite large chunks off northern Aus-
tralia. Besides the press, there was a large pamphlet and throwaway litera-
ture, especially around election time. The Australian Workman claimed to 
have mn off and distributed a miUion items in die election of 1894, 
including copies of the Workman. Black's history. The New South Wales 
Labor Party, what it did and wlwt it prevented, first published in 1893, 
sold 90,000 copies and was regularly updated and reissued.'^^ Copies of 
the party's platform and its election manifestos appear to have been pro-
duced regularly and in large numbers. 
Many of the changes in the organization of the party were minor ones 
made necessary by the growth and elaboration of the branch stmcture, by 
the incorporation of the trade unions into it, and by its adaptation after 
1900 to federal as well as to state electoral campaigns. But some changes 
resulted from the adjustment and readjustment of the constant tension 
between the pariiamentary section of the movement, and the trade union 
and branch sections. The parliamentary members, particulariy the more 
forceful men like Holman, often felt that the demands and doctrines of 
the extrapariiamentary wing of the movement were an electoral liabOity 
and imposed an unacceptable constraint on their work in pariiament. This 
feeling became mucU sharper from about 1904 when the party became the 
direct opposition, could no longer exact concessions from a government 
by threatening to withdraw its support, and realized that it had to win 
middle-class votes to gain office. 
The extraparUamentary section, and especially the trade unions which 
provided so much of the money, the manpower, the propaganda, and the 
organizational support of the party, was constantly suspicious of the MPs 
in the party. From the time of the split in the early nineties it was 
axiomatic that Labor members were untrustworthy unless tied down by a 
pledge that made them, if not delegates of, at least coUectively responsible 
to the organization outside pariiament and above aU to the annual confer-
ence of the party and the platforms it enunciated. The platform was not 
regarded simply as a statement of principles and policies for candidates in 
elections but as a prescription for the work of the parliamentarians as weU. 
When members of parliament faded to do what was expected of them they 
could easily be attacked for having betrayed the movement or for having 
put personal considerations above those of the party. The usual argument, 
not so common before 1910 as it was to become afterwards, has been weU 
summarized by ChUde: 
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The parliamentary representative of the workers tends to set himself 
up as a leader and to claim the right to neglect the recommendations 
of Conference, and even the sacred platform itself in accordance 
with his interpretation of the interests of the Party which is 
frequently determined by consideration of personal safety and mere 
political expediency. This is plainly contrary to the Labor theory of 
self-government and has to be checked by the exercise of the 
authority of the governing organs of the party . . . the workers' 
representative is liable to get out of touch with the rank and fUe that 
put him in the legislature, and to think more of keeping his seat and 
scoring political points than of carrying out the ideals he was sent in 
to give effect t o . ' ^^ 
The conflicts engendered by mutual suspicions were adjusted at annual 
conferences without being permanentiy resolved, and, as Childe notes, 
without producing a split in New South Wales between 1894 and 1916. 
But as the various sections jockeyed for positions of power at the confer-
ences and on the central executive of the PLL, the mles, particularly those 
concerning the composition of the executive, were repeatedly altered. 
But the powers of the executive, which were extensive, remained 
virtually unaltered througliout tiie period: it had sole charge of all matters 
relating to elections except those vested in branches and sole control of 
any by-election that foUowed when a Labor member "ratted" on the party 
and was expeUed from it and resigned his seat. It had reserve powers to 
select candidates if branches faded to do so and power to declare branches 
bogus and replace them with new branches if they disobeyed the executive 
or were judged disloyal to the platform. Members of the executive also had 
the riglit to attend and speak, but not to vote, at any branch meeting. The 
central executive of the PLL, which in 1894 consisted of one delegate 
from each branch, one parUamentary delegate for each ten members of the 
parliamentary Labor party, and the president and six delegates from the 
TLC, was reduced to eleven members by 1896. It was then enlarged to 
twenty-two elected by conference, exclusive of members of parliament, 
two ALF delegates, and an unspecified number of delegates of the Sydney 
Labor CouncU in 1900, reduced to twenty-six (including two representa-
tives of the pariiamentary party) in 1903, and then again raised to thirty-
four in 1908. It consisted in 1896 of the president, the secretary, two 
delegates of the ALF and seven members elected by the annual confer-
ence. From 1898 the pariiamentary members of the party were once more 
directly represented; all were allowed to attend and speak at executive 
meetings but they were allowed only a limited number of votes - five at 
first and two from 1902 onwards. Pariiamentarians could, of course, be 
elected to the executive by the annual conference, just as trade unionists 
were, and in 1903 for example seven members of pariiament were put on 
the executive in this way. Despite the conflicts on this question, the 
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executive frequentiy complained of the poor attendance of the parlia-
mentary members at executive meetings. When the ALF was disbanded at 
the end of the century, trade unions were given direct representation in 
the conference and the Sydney Labor CouncU inherited the representation 
of the Federation on the executive, five members in 1900, and two in 
1902. In 1904, shortly after women had been enfranchised, a women's 
central organizing committee was set up and given direct representation in 
the annual conference and on the executive. When the executive was en-
larged to thirty-four members in 1908, each of the bodies lost its separate 
representation on the executive, but Labor members of either house of 
state and federal parliaments could attend and speak at executive 
meetings. 
TUe rules concerning tUe structure of the executive and its powers, and 
the supremacy given in the party's ideology to the conference and the 
platform made it difficult if not impossible for pariiamentarians to regard 
themselves as leaders of the party. McGowen, the first leader of the pariia-
mentary party, was no more than that and he made no attempt to chal-
lenge the extrapariiamentary sections of the party. He was first selected by 
caucus as its leader in 1894, evidentiy after caucus had decided that it 
could no longer afford to rely on a committee for the purpose, and even in 
that role he has been judged "pedestrian" and the party under his leader-
ship at the turn of the century was criticized for lacking boldness, initia-
tive, and decisiveness.'^^ Holman, elected deputy leader in 1905, became 
leader by caucus election when McGowen resigned in 1913. Evatt's bio-
graphy of him reveals a man who was immensely hard working, ambitious, 
and idealistically devoted to the cause of Labor. That cause he interpreted 
in socialist terms in the early nineties, but he soon modified his views untd 
by 1910 he was coming under criticism from the more radical elements of 
the party. Labor politics were his career and he developed great skiU not 
only in oratory and campaigning but in organizing and in managing the 
organization. His skill, experience, and intellectual capacity made him pre-
eminent in the party, even before he obtained formal office in it, but they 
never enabled him to dominate it. 
Holman came to the leadership only after the party had been in office 
for two years, and although it may be said that he then had greater 
opportunities to employ his abUities than McGowen had whUe not in 
office, it must also be said that by the time he became leader much more 
was being demanded of the pariiamentary wing of the party than had been 
expected of it when it was not in power — more than it could reasonably 
accomplish - and Holman had to take much of the blame for what the 
extrapariiamentary sections of the party regarded as its failures and mis-
takes. 
What was equally important was the stmcture of the party as a whole 
57 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
PETER LOVEDAY 
which put internal power in the hands of committees and conferences. 
Individual leaders found it very difficult to rise to a position of long-term 
domination within it. The various sections of the organization — trade 
unions, especially tlie AWU; the Sydney Labor CouncU; the central execu-
tive of die PLL; the federal members from New South Wales; and even the 
organizations in Newcastle and Broken Hill — were all to some extent 
independent of one another, if not autonomous, and gave a base of 
support and power to their leading figures which could be used to check 
the pretensions of any pariiamentary leader. As a result not one but several 
prominent men could usuaUy be identified in the party at any given time, 
and the arrangements made to bring together a diversity of elements when 
the party was founded were carefully preserved for years afterwards in the 
mles, ensuring the representation of different sections of it in its highest 
organs — conference and the executive. By these arrangements power was 
dispersed throughout the organization. 
Suspicion that leaders might betray the movement was usually reserved 
for the pariiamentary members of the party. Betrayal was a highly emotive 
word for what was a prosaic possibUity, namely that members of pariia-
ment might well enter into commitments with non-Labor leaders, 
ministries, or parties in order to gain office or some other temporary party 
or even personal advantage. Commitments that the parUamentary party 
entered into were necessarily a restriction on the control the extra-
parliamentary organs of the party could exercise over it and might even be 
a restriction on the power and freedom of the branches if they concemed 
the selection of candidates for elections. Consequently the members of the 
pariiamentary party were hedged in not only by the pledge which ensured 
that they acted both unitedly and withUi confines set by the platform and 
the conference, but by mles designed to ensure that they remained in-
dependent of other parliamentary groups. From the earliest years it had 
been specified, to quote the mles of 1894, that "members elected to 
parliament [shaU] form a distinct party and shall not merge themselves 
into other parties".'^^ After Cook had accepted the postmaster,-
generalship in Reid's ministry in August 1894, a new mle was added that 
no member of the pariiamentary party could join a ministry unless it was 
composed mainly of Labor party members. The question was debated 
briefly in 1900 when it was proposed at the conference that individual 
party members should be free to join non-Labor ministries, but the 
proposal was defeated.'''* The party maintained its separate identity 
throughout the three-party period without making any written agreements 
with the other parties. But in 1904 and 1905 the question whether the 
party could formally aUy itself with another party in pariiament became 
important not so much because the New South Wales parUamentary party, 
now in opposition, had to decide on its own tactics but because the federal 
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pariiamentary party, under Watson's leadership, had entered into a written 
agreement with the liberal wing of Deakin's Protectionist party in 
opposition in federal parliament in September 1904. The New 
South Wales party debated the question in its conference in 1905 and 
again in 1906. On the first occasion Riley argued that alliances would be 
made merely to get into office, that they created electoral "misunder-
standings", and that they could undo the work of the past. Watson denied 
that Labor had sacrificed any of its planks, its identity, or its programme 
or had bound any of the constitiient organizations, and he managed to 
have a somewhat more moderate motion passed by conference than the 
one proposed."^ But the next year, when the federal aUiance had ceased 
to have any significance anyway and the Victorian branch had proved to 
be far more difficult, not to say obdurate, than the New Soutii Wales 
party, a motion by Lamond was carried that neither federal nor state 
pariiamentary parties should enter into an alliance extending beyond the 
life of the pariiament it was made in, nor grant nor promise immunity 
from opposition in elections.''*" The question of immunity at elections 
was usually raised in this connection and revealed cleariy what was at 
stake, namely that the extrapariiamentary organization would not accept 
any arrangement made by the pariiamentary wing possibly in its favour, 
which could limit the freedom of action of the branches. As early as 1895 
the party had refused to reciprocate when the Council of the Free Trade 
party offered immunity from competition with its candidates and it took 
the same stand again in 1901 in relation to the Progressives.'^' The sup-
position that the pariiamentary party might subvert the organization to its 
own advantage also lay behind the mle that die PLP might not grant 
financial aid to any candidate without first consulting the branch con-
cerned to be assured of the "bona-fides of such candidate". But tiie party 
did not always refuse to grant immunity to its competitors. In 1898, when 
the party was stiU giving support in parliament to Reid's Free Traders, 
renamed the Liberal and Federal party, it had an electoral agreement with 
the Liberal and Federal party which, although its terms were not disclosed, 
granted immunity in some electorates and even made it possible for Labor 
men like Arthur Rae to stand with endorsement from both parties in 
Murmmbidgee, and others, such as Hector Lamond and C. J. Danaliey, to 
have the endorsement and financial support of Reid's party.'^^ 
The performance of the party in pariiament was the final test of the 
efficacy of the mles governing its behaviour. Its legislative performance, 
only part of the whole, could be measured against the platform. In the 
eariiest years, the pamphlets and press of the party had proudly listed the 
achievements of the parUamentary party not so much in assessment of it 
but in order to convince the Labor movement that its entry into politics 
was paying handsome dividends. The achievements were firm evidence to 
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support appeals for funds, votes, and continued organizational effort at 
the branch and trade union level. 
The story of Labor's achievements, set out most fuUy in George Black's 
pamphlets, gave aU credit to the party and none to its opponents in parlia-
ment. During the thirty-five years before 1891, Black said, pariiament had 
passed many bids for "almost every conceivable purpose, save the Unprove-
ment of the material and spiritual condition of the overworked, iU-fed and 
abominably-clothed workers. Many measures were passed... for the 
purpose of making property secure, adding to the privUeges of the 
wealthy, improving the estates of the landowners at public expense and 
alienating Crown lands, but littie or nothing was done to ameliorate the 
condition of the oppressed, to lighten the load of tod and to surround the 
workers with safe and sanitary conditions."'"*^ He could find only eight 
bUls which had benefits for the working class. But once Labor came into 
pariiament much more was done. Before 1895 the Electoral Act of 1893 
was the party's main achievement according to Black, but he also put 
other items to its credit: the Concdiation and Arbitration Act of 1892; the 
Labor Settiements Act of 1893, which was intended to facUitate the 
communal settlement of the unemployed on Crown land in the depth of 
the depression; and a list of bills that passed the Assembly but were 
thrown out in the Legislative CouncU, all of them dealing with subjects ui 
Labor's platform. After 1895 die party had a much easier task - the lower 
house and the ministry (Reid's) — were more democratic according to 
Black, and Reid had made the upper house more compUant by holding die 
election in 1895 on the question of reforming it. The legislation credited 
to Labor from then untU 1904 was listed as twenty-six items, including the 
major acts introducing land and income taxes in 1895; a Workshops and 
Factories Act; a Coal Mines Regulation Act; various acts that further 
amended the Electoral Act of 1893; the "Exclusion of Inferior Races" 
Act; Amendment of the Navigation Act; and Old Age Pensions Act; an act 
prohibiting truck; a Miners' Accident Relief Act; the Women's Franchise 
Act; and major amendments of the industrial arbitration system in 1901 
which made arbitration compulsory, encouraged trade unionism and col-
lective bargaining, and made strikes and lockouts iUegal, under penalties, 
except under specified conditions. In addition to the legislation, Black 
credited the party with a list of administrative reforms in this period: the 
establishment of a minimum wage and of day labour in place of contract 
labour on governmental works; extension of the eight-hour day; preference 
to unionists as far as possible; and various other reforms of interest to 
unionists. 
All of this and much more was explained as the result not merely of 
Labor's support but of its initiative. The argument had two parts: tiie 
governments which passed the legislation held office only with the support 
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of Labor and their legislation could not have been passed without the 
support Labor gave to it. It was also accepted that this support was effect-
ive because it was soUd. The other part of the argument was that Labor's 
inUiative could be proved by reference to its platform. Since non-Labor 
governments needed Labor's votes in the house, they adopted measures 
from the platform to get them. But in addition there was a more indirect 
argument interwoven with that one, to the general effect that non-Labor 
governments were all governments of a mling class of the wealthy, the 
owners of capital and land; that none of the legislation which Labor 
approved of or which was in Labor's interest was to the advantage of the 
wealthy and much of it was to their disadvantage. The non-Labor 
ministries were primarily interested in office, not in reforms; in serving the 
interests of their class by administering the status quo and occasionally 
adjusting it but not in serving the interests of the community as a whole. 
Consequently they could not, by definition, take a reforming initiative, let 
alone an initiative that was of benefit to the class that had interests 
opposed to their own. 
As propaganda this was undoubtedly effective, but as a history of 
Labor's part in the legislation of the period it clauns too much for the 
party. Martin, Gollan, Dickey, and Fitzpatrick have all critically examined 
the legislative record to test this argument. Martin's is a study of the eariy 
years of Reid's government and he concludes that under pressure from 
liberal middle and lower-class voters in town and country, who strength-
ened the radical wing of the Free Trade party and weakened its wealthy 
and conservative wing in the elections of 1894 and 1895, the party under 
Reid adopted policies, on grounds of both social justice and self-interest, 
designed to compel the rich to bear a larger part of the burden of main-
taining the state, to use state action to protect "the smaller man on die 
land, and to ensure that working men engaged in hazardous enterprises like 
mining were given safeguards against the rapacity of their employers".'^'* 
Dickey has emphasized that there "were social refomiers in both fiscal 
camps", Protectionist and Free Trade alike, at this time; that not all of 
Reid's radicalism can be explained as a response to pressure from the 
Labor party; that the "majorities in support of the Factories and Shops 
BUI and the rest were much larger than ever the Labor Party alone could 
muster", that even the upper house made "sane and moderate" qualifi-
cations, which Labor leaders accepted, to some of the legislation. He too 
concludes that "the Labor Party played a far less independent role in the 
accomplishment of. . . social improvement by legislation than diey them-
selves claimed".''*^ Fitzpatrick accepts that Labor members "did much to 
bring about the introduction and enactment of a great deal of social legis-
lation in the interests particularly of working people" at the turn of the 
century but insists that "a substantial amount of social legislation . . . was 
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enacted, especially in Victoria, without Labor pariiamentary aid, though 
not without trade union advocacy in the pariiamentary lobbies" and that 
the "industrial arbitration systems which were soon estabUshed in all parts 
of Australia did not derive from the Labor Party, though all, and especially 
the compulsory system established in New South Wales by Act of 1901 
and in the Commonwealth by Act of 1904, took some of their character 
from Labor pressure on Governments wliich introduced them".'^^ 
GoUan has put the argument more generally. He agrees that the party 
played an important part in the passage of the reforming legislation, but he 
emphasizes diat simdar legislation was passed in other colonies where 
Labor pressure was negligible, that Labor both adopted policies from the 
liberals of democratic reforms and state intervention in the economy and 
put forward policies for social services and the regulation of industry 
which liberals found reciprocally acceptable, the difference being that 
Labor was often prepared to extend the legislation further than liberals. 
He concludes that by the turn of the century "the lines of policies which 
the Labor Party would continue to foUow had already been drawn [and 
they] . . . owed more to liberal thought than to the socialist ideas and 
militant trade unionism diat had been responsible for [the] formation" of 
the party."''' 
This explains why the radical critics of the party thought it had lost 
much of its early idealism and specifically its socialist tendencies in the 
period when its parliamentary power and extrapariiamentary organization 
were consolidated. The contention that the party had once had a strong 
socialist inspiration is an exaggeration. But though the party as a whole 
was not socialist in inspiration and policies, socialists and socialist organiz-
ations did play a more prominent part in its affairs in its eariy years than 
they played in the later nineties and the first decade of the new 
century.*"** 
The ASL, founded in 1887, had proposed in 1894 the formation of a 
pariiamentary socialist party to extend the principle of state ownership by 
legislation abolishing all private ownership of land, industry, and 
capital.'"*^ Shortly afterwards another body, the Social Democratic 
Federation, was launched by the Active Service Brigade, a more radical 
and ideologically an even less sophisticated body than the ASL which had 
concentrated its work on relieving distress in Sydney in the worst years of 
the depression and in mUitant agitation in the Domain. 
This too, in 1895, joined the ASL in saying that a distinct socialist 
political party was desirable, explaining that the present Labor party had 
proved to be a faUure. But for the time being nothing was done to form 
such a party. Many of their leading figures, and many of the more 
moderate Leigh House socialists - men like Hughes and Holman - were 
members of die extrapariiamentary wing of the Labor party, and at the 
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1896 conference of the PLL the Leigli House group in particular 
"numbered eighteen out of thirty-three delegates" and were prominent in 
the executive and on the platform committee.' The committee 
recommended a number of changes in the platform that had a coUectivist 
if not a socialist character, the most important being to add a plank for the 
nationalization of all coal, sUver, copper, and iron mines. ' A littie later 
in May 1896, the ASL produced a revised platform and now advocated in 
it that a distinct socialist party should be formed. The platform, apart 
from calling for the transfer of aU means of production, distribution, and 
exchange to state and municipal ownership, consisted of ten short planks 
all much more radical than socialist in character.' ^ '^  
The next conference of the PLL marked the higli point of socialist 
influence in the party. Representatives included a higlier proportion of 
socialists than in the previous year; a new plank was added to the general 
platform, but not to the fighting platform as proposed, calling for the 
nationalization of land and tUe means of production, distribution, and 
exchange; the executive elected by conference consisted entirely of 
socialists of various shades and the ten men whom conference chose to 
stand as Labor's candidates in the elections to decide who would compose 
the state delegation to the federal convention included six members of the 
ASL and two or three others of socialist inclination, beside the leader of 
the pariiamentary party, McGowen.' ^ 
But from this point the socialist influence — or radier the influence of 
those who called themselves socialists — decUned, chiefly under pressure 
from three sources: the trade unions, Roman Catholics, and the more 
moderate section, especially the parliamentary and so-called political wing, 
of the party. In AprU and May 1897 there were signs that the unions, and 
especially the country unions, notably of shearers, were dissatisfied with 
events at the recent conference. The Australian Workman,^^'^ itself no 
uncritical friend of the socialists at this time, noted that two factions were 
balding for control of the PLL, one union and one non-union based, and, 
in May, MacdoneU, a spokesman for the shearers and other country 
workers in the AWU, insisted that the PLL was established to help obtaui 
practical reforms for the people and not to set in motion macltinery that 
"would bring forth a miUennium for some subsequent generation", and he 
went on to say that though socialists could capture a conference they 
could not capture the vote, and for that what was needed was "less policy 
and more organisation". His comment came at a time when the AWTJ was 
beginning to recover from the demoralization and disorganization it had 
suffered during the worst years of the depression.' ^^ The importance of 
the vote was driven home to the party shortiy before this by the elections 
held on 4 March 1897 to choose delegates to the federal convention. 
The convention, of ten delegates from each colony except Queensland, 
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was to draft a constitution for the federation of the colonies. The Labor 
party had long had reservations about federation and these were only 
partly expressed in the plank, first set out ui 1890 and surviving in 
foUowing platforms, that federation should be on a national, not an 
imperial basis. The party's anxiety was that national interests might be 
sacrificed to British interests by federation of the colonies, particulariy if 
the proposal were influenced in any way by Chamberiain's imperial federa-
tionist ideas. At the 1896 conference, when the decision that the party 
would contest the convention elections was first taken, it was decided that 
Labor's poUcy on federation, to be set out in the election, would be to 
advocate that both upper and lower houses of the federal legislature 
should be popularly elected, that there should be a power of initiation 
vested in the people, that the power of the upper house to veto legislation 
should be restricted, and that the upper house — intended as a states house 
— should be constituted in proportion to population to prevent it being a 
stronghold of conservative interests. At the 1897 conference, the party 
went further and proposed a unicameral populariy elected legislature, and 
insisted that it would approve federation only on these terms. Their fears 
were not only that the upper house might be as deaf to proposals favour-
able to Labor as the New South Wales upper house had recently been, but 
also that, once the power over customs and excise had been transferred to 
the federal parliament, it might undermine the recent legislation for land 
and income taxes in New South Wales that had been seen as democratic 
measures to raise less of the revenue from the working class and more from 
the wealthy and propertied. 
As the campaign for the convention elections began, the party's 
apprehensions about federation were increased when Bruce Smith, a con-
servative Free Trader, said he expected it to act as a barrier to the growth 
of Labor's political power, and by the admission of Cardinal Moran, who 
decided to stand as an independent candidate, that he saw federation as a 
barrier to socialism. Moran's attitude to the Labor party had at first been 
one of independent sympathy, but for two years or more before the 
convention elections he had been indicating to the party his opposition to 
the growing influence of those in it whom he regarded as socialists.' ^^ In 
addition, the Catholic Freeman's Journal, never as sympathetic to the 
party as the Cardinal, had begun to show "undisguised hostility" to the 
party in 1896. Protectionist in its opinions on the fiscal question, and 
cherishing a grudge of ancient origin against the party Parkes had once led, 
because of his association with the protestant sectarians, the Freeman's 
Journal had little time for Labor while it supported free trade and Parkes's 
successor, Reid.' ^ ' 
Moran's candidacy split the vote for the Labor ticket, but it was only 
one of the factors contributing to the defeat of all ten Labor candidates. 
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Another was the sectarianism introduced into the election by the forma-
tion of a United Protestant Conference and the intervention of the Loyal 
Orange Lodge, which either chose their own or endorsed existing candi-
dates with a view to defeating Moran. Labor's inexperience in conducting a 
state-wide election, the low turn-out, the election being on a working day, 
and perhaps the doubts that others who were non-Catholics had about 
socialist influence in the part / were aU factors contributing to the 
defeat.'^^ Whatever the explanation for Labor's defeat in the convention 
elections might be, members of the party, particularly those who were 
members of parUament and who had already begun to think that the 
socialist influence might be an electoral Uability, had their doubts 
strengthened considerably by it. These men included some who had been 
prominent propagandists for socialism in earlier years. 
Holman, soon to become a member of parliament, was one of them and 
at the 1897 conference in January he argued strongly against including the 
general nationalization plank in the platforms on the ground that it would 
be electorally ill-advised to do so. Hughes made it plain before this, when 
the ASL had talked of the need for a separate socialist party, that although 
he was a socialist his loyalty was to the Labor party. Both men had 
recently done much organizing work in country electorates, in many of 
which the AWU was the main source of votes, and so presumably were in 
touch with country opinion; both had stood as candidates in elections, 
Hughes successfully, and by the end of 1897 both were engaged in negotia-
tions for organizational changes to increase the influence of country 
branches and members of pariiament in the PLL - something radicals had 
always been opposed to. Black, another one-time socialist now a member 
of pariiament, argued in May 1897 that conferences which took up 
abstract questions and added impossible planks to the platform — meaning 
nationaUzation — had a disintegrating effect on the party and that con-
ferences should confine themselves to discussing plans of campaign and the 
organization of elections. The Sydney District Assembly of the PLL - the 
stronghold of Social Democratic Federation men - replied by attempting 
to pass a vote of censure on the members of pariiament and a couple of 
months later censured the PLL executive for not-submitting the revised 
platform to the branches and not publishing it. The executive ignored the 
censure and insisted it was responsible only to conference, which suggests 
that the socialists who predominated in it were more moderate and cir-
cumspect than their critics.'^^ 
Towards the end of 1897 preparations were made for the next con-
ference to be held in January 1898, and the main aim of the more 
moderate members of the party was to obtain a modification of the rules 
to admit all the pariiamentary members of the party to the executive. The 
secretary, the AWU's Lamond, "reorganized" the league branches - it had 
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been noticed in May 1897 that many were defunct — reducing the number 
of delegates considerably. The conference was also transferred from 
Sydney to Newcastle "mainly because of country protests against city 
domination".'^° 
The preparations were effective — of the twenty delegates present, only 
a third were from city branches and aU of the parUamentary members were 
admitted to the executive but only five were given votes in it. A left-wdng 
proposal that the nationalization plank be removed from the body of the 
platform and set at its head as a principle was defeated and so too was a 
proposal that it be dropped altogether. It remained in the platform as the 
second last of twenty-five planks. The fighting platform, chosen with a 
view to the approaching elections, consisted of four planks: abolition of 
the upper house, coupled with the introduction of the initiative and 
referendum; establishment of a national bank; state pensions for the aged 
and infirm; and local government reforms. Others that were evidently 
regarded as tinged with socialist thought were removed from the fighting 
platform.'^' One prominent socialist complained that the Labor party, 
meaning the pariiamentary members, had deliberately packed the con-
ference, had secured the proxies of absent delegates, or come as repre-
sentatives of branches which were probably not genuine. Holman com-
plained only of the change in mles that permitted a sitting member to 
remain as the candidate of a branch unless it saw reason for a baUot; he 
thought candidates should be balloted for every time because it kept the 
MPs on their toes and revived interest at the branch level.'^^ The ASL 
decided a few weeks later at its Easter conference to set up a separate 
political party and to insist upon its own mle, previously ignored but now 
prescribed for the new party, that members of the Socialist Labor party 
(SLP) could not join other parties. Most of those who had been prominent 
socialist propagandists in the past or in other ways associated with the 
Leigh House group of the ASL — men like Hughes, Holman, Spence, 
Sleath, Hepher, Flowers, and others — remained in the Labor party and 
did not join the SLP.'^^ 
The nationalization plank itself remained in the platform in various 
places, usually towards the end, untd it was removed by the PLL confer-
ence in 1905. In the meantime, the warnings that Moran had given the 
party before the election of 1897 had ceased and the Catholic press had 
changed its attitude. The cardinal and the press began to give the party 
public signs of guarded approval, particulariy after 1901. With federation, 
the fiscal question had been moved out of state politics and the Freeman's 
Journal could no longer regard that as a major question in its judgment of 
the state party. The party had, in any case, already transferred its support 
from Reid in 1899 to Lyne's, then to See's government, although each 
soon appeared to be no better than Reid's. A new paper, the Catholic 
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Press, had been formed late in 1895 to develop a more independent line 
than the Freenwn's Journal and, althougli it occasionally reminded Labor 
of the dangers of toying with socialism, it too gave Labor sympathetic 
consideration. There was, perhaps, little else Catholic papers and spokes-
men could do. Many Catholic workers had already attached themselves to 
the Labor party for class and economic reasons and the party appeared to 
be the only one which was independent of the growing influence of 
sectarian organizations of protestants, especially after 1900. There were 
growing numbers of Catholics among Labor party candidates and members 
of pariiament; there was evidence that the party had good support from 
electorates in which Moran had polled well in 1897, and the party showed 
its sympathy with the Irish Home Rule Movement in 1902. Finally, at the 
time of the party conference in Febmary 1905, Moran made it clear and 
the Freeman 's Journal echoed him that he did not regard Labor as socialist 
in any sense condemned by papal encyclicals.' '^* 
At that conference, Cann, the delegate from the Amalgamated Miners' 
branch of the PLL at Broken Hill, moved that the state and federal 
fighting platforms should both have a permanent preamble defining the 
ultimate objective of the party and this he proposed should be "a co-
operative commonwealth founded upon the socialisation of the produc-
tion and distribution of wealth". The phrase a "co-operative common-
wealth" had been used before in the revised manifesto of the ASL in 1898 
after it broke with Labor and reminded members of a popular contem-
porary text on socialism, Gronlund's Cooperative Commonwealth. The 
Mudgee branch had proposed that the old nationalization plank, now the 
seventeenth in the platform, should be dropped altogether. These motions 
reopened the debate of the nineties. One after another, the delegates 
argued that Labor had succeeded since 1898 not by following "theories" 
but by doing "practical work", that the people of New South Wales were 
"not yet educated up to that state of things", that the party would reach 
its goal at some future day, but if they announced that they "wished to 
become socialists straightaway they would do the cause more harm than 
good", that they should not "lose their chance of power in all the states 
by adopting this German fad".'^^ Only one or two spoke out against this 
chorus and by eighty votes to fifty-five Cann's proposal for an objective 
was referred to a committee to devise a preamble. The committee 
proposed that the party adopt as its objective: 
the cultivation of an Australian national sentiment based upon the 
maintenance of racial purity, and the development in Australia of an 
enlightened and self-reliant community [and] 
the securing of the fuU results of their industry to all producers by 
the coUective ownership of monopolies and the extension of the 
industrial and economic functions of the State and Municipality. 
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After an amendment to remove the word "national" from it — Morrish, 
one of Cann's supporters, argued that the trend of the times was inter-
nationalist - this was adopted as the party's objective and plank 17, for 
nationalization, was removed from the platform by the unanimous vote of 
conference. 
Speaking a few months later, Watson, the federal leader of the party 
and one of the most prominent men in the New South Wales party, 
summarized the party's position on sociaUsm. He said that "they looked 
forward to the ideal when coUectivism took the place of competition in 
this worid; [when] production would be for use, not profit. But they 
recognised that that condition of things could not be attained all at once 
. . . and in the meantime . . . they were going to devote their energies to 
relieving the community from the incubus of monopoly." 
And in federal pariiament at the same time, touching a theme that was 
to bedevd the Labor party for another decade or more, he insisted that he 
was a state socialist and "not a social democrat in the sense in which some 
understand the term. I do not believe that diose engaged in a particular 
industry should control it. I am a State Socialist; that is, I believe diat the 
whole community should manage whatever industries they take over. . . I 
believe that Socialism wiU find its greatest development through the 
municipalities." At the Australian political Labor conference a few 
days later, constituted by six delegates from the parties in each of the sbc 
states, the objective devised by New South Wales eariier in the year was 
adopted as the objective for the federal platform, in preference to others 
more aggressively socialistic, by twenty-three votes to eleven, the six from 
Victoria and five from Queensland constituting the minority.'^* 
What the party contented itself with had been becoming popular for 
some time: the nationalization of particular monopolies, the establishment 
of state-owned productive enterprises to supply materials bouglit by the 
state in large quantities or for defence purposes and the setting up of 
state-owned enterprises to compete with capitalist enterprises. The Com-
monwealth Trades Union Congress, for example, had carried motions three 
years eariier for the nationalization of the coal and iron industries on these 
grounds.'^^ A more subtle argument, but one stdl leading to the same 
state socialist conclusion, was presented to the public by Holman in 1906 
in the Reid-Holman debate. Holman spoke officially on behalf of the 
Labor party in defence of its socialism, at a time when Reid was develop-
ing his famous "Socialist tiger" propaganda campaign. The main steps in 
Holman's argument were that monopoly was natural to capitalism in its 
evolution and that 
where these monopolies have reached the stage of complete national-
isation of an industry, where all the articles of a certain kind . . . are 
made under a single contract, there we say we have arrived at a state 
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of things which is absolutely incompatible with the continued 
freedom, happiness or development of the individual citizens of that 
country . . . we deny that we have struggled away from the tyranny 
of the old regime, that we have fought our way out of the old 
military institutions of the colony, that we have overthrown the 
dictatorship of Downing-Street, and established self-governing and 
constitutional institutions here in order to subject ourselves again to 
the unrestricted and unfettered tyranny of an economic mastership 
such as monopolists would be able to impose upon us.'"'o 
The message was distinctly ambiguous: it hinted at a proper Marxian 
analysis of the development of monopoly in capitalist economies but it 
also activated a nationalistic anti-British sentiment and a judicious liberal 
radical concern for individual freedom and self-government. It all 
depended on which adjectives the audience attended to. Its general 
tendency was famUiar to those in the Austrahan SociaUst party who held 
the Labor party in contempt for its want of socialist doctrines. Andy 
Thomson, speaking on the 1905 conference before the Reid-Holman 
debate, put the idealistic contrast between state socialism and democratic 
socialism sharply and in terms much more effective than those used by 
Reid, even though some of Reid's arguments were the same. The ASL 
agreed with Holman that capitalism had inevitable tendencies towards 
monopoly but disagreed with him about the way in which it miglit be 
conquered and democratized. For Holman, state ownership was sufficient 
and that was what Thomson, speaking for the ASL, denied. "The tmst", 
he said, "was efficiently organised capitalist industry, but it took no 
thought of human welfare throwing men and women on the human scrap-
heap in its progress."'^' But nationalization by the state was not the 
answer for a variety of reasons: first, if the second part of Labor's 
objective meant what it said, it was incoherent, because if the producer got 
the profits none would be left for the state and vice versa; secondly, the 
workers would probably be in a worse position under the bureaucracy of a 
state enterprise than under the management of a private monopoly; 
thirdly, if they did gain it would be at the expense of other sections in 
society; fourthly. Labor governments in control of nationalized industries 
would have to conform to the prevailing conditions of a predominantiy 
capitalist society or be hit in a "vital part" ^ the financial part; and, 
finally, no state-run and therefore bureaucratic enterprise could hope to 
compete successfully with private firms. 
Thomson faUed to explain whether he thought society should take 
everything over at once in the course of a revolutionary upheaval or 
whether it might all be democratized from within by some other process. 
The question was one which the Labor party had to face again in a few 
years' time in a more difficult context, but for the time being it seemed 
safe to ignore it. The proposal was once more put before conference in 
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1909 that the objective be changed to say that the party was committed to 
"the securing of the full results of their industry to all producers by the 
collective ownership of die means of production, distribution and 
exchange". After some debate, in which the old arguments were heard 
once more, Holman stood and intemperately said - amid disorder when he 
repeated it - that "there seems to be an impression that this littie idiotic 
idea from Broken HiU [is] tme socialism".'^'^ Against that he posed the 
present objective of steady progress in the development of state and 
municipal functions and the observation that European sociaUsts had 
already begun abandoning the notion that the socialist state could be 
reached by the collective ownership of the means of production, distribu-
tion, and exchange. Hughes agreed, but with the less exasperating argu-
ment that they must talk to the people in the language they understood if 
the party was to win elections. The proposal to alter the objective was 
rejected. 
The party was to win both state and federal elections in the next year, 
but by then it was becoming clear that the pariiamentary party would 
scarcely enter office to accomplish major reforms in the fuUness of its 
strength but would face a most difficult period from both its opponents 
and its own extrapariiamentary organization. But this was not apparent to 
everyone in the party at the time; many expected it to make great strides 
once it gained office and its failure to do so led to a mood of fmstration 
and discontent that was turned against the first Labor government.'^' 
IV 
The party took office for the first time on 21 October 1910, after the 
Wade government had been defeated in the elections of that year. The 
caucus selected the members of the ministry, and McGowen, the party 
leader, allocated the portfolios. Holman became attorney general, Nielsen 
secretary for lands, Griffith minister for public works, and Beeby minister 
for public instruction and labour and industry - to name only those who 
were later at the centre of most conflict within the party. The party won 
forty-six seats in the Assembly, which left it with a majority of one after 
the speakership had been filled from its ranks, but it did obtain some 
support from the seven independents. Party lines were now more firmly 
drawn than at the end of the 1890s and a ministry which had a narrow 
majority had more to fear from deaths, resignations, and internal splits 
than from individual defections and the manoeuvres of the opposition, 
although, as soon became apparent, the ministry could stiU suffer embar-
rassments of those kinds too. 
After the election of 1891 the party had hailed its success with elation; 
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in 1910 the mood was more sober, although the hopes of its supporters 
were still considerable. Their expectations at the time were moderated by 
the knowledge that although a Labor government should be able to do a 
great deal more for the working class than non-Labor governments depend-
ent on the party and under pressure from it, the new government could 
not bring about a massive reformation of society. Apart from die party's 
numerical weakness in the Assembly, the Legislative CouncU, in which it 
had only a minority of supporters, could easdy block Labor legislation; 
there had already been signs that the federal party, now in power with a 
substantial majority in both houses for the first time, might not do as the 
party leaders in New South Wales wished; and, beyond that, no one 
famUiar with the party's twenty-year history could suppose that the 
diverse elements of which it was composed would always work harmon-
iously together and in support of a Labor government towards objectives 
which it felt were within the realm of practical politics. What is more, 
although the depression was fifteen years back in history when the party 
came to power, it stiU had effects on the workforce which increased the 
pressure on the party from its industrial wing and especially from that 
section of it, the mass unions of the unskUled, which were the least likely 
to be tolerant of politicians. 
Except for the effects of a major drought in 1901 and 1902, from 
which the state did not fully recover untU 1905, tUe economy of the state 
expanded steadily up to the outbreak of war in 1914.'^^ Coal output 
avaUable for consumption doubled between 1896 and 1914 and the 
amount avaUable for domestic consumption trebled. Manufacturing 
employment, which reached a low in 1893, rose steaddy from 51,000 in 
1896 to 121,000 in 1913, dien feU slightly in the first years of the war, 
and rose again from 1917 to 1920.'^^ 
But the unskiUed workforce in mining, agriculture, and the pastoral and 
construction industries suffered chronic unemployment from die depths 
of the depression onwards, relieved only temporarily and for particular 
sections by brief bursts of economic activity. The relocation of the un-
skiUed workforce, from industries where it was higlily productive to 
industries where it was not, kept wages down, and the failure of the 
government to resume its old levels of expenditure on capital works 
accentuated the problem. The average weekly wages of the whole work-
force fell from 1891 to 1900 and then rose again slowly, but did not 
exceed the index figure for 1891 untU 1911. Wages in manufacturing 
employment did not faU as far and by 1894-95 had returned to the level 
of 1891. But unskilled labour suffered a loss of wages of about 20 percent 
in the depression which was not recovered untU 1921. Even before the 
war, "because of the movement in retaU prices and house rent, and the 
reappearance of high unemployment for considerable periods, wage 
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earners as a socio-economic group had made little material progress overall 
from 1891 to 1914, although for a short period, 1909-1913, higher 
effective wages were received".'^^ Good seasons from 1906 helped in that 
recovery, but it was by no means complete for the unskilled or the 
chronically unemployed when war broke out.'^^ Then the almost im-
mediate drying up of loan money, and the pegging of wages in a period 
when food prices rapidly began to rise, brought increasing hardship to 
large numbers in the workforce. 
Another effect of the depression, as we have noted, was the weakening 
of the trade union movement. But from the later nineties onwards, partiy 
because of major organizing drives by the Labor CouncU and the AWU, the 
amendments of 1901 to the industrial legislation, the changed tactics of 
unions in relation to arbitration, and the slow return of relative prosperity, 
the numbers of both unions and of union members rose. In 1900 there 
were about 23,000 members in 42 unions; by 1910 there were 127,000 in 
166 unions. Many of the unions were poor and small and aU were 
"relatively weak for most of the 1900s", but this, far from subduing the 
unions, did little to decrease their soUdarity when the Broken HUl lockout 
and the general coal miners' strike occurred within a few months of one 
another in 1909.''^* 
The poUtics of the year 1911 brought to the surface almost all the 
questions which were to weaken the Labor party and hamper the ministry 
without resolving any of the disputes about them; industrial problems 
concerning wages, hours, strikes, and arbitration; relations between the 
federal and the state governments and incidentally between the state and 
federal wings of the party; and relations between the parliamentary and 
extrapariiamentary wings and the industrial and country sections of the 
party organization in New South Wales. 
The mixed feelings of the party in victory were reflected in the address 
of the president of the PLL, Minahan, when he opened the annual confer-
ence of the party early in 1911, three months after the party had taken 
office. "The vessel of Labor", he said, "had saUed out of the harbor of 
theoretical politics, and was now upon the broad ocean of politics. It was 
manned by a crew of loyal pariiamentarians, but with the cargo aboard the 
vessel was now well down to the water line . . . Their Federal Labor 
Government had justified the confidence reposed in it by the people of 
Australia and the manner in which die State Government had conducted 
itself had not only brouglit credit upon itself, but had added prestige to 
their movement."'''^ All this hinted at more than he could say openly: 
namely that the government might be unable to follow a course as strai^t 
as the ideological purists would expect or move as fast in satisfying 
demands as its supporters hoped; that die pariiamentarians would of 
necessity play a major part in determining the course Labor foUowed in 
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power; that, as the word "loyal" hinted, they should not be judged too 
rashly or too soon; and that the party had such a backlog of demands since 
U was in opposition in 1904 that the ministry might well be unable to 
satisfy all of them as soon as the party would like. 
His forebodings and warnings were amply justified - there were now 
two Labor vessels, not just one, on the ocean, and the New South Wales 
party and its supporters had expectations of both and could judge each by 
comparison with the other. The two conferences of 1911 - the annual one 
which Minahan opened, and a special one called later in the year to discuss 
the course of the New South Wales party - provided the opportunities for 
making that judgment. 
The ground for one of the conflicts in 1911 was laid at the interstate 
conference of delegates from the six state Labor parties held in Brisbane in 
1908. That conference decided unanimously that the party in federal 
politics should advocate alterations to the federal constitution which 
would enable the Commonwealth government to make the policy of "new 
protection" effective, to provide for the nationalization of monopolies, 
and to put the powers of the federal conciliation and arbitration court 
beyond doubt and its decisions beyond challenge in the Higli Court. 
The policy of new protection, given form in federal legislation passed 
by Deakin's government in 1906 with Labor support, was designed to 
ensure that the workers got a cut, in the form of improved wages and 
conditions, from the benefits of the protection given to Australian 
industry by the federally designed tariff system and other legislation. This 
legislation had been declared invalid by the High Court in Barger's Case 
and the Union Label Case in 1908, althougli improved wages were 
obtained through the federal conciliation and arbitration court, notably as 
a result of Higgins's Harvester judgment. But the powers exercised by that 
court had been under review by the High Court too and in some important 
respects they had been whittied down, particulariy by its judgment in the 
Railway Servants Case in 1906. The unions, always short of money, found 
their funds swallowed up winning arbitration court awards that were sub-
sequently declared invalid in the High Court. And yet they believed that 
much more could be obtained for their members, especially those in inter-
state unions like the AWU, from federal industrial legislation and court 
actions than from state legislation and state courts and wages boards. 
Finally, the nationalization of monopolies, which for many in the party 
was precious because it was almost aU that remained after years of argu-
ment of its early socialist inheritance, was a plank in both state and federal 
platforms, but the federal pariiament did not have the power to enable a 
Labor government to give effect to it. In addition, the High Court had 
ruled in 1908 that the Commonwealth could not use its corporations 
power to break up intrastate trusts.' *" 
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To carry out the decision of the 1908 conference to alter the constitu-
tion, the federal party had to pass the necessary biUs in the Common-
wealth pariiament and submit them to a federal referendum. When the 
party took office briefly at the end of 1908 it did not have the power to 
do this, but its victory in 1910 gave it the majorities it needed in both 
houses. In the meantime, two different lines of thought about the pro-
posals had been developed; Holman had emerged as the main protagonist 
of the states rights position, and Hughes, the attorney general in Fisher's 
federal ministry, as the advocate of increased Commonwealth powers.'*' 
This position was often labeUed unificationist because there had always 
been a section of the party which regarded a federal system as inherently 
conservative and any move to enlarge Commonwealth powers as a step 
towards the abolition of state parliaments. The party was generaUy con-
vinced that even the more modest objective of enlarging the industrial 
powers of the Commonwealth could be achived only by changing the 
constitution by means of a referendum, and consequently the alternative 
procedure, of inducing aU the states to refer the necessary powers to the 
Commonwealth, was given scarcely any consideration at first. 
The conflict between Holman and Hughes over the extension of federal 
powers was particularly serious for the New South Wales party because 
Hughes too had his political base and powerful aUies in it. The proposal for 
a referendum had been firmly supported by the AWU in 1909'^^ and by 
the more doctrinaire unificationists in the party at its conference early in 
1910 before the party had won power in either federal or state elections. 
The arguments for extending federal powers were both thrashed out again 
at that conference, and the unificationist motions were rejected by large 
majorities. The alternative motion that "the states shall hand over to the 
Federal Parliament the power to legislate in aU industrial matters" was 
carried by 95 to 35 votes, and although two of the future ministers in New 
South Wales, Beeby and Nielsen, argued against it the vote was a com-
promise rather than a defeat for Holman.'*' McGowen avoided the 
question altogether in his policy speech in May 1910 for the state 
elections.'*•* In October the federal government began debate on the two 
bills that were to be put to a referendum to extend Commonwealth 
powers, and on the eve of the conclusion of the debate McGowen, 
Holman, and Beeby set out for Melbourne by train in a fmitiess effort to 
induce Hughes to make alterations in them. 
Minahan therefore had every reason to expect that the conference in 
1911 would be tense and quarrelsome. On its second day it resolved, with 
only a few dissenting votes, that it supported the proposed amendment of 
the constitution to be put forward in the referendum set down for April 
and urged electors to vote yes to the two bids. Holman told the conference 
that he and his state coUeagues would not oppose the decision to support a 
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yes vote.'*^ The report of what then happened given by the Worker, 
which was tersely opposed to Holman, captures some of the flavour of the 
proceedings: 
On Saturday [State] Attorney-General Holman, noticing that the 
attendance of delegates had considerably lessened, and that Mr 
Watson and other advocates of United Australia were absent, 
recognised that this was a good opportunity to gain a snatch-vote for 
Little Australia. He, therefore, moved the suspension of the standing 
orders, so that conference might vote at once on the motions of 
which he had given notice for the following Monday. He appealed 
for unanimity - and he got a majority of 10 in a Conference of 240 
delegates! . . . Delegates opposed to Holmania as a Federal policy 
were of course unprepared for the insidious move, but they put up a 
hard fight. 
On Monday evening when the conference reassembled there was a 
big roll-up. The possibility of the Holman resolutions . . . threatening 
the existence of the labor movement had begun to be recognised, 
and the majority of delegates were determined to nip anything of 
that sort in the bud . . .*^*' 
Holman's three resolutions, only the first two of which were carried before 
the conference rescinded them by 129 votes to 82, were designed to save 
his position by sidestepping the earlier decision of the conference. The 
resolutions were that the interstate conference of the party, composed of 
six delegates from the Labor party in each of the states, should be recon-
stituted on a population basis; that the present interstate conference 
should confine itself to effecting the reconstitution and that the "Labor 
movement [should] oppose all further extension of the power of the 
federal pariiament until the [federal] constitution has been reorganised 
upon lines which secure pariiamentary supremacy". 
These proposals were anathema to the AWU conference which was 
meeting at the same tune in Sydney and it decided to send a strong letter 
to the PLL conference which expressed, among other things, its "in-
d ignan t" r e sen tmen t against the "traitorous attitude of Mr. 
W. A. Holman" and its desire that he should get out of the Labor move-
ment and fight it from outside. In the debate which followed in the PLL 
conference, words like "treachery", "Labor rats", "solidarity", "an enemy 
within", "a small clique", and so on were freely used and finaUy con-
ference unanimously passed two more resolutions condemning Holman's 
action as unconstitutional and expressing tiie opinion that he ought to be 
asked to resign from the party.' '^^  
The anger the conference expressed against Holman was soon extended 
to the pariiamentary party as a whole and especially to those in it who, 
though not opposing the yes campaign, had faded to support it, sometimes 
ostentatiously. When the referendum was held, it resulted in a defeat for 
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the advocates of the yes vote which was only a fraction of the Labor vote 
in the two preceding state elections, and the government's critics were 
furious. Holman issued a statement that every member of the state cabinet 
was agreed that the federal government should have the powers specified 
at the Brisbane conference, and insisted that what Hughes asked for in the 
referendum went far beyond what had been agreed on. He added that the 
government intended to take steps "at once" to pave the way for a 
transfer of powers. But Hughes's case was that what the Brisbane confer-
ence wanted done could not be done at aU without additional supple-
mentary powers. Evatt comments that "whUe Holman was right from the 
point of view of party discipline and constitution, Hughes's general reason-
ing was not easily answerable by those who professed Labor 
principles".'** 
But to the Worker, the AWU, and many of the branches of the PLL 
these were subtleties. The Worker sought branch opinions under the head-
luie "What shaU we do with them?" meaning the state MPs, after the 
Labor CouncU had suggested that a special conference should be held. 
From May to July it had over forty replies urging either condemnation of 
them or a special conference, whUe only about seven replies favoured 
Holman and the government.'*^ The Bourke branch of the AWU was 
scathing in its secretary's annual report in May, and the Central branch, 
disappointed that "nothing much, if anything, of value to the workers has 
as yet been placed on the Statute Book by the new Government", con-
tented itself with finding excuses for it.'^'' The Labor CouncU of New 
South Wales, on the other hand, referred in its half-yearly report in June 
to the "marked abUity displayed by the State Labor Government in . . . 
their administration of existing laws, the introduction of new legislation 
. . . Handicapped as they are by their small majority, their task is a very 
hard one, and is likely to become harder and more difficult when the BiUs 
now before the Assembly reach the Upper House".'^' 
The special conference - formally two special conferences - of the 
party was set down for August 1911. The Worker reminded delegates on 
the eve of its meeting that "every no vote cast in the referendum . . . was a 
seed of evU sown in the life of the nation" and, after noticing increased 
industrial strife, concluded that Australia was confronted by a mono-
polistic conspiracy to plunge the country into industrial war and to make 
dividends out of the suffering of the people which the Commonwealth was 
utteriy helpless to prevent.'^^ The second conference was held first and 
debate began on a censure moved by the Randwick branch and on the 
motion of the Bourke branch, AWU, for the expulsion of Holman, Page, 
and Beeby as traitors because they had either failed to advocate a yes vote 
or had openly advocated a no vote in the referendum. 
But, quite fortuitously, the ministry was in die middle of a major 
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political crisis in parUament. Led by Holman, as acting premier whUe 
McGowen was abroad attending the coronation, the parUamentary party 
had completely outmanoeuvred the opposition in a situation where they 
seemed certain to be defeated. "Conference delegates cheered Holman to 
die echo, his welcome easily eclipsing that of Huglies", and it was soon 
clear that in this atmosphere no censure of Holman would be carried.'^' 
The censure and expulsion motions were negatived, and Watson spoke, 
teUing delegates that he too felt bitter about the result of the referendum 
but that he would not give the advice Holman himself gave twelve years 
before, when Sleath and Ferguson were expelled, to thmst traitors into the 
outer darkness. He then moved that "with a view to maintaining the 
solidarity of the Labor movement and preventing a recurrence of the 
unsatisfactory position in connection with the recent Federal F.^ ferendum 
this Special Conference hereby directs that in future an executive shall not 
endorse as a Labor candidate any person who, henceforth at a referendum, 
opposes or fails to support proposals submitted to the p.ople by the 
Federal or State Labor parties, provided that such proposals have first 
been endorsed by an interstate or New South Wales Conference." Hughes 
and Holman both put their arguments; Foster (the member for New 
England) made a foriorn attempt to raUy the radicals by speaking of the 
states rights curse and reminding Labor of the noble cry " 'Workers of the 
worid unite! You have a world to gain and nothing to lose but your chains' 
(Cheers)". Watson's motion was then carried, the question whether Page 
who had faded to campaign for a yes vote should be re-endorsed as a 
Labor candidate was left to the Botany branch, and the delegates recon-
vened as the first special conference. That meeting decided to alter the 
basis of representation at conference to increase the influence of the 
unions at the expense of the smaller branches; it deprived the Labor 
CouncU of its separate representation at conference, and told Broken HUl 
delegates that their proposal to form a distinct Trade Union party was 
inadvisable.'^'* The conference broke up, Evatt concludes, "with Holman 
in full enjoyment of the confidence of the pariiamentary party, of die 
Labor Leagues and of the majority of the unions".'''^ But diough the 
conference was a vindication for Holman for the time being, powerful 
sections of the movement remained unreconcUed or suspicious: the AWU, 
especially the Bourke branch; the Broken HUl miners; the Worker edited 
by Lamond; some of the city branches of the PLL and the PLL executive 
itself. 
The pariiamentary crisis which made acting-premier Holman the hero of 
the hour in August 1911 arose when two country Labor members. Home 
(Liverpool Plains) and Dunn (Mudgee), resigned their seats in opposition 
to the government's land policy during a debate on the policy initiated by 
an opposition censure motion. The state platfomi of the party after the 
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PLL conference of 1910 included land and financial reforms as the second 
of the planks in its figliting platform, and one of these was the "immediate 
cessation of Crown Land Sales". The plank also included a proposal for 
the consolidation and amendment of existing land legislation to provide 
for compulsory resumption of privately owned land for closer settiement, 
water conservation, and irrigation, and a list of smaller reforms intended to 
facUitate settiement by small owners and to stop speculation. McGowen 
had emphasized in his policy speech in May 1910 that the financial and 
raUway policies of the party were intimately linked with its land policy, 
both in order to facditate settiement and to promote decentralization. 
Opening up Crown lands was to be the first task, before any privately 
owned land was resumed. And he went on to say that "he had been 
creditably [sic] informed that in the central districts there were two 
miUion acres of land fit for agricultural purposes that was leased", that is 
Crown land.'^^ 
Homestead selections in Crown land up to 1908 had been made only on 
terms of perpetual leasehold established by an act of 1895. In 1908 the 
Wade government had framed a conversion act that gave leaseholders the 
right to convert their tenures to freehold. The principle of no further sales 
of Crown land in the Labor platform required repeal of this conversion 
act, and in a statement made shortiy after taking office McGowen had 
reiterated that remaining Crown lands would be leased, not sold. 
The PLL conference in January 1911 had rejected motions to remove 
the nationalization of land from the general platform and to have a 
committee of country delegates revise the plank. A motion was carried 
"regretting" that Nielsen the secretary for lands had been prepared to 
depart "from the leasehold principle even in such a small degree" as to 
propose the sale of a small piece of urban Crown land at Maroubra.' 
Nielsen amplified the policy early in 1911 saying that bills were pre-
pared to consolidate the twenty-four land acts and that they would be 
foUowed by amending bUls which would include a bdl to repeal the con-
version act. Wade moved an amendment to the address-in-reply dis-
approving of the proposed repeal but it was defeated. In July 1911 he 
again moved a censure on the government's land policy which this time 
brought on a pariiamentary crisis and provoked internal conflict in the 
Labor party. Black convened a two-day meeting of twenty-four of its 
members from country areas which produced a set of motions that sub-
sequently formed the basis of the decision reached in caucus.'^* 
Before the vote was taken, Home and Dunn resigned their seats. They 
had arranged pairs for the division, which were honoured, and the censure 
was defeated but the government was left with only forty-three members 
against forty-four Liberals and independents. All but two of the seven 
independents were old Progressive party members representing country 
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electorates and, althougli they had all declared their intention of support-
ing the government at the beginning of the parliament, in the amendment 
to the address-in-reply they abstained and some of them voted with the 
opposition in the second censure motion. Holman decided he could not 
carry on until the two by-elections had been held and souglit supply and a 
special adjournment of six weeks, but then, when the house seemed 
certain to vote against the adjournment, he asked the lieutenant governor, 
CuUen, for a prorogation and, when that was refused, he submitted the 
ministry's resignation. CuUen saw Wade, who agreed to form a government 
if promised a dissolution should he not be able to control the house. 
CuUen refused to promise that and then asked Holman to carry on, now 
granting him the prorogation he had first asked for. MeanwhUe, in order to 
free another Labor member to vote in divisions, Cann had resigned the 
speakership. But caucus then decided that the act repealing the conversion 
act should not interfere with existing land rights and at that point Nielsen, 
who was determined to foUow decisions of the conference and the plat-
form, resigned his portfolio, saying that although he would remain a loyal 
party member he could not take a post in a future Labor government. 
Dunn announced that the decision removed his objection to the land 
policy and he rejoined the party. But the two by-elections left matters 
where they stood: each party won one seat, leaving Labor with forty-five 
to forty-five Liberals and independents. 
This meant that if the speakership were filled by a Labor party man the 
government would again be in a minority, but Holman extricated himself 
from the difficulty by getting a Liberal, Willis, to take the chair, on con-
dition that there would be a short session in preparation for an election, 
and that only bids already passed by the Assembly, the budget and non-
contentious measures would be dealt with. The anger of the Liberals was 
unrestrained and, after chaotic scenes in the Assembly, WiUis was physical-
ly instaUed in the chair by Labor members.'^^ That gave Holman his 
majority of one, but soon there were two more by-elections, one of which 
Labor won, which gave it a majority of three. At diis point a further 
change in the block of independents occurred which was also of benefit to 
the government. When pariiament first met in 1910 the independents had 
agreed to act together and at the end of 1910 announced themselves as the 
Democratic party. But now late in 1911 they broke up and at least three 
of them were expected to give general support to the government. 
In this situation, the government reintroduced legislation which was 
regarded as contentious, including an industrial arbitration bUl and an 
income tax biU which provided for a graduated tax and distinguished 
between earned and unearned income. WiUis protested, but Holman argued 
that the agreement with him not to bring such legislation forward was 
subject to reconsideration if the strength of the party changed. WUlis did 
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not resign. Wade again moved and lost a censure motion and the session, 
adjourned for Christmas 1911, was to continue into 1912, making it clear 
the government had no intention of holding an early election. 
Success in dealing with the parliamentary crisis was only one of the 
things the government had to its credit by the end of the second session in 
March 1912. Soon after taking office it released Bowling, who had been 
sentenced to twelve months' gaol eariier in 1910 for his part in the major 
coal strike that began late in 1909 while Wade was stUl in power. This was 
an election promise and of considerable symbolic value to the unions, 
particulariy since the leaders of the party had dissociated themselves at the 
time from the more extravagant of the doctrines inspired by the Industrial 
Workers of the World (IWW), concernUig strikes and industrial warfare, 
that were then being actively advocated in a section of tiie union move-
ment. What was of more importance to the unions was that the govern-
ment should repeal both of Wade's acts for dealing with industrial 
relations. To accomplish this, the figliting platform of 1910 included the 
demand that the 1901 industrial arbitration act should be re-enacted. 
The fighting platform included six other planks besides the two dealing 
with land reform and industrial relations. The first consisted of a long-
standing demand that the upper house should be abolished and replaced 
by initiative and referendum, and proposals for electoral reform. Free 
technical, secondary, and university education, regulation of the hours of 
labor, a workmen's compensation act, nationalization of coalmines, and a 
zoned system of raUway fares and freights comprised the remaining planks. 
McGowen stayed close to this platform in his policy speech. Soon after the 
elections tiie new Labor government announced plans for a state coal mine 
and a state brickworks and for adopting die Commonwealth adult male 
minimum wage for its own employees. Not much could be done in the 
short session held in 1910, but an irrigation bid and public works biUs 
were put through pariiament as well as the budget. By the end of 1911 a 
state brickworks and metal quarries had been set up and various schemes 
for public works, including radways and harbours, were under develop-
ment for both Sydney and the country. The most important acts passed 
during the year were the Income Tax Act, an act, not finally passed untU 
1912, for absentee voting and to extend the hours of poUing, and the 
Industrial Arbitration Act. Eariy in 1912 a Housing Act was passed 
authorizing the state to budd houses to reduce the housing shortage and 
bring down rents. Daceyville, named after the minister, was buUt as a 
model working-class suburb under this act. Legislation was also passed to 
authorize the establishment of state coal mines. 
The executive of the PLL was moUified. In its annual report for the 
year, it regretted that the government had stUl taken no steps to abolish 
the upper house, that the alienation of Crown lands was continuing, and 
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that the party had not had a chance to discuss the resignations of Home 
and Dunn. But, conceding that internal party strife had delayed legislation, 
it found a good deal which it could praise; the provision of housing for 
workers, the state brickworks and timber yard, the amendment of the 
Electoral Act, the Income Tax Act, and the select committees the govern-
ment had set up to study other questions in the platform.• '^^ ° The annual 
conference of the party in January 1912 was free from contention and did 
no more than load a number of new and minor items on to the party 
platform, urge the government to establish a state iron industry, and insist 
that in future no one should resign, as Home and Dunn had, without first 
obtaining the consent of caucus. 
But the unions were dissatisfied with the faUure of the government to 
carry out much of its industrial platform. Of the half-dozen industrial acts 
it promised at its outset, only one, the Industrial Arbitration Act, had 
been completed and that had been held up and drastically amended in the 
upper house.^*" The Worker complained particularly that a compensation 
law, a minimum wage law, and the eight-hour day for miners had not been 
obtained. The Industrial Arbitration Act was attacked not only by Labor's 
opponents, but also by some of the unions, notably the government raU-
way and tramway service association, for its failure to grant compulsory 
preference to unionists in employment. From 1912 onwards the dissatis-
faction of the trade union section of the movement with the government 
increased. 
Their industrial demands were based partly on the fact that the 
industrial arbitration act of 1901, put through by the Lyne government 
with Labor's support, had established a system in wliich arbitration was 
made compulsory for the first time in New South Wales. When the original 
act expired and had to be renewed in 1908, the Wade government was in 
power and Labor in opposition. The act of 1901 needed amendment "but 
not in the direction of discouraging the trade union as the selected unit for 
the system of concdiation". However, the biU "introduced by Wade was 
designed to discourage [the] growth of unionism which he correctly 
associated with Labor's increasing political power".'^"'^ At the time 
Holman and Beeby managed to obtain amendments to the bUl which 
preserved the trade unions as the employees' negotiating bodies, but the 
increased penalties and the wage board system which the act introduced 
were a challenge to the unions. The pariiamentary Labor party urged the 
unions to accept the new act, but the Sydney Labor CouncU caUed for a 
boycott of it. 
The boycott was unsuccessful, but the act was challenged directly by a 
number of strikes, particularly that on the coalfields and by die lockout of 
miners in Broken Hill. These provoked Wade to increase die already heavy 
penalties of the 1908 act by the amending legislation of 1909 - the 
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"coercion act" — which was gagged through parliament late in the year, 
more in a spirit of revenge than •with any rational plan in mind for settiing 
the coal strike or regulating industrial relations.^°^ It was under this act 
that Peter Bowling, the leader of the Newcastle miners, was convicted and 
sent in leg-irons to Goulbum gaol early in 1910. The result was to create a 
martyr to the cause of direct action. 
For a whUe, after about 1907, direct action doctrines, spread by 
mUitant socialists like Tom Mann and Peter Bowling and by IWW clubs, 
had some appeal to men in the mass unions of the unskiUed, particularly 
miners in Broken HiU and Newcastle. The lockout in Broken HUl which 
lasted for over sixteen weeks early in 1909 ended in a qualified victory for 
the men: Higgins gave judgment in their favour, part of which the High 
Court reversed on appeal, and some mines had to remain closed untU metal 
prices rose, once they were compeUed not to reduce wages. The coalminers 
in Newcastle who faded to get the support of watersiders and transport 
workers suffered a severe defeat, in which five of their leaders were 
arrested and their demands for a minimum wage and "eight hours bank to 
bank" were rejected. They were, as Tumer puts it, "domesticated" by 
force to the arbitration process'^ *''* but in circumstances which revitalized 
and strengthened an old tendency in the union movement to distmst 
politicians, parties, governments, and courts. It was this feeling that the 
Labor congress expressed in 1908 in its resolution that "whereas there is a 
grave possibUity of the industrial movement being eclipsed by the political, 
and whereas those taking part in the political movement are not always in 
touch with industrial developments, therefore it be resolved that the 
industrial movement hold a Congress annually in order to give adequate 
expression to Labor's aspirations and general direction to the political 
movement, aiming always at making the industrial the dominant factor in 
political affairs".'^"^ 
This meant, of course, not that bodies like the Labor CouncU would 
accept radical and direct action doctrines - the CouncU made that plaui in 
repudiating the IWW in 1910^*'^  - but that they would expect a lot from 
the political movement and watch it closely. Even the Bourke branch of 
the AWU, the more radical of the two branches in New South Wales, 
insisted in 1910 that the "political arm is quite as essential as the industrial 
one - in fact they are inseparable".'^"^ 
As long as it was in opposition, tiie pariiamentaiy Labor party suffered 
littie from this distmst. But in office it had to show that it was capable of 
meeting the unions' demands if it too was not to be held in contempt by 
them. The demands, however, were not aU easUy met, as a discussion of 
the arbitration plank at the PLL conference in 1910 showed. In the course 
of debate, Stuart-Robertson, one of the more radical members of the 
pariiamentary party, urged that the plank be removed altogether from the 
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platfomi for two reasons that were linked. He agreed there coidd not be 
compulsory arbitration without penal clauses which a Labor government 
would have to enforce. But arbitration and wages boards had so far 
granted nothing more than a living wage and in most cases less than that 
and in such a situation the unionists had to be able to resort to strike 
action. If they did, he implied, a Labor government enforcing penalties 
would be in the same position as a non-Labor capitalist government. 
Another delegate, who insisted he preferred constitutional methods to a 
strike, especially a general strike, argued that a Labor government would 
not necessarily be defeated if a union went on strike and it had to enforce 
penalties, but Stuart-Robertson thouglit that one or the other, arbitration 
or the strike, would have to be given up. Watson deprecated the sharp 
contrast, and asked conference to confine itself to general principles and 
leave the detaUs of an act to the parliamentary party.^ 
The government's Industrial Arbitration Act of 1912 went some way 
towards meeting union demands. It introduced concdiation committees, 
provided for grouping of industries so that the number of wages boards 
could be reduced, and altered the penal clauses but did not abolish them. 
The wages board system was stdl open to delays even though it was 
smipUfied; the upper house insisted on retaining some penalties which the 
government wanted to end, but the penalty of imprisonment was done 
away with. Unions wlUch did not choose to register under the act were stUI 
free to strike. The granting of preference in employment to unionists was 
left to the Court but the measure was so designed that the Court would 
have to grant preference in most cases. But no act could regulate the 
consequences for a Labor government, especially one with a slender 
majority, if it intervened on the wrong side in a strike, and that was 
precisely what happened early in 1913. 
By that time, the relative harmony that had prevaUed at the party's 
annual conference eariy in 1912 had been destroyed by appointments the 
government had made to the upper house, by its deal with Broken HiU 
Proprietary Company (BHP) to help it set up a privately owned steel-
works, and by the resignation of Beeby, minister for labour and industry. 
AU of these provoked heated argument at the next conference in 1913 and 
resulted in resolutions hostUe to the government. 
In March and April 1912 eleven men were appointed to the upper 
house but only six of them were recognized members of the Labor move-
ment. ^ Neither the executive of the PLL nor caucus was consulted 
about the appointments. In August, a Labor Principles Defence Committee 
was formed under the leadership of Duncan, vice-president of the PLL and 
president of the Clerks' Union, particularly to force Labor representatives 
to adhere to the policy of abolishing the upper house. It threatened to 
play a prominent part in selecting Labor candidates for the next election. 
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The upper house had passed the bdl for the state to set up its own coal 
mines, but it had amended the Industrial Arbitration Act, and rejected or 
shelved a bdl to give coal miners their eight-hour day underground, an 
early-closing bUl, and bUls to amalgamate two savUigs banks, to give 
shearers better accommodation, and to give tenants a share in improve-
ments they effected. The house also blocked the state ironworks biU, 
carried in the Assembly by large majorities. The government had shown no 
signs of moving to abolish it and some of its appointees had helped block 
or amend its own legislation. But stiU the 1913 conference, although it 
passed a motion that the appointment of unpledged men to the CouncU 
was contrary to the spirit and detrimental to the interests of the party, was 
not prepared to pass a motion that the PLL executive should give prior 
endorsement to aU Labor appointees and contented itself with a motion 
that appointees should have been League or union members for four 
years.^'° 
The argument about the agreement with BHP for an iron and steel 
works was simple enough, although the political manoeuvring by which 
the agreement was reached was not.'^'' The arrangement made, which was 
to be ratified in pariiament, was that the government would dredge the 
Hunter River beside the site chosen for the works and vest the necessary 
land in the BHP Company. The government also agreed to consider a 
preferential contract vAth the company for the supply of steel to the state. 
One of the advantages of the arrangement was that it would increase 
employment in Newcastie, but it was contrary to the recentiy reiterated 
demand that the government set up a state ironworks and it would lead to 
a monopoly by BHP and enable it to supply the state raUways with the 
steel it required. Conference resolved, by 104 votes to 42, that the agree-
ment was contrary to plank 6 of the platform and to the spirit of the 
movement as exemplified in other state enterprises set up by the govern-
ment. 
Beeby's resignation enabled conference to touch on the untmst-
worthiness of politicians. Beeby, minister for labour and industry, resigned 
his portfoUo, his seat in pariiament, and his party membership in 
December 1912 and announced he would contest Blayney again as an 
independent. He said he wanted to be free to oppose a yes vote in the 
forthcoming referendum when Hughes was to resubmit his proposals for 
increased Commonwealth powers to the country, but he also left little 
doubt then and later that he resented the attempts of the extra-
parliamentary organization to exert a close influence on Labor parlia-
mentarians. The unions, and especially the AWTJ, resented his administra-
tion of the arbitration act and his attitude to other legislation of Uiterest 
to them. At the annual conference of the AWU it had even been argued 
that the union, one of the main sources of party funds, should stop 
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supporting the party financially "seeing the way some of the parlia-
mentarians had acted and the intriguing that went on". The conference 
was particularly angry because the pariiamentary party had ignored its 
requests in relation to the Hut Accommodation Bdl, and by May 1913 the 
Bourke branch was sarcastically accusing the Labor government of much 
kinder consideration of squatters and farmers and the members of being 
concerned only with their own personal aggrandisement.^'^ Three can-
didates stood for Blayney: one Labor, one Liberal, and Beeby. The Labor 
man was eliminated on the first ballot, leaving Beeby and the Liberal, 
Withington, to go to the second. The Worker urged Labor electors to vote 
for Withington as a punishment for Beeby, but the PLL executive and the 
ministry advised them to vote for Beeby on the ground that Beeby had 
promised the government his general support. In radical eyes die govern-
ment had done a deal with a Labor rat.'^" Beeby won. At the 1913 
conference, Lamond, the editor of the Worker, moved for a committee of 
enquiry into the Blayney by-election, the fate and future of the Shearers' 
Hut Accommodation BiU, and the resignation of Nielsen from his seat in 
Yass, a question designed more to embarrass the government by reviving 
old figlits on land policy than to serve any useful purpose. 
By the time of the 1913 conference, tiiere was tension in caucus as 
well. In July 1912 the pariiamentary party decided that it had confidence 
in Page, member for Botany, who had openly opposed a yes vote in the 
federal referenda, and to publish its opinion.^'^ In September, it passed a 
motion that the main principles of all bUls were to be submitted to caucus 
before the bUls were introduced into the house; and by the end of the year 
a number of members were in arrears in their agreed contributions to the 
caucus funds. And finally, according to Black who was m die pariia-
mentary party at that time, Holman and Beeby were both canvassing the 
question of the leadership of the party on the assumption that McGowen 
did not have much longer in the position.^'^ 
Then, in February and March 1913, the gasworkers in Sydney went on 
strike and were out for over ten weeks. They had spent six months trying 
to get improved conditions from the court and finally Judge Heydon 
rejected their claims. The secretary of die Labor Council and die minister 
for labour, now Carmichael, tried to arrange negotiations for a settiement, 
but the men, deciding that Carmichael had broken a promise he had given 
at a mass meeting because die ministry refused to stand by U, were 
adamant and turned down flat all proposals for negotiations. The ministry 
issued a proclamation calling for volunteers to man the gasworks and die 
Worker reacted with the headline: "Labor Government calls for Amateur 
Blacklegs, Extraordinary proceedings in New South Wales."'^'^ The out-
come was that when the unionists went back to work it was to their 
former jobs and without victimization, with a promise from die govern-
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ment diat it would call a special session of pariiament to amend the 
arbitration act, and with a promise from the gas company that it would 
agree to a wages board hearing on their claims and concede retrospectivity 
to any increase in wages it granted. They were confirmed in their opinion 
that the strike as a weapon of last resort was an essential adjunct to the 
arbitration process.^'^ Several other strikes occurred during the eariy 
months of the year and a number of workers were prosecuted and fined 
for their part in them, and this further strained relations between unions 
and government. A. B. Piddington, K. C, was appointed as a commissioner 
to enquire into the working of the arbitration act and recommended that, 
althougli there was no substantial opinion in favor of ending arbitration, 
the wages board system should be replaced by a three-man court to make 
it more efficient. McGowen admitted he wanted to retire - he had 
realized, according to Evatt, that his leadership "had become a nuUity 
. . . the workers had ignored both his advice and his threats"'^' * - and a 
couple of months later he resigned and Holman was elected leader. 
Holman took over in July 1913 with a short session of pariiament in 
front of him before the general election became necessary. The govern-
ment had a clear majority and it survived three motions of censure. One of 
these motions, on a proposal by the minister of public works, Griffith, for 
a £3 million ($6 miUion) contract with the British firm of Norton-Griffiths 
to finance public works, showed caucus to be divided. Holman said it 
would be treated as a non-party matter and spoke against it, and the 
proposal was defeated. But the party was to hear more of that question in 
the future. Once more, although the government had a substantial list of 
measures to its credit, the upper house had even more to its: twenty-three 
either held up or rejected including, as usual, legislation on such subjects as 
workmen's compensation, closer settlement, fair rents, public servants' 
superannuation, and various industrial and railway constmction bills.^'^ 
The elections were to be held on 6 December 1913, and in October the 
PLL executive endorsed McGowen and Holman, but only after consider-
able opposition to Holman had been expressed because of his attitude to 
the powers referenda. The executive refused to re-endorse Page and 
althougli the caucus asked it to reconsider its decision'^^" it refused to 
change it. Page stood successfully as an independent Labor candidate and 
one branch seceded from die league. Less serious quarrels between the 
executive and the branches over selections occurred in two other elector-
ates. 
In his policy speech Holman stressed Labor's achievements since 1910 
and blamed the upper house for blocking many measures. His proposals 
included many measures already blocked in the CouncU but none to show 
how he thought the CouncU might be induced to pass tiiem.-^^' During 
the campaign, the most dangerous threat came, not from the unions or the 
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Labor Leagues which appear to have thrown themselves loyally into the 
work despite tiieir dissatisfactions, but from the Catholics. The Catholic 
Federation asked all Labor candidates by circular to undertake to redress a 
list of grievances connected with schools and hospitals and Holman 
countered by reminding candidates that party members could give no 
pledges to any other organization. O'Reilly, a priest prominent in the 
federation, attacked Holman publicly for this and Holman replied in kind, 
successfully averting the threat.^^^ The results were a triumph for the 
state party, the more impressive not only because the second federal 
powers referendum had again been defeated a few months before but also 
because in the Commonwealth elections in May, the federal Labor 
ministry had been defeated after a fall of approximately 4 per cent in its 
vote in New South Wides since 1910.^'^-' The government went into 1914 
with a comfortable majority of eiglit in die new parliament. 
Internal tensions in die party were, however, increased rather than 
eased by electoral success and from the beginning of 1914 onwards tension 
mounted for three years until finally when Huglies raised die conscription 
issue the party split apart. Immediately after the election, caucus met and 
Holman, congratulating everyone on die splendid victory, "pointed out 
the great responsability [sic] now resting on the Party and tmsted that 
everyone present would stand shoulder to shoulder in a solid endeavour to 
justify the existance fsicj of die Party now that it had a real majority 
behind it. There could be no excuse in the future, and we must be pre-
pared to do big things. . ."^^"^ The Labor CouncU took the same view — 
in its annual report it said "there should now be no reason for delay in 
bringing forward a number of industrial measures previously delayed 
owing to the smallness of die Government's majority in the last Pariia-
ment, such as an Amended Arbitration Act, Workmen's Compensation 
Act, Eariy Closing Act and many other measures. . ."^^^ 
Observations like these led inevitably to the question how Holman 
would tackle the upper house, because it was plain to all that die govern-
ment had suffered more from it dian from its narrow majority in the 
preceding parliament. The annual conference of the PLL in January 
formed fimi ideas about how Holman should proceed. Early in the confer-
ence its temper was exposed when die executive's action in refusing to 
endorse Page was upheld by ninety votes to forty-nine, after Holman, 
speaking in effect for the old caucus, had argued against it. For the first 
time for diree years someone proposed that die objective include die 
collective ownership of the means of production, distribution, and 
exchange and the new feamre, political and economic equality of die 
sexes. The proposal was easUy defeated. Resolutions to make members of 
parliament more amenable to their branches and conference were 
defeated, and then conference got down to a debate on the upper house 
87 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
PETER LOVEDAY 
and Labor's past appointments to it. A committee was appointed which 
proposed that 
1. to get abolition the government must make its appointments 
early 
2. the appointees should include; 
6 nominated by Conference 
2 nominated by the AWU 
2 nominated by the Women's Central Organising Committee 
3 nominated by the Labor CouncU 
2 nominated by the ALF 
1 nominated by the Maritime Unions 
3. of the twenty or more needed in all, the caucus of Assembly 
members should nominate the rest - say half a dozen 
4. aU candidates for nomination should sign a pledge to work for 
aboUtion and the substitution of the initiative and referendum, 
that is, the fUst plank of the party's fighting platform. 
Watson tried to make it a little easier for Holman to swaUow: he argued 
that cabinet not caucus should make the nominations under the third 
heading. Clause 1 was carried; clauses 2 and 3 were replaced by an 
amendment that the government should submh the names of all appointees 
to the executive of the PLL for prior endorsement, and that was carried by 
95 votes to 53. Clause 4 was then carried. In this atmosphere, the AWU 
Central branch's motion that it should be allowed to withdraw its political 
funds from the control of the PLL executive was lost. 
In caucus in December 1913, McGowen and Meagher were nominated 
for the speakership, Meaglier by Stuart-Robertson. McGowen was 
Holman's choice and Meagher was chosen by twenty-four votes to sixteen. 
Having had what the minutes describe as an "animated discussion", caucus 
decided not to proceed with the election of ministers but adjourned for a 
month. When it met in January, as conference was beginning, it re-elected 
Holman unanimously and then when the motion for election of eiglit 
ministers came on, an amendment was moved, but defeated, to deprive 
Holman of the allocation of portfolios by electing them to particular 
posts.^^^ From this time onwards Holman was opposed in caucus by a 
"cave" of radical critics consisting, according to Molesworth, mostly of 
new members and a few old members including Dooley, Stuart-Robertson, 
and Cochran. Its objects were to "force the government to get along with 
the abolition of the Upper House and to introduce a straiglitout Labor 
pol icy" .^" 
In this period Holman made what Evatt describes as a "disastrous" 
decision, that is, not to make twenty or thirty appointments to the upper 
house immediately after the election. It is far from clear why he faded to 
do this, or at least to put the necessary names before the governor. Evatt's 
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explanation is that for his trip abroad Holman had borrowed money from 
Hugh Mcintosh, a wealthy entrepreneur in the entertainment worid and 
later a major newspaper proprietor, and had promised him a seat in the 
Legislative Councd. Holman admitted the promise and, without naming 
him, that the man concerned was not a Labor man. But, since the 
executive of the PLL was determined that only firm Labor men should be 
appointed to the CouncU, Holman's honouring his promise to Mcintosh 
would have provoked a clash with it.'^ '^  * 
As it was, the members of caucus, if not a formal caucus, appear to 
have made the next move, which was to ask, on Meagher's motion, that 
the ministry submit to it names for appointment to the CouncU. Meagher 
and Holman engaged in a public brawl, reported by the Worker under the 
headline "Ministry versus Movement, Holman Ministry defies Conference 
and ignores Caucus",^^^ which ended with Holman insisting diat no 
appointments would be made to the Council and if they were they would 
not be submitted to any body outside the ministry.^'" Either alternative 
was outright defiance of the conference and, althougli the conference and 
executive could do littie to force his hand, caucus could become difficult. 
In June Lamond published an article in the Lone Hand which put forward 
a view of the nature and functions of caucus which must have been 
anathema to Holman. The vital passages were that "in short the Caucus 
system is designed to make all the members of the Party keep the promises 
they made to the electors when, as Labor candidates, they souglit their 
votes", and again that "the Caucus system extends the number of those 
who may exert influence upon the Government. But the Caucus exists 
only that that number may be extended until it includes every sane man 
and woman in the States [s/c]."^'" It was cleariy a justification of the 
radical "cave" in caucus. 
Shortiy afterwards Holman had to ask caucus to make sure they all gave 
a solid party vote whenever a minister moved closure. On die same day 
Black brought forward a motion to consider the mismanagement of public 
business in the late session and Holman replied to it at considerable length. 
At the next meeting, on the eve of the outbreak of war, the whip, 
Grahame, complained that members were absenting themselves from die 
house and that he had barely been able to ensure a majority of one.^ '^ At 
subsequent meetings in September, the caucus agonized over industrial 
arbitration, eventually deciding to appoint a committee from its own 
ranks, rather than ask the PLL executive to call a special conference, to 
decide what to do.^'^ And then at the next caucus meeting in December, 
when Storey was carpeted for things he had said in pariiament about 
Griffith, the minister for public works, Holman had to "remind" members 
of their duties inter se and of the degree of loyalty he expected from diem 
towards cabinet. The homily evidently cut little ice, because Holman then 
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had to explain why the negotiations with the firm of Norton-Griffiths had 
been reopened, and Dooley moved that entry into the contract be post-
poned for six months. The motion was never voted on in caucus because it 
then adjourned for lunch and afterwards a quomm could not be 
obtained.'^ •''* 
By the end of 1914 the war, wluch had begun in August, was starting to 
have an effect on die economy of the state. Early in August, shortiy after 
pariiament had reopened, Holman announced that die extensive legislative 
programme the government had prepared would be altered by dropping 
contentious items. By-elections would not be contested either but vacated 
seats would be fiUed by the nominee of the party of the retiring member. 
Unemployment rose steadily, partly because of a severe drouglit and partly 
because loan funds from Britain were cut off or much reduced by the war. 
Many government employees were put on half-time. In November, Judge 
Heydon mled that industrial wages boards would accept no more claims 
for wage increases except in special circumstances. A necessary com-
modities control commission was set up to prevent food shortages and 
rises in prices, but from then onwards, despite its activity, food prices rose 
steadily. In January 1915 the wages boards were given leave to consider 
claims for increased wages and by the end of the year a small increase in 
the basic wage had been granted. But industrial unrest, much of it linked 
with the increase in food prices, grew throughout 1915, and in March 
Holman and the attorney general, now D. R. HaU, explained to the Labor 
CouncU what they proposed to do to keep prices down.^''^ 
Early in 1915 the government announced its decision to go ahead with 
the Norton-Griffiths agreement to finance public works to the extent of 
£10 miUion ($20 miUion) over five years, the firm to take 5 per cent for 
supervision of tiie work done. The intention was to free the state from the 
effect of the rationUig of loan money imposed by the Commonwealth and 
to permit the government not only to keep unemployment down but to go 
on with public works that were called for by the party's platform and its 
own programme, particularly the development of the railway system of 
the state in mral areas. As in the past, legislation of interest to trade 
unions had either been blocked or amended in unacceptable ways in the 
upper house by the end of 1915 and some items had suffered a simdar fate 
in the lower house under the party tmce. 
The unrest in the movement was evident at the conferences of the AWU 
in January and the PLL in Aprd 1915. A proposal that the AWU withdraw 
its funds from the New South Wales Labor party was considered and 
rejected a second time, but only after the members of state parHament and 
the ministry had been sharply criticized for their faUure to give effect to 
vital planks of the platform, for the agreements with BHP and Norton-
Griffiths, and for their faUure to do anything to abolish the upper house. 
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There was talk of reconstmcting the branches of die league on a sound 
unionist basis, of a new industrial party, of unsatisfactory politicians who 
had sold the Labor movement and should be thrown out of it.^"' The 
president of the Labor Council thouglit there were too many unions with 
too little power, especially in the PLL branches,'^^^ a reflection which 
made clear the political aspect of the proposals for federation of unions 
which had been made, under AWU auspices, some mondis before. 
At the PLL conference in AprU, Meaglier, who had been elected 
president the year before, in his opening address uncompromisingly 
stressed that "this Conference was the sanctuary which holds the sacred 
book of democracy. He did not take orders from the Parliamentary party 
or from the Labor caucus. . . The executive officers were the governors of 
the Labor cause, and members of Pariiament were merely their servants to 
carry the platform, which this Conference made, into effect."^'* He 
emphasized that the only way to deal with the upper house was to abolish 
it altogether but took a much more moderate view of the Norton-Griffiths 
contract. In his speech on retiring from the presidency of the PLL he also 
emphasized the need for one big union, to wipe out craft unions, unite die 
voice of labor, and make the government "hurry up".^'** 
Holman explained that the government had consulted not only caucus 
but the PLL executive fully about die contract, refused to consider 
abolition of the upper house, and announced diat the government's policy 
was to transform it gradually by appointing "democrats". Three appoint-
ments would shortly be made, two of sound Labor men and one of a man 
to whom he, Holman, was "absolutely bound", that is, Mcintosh. Holman 
defended the Norton-Griffiths contract, even though it was a departure 
from the platform, on the ground that "it was equally the duty of die 
Government to keep its people in employment as it was to keep to the 
plat form".^^° 
By this time. Labor was in power again in federal politics, with Fisher 
as prime minister and Huglies as attorney general after a solid victory in 
the elections of September 1914.^'*' Hughes attended the conference to 
get a resolution from it, which was passed, that it supported a third refer-
endum to alter the constitution to increase the powers of the Common-
wealtii. He and Holman once more snapped at each odier on that 
question,^'*^ and Huglies took die opportunity to stress too that the 
Norton-Griffiths agreement undercut die Commonwealth's loan policy. 
Conference then debated a motion censuring D. R. Hall for bringing a libel 
action, which had greatiy annoyed the AWU delegates, against the Worker, 
and after that went on to consider tiie work of die government and in 
particular its faUure to abolish the CouncU, to set up a state ironworks, to 
put forward a fair rents bUI, and to extend the state housing scheme at 
DaceyvUle. It also came under fire for suspending wages boards, lowering 
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wages, and shortening hours. Holman revealed the extent of the tension in 
caucus by saying that if the government had to rely on Stuart-Robertson's 
vote to stay in office if would rather resign, and one by one the motions 
censuring the government were defeated.^ ^ ^ 
In caucus, Holman managed to defeat his critics. In Febmary Dooley 
criticized Griffith's handling of the public works portfolio, by implication 
challenging Holman to reassert his opinion that caucus had no business 
discussing administrative acts of the government, but the motion was 
defeated. When Trefle, minister for agriculture, died, George Black, who 
was on Holman's side, defeated Stuart-Robertson in a ballot of caucus. 
Then a month later caucus dealt at length with a quarrel between Hobnan 
and Carmichael which ended in Carmichael's resignation and the election 
of Grahame to the cabinet by a narrow majority. In April caucus discussed 
an appointment to the upper house to fill a vacancy caused by the deadi 
of its president, and J. D. Fitzgerald, the nominee of cabinet, was chosen 
by a narrow majority.^^^ In July and August caucus again discussed 
irregularity in the attendance of members, and Holman insisted the party 
must support the government in divisions; Dooley (who along with Stuart-
Robertson was one of diose who faded to support the government in 
divisions) challenged die govemment again on the Norton-Griffiths pro-
posal and caucus decided tiiat a party vote must be given on it in the 
house; and in October Stuart-Robertson refused to be bound by caucus 
decision in view of the decision of the annual conference in a vote on the 
hours of trade in hotels.^ ^ ^ 
In November Holman explained that, in order to improve the discipline 
of party members in the house, the executive of tiie PLL would be asked 
to advise the officers of caucus of its proposed selections before it finaUy 
endorsed any sitting member - a clear threat that those who challenged 
Holman in caucus would be denied re-endorsement by the PLL exec-
utive.^'*^ A week later Holman criticized Gardiner in caucus for his 
remarks in the house in a no-confidence motion, and that led to two 
motions, one by Gardiner of no-confidence in the cabinet and the other by 
Stuart-Robertson that Holman should resign, both of which were defeated 
after the motion for a secret ballot had been lost.^^'' These incidents and 
their background in disagreements in the assembly forced Holman to 
realize that his government might be overthrown.^^^ 
By this time tiie party had become increasingly divided about conscrip-
tion, and in federal politics Huglies had replaced Fisher as prime minister 
and leader of the federal pariiamentary party. The federal govemment had 
not yet made a proposal for conscription, but it had announced a plan for 
compulsory registration of men in July, and in the same mondi the state 
government had begun an official recmiting scheme, based on a wide-
spread system of committees dirougliout tiie state. The Universal Service 
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League, advocating conscription, had been formed in September and it 
included eight members of the government - Holman, HaU, Cann, 
Griffith, Ashford, Fitzgerald, Flowers, and Black — as weU as other leading 
Labor men. A few days later an Anti-Conscription League was formed at 
the Trades Hall with support from a wide variety of unions and other 
organizations, notably the SLP, the Australasian Socialist Party, and the 
IWW. The mUitants of the Anti-Conscription League saw the war as a 
capitalist conflict from which the workers would emerge as the losers and 
they felt that the state and federal mmistries, backed by the conscrip-
tionists, were drifting rapidly away from democratic to authoritarian 
methods of government.'^''^ 
But for the time being the agitation about conscription continued 
wdthout being brought to a head, and early in 1916 Hughes left for a trip 
to Britain to study the war at first hand. A further quarrel over Common-
wealth powers was avoided when the federal government agreed not to 
hold the referendum on condition die states handed over the necessary 
powers. These events left Holman and his govemment to deal with their 
critics primarUy on their domestic record, and that was not a good one. 
Evatt comments that 
by the end of the 1915 — 16 session, the Upper House had become 
fully aware of the gradual decUne in the Government's prestige . . . 
After the CouncU had compelled the Government to jettison its 
RaUway Bill, its amending Arbitration BUl and its Trades Union BiU, 
the Sydney Morning Herald summed up the work of the long session 
by stating that the only piece of legislation of the slightest public 
importance passed by the Labour Government was the Liquor 
Referendum Bill (to determine whether hotels should close before 
11 p.m.] and that had been wrung from it by an indignant people 
and had split the caucus.-^^'^ 
The strength of the opposition to Holman within die party was made 
clear at the 1916 conference of the PLL, but he evaded defeat for the time 
being by challenging conference to tiirow the government out. The 
opposition took the form of a separate group, calling itself the Industrial 
Section of the PLL, fonned in November 1915 at a meeting of union 
representatives called by the AWU. This section claimed that its origins lay 
in the 1915 conference. There had been a very large minority at that 
conference convinced that the government was not conscientiously trying 
to carry out the platform but "prostituting its principles ui order to retaUi 
office at any price". Holman had promised then to proceed with the 
policy and "force conclusions" widi the upper house if it blocked his 
course, but he had faded to carry out either promise.^^' In addition, 
according to Molesworth, Holman packed the 1915 conference and 
survived, but he "had learned [sic] die industrialists that if they wanted a 
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say in Labor matters, diey would have to organise".^ '^^  
Whether Holman did pack that conference or not, die industrialists 
presumably knew about and feared the consequences of the caucus 
resolution of November - taken at about the same time as the section was 
formed - that the PLL executive would be asked to allow officers of 
caucus to confirm its endorsements of sitting members. Since an election 
would fall due in 1916, the conference eariy in that year was the indus-
trialists' only chance to ensure that Holman did not obtain a compliant 
PLL executive and so set the stage for obtaining a manageable caucus after 
the elections.'^^^ The section therefore aimed to break the ministry's 
control over caucus and influence in conference by increasing and 
organizing its own representation in both conference and the PLL 
executive and by encouraging the main unions to take a more active part 
in branch affairs. Beyond that it aimed to compel the Labor ministry to 
push legislation through both houses giving workers improved wages and 
conditions, and unionists absolute preference in employment. The group 
admitted later that it had adopted a misleading name in caUing itself the 
Industrial Section - it insisted that it was neither a section nor exclusively 
industrial because representatives from PLL branches could join it. 
Evidently many did so, at least from late 1916, although aU but two of the 
twenty-three branches listed in the report for the year ending 1917 were 
metropolitan. The contention that it was representative of aU sides of the 
Labor movement was no less misleading than its name. One of the features 
of this "curious" organization^^'* was that the more important unions 
represented in it were neither urban nor industrial in the sense tiiat they 
were located in large-scale metropolitan manufacturing activities; diey 
were those, like the AWU, the Rockchoppers', the Coal and Shale 
Employees', and tiie Wharfies', winch were tiie main unions of the 
unskUled and semi-skUled as contrasted with the unions of die skilled, 
many of which still retained some of their earlier craft characteristics, were 
smaller and were more exclusively based in the metropolis. Another 
feature of the Industrial Section was that its members were self-selected, 
not chosen officially by the unions and PLL branches they were said to 
represent. 
In this context the industrial part of the name the group adopted makes 
most sense if it is understood by reference to die doctrines which left-wing 
groups, especiaUy the IWW, had been advocating for some years. There is 
Uttle reason to dwell on the voluminous, dogmatic, and singularly repeti-
tious pamphlet literature on the IWW, the Australian Socialist Party, and 
the SLP, or to foUow through the tangled skeUi of their relations with one 
another and their factional splits.^^^ TheoreticaUy considered the 
arguments in the pamphlets were of a cmde Marxist character, developed 
in syndicalist and anarchistic directions; ideologically considered they had 
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some effect, primarUy in providing a general rationale for the contempt 
politicians were held in and an explanation why they did not deliver all 
that the industrialists demanded of them. They provided an image, if not a 
definition, of the industrialist as the solidarity-minded unskUled worker in 
a mass union, a worker who had no stake in the capitalist system and, 
ideally, was prepared to use any means to overthrow it. This somewhat 
heroic doctrine provided a justification in practice for assorted acts of 
petty sabotage, from the go-slow upwards, and a means of identifying as 
the martyrs of the cause those few who took somewhat more drastic steps 
than usual to organize the unskUled, to secure organized expression of 
discontent, or to provoke reprisals by the state and capitalists. 
Socialist doctrines were less anarchistic, at least as regards methods, but 
at this time most left-wing pamphlets promoted the notion, at least 
occasionally, that the only acceptable and incormptible social order would 
be one in which the workers themselves controlled their own affairs and in 
particular the industries in which they worked. The Labor party and the 
old-fashioned trade unions that accepted arbitration were from this point 
view irredeemably implicated in the capitaUst system. This meant that the 
party was bound to betray the workers, not because its leaders were 
politicians, that is self-seeking opportunists, but because that was the 
nature of poUtical parties. But from a more practical and less Utopian 
point of view the neglected interests of the union movement - for 
example the AWU, had stiU not obtained legislation compelling employers 
of mral labour to provide satisfactory accommodation for shearers and the 
like, and the miners had not yet secured an eiglit-hour day underground — 
were easdy blended with ideology and for most unionists their interests 
were undoubtedly much more important than the doctrines of local 
socialists and IWW men. 
The accommodation between interest and ideology is exhibited in a 
short pamphlet put out about this time over the signatures of P. Adier and 
W. J. McKell, two members of the Industrial Section. The pamphlet was 
produced when the amalgamation movement in the unions was gathering 
momentum. For some years past, the AWU had been absorbing other 
unions, and various schemes for federation or amalgamation of all unions 
into one large agglomeration had been discussed in the movement, chiefly 
under the influence of the IWW and the AWU. In 1916 the one-big-union 
proposal, designed to replace aU craft and simdar trade unions with one 
comprehensive union organized into industrial sections, was emerging as 
the most popular of the various schemes. The pamphlet was intended to 
prepare the ground for a conference held in September, to discuss the 
desirabUity of and to plan for one big union. Members of the Industrial 
Section were prominent in it and had probably been the main ones who, 
according to AdIer and McKeU, met informaUy to set up the conference. 
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Adler and McKeU argued, after noting that the trade and craft unions 
might find it difficult to accept the scheme, that "a war none the less 
deadly, though bloodless, is being waged between Capitalism and Labour 
here in Australia, and unless we keep pace with the Commercial uiterests 
which are arrayed against us, and organise on simUar lines, we must of 
necessity faU in the stmggle to maintain our liberties.. .let this unscien-
tific and obsolete system of today disappear, and let us coalesce and 
reform into One Big Union, which will be able to resist or deliver attacks 
. . ."25 6 xhey then went on to say that the most important problems 
facing the unions during and after the war were unemployment and the 
absorption of returned soldiers, the demand of employers to dilute skilled 
with unskUled labor, and "the specialising of machinery, and men", the 
employment of women in place of men, and the related question of equal 
pay for equal work. Their argument concluded with the familiar diagram 
of the IWW for industrial groupings of different workers.^ ^ "^  Finally, the 
practical concerns of the Industrial Section itself, once it had defeated 
Holman in the conference, indicated its diverse and predominantiy non-
ideological interests. After the conference, it set up a committee to act in 
conjunction with the executive of the PLL to select and draft proposed 
legislative measures. Fifteen bids emerged from this collaboration, dealUig 
with such questions as wages, hours, arbitration, workers' compensation, 
industrial safety, workers' accommodation, local government, and the 
right to work.^^* 
The men in the Industrial Section, most of them relatively obscure in 
the union movement at the time, confronted Holman in the PLL con-
ference late in AprU 1916.^^^ The ministry wrote a reply to criticisms of 
it listed in the conference agenda but it appears to have drafted the reply 
in ignorance of the plans of the Industrial Section. It made no attempt to 
explain why there had been no significant industrial legislation and that 
was the main concern of the section.^^^ What is more, in die fourth 
session of the parUament which had ended just before the conference 
began, the majority of the eighty-odd bids passed had been mauled in the 
upper house, and business on another forty-odd — much of it in the 
Councd — had not been completed. The Industrial Section felt that 
Holman had committed himself at the 1915 conference to challenge the 
upper house if it blocked industrial legislation and he had made no sign of 
doing so.^^' 
The outcome was, on balance, a defeat for Holman. Admittedly he was 
not thrown out of the party, and althougli the ministry with the backing 
of caucus decided to resign during the conference and elected Storey as 
leader in Holman's place, the resignation was not submitted to the 
governor. With the threatened resignation of the ministry in front of them, 
the leaders of the Industrial Section in the conference negotiated with 
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Holman, he resumed the leadership and the ministry continued in office. 
But Holman had been forced to concede what he had always refused 
before: that a referendum should be held on abolition of the upper house 
at the time of the next state election. He did not get conference to rescind 
its eariier resolution censuring the ministry for its faUure to deal with the 
upper house and he faUed to win control, not only of conference, but of 
the central executive of the PLL. Twenty-nine of the thirty non-officiii 
positions on the executive were captured by the Industrial Section, whose 
members at conference voted to a prearranged ticket and ensured that 
they would foUow the ticket by a new voting tactic, namely voting m 
threes, each man's vote being scmtinized by the other two.^^^ They had 
control of the executive and consequently could ensure that sitting or new 
members who were likely to be critical of Holman, would not be refused 
endorsement. In addition motions were carried that members of parUa-
ment should not sit on the executive of the PLL nor be members of 
conference but, since these were not carried by two-thirds majorities, they 
were of no effect. The mles regulating the selection of candidates were 
again amended to enlarge the influence of unionists in the process, and to 
reduce the number of ephemeral and bogus branches set up to make 
selections. 
Another motion, far more important in later months in the year, was 
also carried that conference pledged itself to oppose conscription for 
mUitary service abroad and to oppose, through its unions and branches, all 
Labor members who might vote for or otherwise support conscription. To 
make these pledges effective, conference instmcted its executive to refuse 
to endorse any conscriptionist candidate and to require its delegates to die 
interstate conference to oppose conscription at all costs in diat part of the 
organization.^^' This too was a threat to Holman and other members of 
the party who had been active in the pro-conscriptionist Universal Service 
League.2 '^* 
Shortly after the fifth session of pariiament opened in July, Hughes 
returned from his trip to Britain.^^^ From about die middle of 1916 the 
Universal Service League had renewed its activities, and the Liberal party 
and F and SA had carried motions favouring conscription at their annual 
conferences. The Anti-Conscription League, the Australian Freedom 
League, the Australian Peace Alliance, the IWW, the New Soudi Wales 
Labor CouncU, tiie executive of die PLL and otiier organizations had also 
begun to agitate against conscription about tiie same time. The Worker of 
course joined in and published resolutions of meetings and branches 
against conscription under the heading, "The voice of Labor".^^^ Then at 
the end of August, Hughes announced that there would be a referendum 
on the subject at the end of October. On 4 September he met the 
executive of the PLL and explained the need for conscription. A motion 
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supporting it was rejected by twenty-one to five by the executive. 
The executive of the PLL acted swiftly. In September U expelled 
Hughes and E. S. Carr from the party and withdrew the endorsements of 
Holman, Griffith, HaU, and Bagnall, who had said they would support 
Huglies in the referendum campaign. It also began "considering" the 
position of other Labor members whose position on conscription was 
"indefinite". HolUs and Chanter soon lost their endorsements too.^^^ 
Both sides formed councUs to organize their referendum campaigns. The 
ministry was divided, but those opposed to conscription were persuaded 
by Holman not to campaign agaUist it. Eighteen members of the pariia-
mentary party actively opposed it.'^^* On 28 October the vote was taken 
and conscription defeated, New South Wales returning a majority of over 
117,000 against it. The party haded the vote as a "victory of democracy 
over mUitarism".^''^ 
Parliament, adjourned throughout October during the campaign, met 
again on 1 November. In the preceding week Holman, whose political 
position now "seemed hopeless", at least in the Labor party, had held 
discussions with Wade, die leader of tiie Liberal party, with a view to 
forming a coahtion govemment and to prolonging the Ufe of pariia-
ment.-^'° Agreement had not been reached by the time pariiament 
reassembled, but in the meantime E. Durack had been elected leader of the 
parliamentary Labor party and he at once moved a motion of no con-
fidence in the ministry. A week later the motion was defeated and an 
amendment moved by Wade was carried to the effect that it was in-
appropriate to move a no-confidence motion whUe a new national govem-
ment was being negotiated. Twenty-one Labor men voted against the 
amendment, die executive of the PLL expeUed all conscriptionists and 
those who had not voted with Durack.-^^' On 1 5 November 1916 HoUnan 
announced the formation of a new ministry and the spht was complete, 
leaving only twenty-four members in the pariiamentary party, three of 
whom were on active service. The party was once more in opposition and 
faced with the task of getting back to the government benches. It took 
three years. 
The split had removed from the Labor party many of its most experi-
enced and able pariiamentary leaders, but it was not at aU clear at the end 
of 1916 whether it had been much weakened in other respects. The 
elections and the party conference of 1917 were soon to show that much 
of the party's strength remained. But new blows were to faU on it withUi 
months. Its annual conference had only recentiy been concluded when a 
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major strike broke out, and foUowing that, Huglies again held a 
referendum on conscription. 
The Wade-Holman govemment put an act through the expiring pariia-
ment at the end of 1916 to extend its life by twelve months but eariy in 
the new year Holman announced that elections would be held in March. 
The party was iU-prepared for the campaign. Shortiy before the election 
was announced, Durack, the new leader of the party, spoke on its future ui 
uninspiring terms. He tried to convince the public that what the party had 
suffered was not a split but only the loss of some rats and that it stUl 
retauied its higli ideals - humanitarianism, justice, and socialism - and 
looked forward to times when production would be for use not profit and 
the producers would obtain the fuU results of their labour. But his policy 
followed the platform closely and that had not recentiy been materially 
altered; he stressed both the determination of the party to abolish the 
upper house and some official posts that were supposedly useless, and also 
its aim of development by means of extending the raUway system and a 
new scheme of land valuation.'^ '^^  During the campaign Labor speakers 
stressed in addition the need for an 8-hour day for all workers and the 
danger that conscription miglit be introduced after all. It was an unexcit-
ing programme and Holman refused to be drawn on conscription. 
Instead he attacked the PLL for being under the control of the IWW 
and this attack was made plausible by events at the last party conference 
and threatenuig by the recent activities of the IWW. The IWW men had 
been among the most dogged and prominent opponents of conscription; 
their paper Direct Action had regularly attacked the whole capitalist 
system and their pamphlets had discussed the overthrow of it by sabotage. 
Late in 1916 twelve IWW men were arrested, tried and found gudty of 
conspiracy, and sentenced to terms of five to fifteen years in court pro-
ceedings of doubtful validity. Their convictions were largely upheld in 
appeals that were tried during the campaign in Febmary and March 
1917.^^ '^ This put the Labor party on the defensive in much of its 
campaign. The sectarian cry was also raised against it by the Loyal Orange 
Lodge, Protestant and Nationalist groups, and the Sydney Morning Herald. 
Shortiy before the campaign began, Durack resigned the leadership and 
Storey was elected to replace him. The party was short of money and 
experienced speakers and its branches were pooriy organized. A few were 
split, some were unable to find candidates, and distmst of sitting members, 
even loyal ones, was stdl strong in the party. Many of the endorsed 
candidates were trade union officials and members of the executive of the 
PLL and consequentiy of the Industrial Section. 
In the circumstances, it was not surprising that the party was defeated 
in the elections, but the results suggested that the split in tiie pariia-
mentary ranks had not greatly reduced the voting support for the 
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party.'^^'* It won thirty-three seats, an increase of nine on its strength in 
the old parliament after the split, and the Nationalists, as the combined 
govemment forces were named, won fifty-two seats. Despite its dis-
organization, Labor put forward eighty-four candidates as compared with 
eighty-five in 1913 and its share of the total valid vote feU by 3.7 per cent 
to 42.9 per cent. Endorsed Labor candidates were returned for ten seats 
that had been lost in the split and a Labor man defeated Page in Botany. 
Meagher, McGowen, and Griffith, who stood as independent Labor men, 
were defeated and only one independent Labor candidate was retumed. 
Seven of the new Labor members were founders of the Industrial Section 
and members of the PLL executive.^^^ 
Two months after the election the party held its annual conference. 
The Worker, under the editorship of H. E. Boote since 1914, insisted that 
the conference should redefine Labor's objective as "industrial socialism", 
meaning that the workers should "control and direct the production of 
wealth and its distribution and not a central government".^ ^ ^ But, 
although the Industrial Section was stiU in existence and largely in charge 
of proceedings at die conference, it ignored this call to move left. The 
fighting platform remained unaltered. The old arguments agaUist having 
members of parliament at the conference or on the executive of the PLL 
were again aired, but the only result was a resolution excluduig federal 
members from the state executive. An argument developed about the 
activities of the Industrial Section when one member of conference moved 
it should be disbanded, but the motions to this end were aU defeated.^^^ 
Rules governing representation at conference were altered to increase the 
influence of affiliated unions; and resolutions were carried that expeUed 
conscriptionists should never be readmitted to the party, diat Judge 
Heydon should be removed from the arbitration court, that evidence 
should be gathered to support a demand for a royal commission into the 
trial of the IWW men, and that there should be no £5,000 ($10,000) 
exemption in the federal land tax system. The main debate was on the 
attitude of the party to the war and the terms on which it should be 
ended. Four resolutions were passed, insisting that war would be avoided 
only by production for use under democratic control, rejoicing in the 
revolution against despotism and class privilege in Russia, urging immedi-
ate negotiations for an international conference, which should include 
working-class representatives, to end the war, and listing the terms which 
should guide the peace settlement.^ ^ * 
The Industrial Secrion reported its satisfaction with the conference, 
which had accepted "in every instance its proposals regarding alteration of 
Rules and other matters which appeared on tiie Agenda Paper, and [had 
elected] practically in all cases members of the Section to die various 
positions for which they were nominated".-^^^ 
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The first serious blow to the party in 1917 was tiie major strike which 
began on August 2 and ended in total defeat for die men as the unions 
retumed to work in September and October. The detaUs need not concem 
us; what matters is that the attitude and actions of the government greatly 
strengthened the moves tiiat had so far been unsuccessful for the forma-
tion of one big union. The govemment evidentiy believed that the IWW 
had played a large part in fomenting and organizing the strike and that it 
posed a threat to the state. Accordingly, it determined to concede nothing 
to the strikers, employed volunteer non-union labour, formed loyalist 
unions, dismissed strikers, deregistered striking unions, rationed power and 
fuel, commandeered coal and transport, and arrested three of the leaders 
of the Strike Defence Committee. When the strike was evenmaUy broken, 
many of the men could not get their jobs back, despite promises that there 
would be no victimization; several unions were not reregistered; and some 
of the loyalist unions were not disbanded. Another important point was 
that, contrary to the government's belief, the "origins of the strike were in 
mass working-class unrest rather than in the agitation of revolutionary 
minorities''.^^" It developed without much planning and organization and 
often in opposition to the advice and efforts of the union leaders to 
restrict it or to negotiate. In aU respects, it formed a total contrast to the 
coal strike late in 1916. That had been carefuUy planned and limited to a 
particular industry; it had cleariy defined objectives; and it was carried 
througli with determination against a government unwUling to budge an 
inch, and it had been totally successful.^*' 
The contrast between the two strikes and the action of the government 
convinced union leaders, even those who did not accept what the IWW and 
other socialists said about class war, of the need for working-class unity 
and for direct action against both governments and employers, and tiiat a 
much stronger organization of unions was necessary if they were to make 
their industrial demands effective. But for the time being nothing could be 
done: the unions were temporarily shattered by the strike.^*'^ 
When conscription was once more put to the electorate in a referendum 
later in the year, the Labor party, the unions, and left wing political 
organizations opposed it - again successfuUy. Labor had suspected since 
the last referendum a year before that Huglies would try a second time to 
have conscription approved, and the campaign was particularly bitter, 
especially since the federal government used its police and censorship 
powers to hamper the anti-conscriprionists in presenting their case. The 
importance of the campaign was that it confirmed die distmst of govern-
ment that unionists and Labor men felt and it taxed their already depleted 
resources to the limit. But this time the pariiamentary party remained 
united and at one with the executive of die PLL and the trade unions. 
With this background, the annual conference of the party in June 1918 
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was hamionious and uneventful, althougli there was stdl some talk of the 
necessity of disbanding die Industrial Section, which had been renamed 
the Industrial VigUance CouncU (IVC).^*-' In die preceding months the 
executive had appointed Arthur Rae as full time organizer, with a support-
ing department, to rebuUd the party at the branch level.^*'* The platform 
committee recommended tiiat the platform should be abbreviated and 
simplified but made no proposals for radical changes in the kind of things 
put in it. But before the next conference of die party, the harmony was 
broken. 
In August 1918 the state trade union congress adopted a plan to form 
one big union, under the tide, Workers' Industrial Union of Australia. The 
six-point preamble argued that the capitalist owners and the working 
producers were locked in a class stmggle which would be ended only "by 
the workers uniting in one class-conscious economic organisation to take 
and hold the means of production by revolutionary industrial and political 
action".'^ ^ The organization was designed generally on die lines long 
advocated by the IWW, and pamphlets issued by J.S.Garden, the 
secretary of the organizing and propaganda committee, under tides like 
"We can and we wdl own the workshops" speUed out the message of the 
preamble. But this plan did not succeed. ChUde explains: "The opposition 
of the Australian Workers' Union [which had long had its own pretensions 
to being the One Big Union] was the rock on which the One Big Union 
went to shipwreck."-^*^ The conflict that developed soon involved die 
Labor party and gave its leaders the opportunity to check the radicals and 
to rid itself of some of them. 
One incident which brought the conflict to the surface was Garden's 
statement in March 1919 that the One Big Union (OBU) committee set up 
by the August conference would try "white anting the unions beginnuig 
with the A.W.U.",'^ *^ since the unions had so far proved extremely 
reluctant to take the steps agreed on and necessary to dissolve themselves 
into the OBU. But another incident, more immediately threatening to the 
Labor party, was the recommendation of a subcommittee of the IVC, 
made in December 1918, that the council should replace its old objective 
with that of the OBU. This indicated cleariy that if die IVC changed its 
objective there would be a figlit over the objective of the PLL at the 
conference of the party set down for Easter 1919. Moleswordi, one of the 
lesser figures deeply involved in the affairs of the IVC, but on the side of 
disbanding it, has said that leading unionists and state and federal Labor 
members decided in Febmary to fight the "revolutionaries" by opposing 
any change in the objective of the party or the elecrion of "unknown" or 
"disloyal" people to its executive.^88 j^i further meetings in March and 
AprU, the conference was adjourned to June, a preliminary estimate of the 
numbers on either side was made, tickets for the state executive and the 
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interstate conference were agreed on, and it was decided to support the 
proposals of the 1918 committee for condensation of the platform and to 
alter the mles to allow a limited number of members of pariiament on die 
executive. Meanwiiile Garden had made his white-anting statement and 
Storey, the party's leader, had attacked him and three other members, 
including WiUis, the organizer of die 1916 coal strike, for remaining in the 
party whde attacking parties and politics and planning to replace die 
Labor objective with that of the OBU.^*^ In May, Boote, the editor of the 
Worker, castigated the OBU executive for using methods which provoked 
fratricidal strife, but hedged by saying he favoured die OBU.-^^° Then 
Blakeley and Grayndler, president and secretary of tiie AWU, publicly 
examined OBU doctrines and tactics to show it was a wrecking organiza-
tion.^'" 
By May, the moderates believed their likely support at conference had 
increased and they decided that an attempt should be made to disband the 
IVC. Shortly before the conference met, the IVC met and with an unusual-
ly large attendance which quickly resolved itself into two factions. The 
members favouring the OBU were in a nUnority; the majority carried a 
motion adjourning the meeting untd after the Labor conference and die 
minority decided to hold a separate meeting to form a new industrial 
section. The success of that move clearly depended on the success of the 
faction at the Labor conference.'^^^ 
But in that too they were defeated. Conference met early in June and 
from the outset it was a tense meeting, marked by verbal brawling between 
the factions on minor questions. In votes taken in die eariy stages on 
motions to set up the committees of conference, die moderates out-
numbered the extremists. Then, when Wdlis moved that the League 
executive should consist of thirty-one members to be chosen by ballot of 
the rank and file members of the branches and the unions, the motion was 
defeated by 113 to 109. That led to further uproar, to be followed by 
more when anotiier motion, put by Willis, was lost 127 to 112, for a plank 
advocating the establishment of social democracy, meaning that the 
workers, industrially organized, should own the means of production. That 
session ended in disorder as the left wing sang the Red Flag and the riglit 
cheered.^^' At the next session WiUis and Storey clashed on the question 
of nationalization and then, when the moderates won aU positions on tiie 
executive, the extremists walked out of the conference en bloc and the 
conference ended abruptiy.'^^^ The extremists were expelled from the 
party and met to form a new party of leagues and unions to be caUed the 
Industrial Socialist Party and the new executive of the PLL anadiematized 
the IWW and aU its works.^^^ The extremists met in August and decided 
to form a new party, to be called the Socialist Party of AustraUa, and to 
invite other socialist parties to join them, but even at its formation die 
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components of the new party feU into a fundamental quarrel in choosing a 
name for their party, some insisting that it be described as revolurionary, 
and others quarreUing to decide whether it should undertake industrial 
action only, or political action as weU.^^^ 
What tiien remained for the Labor party was to discover whether tiie 
left wing had power to do it as much damage when it spUt off as the 
parliamentary leaders had in 1916, and the answer, at least the answer in 
electoral terms, was soon provided. In die elections in March 1920 Labor 
contested eighty-eight seats, nine more than in 1917, and, although its 
vote rose by only 0.17 per cent, it won ten more seats than at the previous 
election. The socialists contested sixteen seats, ten more than in 1917, and 
won 1.05 per cent of the vote and one seat in parliament — Sturt in the 
Broken HiU area where they had secured support for the sitting member, 
Brookfield, from Labor party branches. The Nationalist and Progressives 
together won forty-three seats too, and independents three. The socialist 
and one of the independents gave Labor a minute majority, enough to 
return to office. 
BIOGRAPHICAL INDEX 
[NOTE: (1) A biographical index follows each state section. It includes 
those trade unionists, politicians, and Labor party members who were 
most important in the state Labor party between 1880 and 1920. (2) The 
following abbreviations are used in the biographical indexes and are 
additional to those listed at the end of the preUminary pages, before the 
Introduction. 
MLA Member of the Legislative Assembly (lower house) 
MHA Member of the House of Assembly (lower house in South Australia 
and Tasmania) 
MLC Member of the Legislative CouncU (upper house) 
NSW New South Wales 
Qld Queensland 
Vic Victoria 
SA South Australia 
WA Western Australia 
Tas Tasmania 
NZ New Zealand] 
BAGNALL, William Roy Clifford. MLA (St George), 1913-22. Expelled 
from party November 1916. 
BAVISTER, Thomas, b. Yorkshire (England), 1850; d. Kogarah (Sydney), 
1923. Bricklayer. For six years secretary, Sheffield (England) branch 
of United Operative Bricklayers' Trade Society. For six years central 
executive member of United Operative Bricklayers' Trade Society, 
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England. Assistant secretary to Councd of United Operative Brick-
layers' Trade Society, England, 1877-83. Delegate of society to 
1875 Trades Union Congress at Glasgow, and at PlimsoU Conference 
demonstration in London, 1876. Arrived NSW, 1883. Worked with 
Sydney TLC. MLA (Canterbury), 1891-94, (Ashfield) 1894-98. 
Government buUding inspector, n.d. Joined Free Trade party, 1895, 
after disagreeing with "solidarities", 1893. 
BEEBY, George Stephenson, b. Sydney, 1869; d. 1942. Solicitor. Member 
Georgian Association, c. 1891, and ASL, c. 1895. MLA (Blayney), 
1907—12 (resigned); (Blayney), January 1913 —November 1913; 
(Wagga Wagga), 1917-20. MLC, November 1916-Febmary 1917 
(resigned). Minister of public instruction and minister for labour and 
industry, October 1910 - September 1911. Secretary for lands, 
September 1911—December 1912 and minister for labour and 
industry, November 1911—December 1912. Minister for labour and 
industry, November 1916-July 1919. Appointed judge, NSW 
Arbitration Court and president of Board of Trade, 1920, and judge, 
Federal Arbitration Court, 1926. Resigned from party, December 
1912. 
BLACK, George, b. Edinburgh (Scotland), 1854; d. Randwick (Sydney), 
1936. Clerk, Scotland. Jackeroo, Vic, NSW. Canvasser. Picture 
framer. Hotel servant. Part-time journalist. Manager, labour bureau 
(founded with legacy). Journalist with Australian Star. SUver miner. 
Broken HUl. Freelance journalist. Sub-edUor, Bulletin, 1889-91. 
Ed i to r , Australian Workman, 189 1-92; Sydney Worker, 
1899-1904; Bathurst National Advocate, 1908. Member, ASL, 
1 8 9 0 - 9 4 . MLA (West Sydney), 1891-94; (Sydney-Gipps), 
1894-98; (Namoi), 1910-17. MLC, 1917-34. Minister of agricul-
ture, February 1915-March 1915. Colonial secretary, 1915—16. 
Minister for public health, 1915-16. Elected to Public Works Com-
mittee, 1895 -I-. Left party, 1893. Rejomed Labor party, 1895. 
Expelled from party, November 1916. 
BLAKELEY, Arthur, b. Gdberton (SA), 1886; d. 1972. Union official. 
Organizer, AWU, 1910-15. President, AWU, 1918 -i-. Secretary, 
Western branch, AWU, 1915-17. MHR (DarUng), 1917-34. 
Member of NSW executive of ALP, 1914-17. Secretary, federal 
PLP, 1920-28, 1932-34; deputy-leader, April 1928-Febmary 
1929. Minister for home affairs, 1929-32. 
BROOKFIELD, Percival John. b. Liverpool (England), 1876; d. 1921. 
Miner. Member, AMA. MLA (Sturt), 1917-20. 
CANN, John Henry, b. Howabridge (Devonshire, England), 1860; d. Peter-
sham (Sydney), 1940. Miner. Worked in BrUish mines, 1869-82. 
Became railway porter in London. Arrived Sydney 1887. Mineral 
Kembla and Barrier. First President, AMA, 1890; President, Broken 
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HUl branch, AMA. MLA (Sturt), 1891-94; (Broken HUl), 
1 8 9 4 - 1 9 13; (Sturt), 1913-16 (resigned). Colonial treasurer, 
1912-14. Colonial secretary and minister for mines, 1914-15. 
Minister for public works, 1915-16 (resigned). Assistant raUway 
commissioner from 1 January 1917. Chairman of committees, 
1900-1904. Speaker, November 1910-July 1911. Expelled from 
party, November 1916. 
CARMICHAEL, Ambrose CampbeU (later Captain), b. Hobart, 1872; d. 
1953. Accountant. MLA (Leichardt), 1907-20. Minister of public 
instmction and miruster for labour and industry, September 
1911-November 1911. Colonial treasurer, AprU 1912-May 1912. 
Minister for labour and industry, December 1912-June 1913. 
Minister of public instruction, 1912—15. Recmited Riflemen's 
Battalion, December 1915; wounded 1917; awarded Military Cross. 
CARR, Ernest Shoobridge. b. Dubbo (NSW), 1875; d. 1956. Journalist 
and editor. Editor and proprietor. Orange Leader. MHR (Macquarie), 
1906-17. MLA (Cumberland), non-Labor 1920-22. ExpeUed from 
federal Labor party, 1916. 
CLARK, George Daniel, b. Colchester (England), 1848; d. Lakemba 
(NSW), 1933. Journalist. Seaman, England. Arrived 1871. Seaman 4 
years. Messenger, Sydney Observatory. Editor, New South Wales 
Good Templar (Temperance journal). Foundation member, Sydney 
Institute of Journalists. Grand electoral superintendent. Independent 
Order of Good Templars. MLA (Balmain), 1891-94. 
COOK, Joseph, b. Silverdale (Staffordshire, England), 1860; d. Sydney, 
1947. Coalminer at LUhgow (NSW), 1885-91 . General secretary. 
Western Miners' Association, 1889. MLA (Hartley), 1891-1901. 
MHR (Parramatta), 1901-21, as Free Trade to 1906, anti-Socialist 
to 1910, Liberal to 1917, Nationalist to 1921. Postmaster general, 
1894—98. Secretary for mines, 1898—99. Minister for defence, June 
1909—April 1910. Prime minister and minister for home affaUs, 
1913-14. Minister for the navy, 1917-20. Treasurer, 1920-21 . 
Elected leader, PLP, October 1893, in shortlived attempt to reunite 
party. Left party 1894 and joined Free Trade party. Deputy-leader, 
Free Trade and Anti-Socialist parties, and then deputy-leader of 
Liberal party, and of opposition after the fusion 1910—13. High 
Commissioner, London, 1921—27. Australian representative, League 
of Nations, 1922-26. 
COTTON, Francis, b. Adelaide, 1858; d. Sydney, 1942. Journalist. 
Assisted in founding the Nationaliser (Lithgow). Co-editor of 
Sydney single tax paper, Democrat, 1891. Prominent single-taxer. 
MLA (Newtown), 1891-94; (Newtown-Camperdown), 1895-1901. 
Left Labor party, 1894. Joined Free Trade party, 1895. 
DACEY, John Rowland, b. Cork (Ireland), 1856;d. Sydney, 1912.Coach-
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builder. Trained as agricultural blacksmith, Victoria. Moved to 
Sydney, 1883. Established Dacey & Co., blacksmiths and whee-
lwrights, Alexandria. Member, Coachbudders' Union. Alderman of 
Alexandria, 1886. Mayor of Alexandria, 1888. Established model 
suburb (DaceyvUle) at Kensington. MLA (Botany), 1895-1912 
(deceased). Honorary minister, 10 November 1911—26 November 
1911. Colonial treasurer, November 191 1-April 1912. Appointed to 
Public Works Committee, 1907. Treasurer, PLP, 1901 -I-. 
DANAHEY, Cornelius James, b. Detroit (Michigan, U.S.A.), 1856; d. 
1928. Fitter and engineer (raUways). Associated with formation of 
Australasian Society of Engineers. MLA (Canterbury), 1891-94. 
Selected as Liberal and Federal party (Free Trade) candidate for 
Uralla-Walcha, 1898. 
DAVIS, Thomas Martin, b. Redditch (WorcestershUe, England), 1856; d. 
Ashfield (Sydney), 1899. Seaman. Also inspector railway construc-
tion on mditary line, India. Seaman, 1876-79. Interpreter in mines 
in New Caledonia (returning to Sydney, 1886). Secretary, Seamen's 
Union. Organizer of Maritime CouncU (member of Royal Com-
mission on Strikes). MLA (West Sydney), 1891-94; (Sydney-
Pyrmont), 1894-98. Whip, PLP, 1891 -i-. 
DOOLEY, James, b. Dublin, 1878; d. 1950. Tailor. Member of TaUors' 
and Cutters'Union. MLA (Hartley), 1907-20; (Bathurst), 1920-27. 
Colonial secretary, 1920-22. Premier, October 1921-AprU 1922. 
Speaker, 1925-27. 
DUNN, WUliam Eraser (later Captain), b. 1877; d. 1951. Farmer to 1898. 
School teacher. Member, Teachers' Federation. MLA (Mudgee), 
1910-20; (Wammerawa), 1920-27; (Mudgee), 1927-50. Minister 
for agriculture, 1920—27. Assistant secretary of lands and minister 
for forests, November 1926-May 1927. Minister for agriculture and 
minister for forests, 1930—32. Minister for agriculture and forests, 
1941—44. Minister for conservation, 1944-46. Secretary for lands, 
1946-47. 
DURACK, Ernest, b. Taranta (New South Wales), 1881; d. (?). Grocer and 
accountant. MLA (Bathurst), 1913-17. Leader, PLP, November 
1916-January 1917. 
EDDEN, Alfred, b. Tamworth (Staffordshire, England), 1849; d. Redfern 
(Sydney), 1930. Miner, Adamstown, 1879-91. One of fust Adams-
town aldermen; twice mayor. Methodist lay-preacher. MLA (North-
umberland), 1891-94; (Kahibah), 1894-1920. Secretary for mines, 
1910-14. Left party, 1891. Rejoined Labor party, 1895. Deputy-
leader, PLP, 1901-4. ExpeUed from party, November 1916. 
ESTELL, John. b. Minwi (NSW), 1861; d. 1928. Engine driver in colUery. 
President, Northern Miners' Federation. Miners' Union delegate to 
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TLC. Mayor of Plattsburg, 1891, 1897, 1899. MLC, 1899-1901 
(resigned). MLA (WaUsend), 1901-4; (Waratah), 1904-20; (New-
castle), 1920—22. Secretary for public works and miruster for raU-
ways, 1920-22. MLC, 1922-28. Honorary minister and minister for 
labour and industry, 1914—16. Secretary for mines, 1915 — 16. Whip, 
PLP, 1904-10-1-. 
FEGAN, John Lionel, b. Essex (England), 1862; d. Wickham (NSW), 
1932. Miner, prominent in miners' lodge at Wickham and Bullock 
Island Co., colliery. In turn, secretary, treasurer, and chairman, NSW 
Miners' Accident Relief Board. Twice Mayor, Wickham; alderman 
untU death. Superintendent of Newcastle Benevolent Society. 
Member of Newcastle Hospital, Ambulance, and District Abattoir 
boards. MLA (Newcastle), 1891-94; (Wickham), 1894-1907. 
Secretary for mines, 1899—1901. Honorary minister, 1903—4. 
Minister of public instmction, 15 June 1904-29 August 1904. 
Joined Free Trade party, 1894, but left to join Lyne's Protectionist 
ministry, 1899. 
FERGUSON, WUliam John. b. Scotland (n.d.); d. Brisbane, 1935. Engine 
driver. Imprisoned as strike leader. Broken HUl, 1892. MLA (Sturt), 
1894-1904. Went out of party in 1901 after local quarrel in Broken 
HiU branch, and stood as Protectionist candidate in federal elections, 
1901, for Macquarie. 
FITZGERALD, John Daniel, b. Shellharbour (NSW), 1862; d. Darling 
Point (Sydney), 1922. Printer and union official. President Typo-
graphical Society for two years. Vice-president, TLC. Representative 
of Western Miners on TLC. Four years alderman, Sydney CUy 
CouncU. President, Greater Sydney League and Health Society of 
NSW. Chairman, Housing Board. Member, ASL, c. 1890-91. MLA 
(West Sydney), 1891-94. MLC, 1915-22. Assistant minister for 
public instruction, 4 Aprd 1916—18 July 1916. Minister for public 
health, 1916-19. Minister for local government, 1916-20. SolicUor-
general and minister of justice, 1919—20. Expelled, 1893, by Solid-
arity conference; readmitted, 1909; expelled, 1916, with Holman. 
FLOWERS, Frederick, b. Staffordshire (England), 1864; d. 1928. Chair-
man, Fire Brigades Board, c. 1911. Chairman, Abattoirs Board. 
MLC, 1900-28. Member, Public Works Committee, 1904-t-, 1907-I-. 
Chief secretary, 7 November 1911-26 November 1911. Minister of 
public instruction, 27 November 1911-29 Febmary 1912. Secretary 
for lands, 4 August 1911-26 November 1911. Vice-president, 
Executive Council, and representative of government in Legislative 
CouncU, 1910-15. Minister of public health, 1914-15. President 
PLL, 1896, 1897, 1898. 
GARDEN, John Smith, b. Scotland, 1882; d. 1969. Arrived Australia, c. 
1900. Joined Clerks' Union, 1907. Secretary, NSW TLC, 1918-38. 
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Alderman, Sydney City CouncU, for 5 years. Member, Labor party, 
1904-19. Expelled, 1919, and in 1919-20 helped form Communist 
party of Australia. Left it in 1925 and returned to NSW Labor party 
in Lang's inner group. 
GOUGH, John George, b. 1848; d. Craigie (NSW), 1907. Ironmonger. 
Builder and contractor at Young untd c. 1888, when he estabUshed 
J. G. Gough and Co., ironmongers. Young. MLA (Young), 1889-94. 
GRAHAME, WUliam Caiman. MLA (Wickham), 1907-20. Honorary 
minister, 15 March 1915 — 1 June 1915. Minister of agriculture, 
1915-20. Whip, PLP, 1914-15. ExpeUed from party, November 
1916. 
GRAYNDLER, Edward, b. Mount Victoria (NSW), 1867; d. 1943. Union 
secretary. Also fencing, droving, bush work, shearing. Appointed 
organizer, AWU in NSW, 1895. Secretary, AWU in Victoria, 
1900-1909. General secretary, AWU, 1912-36 -i-. MLC, 1921-34. 
GRIFFITH, Arthur HUl. b. Gortmore (Co. Westmeath, Ireland), 1863; d. 
1946. Schoolmaster and journalist (master at Sydney Grammar 
School for nine years and editor. Railway and Tramway Record, 
1904). Founded firm of patent attorneys, Griffith, Hassel and 
Griffith, 1895. Trustee eight years, NSW Government Savings Bank. 
Conducted state aerodrome at Richmond in World War II. Laid out 
towns of Griffith and Leeton. First chairman, Murrumbidgee Irriga-
tion Scheme. MLA (Waratah), 1894-1903 (resigned); (Sturt), 
1904-13; (Annandale), 1913-17. Secretary, PLP, 1894-(-. Expelled 
from party, November 1916. 
HALL, David Robert, b. Victoria, 1874; d. 1945. Barrister. MLA 
(Gunnedah), 1901-4. MHR (Werriwa), 1906-12. MLC, 2 AprU 
1912-23 July 1912 (resigned). MLA (Enmore), 1913-20. Minister 
of justice, 1912-16. Attorney general, 1914-19. Minister for 
housing, 1919-20. Vice-president, Executive CouncU, 1919-20. 
Expelled from party, November 1916. 
HOLLIS, LesUe Thomas, b. Goulburn (NSW), 1865; d. Goulburn, 1898. 
Physician. For four years pupU teacher in Department of Public 
Instruction. Began medical studies, 1 886. House surgeon, Sydney 
Hospital, 1890. Practised in Goulburn, 1891. MLA (Goulburn), 
1891-98. Joined Free Trade party, 1895. 
HOLMAN, William Arthur, b. London, 1871; d. Sydney, 1934. Cabinet 
maker, barrister, 1920 -i-. Member, Georgian Association, c. 1891. 
Member, ASL, c. 1894-95. Publisher, Grenfell Vedette, late 
nineties. MLA (Grenfell), 1898-1904; (Cootamundra), 1904-20. 
MHR (Martin), 1931-34. Attorney general and minister of justice, 
1910-12. Attorney general, 1910-13. Premier, colonial secretary, 
and attorney general, 30 June 1913-29 January 1914. Premier and 
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colonial treasurer, 1914-18. Premier, 1918-20. Delegate to Inter-
state Labor Conference, 1908. Elected deputy-leader, PLP, 1905; 
leader, June 1913. ExpeUed from party, November 1916. 
HORNE, Henry Edwin, b. 1873; d. 1955. Teacher. Member of Teachers' 
Federation. MLA (Liverpool Plains), 1907-11 (resigned). 
HOUGHTON, Thomas John. b. Manchester (England), 1 862; d. Artarmon 
(Sydney), 1933. Compositor. Member, Typographical Association. 
Permanent secretary, TLC. MLA (Glebe), 1891-94. Secretary, PLP, 
1891-94. 
HUGHES, WiUiam Morris, b. Pimlico (London), 1862; d. Sydney, 1952. 
Small shopkeeper and umbrella mender, bushworker, drover, 
seaman, kitchen man, oven-maker, odd-job man. Admitted to the 
bar, 1903. Political organizer, Young Trades CouncU, 1893. 
Secretary, Sydney Wharf Labourers' Union, 1899-1916. President, 
Trolley, Draymen and Carters' Union, 1901 — 16. President, Water-
side Workers' Federation, 1902-16. Member, Georgian Association, 
c. 1 8 9 1 . Member ASL, c. 1894-95. MLA (Sydney-Lang), 
1894-1901. MHR (West Sydney), 1901-17; (Bendigo), non-Labor 
1917-22; (North Sydney), non-Labor 1922-49; (Bradfield), non-
-Labor 1949-52. Minister for external affairs, 27 AprU-17 August 
1904 . Attorney general, 13 November 1908-1 June 1909, 
1910-13, 1914-21. Prime minister, 1915-23. Minister for external 
affairs, 1921-23, 1937-39. Minister for health and repatriation, 
1934-35, 1936-37. Artorney general, 1939-41. Minister for the 
navy, 1940-41 . 
JOHNSTON, (E) James, b. Liverpool (England), 1854; d. Sydney, 1930. 
Boilermaker. Arrived Sydney, 1857. BoUermaker, coal trimmer, 
bush worker. President, Boilermakers' Society. While in Brisbane 
assisted in formation Qld branch of BoUermakers' Society, Qld 
branch Federated Seaman's Union, and Qld TLC. MLA (Balmain), 
1 891 - 9 4 . ExpeUed from party, 1893. 
KELLY, Andrew Joseph, b. Dublin (Ireland), 1855; d. Sydney, 1913. 
Wharf labourer. Three years United States Navy. Arrived Sydney, 
1881. Carrier. Helped run Democrat (working-class newspaper). 
Licensed victualler. Helped to found, and sometime president. Wharf 
Labourers' Union and TroUey and Draymen's Union. President, 
TLC. Alderman of City Councd, 13 years. MLA (West Sydney), 
1 8 9 1 - 9 4 ; (Sydney-Denison) , 1901-4; (Lachlan), 1904-13 
(deceased). Expelled from party, 1893, but had rejoined it by 1901 
when he held Denison division of Sydney as Labor party member. 
KIRKPATRICK, John. b. Scotland, 1840; d. Gunnedah (NSW), 1904. 
Country storekeeper. TaUor's apprentice, Scotland. Goldminer, 
Otago (N.Z.). Cotton planter, Fiji. Arrived NSW, 1871. TaUor and 
storekeeper, Gunnedah. Chairman of directors of successful co-
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opera t ive butchery, Gunnedah. Alderman and twice mayor, 
Gunnedah. MLA (Gunnedah), 1891-95. Selected as Liberal and 
federal (Free Trade) candidate for Gunnedah, 1 898. 
LAMOND, Hector, b. NSW, 1865; d. 1947. Journalist. Editor and 
proprietor, Corowa Chronicle, 1894. Manager o{Australian Worker, 
1896-1917; also managing editor, but advocacy of conscription 
terminated connection with paper. Proprietor and editor of the Four 
Mails, 1924-47. Selected as Liberal and Federal (Free Trade) 
candidate, Corowa, 1898. MHR (lUawarra), non-Labor 1917-23. 
Honorary minister and assistant minister for repatriation, 1921-23. 
President of the PLL, 1903, 
MACDONELL, Donald, b. Vic, 1861; d. 1911. Shearer. Secretary, AWU, 
Bourke branch, 1894. General secretary, AWU, 1899. MLA (Cobar), 
1901—11. Colonial secretary and minister for agriculture, October 
1910-September 1911. Colonial secretary, 1910-11. Treasurer, 
PLP, 1907 -I-. 
McGOWEN, James Sinclair Taylor, b. at sea, 1855; d. Petersham (Sydney), 
1922. Boilermaker. Joined RaUway Department, 1875. Secretary, 
Boilermakers' Society, 1874-93. President of Eight-hour Demon-
stration Committee and on executive of Trades Hall Committee, 
1888-91. President Trades Hall executive, 1888. Sunday-school 
teacher. MLA (Redfern), 1891-1917. MLC 1917-22. Premier and 
colonial treasurer, 1910-11. Premier and colonial secretary, 
1911-13. Minister for labour and industry, 1913-14. Member of 
Public Works Committee, 1901 +. Leader, PLP, 1894-1913. 
Expelled from party, November 1916. 
McKELL, WUliam John. b. NSW, 1891. BoUermaker. Assistant secretary, 
BoUermakers' Union, 1913-17; Member of IVC, 1916-18. MLA 
(Redfern), 1917-20; (Botany), 1920-27; (Redfern), 1927-47. 
Assistant minister of justice, 13 AprU 1920—21 December 1920. 
Minister of justice, 1920-22. Minister of justice and assistant 
colonial treasurer, 1925—27. Minister for local government, 4 
November 1930-17 June 1931. Minister of justice, 1931-32. 
Premier and colonial treasurer, 1941—47. Governor general, 
1947-53. 
MACKINNON, James Archibald, b. Benalla (Vic), 1841; d. GrenfeU, 1910. 
Stock and station agent. Bought stations, 1873—75, but lost heavily 
through "blackmaUing". Owner of Mermegong, Young. For some 
years commission agent in GrenfeU. MLA (Young), 1882-94. 
Refused to sign the pledge and left the party. 
MEAGHER, Richard Denis, b. Bathurst (NSW), 1866; d. Lewisham 
(NSW), 1931. Solicitor. Commenced practice as soUcitor in Sydney, 
1889. In partnership with W. P. Crick from 1891. Stmck off rolls, 
1896. Restored to roll of solicitors by special Act, 1920, and 
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retumed to practice after resigning as MLC. Alderman of Sydney, 
1901-20; lord mayor, 1916-17. Trustee, Public Library, 1916. 
MLA (Sydney-PhUlip), 24 July 1895-8 October 1895 (resigned); 
(Tweed), 1898-1904; (PhUlip), 1907-17. MLC, 1917-20. ChaU-
man of committees, 1910-13. Speaker, 1913-17. Member, Metro-
politan Water Board, 1906-10. ExpeUed from party, November 
1916. 
MINAHAN, Patrick Joseph b. Ireland, 1865; d. 1933. Boot and shoe 
manufacturer. Member of Musicians' Union. MLA (Belmore), 
1910-17. President, PLL, 1910-11 . 
MOLESWORTH, Voltaire, b. Balmain, 1890; d. 1934. Journalist and 
managing editor. Managing editor. Daily Guardian. Member of Aus-
tralian Journalists' Association. 
MORGAN, James, b. Hobart, 1851; d. Sydney, 1933. ComposUor. Spent 
some years on goldfields. Joined clerical staff on Sydney Morning 
Herald at age of ten. MLA (Bogan), 1891-94; (Dubbo), 1894-95. 
MORRISH, James John. b. Wales, 1868; d. 1956. Secretary, Hotel and 
Restaurant Union. MLA (King), 1910-17. Treasurer, PLP, 1914 -I-. 
Expelled from party, November 1916. 
NICHOLSON, John Barnes, b. Cumberland (England), 1849; d. Woonona 
(NSW), 1919. Miner. Went to Canada and Vancouver Island. Worked 
in gold and sUver mines, California. Arrived Australia, 1882. Miner, 
BuUi. Became paid general secretary, lUawarra Miners' Union. MLA 
(Illawarra), 1891-94; (Woronora), 1894-1904; (WoUongong), 
1904—17. Left Labor party, c. 1891, but remained as Independent 
Labor. Rejoined Labor party, 1904. ExpeUed from party, November 
1916. 
NIELSEN, Niels Rasmus WUson. b. Denmark, 1869; d. 1930. Cabinet 
maker and carpenter. Member, Furniture Trades Union. MLA 
(Boorowa), 1899-1904; (Yass), 1904-13 (resigned). Secretary for 
lands, 1910-11 . Secretary, PLP, 1901 - 1 0 . 
PAGE, Frederick Joseph, b. Windsor, 1859; d. 1929. Master tanner. 
Member of Botany Council. MLA (Botany), 1907-17. 
RAE, Arthur, b. Christchurch (NZ), 1860; d. 1946. Shearer, miner, bush-
worker. Secretary, Shearers' Union, 1890. Sentenced to sixty-five 
separate fortnights' imprisonment for bringing shearers out on strike 
and refusing to pay fines; released by government after one month in 
prison. Made life member, AWU, for services rendered in strike. 
Vice-president, AWU, 1893. President, AWU, 1895. General 
secretary, AWU, 1898-99. Excluded from membership, AWU, 
1920, for taking part in breakaway socialist movements, 1919. MLA 
(Murrumbidgee), 1891-94. Senator for NSW, 1910-14 and 
1929-35. Selected as Liberal and Federal party (Free Trade) 
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candidate for Murmmbidgee, 1898, but also shown as Labor candi-
date. 
ROSA, Samuel Albert, b. Australia, 1866; d. Sydney, 1940. Journalist. 
Educated in England with socialist group that included Burns, 
Hyndman, WUliam Morris. Freelance journalist. United States, 
1886—88. Returned to Australia. Urged the unemployed to form an 
army in Melbourne, 1889. Went to Sydney just before the 1890 
strike. Worked as navvy, canvasser, freelance journalist. Contributor 
to Truth, and a friend of John Norton. Editor of Truth, c. 1 906—23. 
Rejoined Truth, 1934, as leader writer. ASL, c. 1890. ExpeUed from 
Socialist League early 1892. Announced he would form a revolu-
tionary "League of the Just". Sued Norton for Ubel after Truth 
reported that he proposed to steal "the funds of the Melbourne 
unemployed". Won his case and awarded £15 ($30) damages. Sought 
but denied Liberal and Federal (Free Trade) selection as candidate 
for Braidwood, 1898. Expelled from NSW Labor party 1919. 
Formed a shortlived Socialist party. 
SCHEY, WiUiam Francis, b. London, 1857; d. Woolwich (NSW), 1913. 
Clerk (raUways). Seaman. Arrived Sydney, 1875, as second mate of 
Fairlie. FeU UI and had to remain behind. BuUders' labourer for 
Saxton of Redfern. Labourer, shunter, and parcels clerk in railways. 
Secretary, Railway and Tramway Employees' Association, 1877. 
Secretary, NSW Amalgamated Railway and Tramway Service 
Association, 1886. Member, ASL, about 1890-91. MLA (Redfern), 
1887-94; (Darlington), 1894-98. Joined Protectionists, 1895. 
SCOTT, David, b. Newcastle-on-Tyne (England), 1848; d. Adamstown 
(NSW), 1927. Ironworker. Arrived NSW, 1874. Went to CaUfornia 
for two years. Returned to Newcastle. One of the promoters of 
Newcastle TLC. Trustee of Eight Hour Association. Alderman of 
Carrington; mayor of Carrington. MLA (Newcastle), 1891 - 9 4 . 
SHARP, William Henry, b. London, 1844; d. Mosman (NSW), 1929. 
Compositor. Emigrated to America. Returned to London, 1874. 
Went to Australia. Worked in Government Printing Office. Joined 
Sydney Typographical Association. On board of management, 
Sydney Typographical Association, for six years. Delegate to TLC. 
President, TLC, 1891. MLA (Redfern), 1891-94. Expelled from 
party, 1893. 
SHELDON, Job. b. Chester (England), 1849; d. Petersham (Sydney), 
1914. Confidential clerk. Enlisted in army at eighteen. Appointed 
schoolmaster to regiment. Arrived NSW, 1882. MLA (Namoi), 
1891-94. 
SLEATH, Richard, b. Fifeshire (Scotland), 1863; d. Sydney, 1922. Miner. 
Emigrated Queensland. Shearer, timber-getter, navvy, prospector, 
contractor (Sydney), miner (Broken HUl). President, Miners' Trade 
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Association, 1888; secretary, 1890 (jailed during 1892 strike). 
President, AWU, 1896-97. MLA (Wilcannia), 1894-1904. Out of 
party, 1901 (quarrel with local branch over election funds). 
Rejoined later when elected as candidate of Coogee branch. 
SPENCE, WiUiam Guthrie, b. 1846, Orkney Island; d. Victoria, 1926. 
Union official. Secretary, Creswick Miners' Union, 1878—82. 
General secretary, AMA, 1882 — 88. Formed and was president of 
ASU, 1886-93. Secretary, AWU, 1894-97; president, 1898-1917. 
MHR (Darling), 1901-17; (Darwin), non-Labor 1917-19. Post-
master general, 1914—15. Vice-president, Executive Council, 14 
November 1916-17 February 1917. Expelled from Labor party, 
1916. 
STOREY, John. b. Jervis Bay, 1860; d. 1921. BoUermaker. Member, 
Boilermakers' Union. MLA (Balmain North), 1901-4; (Balmain), 
1 907-20 . Public Works Committee 1910 -I-, and chairman. Honorary 
minister. November 1916—July 1917. Minister for public health, 
July 1919-January 1920. Premier, 1920-21. Elected leader, PLP, 
January 1917. 
STUART-ROBERTSON, Robert James, b. NSW, 1874; d. 1933. Shop 
assistant. Member, Shop Assistants' Union. MLA (Camperdown), 
1907-22. 
TREFLE, John Louis, b. Victoria, c. 1866;d. 1915. Farmer. MLA (Castle-
reagh), 1906-15. Honorary minister, 1910—11. Honorary minister 
charged with duties of minister of agriculture, 11 September 
1 9 1 1 - 6 November 1911. Minister of agriculture, 1911-13. 
Secretary for lands, December 1912—June 1913. Minister of agricul-
ture and secretary for lands, 1913—15 (deceased). 
VAUGHN, Robert Matteson. b. 1835; d. Paddington (Sydney), 1908. 
BuUding contractor. Miner (a "forty-niner" from California with 
cons iderab le mining experience). MLA (Grenfell), 1880—94. 
Secretary for mines, 22 December 1885 — 25 February 1886. In 
Robertson ministry, 1885—86. 
WATSON, John Christian, b. Valparaiso (ChUe), 1867; d. Sydney, 1941. 
Compositor. Delegate of Typographical Association to TLC, 1890. 
Vice-president, TLC, 1892; president, 1892-94. President, NSW 
Provincial Councd, ALF, 1895. MLA (Young), 1894-1901. MHR 
(Bland), 1901-6; (South Sydney), 1906-10. FUst leader, Federal 
PLP. Prime minister and treasurer, 27 AprU 1904-17 August 1904. 
WILLIAMS, Thomas Henry, b. Plymouth (Devon, England), 1862; d. 
1953. Shearer. Arrived Vic, 1870. Drover, Qld, Vic. Speculator, WA 
(lost everything). Fencing, tank-sinking, shearing, Vic. Secretary, 
Scone branch, ASU, 1891. TraveUing agent for ASU. MLA (Upper 
Hunter), 1891-94. 
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WILLIS, Albert Charies. b. TonyrefaU (Wales), 1876; d. Sydney, 1954. 
Miner. Arrived Australia, 1911. Miner, Balmain. President, lUawarra 
Miners' Association, 1913. First general secretary of the Coal and 
Shale Employees ' Federat ion, 1 9 1 6 - 2 5 . Founder and managing 
director, Labor Daily, 1 9 2 3 - 3 1 . MLC, 1 9 2 5 - 3 3 . Vice-president, 
Executive Council, 1 9 2 5 - 2 7 , November 1930-Apr i l 1931 . Agent-
general, London, 1 9 3 1 - 3 2 . President, NSW Labor par ty , 1 9 2 3 - 2 5 . 
Readmitted to federal Labor party, Febmary 1934. 
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It has been commonplace to relate the formation of the Labor party in 
Queensland to the maritime strike of 1890 and even more to the shearers' 
strike of 1891. This interpretation has depicted the journalist William Lane 
as the key figure, placing the stamp of socialism on the party and giving it 
a "socialist from the jump"' character and an identity which was later to 
be lost by scheming politicians more intent on gaining votes than on 
upholding socialist principles. It is an interpretation which now demands a 
reassessment. The Labor party in Queensland evolved as a result of changes 
in trade unionism and in the fortunes of hberalism in that colony and in 
Australia. It inherited the radical strands of nineteenth-century liberalism 
and the idealism of the socialist writers of the time, emerging as a radical 
liberal and social democratic party which provided a political base for 
reformers of all kinds but which had close associations with a pragmatic 
urban and rural working class, linked with scattered union organizations. 
Though, untU the mid-1920s, it could claim to be a moderately socialist 
party, it was far from being "socialist from the jump". Its essential feature 
was a pragmatic and practical approach to political issues, with little reli-
ance on political theory, but with strong streaks of idealism and 
nationalism and a determination to use the power of the state to provide 
for a more equal distribution of wealth. Its other aims were to ensure that 
employees worked in safe and reasonable conditions, to provide state 
assistance for the aged, invalids, and children, to assist selectors, and to 
provide for government by the people on the basis of majority rule. State 
business enterprises were seen as the means of breaking the economic and, 
therefore, the political and social power of monopoly capitalism. 
When the first Inter-Colonial Trade Union Congress (ITUC) met in 
Sydney in October 1879, no significant Labor or union organization 
existed in the colony of Queensland.^ An eight-hour movement, begun in 
Brisbane in 1857, had existed fitfully, staging a march in 1865 and dying 
during the recession of the late 1860s. A bUl in 1876 to provide for a 
statutory eight-hour day had lapsed in the Legislative Assembly. In the 
1870s various union and workingmen's associations sprang up, generally 
on the basis of a single issue, to die again after the issue was resolved. 
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Working men who were eligible to vote tended to follow Liberal politicians 
like Charles Lilley, a barrister and the driving force behind the develop-
ment of free education in Queensland, and later Samuel Griffith, another 
barrister whose concern was the implementing of free education. It was 
not untU the 1880s that a vibrant Labor movement emerged, which, by 
the end of the decade, had determined to enter politics in its own right 
and had begun to provide the organization necessary to send working men 
into parliament. 
The 1880s saw Queensland prosper; capital was invested in the pastoral 
and mining industries, the sugar industry along the north coast provided 
large export earnings in agriculture (the only agricultural industry to do 
so), and large-scale immigration provided the labour for the towns and 
ports which developed. Queensland's population increased from 213,525 
in 1881 to 322,853 in 1886, and 393,718 in 1891, but, because of the 
decentralization in the west and along the coast and because of successive 
governments' attempts to induce large-scale rural settlement, Brisbane did 
not develop as an industrial centre as did Sydney and Melbourne. As the 
labouring population was concentrated in the mining areas in the north 
and at Mount Morgan and Gympie, in the sugar and cattle areas in the 
north, and in the pastoral areas in the west, these rather than Brisbane 
were the places where the Labor movement was to dominate. As the 
export of wool and minerals increased, coastal ports became not only 
exporting centres but also centres for importing goods, servicing industries, 
manufacturing buUding materials, and processing food. They also became 
the termini of raUways. The mining of gold and metals, tlie export of 
which at times exceeded that of wool, provided the impetus for a timber 
industry and the development of foundries and engineering firms. Because 
of the large area covered by the pastoral industry and the value of mineral 
exports, transport became a major concern and involved the government in 
heavy expenditure on buUding raUways, ports, and roads, and in providing 
postal services. These in turn, provided work for large numbers of seamen, 
labourers, waterside workers, carriers, and railway employees. 
WhUe the Queensland economy in the 1880s provided for the develop-
ment of pastoral, mining, sugar, and buUding industries, Queensland 
politics entered a liberal era in which social legislation became more 
important, more people were enrolled as voters, education was extended, 
and unions were able to grow. Throughout the decade a mUd liberal and 
conservative party system existed in which the major differences arose out 
of such questions as the use of Kanaka labour, the granting of land for 
raUway construction, and the method of opening up new land for agricul-
ture. The liberals tended to be those associated with the Brisbane middle 
class, the enfranchised working men, and the Darting Downs farmers, who 
looked to Sir Samuel Griffith as tlieir leader, whUe the conservatives 
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tended to comprise the pastoralists, the sugar planters, and larger moneyed 
interests, all of whom looked to Sir Thomas Mcllwraith as their political 
leader. The differences however were not deep. Both accepted the 
economic theories on which private enterprise was based and each believed 
that the role of government was to provide the climate where men could 
succeed through hard work and the judicious use of their capital resources. 
Though trade unions were not really legal untU the passing of the Trade 
Union Act in 1886, they had begun to organize and operate openly before 
this. The impetus for the organization of a trade union movement in the 
colony had come from English migrants with previous trade union experi-
ence, and in 1882 an eight-hour day committee was re-established in 
Brisbane where a march and demonstration were held in March 1885. Only 
one further step was required to establish the Brisbane Trades and Labour 
CouncU (TLC) on 1 September 1885. Prior to this, craft unions were 
developed in the buUding and printing trades by 1884, and a branch of the 
Seamen's Union, already weU established in the other colonies, was 
formed; unions of waterside workers and labourers, and working men's 
societies for protection against black and non-European labour, were 
brought into being in the principal coastal towns. At the same time, miners 
in the goldfields were also taking the first steps towards protecting them-
selves against non-white labour and rapacious overseas mine ovmers. The 
unions formed were not then oriented towards political action, but were 
primarUy concerned with protecting the industrial interests of their own 
members. However, as with those in the southern colonies, it was 
impossible for Queensland unions to avoid being involved in polifics and 
the first tentative steps were taken in 1886 when the Queensland Typo-
graphical Association (QTA), at its annual meeting, recommended to the 
TLC that at least two Labor candidates should be nominated for Brisbane 
electorates at the general elections in 1888. It proposed that its president, 
Albert HinchcUffe, and vice-president, W. P. Colboume, should stand. In 
that same year the president of the TLC, Alderman WUliam Galloway, a 
seaman and chairman of the Eight Hour Day Committee, became the first 
to stand as a Labor candidate when he nominated for a by-election in 
Fortitude Valley, one of the few metropoUtan electorates with a higli 
proportion of working-class people; he was later endorsed by the TLC. He 
polled only 111 votes out of 1,401 to finish last.-' 
At the successive ITUCs it was obvious to the delegates that working 
men could gain entry to parliament only when three conditions were 
fulfilled: payment of members, enfranchisement of working men, and 
better organization of unions. In Queensland, Griffith's liberalism assisted 
the first two of these somewhat, by the passing of the Members Expenses 
Act in 1886 by which members of parliament drew £2.2s ($4.20) for each 
sitting they attended, with a maximum of £200 ($400) a year, and by the 
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amending of the Election Act in 1885 to prevent disqualification of a 
voter on the grounds of his change in residence. The third condition was 
the responsibUity of the unions themselves who received some inspiration 
at each ITUC and through the writings of optimistic authors who told of a 
new worid emerging in which organized Labor would play a new and 
dominant role. 
Queensland was again not represented at the second congress in 
Melbourne in 1884, but sent seven delegates to the third congress in 
Sydney in October 1885, and four delegates to the fourth congress in 
Adelaide in September 1886. At each congress, payment of members and 
direct representation of Labor in parliament were debated and agreed 
upon by the delegates. With the establishment of at least fifteen new 
unions in Brisbane by 1886, together with a miners' union at Charters 
Towers, the premier mining town in north Queensland, and wharf 
labourers' and seamen's unions in the coastal ports, in 1887, Labor in 
Queensland was poised to take on a political as well as an industrial role. 
Among those most influential in this movement were Albert Hinch-
cliffe, WUliam Lane, and Charies Seymour. Hinchcliffe,^ born in Lanca-
shire in 1860, had come to Queensland as a boy of six. After an inter-
rriittent education he served an apprenticeship as a printer with the Darling 
Downs Gazette, where he worked for eight years from 1874 to 1882. 
FoUowing a twelve months' visit to England in 1882, he settled in Bris-
bane, working on the Brisbane Courier and then the Telegraph and assis-
ting in the refounding of the QTA in 1884. He held the offices of presi-
dent and secretary of that union and when Alf Walker, then secretary of 
the TLC, became business manager of the new radical paper, the Boom-
erang, late in 1887, Hinchcliffe became secretary of the TLC, whUe 
continuing to work for the Telegraph. From this beginning he developed 
into the most important single figure in the Queensland Labor movement 
before World War I. Though small in stature and quiet in demeanour, 
Hinchcliffe was an extremely competent organizer and planner, whose role 
in Queensland history has been largely neglected and, in some cases, 
completely ignored. Yet both the Labor party and tHe Labor movement 
were to exhibit his influence. Hinchcliffe, though a socialist in his long-
term aspirations, was fundamentally a pragmatist and was not concemed 
wdth Utopias. His aim was the immediate improvement of working and 
living conditions, while stUl keeping siglit of his long-term goals. To 
achieve these, about which he and his friends were understandably vague, 
he saw two necessary requirements: the federation of aU Labor unions and 
the gaining of political power by Labor. 
WUliam Lane^ was a quite different person from Hinchcliffe. Bom in 
Bristol, England, in 1866 of a conservative working-class family. Lane was 
small, with rather large, sad eyes behind steel-rimmed spectacles, and he 
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had been slightly crippled since birth. He had emigrated to Canada and the 
United States where he worked as a printer and a reporter before coming 
to Brisbane in 1885. His "labour notes" in the Evening Observer during 
1886 revealed his concern with social problems and with buUding useful 
contacts in the Labor movement and in liberal reform groups. Though he 
was not actively engaged in the Labor movement, his views on the 
common ground existing between capital and Labor coincided with those 
of most union leaders. He saw the role of the unions as the mitigation of 
the worst evUs of capitalism, and the use of their organizational power to 
gain Labor representation in parliament. But where Hinchcliffe was the 
cool organizer. Lane was the crusader and propagandist, driven on to 
spread his gospel through the written word. With the establishment of a 
new liberal radical weekly the Boomerang^ at the end of 1887, Lane, as 
editor, was able to give expression to the dreams bubbUng within him: 
state-aided co-operative village settlements, Australian nationalism. Labor 
in politics, the organization of Labor, and the exclusion of raciaUy inferior 
non-whites who would engulf the white Australian nation. He wrote well, 
with feeling and wath a turn of phrase that was to gain him hundreds of 
devoted admirers and followers, some of whom were to find Lane in 
person quite different from Lane in print. 
Although Seymour initially rivalled Hinchcliffe and continued to be a 
force in the Labor movement untU his death in 1924, he has been the least 
chronicled of the three. A native of Dublin, he became a seaman and in 
1880 settled in Queensland, where he became a bookkeeper and in that 
occupation formed the Queensland branch of the Federated Seamen's 
Union of Australasia, being elected secretary in 1885. He became 
associated with the growing Labor organization in Brisbane and initiated 
proposals for an intercolonial federation of marifime unions, the structure 
of which was simUar to that of the later Australian Labor Federation 
(ALF). Seymour's essential quality was loyalty rather than brilliance or 
administrative ability. It was because of this tJiat he remained a back-
ground faithful figure, carrying out the policies of others, rather than 
being an initiator in his own riglit. 
With Hinchcliffe as secretary of the TLC and Lane as editor of the 
Boomerang, a serious attempt was made in 1887 to form a workingmen's 
political organization - the Workers Political Reform Association — in 
Brisbane, Ipswich, and the surrounding areas. In other parts of the colony, 
simOar ideas were being put into effect. In the northern mining areas of 
Charters Towers, Croydon, and Ravenswood a radical movement was 
emerging which included others as well as trade unionists and which went 
beyond mere trade union demands.' In the pastoral areas in western 
Queensland, the Shearers' Union and the Labourers' Union were moving 
towards the formation of a political association to elect their own repre-
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sentatives to pariiament. These moves towards Labor's taking a direct role 
in politics were reported not only in the Boomerang and similar papers in 
the mining areas, but also in the established press. This led liberals, such as 
Griffith, who were conscious of the changes occurring in the colony's 
political structure, to attempt to capture political Labor before it estab-
lished itself as an independent and separate force. In his election manifesto 
in March 1888 Griffith wrote: "The relations between labour and capital 
constitute one of the great difficulties of the day. I look to the recognition 
of the principle that a share of the profits of productive labour belong of 
right to the labourer as of the greatest importance in the future adjustment 
of those relations."^ But as delegates to successive ITUCs had indicated, 
Labor wanted to be represented in parliament by Labor, not by liberals, 
conservatives, or by any other group. 
A boost was given to Queensland unionism and political labor with the 
holding of the fifth ITUC in Brisbane in March 1888. At this congress, the 
South Australian delegates reported that, foUowing the fourth congress in 
Adelaide in 1886, a pohtical platform had been drawn up, nine candidates 
endorsed, and seven of these elected to the colony's parliament at the 
following general elections. They claimed that through their efforts legis-
lation for payment of members had been passed.^ With this evidence, 
there was no opposition to a motion calling on TLCs to make greater 
efforts to secure direct representation of Labor in parliament. The mood 
of the Queensland delegates had been well expressed by the president of 
the Queensland TLC in his presidential address to the congress when he 
concluded: "There is one more question I feel compelled to avert to, 
which seems to me to be absolutely necessary to give effect to all that has 
gone before [exclusion of Chinese, abolition of state-aided immigration, 
Factory and Workshop Act, encouragement of native industry], I refer to 
direct representation of labour in parliament (applause). If we workingmen 
are to get beneficial legislation, it is largely to ourselves we must trust."'*' 
In his introduction to the published report of the congress, Hinchcliffe 
who had been the secretary also made his attitude clear on this question: 
The unanimity of opinion which characterised the debate . . . is 
certainly matter for congratulation. Will it not be matter for even 
greater felicitation if when the next Congress meets at Hobart, 
Tasmania, delegates are able to report that a fair proportion of the 
resolutions arrived at have been carried into effect? The first step 
towards the accomplishment of this is to secure direct representation 
of labour in the Houses of Legislature in the various colonies. Wage 
earners have been too often gulled and hoodwinked at election times 
by the rash promises of so-called labour candidates which are mostly 
forgotten after they have secured their seats, and now the workers 
have determined that none but a man direct from the workshop -
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one from among themselves — shall be retumed in the interests of 
labour. 11 
Since the 1884 congress, plans had been discussed for an intercolonial 
federation of unions, but no concrete proposals had been put forward. At 
the 1888 Brisbane congress, a delegate from the Amalgamated Society of 
Carpenters and Joiners, whose union was already moving towards a feder-
ation of the buUding trades in Brisbane, moved for a committee of six to 
be formed to draft a constitution for the federation of Australian Labor. It 
was evident from the remarks of Hinchcliffe's QTA coUeague, Colbourne, 
that their union also wanted a stronger combination of unions than was 
possible under the TLC arrangement. 
During the two months foUowing the congress, the first attempt was 
made by a body of Labor candidates to enter the Queensland parliament. 
In Brisbane the TLC endorsed four candidates: the two printers Hinch-
cliffe and Colboume in Toombul and Fortitude VaUey respectively, and 
two boUermakers J. Valentine and J. Johnstone in Toowong and 
WooUoongabba respectively. Outside Brisbane, Thomas Glassey was adver-
tised as a Labor candidate for Bundamba, near Ipswich.''^ Though the 
Boomerang campaigned well for the Labor team in the metropolitan area, 
its influence could not match that of the Courier or the Telegraph. The 
four metropolitan candidates polled only 1,261 votes between them 
compared with the 6,544 of their opponents. It was obvious that solid 
grass-roots organization combined with an efficient central administration 
would be the key to electoral success. Glassey, alone of the Labor candi-
dates, was elected.'^ Politically he was a good representative of the type 
of British migrant who was to become the backbone of the new Labor 
party as it developed. Born in Northern Ireland in 1844, he had worked as 
a miner in Scotland and northern England where he had organized unions 
of miners. He had taken an active part in local government elections and 
had assisted in returning Thomas Burt as the first working man to enter 
the House of Commons. Having been a member of the Liberal party in 
England, he attached himself to Griffith's liberals on his arrival in 1885 
and became a friend of Lane and HinchcUffe and of the leaders of the 
liberal organization. After organizing a Mutual Protection Association 
among the Ipswich coalminers, he had been asked by them to stand for 
parliament against the official liberal and the Mcllwraith candidates. In his 
first speech in Parliament, he declared himself a Labor representative, 
though he acknowledged that he was a supporter of Griffith. 
Defeat at their first attempt to secure parliamentary representation did 
not deter the leaders of the Labor movement. In the boom of the 1880s, 
working men with a trade or in good jobs, who were seeking higher pay 
and better conditions througli combining in unions, continued to enrol in 
unions and invite others to join them. Labor leaders like Hinchcliffe, Lane 
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and Seymour, with concern for sweated employees, pressed for Factory 
Acts to improve the working conditions of the thousands of exploited, 
non-union workers and for work for the unemployed. For, despite the 
remarkable increase in unionists registered under the Trade Union Act 
from 2,359 in 1887 to 21,379 in 1890, it was estimated that 120,000 to 
140,000 employees stiU remained outside the unions in 1890.*'* A 
characteristic of the unions now was a greater interest in Labor's directly 
entering politics. The growth and emerging politicization of unions, in 
turn, produced a desire for closer federation not only in Brisbane, but in 
the principal coastal towns, in the mining areas and in the shearing centres, 
where the bushworkers had appointed traveUing agents to visit the stations 
to see that aU eligible workers were on the roU as a preliminary to electing 
their own representative to parliament.'^ 
The scheme for an intercolonial federation of unions, which provided 
also for a union federation within each colony, was duly drawn up by 
Hinchcliffe, Seymour, and a recently arrived English migrant, Mat Reid. 
Reid was born in 1856 in London where he became a carpenter and a 
member of the Amalgamated Carpenters' Union. He had also been a 
member of Henry Hyndman's Social Democratic Federation which pre-
ached a form of Marxist socialism and sought to create a large working-
class party. On his arrival in Brisbane in 1887, he was elected as a delegate 
from the Carpenters' Union to the TLC and soon emerged as the leading 
figure in the formation of a Labor League. There is no evidence to suggest 
that Lane's was the organizing brain behind the scheme, though as the 
leading Labor propagandist he probably took part in the discussions, 
particularly those concerning the federation's newspaper. 
Through the Boomerang, Lane provided the mouthpiece for the in-
creasing dissatisfaction with the TLC organization and for demands that it 
should be replaced by a body something like the Labor League which was 
then threatening to break away from the TLC. Like the Labor League, the 
Labor federation provided for a more tiglitly unified organization of 
unions, but planned to base this geographically on district councUs which 
would try to settle disputes in the areas concerned, have the power to levy 
members and unions, organize new unions, and be responsible for pro-
viding a united front of unions in the event of industrial trouble. The 
district councU, in turn, was to be affiliated with a general councU which 
Would exercise an overaU supervision throughout the colony and which 
could, in an emergency, assume control of a dispute. The federation was to 
be financed by a levy of sixpence (five cents) per member per month, one 
penny of which was to go to the general councU and the district councU 
for administration; two pence to the district councU for organization; one 
penny to the district councU for a reserve fund, and one penny towards a 
monthly journal of the federafion. In addition to running this labor news-
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paper, the federation aimed at consolidating the eight-hour system, 
securing direct representation of Labor in pariiament, obtaining fair and 
reasonable conditions of work, and prevenfing "Australians being degraded 
by competition to the level of Chinese and European labourers".' "^  
It was in effect, a poUtical and industrial One Big Union (OBU) where 
the skiUed worker would be protected against the unskilled taking his job 
during a dispute and where the weakest union would have behind it the 
strength of a united Labor movement. It was such an organization, said 
Seymour presenting it to the ITUC in Hobart in 1889, as would provide 
the remedy for the bane of all labour, viz. strikes, and would make it 
"utteriy impossible for any combination of capital to break through it". It 
was however too advanced and too constricting for the southern unions, 
whose delegates were not even prepared to discuss the scheme, but, when 
in AprU and May 1899 a protracted strike of Brisbane printers against the 
employment of non-unionists was broken by the importation of "free" 
labour from the south, the deficiencies of the TLC were so starkly revealed 
that it was disbanded, and in June the federation proposals were adopted 
under the title of the Brisbane District CouncU of the ALF. Seymour was 
elected provisional secretary and a bootmaker from Victoria, David 
Bowman, president. Born in Bendigo in 1860, Bowman had come to 
Brisbane in 1889 for health reasons, and almost immediately organized a 
union among the men in his own trade. He soon found his place in 
Brisbane among Lane, Hinchcliffe, Seymour, Reid, BiUy Mabbott, the 
idealist secretary of the Waterside Labourers' Union, and GUbert Casey, a 
former bushworker, seaman, and miner. Casey had a flair for oratory that 
made him the nearest thing to a professional agitator among the group.'^ 
Events were now moving quickly in the colony. Though Griffith's party 
had been defeated at the 1888 election, his liberalism had not been 
quashed and in the Christmas Boomerang of 1888 he had contributed a 
remarkable article called "Wealth and Want" which was as radical in its call 
for a fairer distribution of wealth as anytliing spoken or written by Lane 
or the other Labor leaders. He subsequently had the article reprinted in 
pamphlet form and distributed throughout the colonies, where it was 
favourably received by the Labor movement. It was as close as Griffith was 
to come to leading the political Labor movement.'^ Somewhat reserved, 
he, like other middle-class Uberals, could not bring himself to associate 
directly with the working class or to be bound by the closely knit poUtical 
organization then being planned. On its side. Labor had made it clear that 
it wanted its own men, not "brainy democrats", to lead and represent it. 
In 1889 an act to provide for the payment of members was passed, 
under which members were to receive £300 ($600) a year with a mUeage 
allowance for traveUing expenses. The way was thereby opened for a larger 
number of Labor candidates without other means to nominate at the next 
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general election. In September 1890 a Constitution Act Amendment Act 
was passed reducing the length of Queensland parliaments from five years 
to three — and fulfiUing a desire which Griffith had advanced since his 
entry into politics. Labor, it was anticipated, would have its next oppor-
tunity to put forward candidates at a general election in May 1891. The 
high point of public sympathy and support for a fairer deal for working 
men was reached during August 1889 when the London Dock Strike Fund 
Committee consisting of Labor and non-Labor sympathizers, with Hinch-
cliffe as secretary, contributed significantly to Australia's £30,000 
($60,000) donation. Nothing seemed to bar Labor's way to achieving what 
the multitude of writers was promising — a new society where the working 
man would take his rightful place in the government of the country and in 
the sharing of its economic wealth. 
The need for the working man's case to be placed before the voting 
public was appreciated by the Labor leaders and six months after the 
adoption, in June 1889, of the ALF scheme by tlie Brisbane unions a 
meeting was held in the maritime haU in Brisbane to formulate plans for a 
monthly newspaper, to be owned by the unions and circulated among 
their members. More than 20,000 unionists were represented, giving the 
newspaper a potential circulation liigher than that of any other in the 
colony.^'^ A board of trustees consisfing of HinchcUffe, Casey, Reid, and 
Seymour was elected, Mabbott being added later. Casey became chairman 
of the board, Seymour was secretary, and Hinchcliffe, treasurer; sub-
sequently he became manager, a paid position, which gave him flexibUity 
and greater power within the Labor movement. Lane was appointed editor 
on £3 ($6) a week, a substantial sacrifice on his part considering that he 
had been earning £12 ($24) on the Boomerang. The success of the venture 
depended on its acceptance by the shearers', carriers', and labourers' 
unions, since these had the big numbers to provide the finance. There was 
little doubt of their acceptance. Lane's reputation and foUowing were 
strongest in the west, but in any case Hinchcliffe made a tour of the 
coastal, mining, and shearing areas with Glassey and Casey in November 
1889 to sell the idea of the federation and the newspaper to the unionists 
there. To be quite sure, he also had himself elected as a delegate to the 
meeting of the central Queensland labourers', shearers', and carriers' con-
ference called to discuss the formation of a central district councU of the 
ALF.^' The tour was immensely successful and local newspapers, some-
times hostile to Labor, reported large audiences absorbing the explanation 
of the ALF by Hinchcliffe and Casey and the long addresses by Glassey on 
politics and pariiament; in these he urged Labor to send more of its own 
men into the Legislative Assembly.^^ 
The new eight-page journal called the Worker - the eariier title of the 
Swagman having been discarded - made its first appearance at the eight-
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hour day procession in March 1890. It promised to be a Uvely journal, 
mostly written by Lane under a number of noms-de-plume but wath some 
contributions by Hinchcliffe and Seymour. It was to be above all a 
political as well as an industrial Labor journal, teaching as weU as in-
forming the workers. In his opening paragraph Lane wrote: 
The political attention of the Worker will be limited to those 
questions which closely affect the welfare of the wage earning 
masses. It wUl advocate the measures and reforms agreed upon as 
desirable at the Labor Congresses of Australia and wiU comment 
radically upon any and every proposal tending in the same direction. 
Neither of the old political parties will have its praise or its blame 
excepting as they treat demands of the workers for justice and all 
efforts to secure direct representation for organized labour will have 
its loyal support. 
In Queensland in 1890 where the results of expanded education had 
promised a waiting and eager audience, such sentiments were popularly 
received. Lane, driven on by an inward compulsion known only to the 
crusader, had a free hand to write what he chose and so was born the 
legend of the man who accomplished aU things for Queensland Labor. 
Coincident with the publication of the Worker, came a growth in the ALF. 
To the Brisbane and central Queensland unions were added district 
councUs in Wide Bay and Burnett (Gympie, Maryborough, and Bundaberg) 
in May, and in Townsville, Charters Towers, and Rockhampton in June. In 
May also the ALF scored its first industrial victory in the Jondaryan 
dispute when the Brisbane maritime unions made it clear that they would 
not handle wool shorn by non-union labour. A conference between the 
pastoralists and the unions led by Hinchcliffe and Spence, who had been 
invited to take part, resolved the dispute, with the pastoralists agreeing to 
shear with union labour. Labor had won, though it overestimated the 
significance of its victory. A "slate" of seven points to prevent disputes 
between employees and employers was drawn up by the ALF executive 
for presentation to the pastoralists before the next season. Unions were to 
be asked to subscribe 2s.6d. (25 cents) per member for increased organiz-
ation to provide the strength necessary to prevent employers infringing the 
"slate" proposal. These proposals were constructive, but within the Labor 
movement the first rumblings against the assumption of power by the ALF 
executive were heard.'^ 
In capitalist circles, the new strength of the combined unions was 
recognized by the pastoralists and the non-Labor press, which pointed to 
the ob-vious corollary of a union of employers. The Brisbane Courier 
correctly noted: "A combination of capitalists if once seriously set about 
would from the very necessities of the case be of greater strength than any 
which all the Labour Federations put together could accomplish. 
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Moreover, in a war, the sinews of the labourers would soon be wasted from 
sheer want, since they would be producing nothing, and therefore would 
speedily exhaust suppUes long before the capitalists could be sensibly 
touched."^'* Moreover, serious economic changes were occurring which 
neither organized Labor nor optimistic liberalism could avert. Drought in 
1889 and 1890 had caused heavy losses of sheep and cattle with a pre-
dictable effect on urban commercial life.^^ The price of wool, which had 
been declining since 1882 despite an increase in the quantity exported, 
recovered somewhat in 1889 but decUned once more in 1890. Pastoralists 
already heavUy in debt to finance companies were fearful of rising labour 
costs as profits feU. In addition, as so many Queensland stations were 
owned by pastoral companies outside the state, the former personal re-
lationship between employer and employee was lost. In the north, the 
boom in the sugar and mining industries ended, producing increased un-
employment.^^ The oncoming depression was felt by the government 
when the treasurer announced a deficit of £1.3 miUion ($2.6 miUion) and 
proposed a 5 per cent tax on aU property - real and personal — to make 
up the deficit. The Assembly saw Griffith and McUwraith voting together 
against the proposal, to bring down the government on 7 August. After 
some speculation, the "Griffilwraith", a coalition of Griffith and 
Mcllwraith, was sworn in. It was to become known in the nineties as the 
"continuous ministry". The approaching depression, the absence of other 
capable leaders, and the problems raised by the new mUitancy of Labor 
brought to an end the non-Labor political divisions of the 1880s. 
Though the changes in the colony's economic fortunes were recognized 
by pastoralists and businessmen. Labor leaders dismissed stories of 
treasury deficits as attempts to confuse the electors and continued on in 
their spirit of optimism. The first general councU of the ALF met in 
Brisbane in August 1890.^' Its main business was to draw up the official 
constitution and rules, consider the "slate" proposals, provide for women's 
organizations, and lay down the basis for political action. In the heady 
atmosphere of success, the eight members — none of whom had any 
experience of parliament — drew up a poUtical programme which, far from 
reflecting solely the influence of Lane as has been claimed, reflected rather 
the spirit of optimism of Queensland Labor at the time, as these leaders 
interpreted it-. Intoxicated with the romance of the occasion and with past 
successes (they were mostly teetotallers), they resolved to by-pass all inter-
mediate steps and at one blow bring about the reformation of society and 
the emancipation of the working class. The political aims of the ALF 
which they sent to the district councils for their endorsement were:^* 
1. The Nationalization of all sources of wealth and aU means of 
producing and exchanging wealth. 
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2. The conducting by the State authority of all production and all 
exchange. 
3. The pensioning by the State authority of aU children, aged and 
invalid citizens. 
4. The saving by the State authority of such proportion of the joint 
wealth production as may be requisite for instituting, maintaining 
and increasing national capital. 
5. The maintenance by the State authority from the joint wealth 
production of all educational and sanitary institutions. 
6. The just division among all the citizens of the State of all wealth 
production, less only that part retained for public and common 
requirements. 
7. The Reorganization of Society upon the above lines to be 
commenced at once and pursued uninterruptedly untU social 
justice is fuUy secured to each and every citizen. 
These aims, said the general councU, were "impossible of attainment so 
long as political power is withheld from the people . . . In one year a 
People's Parliament wUl give Queensland workers more justice than can be 
wrung from capitalistic parliaments in a generation". So the legend of 
Queensland political Labor being "socialist from the jump" was born. A 
further significant resolution sought the commitment of working men to 
an abstinence from alcohol, "which interferes so fataUy with that intelli-
gent persistence without which it is hopeless to organise for Social 
Justice". 
The councU clearly recognized from the "people's parliamentary plat-
form", included in their report, that the attainment of a people's pariia-
ment was ultimately dependent upon aU the people having the franchise 
and voting. This platform included the exercise of universal white adult 
suffrage for all parliamentary and local elections, the virtual abolition of 
the Legislative CouncU, the holding of all elections on one day, the estab-
lishment of equal electoral districts on adult population basis, and annual 
parliaments. It was clear also that in their optimism they thought that aU 
the working people, who formed a majority in the colony, would support 
their programme and vote for it. Though the district councUs, and there-
fore the unions which comprised them, had to consider tlie platform 
before it could be adopted, the Boomerang confidently reported: "If this 
is accepted a Labour Party wiU at once be formed of which the Federation 
wiU be the backbone and which wUl keep itself independent of other party 
affiliations."^^ 
Now, however, the ALF found that its idea of unlimited progress was 
not universally shared among its aUies, as Uberals, fearful of the term 
"nationalization" and what it would do to their property, swung away 
from support for the aims of Labor and hid behind the skirts of the 
Griffilwraith. The Brisbane Courier waxed eloquent in its most outraged 
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terms as it saw Communism and revolution becoming the aims of Labor. 
As the ALF reeled from the blows of the colony's conservatives, the 
bubble of aU its hopes burst. In Melbourne, Sydney, and Adelaide one of 
the greatest industrial struggles in Australia's historj', the maritime strike, 
broke out and quickly spread to Queensland. Reports of police charges 
and instructions to soldiers to "fire low and lay them out" dispelled the 
belief in the harmony of capital and Labor. The ALF gave full support to 
the strike, but having paid out £15,000 ($30,000) in strike pay, 
HinchcUffe was forced to wire Melbourne on 22 October that exhaustion 
of funds was forcing Queensland to call off the strike. The victory at 
Jondaryan had clearly been over-rated. Not aU working men had absorbed 
or even read the gospels of the Worker; in fact the majority were still 
outside the unions, apathetic about their own emancipation and, in their 
need for jobs, prepared to act as strike breakers against the interests of 
their feUow workers. 
Though the faUure of the strike in Queensland was a costly and severe 
setback for unionism, it did not deter the leaders of the Labor movement 
from their path towards direct Labor representation in parliament. Union 
leaders, in fact, used the obviously repressive actions of the colonial 
governments as propaganda to try to urge the uncommitted workmen and 
non-unionists to realize the need for Labor to be in parliament where it 
could put an end to strikes and bitter industrial disputes. However, the 
depression, the strike, and the public reaction to the ALF platform were 
turning workers away from unions and politics. Their views can be roughly 
measured by the reaction of the district councUs, which, with the excep-
tion of Charters Towers, aU opposed the proposed political platform. It 
was apparent that there was large-scale opposition to the ALF platform 
from the ranks of the Labor movement and, if affiliated unionists were 
upset by the platform, it seems unUkely that those outside the unions who 
were sympathetic to Labor were any more impressed. 
Charies McDonald, the ALF organizer in Charters Towers and state 
president of the ALF, with Hinchcliffe and Lane tried through the 
Worker's columns to defend the platform, but it was obvious that the 
leaders had advanced too far and too fast for the rank and file. The latter 
had wanted Labor in pariiament, but only to reform the exisfing society 
that they knew, not to pull it down. If socialism meant using the power of 
the state to introduce reforms beyond what liberals were prepared to 
concede was a legitimate role of the state, then the Labor movement 
collectively opted for socialism, but if socialism meant more than this, if it 
meant a rapid upturning and reorganization of society or the nationaliz-
ation of aU industries, then the Labor movement drew back and opted out. 
It is likely that the press reports at the time of the maritime strike had 
something to do with this rejection, but the important fact was that the 
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Labor movement in Queensland fumed quickly from a theoretical to a 
pragmatic and practical approach to reform and to politics. 
As opposition to the political platform continued to be voiced, the 
general executive of the ALF met in the central Queensland shearing town 
of BlackaU in December to fulfil one of the instructions of the August 
general councU, namely to draw up the plans for the organization of the 
political Labor party. It could not amend or alter the platform, a task 
which was the sole responsibUity of the general council, not due to meet 
again untU August 1891. It was at this meeting that the Labor party in 
Queensland was formaUy bom. 
It was to comprise members of unions affiliated with the ALF and 
members of unaffiliated unions or poUtical associations which endorsed 
the political principles of the ALF, i.e. those who resolved to accept its 
platform and who were recognized as being sympathetic to the Labor 
cause by the district councU of the ALF in the area in which they were 
located. The inclusion of local political associations reflect clearly the view 
that though the Labor party was seen as the poUtical vanguard of the 
union movement, it was not to be an exclusively trade union party. Those 
who were sympathetic to the movement, but who were not members of 
affiliated unions, on accepting the platform were to be given equal rights 
with unionists. Thus selectors, storekeepers, smaU businessmen, white-
collar workers, in fact, anyone who saw himself as being in sympathy with 
the aspirations of the Labor movement was accepted as a member of the 
political Labor party from its inception. 
The task of selecting candidates and ensuring that Labor politicians 
obeyed the rules was left to the local associations. Because of the decentra-
lization of Queensland industry and population, suspicion of Brisbane 
domination in all state politics, and idealistic notions about democratic 
control, these local organizations were given complete autonomy. Candi-
dates were to be chosen either by a two-thirds majority of a meeting of 
Labor members or, if this was not physicaUy possible, by a plebiscite. The 
only restrictions imposed by the executive were that official Labor candi-
dates would be required to sign a pledge to support any political reforms 
demanded by the Labor party and to resign if a vote of no confidence was 
passed by a two-thirds majority of the Labor members in the district. 
Almost simultaneously with the ALF executive's decisions, the 
Workingmen's Parliamentary Representative Association changed its name 
to the People's Parliamentary Association (PPA) and began establishing 
new branches in other western shearing towns. In centres in tlie north and 
along the coast where miners' unions, wharf labourers' unions, carriers' 
unions, and other unions were organized, local Labor political organiz-
ations were formed adopting different names: Democratic League, 
Workers' Political Association, Political Reform Association, and Workers' 
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Political Organization (WPO). Such bodies were open to all unionists and 
non-unionists who accepted the ALF platform. Their responsibUities were 
the enrolling of electors, the making of house-to-house canvasses, and the 
educating of workers in the principles of the Labor movement; in addition 
they arranged for the choosing of political candidates. At the end of 
February 1891, under the auspices of the ALF, the first WPO was formed 
in Brisbane in the electorate of Fortitude VaUey and by July 1891 each 
electorate in Brisbane had its WPO. To heighten the emphasis being given 
to politics, the Worker in January 1891 began a new column, "Labour in 
Politics", compUed by Hinchcliffe. It was apparent at the beginning of 
1891 that both capital and Labor were beginning to organize for the 
election which would possibly be held in May 1891. By now. Labor's 
parliamentary representatives had increased to two with the election of 
John Hoolan, an eloquent and at times offensive newspaper editor, who 
had won the mining seat of Burke in a by-election in September 1890. 
With Glassey he began to organize for the expected election. 
However, before any election could be held, a greater battle between 
Labor and capital commenced in Queensland. The defeat of the maritime 
strike had dimmed none of the unions' ardour for closed shops nor its 
opposition to working with non-union labour, but the strike itself had 
drawn employers closer together not only in the pastoral and maritime 
industries but also in north Queensland. The depression had made the 
employers more intransigent, whUe rumours of the introduction of cheap 
coloured labour were the best incentives to workmen to combine against 
the increasingly impersonal face of capitalism. Mistaking the sentiments of 
Lane's flamboyant journalism for the immediate goals of Labor, capitalists 
and conservatives assumed that, for the maintenance of their own 
privileged position, they would have to confront and defeat organized 
Labor. With the depression providing an increasing abundance of unem-
ployed workmen wUling to work anywhere for any price, capital was in a 
strong position, while the unions containing numbers of unemployed 
themselves and being £15,000 ($30,000) poorer as a result of the maritime 
strike, were in a less favourable posifion. As the depression increased in 
severity in 1891 it was from Labor's point of view the worst possible time 
for an open clash with capital. 
During a series of meetings in November and December 1890 among 
the pastoralists and pastoral companies, tactics were agreed upon for the 
shearing season to open in central Queensland in January 1891. Freedom 
of contract, an idyUic piece of liberalism defined by the secretary of the 
New South Wales Pastroalists' Union as allowing "an employer to be free 
to employ whom he pleases and an employee to be free to engage or refuse 
to engage work as he pleases", ^ was to be insisted upon, with wage 
reductions of up to 33 per cent for labourers who constituted 60 per cent 
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of the employees on the station. There were to be no prior negotiations 
with the unions or with the ALF as reports seeped through of growing 
employer strength. On 13 January, Hinchcliffe wired to the Secretary of 
the ALF in Barcaldine: "Private information. Federated pastoralists 
levying three hundred thousand pounds throughout Australia to fight 
Queensland. Eight thousand in Queensland. Figlit delayed tiU levy comes 
in. Employers plan to raise thousands blacklegs to take district after 
district in rotation. Keep this stricfly secret. Act cautiously. Big trouble 
aliead."^' He further arranged with McDonald for both of them to go to 
Barcaldine to try to reach a settlement with the pastoralists. HinchcUffe 
was no revolutionary, nor were the unionists associated with him. In the 
Jondaryan dispute he had tried to establish some rapport with the 
squatters and though rebuffed had kept open the invitation to immediate 
settlement. He was prepared to exercise the same patience in 1891 and 
avoid open warfare. His attempts to seek an open conference with the 
pastoralists faUed as it was clear that nothing short of agreement on their 
terms would be acceptable. It was soon apparent that the pastoralists had 
laid their plans weU. On 23 February, as batches of infantry and artUlery 
arrived in Rockhampton, the government issued a proclamation calling on 
shearers and labourers to break up their camps and disperse; this the ALF 
saw as provoking the unions at a time when they were trying to effect a 
settlement.^•^ 
Since Griffith was in Sydney at the National Australasian Convention, 
it was to McUwraith, the acting premier and a leading member of the 
pastoralists, that HinchcUffe appealed on 1 March to try to arrange an 
unconditional conference between the unions and the employers to bring 
about a settlement. Mcllwraith's reply was evasive and virtuaUy demanded 
that the unions admit to freedom of contract before he would take any 
initiatives. Undeterred, Hinchcliffe tried again, only to be rebuffed with a 
homily on obeying the law. On 3 March, a special general councU of the 
ALF met at Rockhampton and issued a manifesto setting out their specific 
grievances against the pastoralists in particular and Australian capitalism in 
general, including also charges of aUowing coloured labour to take its place 
beside white labour, of provoking the unions with armed police, and of the 
disfranchisement of bushmen. It concluded with a plea to the colony's 
citizens for financial and moral support for the bushmen and with an 
appeal to "each man and woman to remember always that tlirough the 
ballot box we can peaceably win our rights when we have votes''.^ ^ 
Anticipating an election in May, and sobered by the reaction inside and 
outside the movement to the early political platform, the general councU 
drew up a completely new platform wluch dropped aU references to 
nationalization and provided a pragmatic reform platform in line with the 
express desires of the miners, shearers, selectors, and others who made up 
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the Labor movement.^'* Throughout January and February, HinchcUffe, 
Bowman, Reid, McDonald, Glassey, and Hoolan had carried out extensive 
organizafion of the poUtical party and knew what the rank and file would 
accept. The new platform which was recommended to the district councils 
gave priority to electoral reform, namely, universal and equal adult white 
suffrage and the abolition of the Legislative CouncU. It also sought state 
control of waterconservation and irrigation, state-aided vUlage settlements, 
and a state bank. It included free compulsory education, a statutory eight-
hour day, pensions for aU people over sixty and for orphaned children, 
shop and factory acts, a mines act, a wages act, and the amendment of the 
Trade Union Act to provide protection against conspiracy laws. The repeal 
of state-aided immigration was also sought. Broadly, it was a platform 
containing the demands that trade unionists had made at successive ITUCs. 
As it was to remain basicaUy the platform for the 1893 election, its general 
acceptance by the Labor movement was apparent. 
In March the real bitterness of the strike began to emerge. There was 
disagreement within the ALF and the strikers over whether or not a 
general strike should be called. Lane, Casey, and Mabbott were in the 
forefront of those who urged this course. One of Lane's foUowers, 
W. FothergjU, secretary of the central district councU, urged George 
Taylor, the organizer, to "remember the Commune and see if the thing is 
possible in Clermont";^^ to WUliam HamUton, an organizer in Clermont, 
he had previously written: "the men are of the opinion that constitutional 
means are very little good, and other methods must be tried."^^ In his 
autobiography. Dawn to Dusk, Ernie Lane later claimed that his brother 
planned to get into direct communication with the French communists in 
Paris with the intention of forming a militant international organization,^' 
but it is difficult often to separate fact from fancy in this book. On the 
other hand Hinchcliffe, Bowman, Reid, Seymour, and Glassey urged 
caution. Hinchcliffe used Seymour, whose seamen were solidly behind the 
bushmen, as his personal envoy to try to raise funds from other unions and 
to prevent the strikers from doing anything that would break the unions. 
Glassey and Reid concentrated their efforts on tlie less romantic but most 
important task of enrolling voters before 4 April when the next revising 
court was held. Glassey wrote to George Taylor: 
Say to our friends to exercise forbearance and not to be tempted to 
break the peace. Use all the forces at your command to canvass the 
different Electorates to see that those who are off the capital RoUs 
and entitled to vote are put on. You have up to the first Tuesday in 
April to register names, so be busy. 
. . . Leave no stone unturned to have every name placed on the 
Electorate Roll and be prepared for the coming stmggle which 
cannot be very far off.^ ^ 
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At the end of March, Reid applied to the colonial secretary's office for 
5,000 electoral claim forms for use in enroUing electors at meetings of the 
WPOs but was given only 100. However those in the unions seeking a 
general strike won and a general call out of aU pastoral workers was 
announced from 24 March. Though the general strike had aU the romance 
of a revolution about it, its chances of success were sUght in a country 
where the population was, at best, apathetic toward the strikers and, at 
worst, antagonistic. Moreover in an open war between unions on the one 
hand and capitalism, the government, the press, and community leaders on 
the other, the unions were virtuaUy beaten before they started. When to 
this was added the effects of the depression, and the increasing unreality 
of Lane's thinking which contrasted with the clearer analysis of the 
situation by Hinchcliffe and Reid, the bitterness generated by the strike 
inside and outside of the Labor movement was understandable. It is 
perhaps significant of the widening breach between Lane and the ALF 
leaders in Brisbane that Lane, the chief Labor propagandist, should have 
been ushered off to BaUarat to the ITUC for a week at the end of AprU 
when the strikers were being arrested, tried, and sentenced to hard labour 
for intimidation, and when the Worker was expected to provide the Labor 
case. McDonald and Bowman represented the ALF at the congress, whUe 
Hinchcliffe and Seymour remained in Queensland. 
It is significant that the report of the Queensland parliamentary com-
mittee to the ITUC, delivered by Bowman, made no menfion of either 
strikes as being the reason for Labor's entry into poUtics. The fact was that 
the Labor movement in Queensland had obviously determined to enter 
poUtics and, if anything, might have been deterred rather than spurred on 
by the strikes. Bowman's remarks were quite clear: "To poUtical action 
Queensland has paid particular attention, the idea being everywhere 
accepted that labour must strike systematically at the baUot box in order 
to secure for the workers ownership and control of the means of living 
now monopolized by the capitalist class . . . It is expected that at the 
coming elections the effect of long continued organization wiU be felt."^^ 
Whereas Bowman and Hinchcliffe were clear in their plans for the 
emancipation of the working class. Lane was torn between his advocacy of 
the ballot box and his advocacy of revolution. In responding to the toast 
to the "trades and labour councils of Australasia", he said: "They must 
stand by their union, and even be prepared to die for it, for it was the only 
means of securing their rights... If the government refused to allow them 
the chance of securing the baUot, by which only they could redress their 
wrongs, they must get it and if that meant rebellion he only hoped he 
would have strength and courage to join in it."^*' It was purple pieces such 
as this in the Worker that were becoming a source of concern to the 
unionists and union officials hoping or trying to effect a settlement with 
147 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
D. J. MURPHY 
the government and the pastoralists. 
The government had produced its own method of settUng the strike. 
T. J. Byrnes, the attorney general, wrote to Horace Tozer, the home 
secretary, on 14 March: "I think we could prosecute the leaders for con-
spiracy to prevent employees from foUowing their calling by infimidation. 
Conspiracy is probably the most elastic offence known to the law.'"*' An 
1825 English conspiracy law, since repealed in England but not in Queens-
land, was dug out. From Sydney, Griffith agreed to the charging of the 
strike leaders with conspiracy, but counselled against the use of the overt 
military force that the pastoralists and the poUce magistrate R. A. Rankin 
were requesting. He did not want the government to assume the position 
of being allies in a class war, though he agreed to Tozer's plan to stop 
telegrams between the ALF and the shearers. With the jaiUng of twelve 
strikers the government and pastoralists had clearly won. The strike was 
officially called off at the beginning of June. HinchcUffe had agreed to the 
central district councU's recommendations. He had always believed in 
keeping the union organization intact to fight another day rather than in 
destroying everything for a principle which could later be achieved by 
careful management and negotiation. 
Griffith did not hold the anticipated elections in May. It is not possible 
to say whether it was because of the disorganization caused by the strike, 
or the warning of possible Labor party successes suggested by a by-election 
in Townsville in the middle of May, or the New South Wales Labor party's 
gaining thirty-six of the forty-eight contested seats in June of that year, or 
whether it was simply a decision to allow the pariiament to run its fuU 
term. The Labor party was ready in Queensland and anxious to try itself 
out. A number of by-elections gave it a chance to test its organization in 
four electorates. In Townsville in May, Anthony Ogden, secretary of the 
meatworkers' union was defeated by only 806 votes to 655. Two months 
later E. Byrnes, secretary of the miners' union at Eidsvold, stood for 
Burnett, seeking the votes of farmers and other workers as well as miners. 
He poUed 245 votes to the winner's 318 and the other candidate's 267. 
Labor was not winning, but it was obviously not being disgraced. Its first 
success came when the member for Barcoo died in February 1892 and the 
PPA nominated Tom Ryan, secretary of the central district councU and 
one of the two strike leaders acquitted. In a short campaign Ryan defeated 
W. H. Campbell, the proprietor of the Western Champion, a Barcaldine 
paper supporting the pastoralists, by 518 votes to 322, to become the first 
endorsed Labor candidate to wan a seat. G. J. Hall, a carpenter, repeated 
the performance in Bundaberg in June by campaigning on opposition to 
black labour and slipping through a field of four to win by 452 votes to his 
opponents' 353, 170, and 14. Griffith countered by amending the 
Electoral Act to provide for contingent voting, i.e. optional preferential 
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voting, and to require stricter residential clauses which caused thousands 
of names to be removed from the roll. However in BuUmba, a metro-
politan electorate, a candidate could not be found, even though a WPO 
was established there. 
It was apparent that those areas best organized industrially would be 
the first to send Labor members to pariiament. A second factor to emerge 
was that even though the organization of the Labor party was centred on 
Brisbane, the Worker emanated from Brisbane, and the men exercising the 
power in the party lived and operated from Brisbane, the electoral and 
financial strength of the party was to be in the mral and mining areas and 
in the provincial towns which were the centres for these industries. 
The two years between the shearers' strike and the general elections 
provided the Labor party with a breathing space to consoUdate the 
organizing that had been started at the end of 1889. In those two years 
WPOs, PPAs, and Democratic Leagues were organized; these included 
selectors, workers, and anyone who was sympathetic to Labor and who 
would sign the platform. Consequently at a time when liquor reform and 
land reform were two burning issues, the Labor party found representa-
tives of each of these movements inside its ranks. Land reform to break up 
the large holdings for smaller selectors was at least as important as 
industrial reform. The Australian dream of a nation of yeoman farmers 
was held as strongly by the Labor movement in Queensland as by any 
other group in the continent. The main functions of the local organiza-
tions continued to be the enrolment of electors, the raising of finance, and 
the holding of public meetings where the Labor party and its platform 
were explained. 
The party had not been bom out of the strikes nor had it arisen because 
of them. Both the strike and the Labor party were the end results of a 
decade of working-class optimism in a society heavUy influenced by British 
poUtical philosophies. Had there been no shearers' strike, the party would 
have evolved in much the same way and with much the same ideology. The 
influential leaders after the strike were the same as those before. What had 
changed was the ideal of capital and Labor living in harmony, and with the 
starkness of that change came a greater determination by the ALF leaders 
to organize Labor so that it could in time govern the colony. In this regard 
the role of the strikes was clearly their use as propaganda, to show to 
apathetic working men and doubtful craft unionists in the Brisbane area 
how far organized capitalism was prepared to go to crush the legitimate 
rights of Labor and to keep it from having its full share in the wealth of 
the colony. It was to be almost twenty years before this lesson was 
appreciated. Nevertheless "1891" became part of the legend of the 
shearers, the noblest of the bushworkers, defeated by the squatters, the 
princes of Australian capitalism, but rising undaunted to become the 
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emerging political force in the colony. Legends in any society are import-
ant and, as the strike receded and memories dimmed, the legendary 
foundation of the Labor party emerged as having a basis of fact. 
For the Labor movement in Queensland, the strikes were the occasion 
of the ending of its association with Lane. It was not in despair that he set 
about founding his new colony; it was the coming to fmition of dreams he 
had nursed for several years. The parting was welcomed on both sides. 
Lane with his messianic vision of founding an Aryan Utopia was anxious 
to leave Australia and begin his colony in South America partly because of 
his fear of Australia's engulfment by hordes of Asiatics and partly to prove 
that he could succeed in creating a communist Utopia, where others had 
faUed.'*'^  His joumalistic extravagences no longer suited the mood of 
Queensland Labor where Hinchcliffe and Reid had to organize and 
administer a non-utopian Labor movement in non-utopian surroundings, 
while Glassey and Hoolan strove to defend the strikers in a parliament that 
was not only anti-Labor but prepared to agree, ostensibly as an economy 
measure, to reduce parUamentary salaries from £300 to £150 ($600 to 
$300) a year to deter Labor men from coming into parUament. Moreover, 
despite what some unionists and propagandists had said and written of 
revolutions and communes during the strike, the fact was the Labor move-
ment and the Labor party were not highly theoretical in their approach to 
politics but pragmatic, with a strong element of idealism, and a faith in 
what state action under a Labor government would achieve. Though their 
leaders were radicals with strongly held hopes and views on politics and 
parliaments, they too were governed by the realities of what they could 
achieve in the present. By 1892, Lane was out of touch with these 
realities. Nevertheless, his racialist views and his jingoistic support for con-
scription in World War I should not detract from the significance of his 
earlier role as an inspiring and crusading propagandist for the working 
classes. 
In 1892 Labor had four members in the colonial parHament, but no real 
identity in its own right except as a part of the ALF. Before the general 
election of 1893, the four members of the PLP sought a convention of 
Labor associations throughout the colony to draw up a platform for the 
election and to establish an executive to administer the party. During 
Exhibition week, in August 1892, twenty-four delegates representing the 
PLP, the ALF, and local Labor organizations (WPOs and PPAs), assembled 
in Brisbane for the first Queensland Labor-in-Politics Convention. No 
definite criteria were set for the basis of representation, other than that 
the delegates were to be elected by those Labor associations which had 
accepted the ALF platform. As the political organization of workers was 
stronger in mining and shearing areas than in the area in and about the 
capital city, country representatives outnumbered those from Brisbane, 
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nineteen to five. As long as the decentralization of Queensland industry 
and population persisted, this pattern could be expected to continue. 
Glassey, leader of the PLP, was elected without opposition as chairman of 
the convention. 
After several hours of discussion an executive councU of twelve was 
constituted, consisting of the four pariiamentarians and eight others 
elected by the convention. The councU was to hold office until 31 January 
1894, unless re-elected in the meantime, suggesting that at this stage it was 
envisaged that conventions would be held on an annual basis as was the 
ALF provincial councU meeting. The functions laid down for the executive 
council remained basically the same after it was replaced by the Central 
Political Executive (CPE) and later by the Queensland Central Executive 
(QCE). They included hearing appeals over the selection of pariiamentary 
candidates, endorsing candidates as officially "Labor", raising money, 
checking electoral roUs, and estimating the strength of other parties in 
various electorates. The platform agreed upon closely resembled that 
issued by the ALF in March 1891, with electoral reform - one man, one 
vote — again being the first plank. 
New policies were inserted reflecting the widening basis of the party as 
a reform movement. It was a significant comment on the continuing dream 
of a colony of small landholders that land reform was included in the 
"labour rights" section and aimed at breaking up the large agglomerations 
of land by a progressive tax on land values, irrespective of improvements. 
The effects of the depression, namely, its spectre of unemployment and 
overtones of cheap labour being introduced by pastoralists, planters, and 
mine owners provided the stimulus for an aU-embracing plank caUing for 
the exclusion of coloured Asiatic, contract, or indented labour. Opposition 
to foreign capitalists' exploiting the buUding of raUways for their own 
profit was reflected in the demand for state construction and ownership of 
all railways. However, on the more touchy questions of northern and 
central separation, where there was not the same unanimity, the platform 
left local organizations free to determine their own courses of action, 
while the equaUy sensitive question of free trade and protection were 
placed outside internal Labor politics. The political theorists were able to 
have the referendum included, while the liquor reformers were able to 
have a recommendation appended that only "sober men" should be 
chosen as Labor candidates.''-' A party, a platform, and electoral organiza-
tions had evolved and taken recognizable form. Following the convention, 
Seymour drafted the first manifesto which, significantly, was concerned 
principally with land settlement. WhUe it charged the government with 
being partly responsible for the depression through heavy overseas borrow-
ing, it was more fearful of the possibility of its allowing railways to be 
built in return for land grants and of its accepting the introduction of 
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more coolie labour which would depress further the opportunities for 
small independent farmers. Labor in politics promised a new era. Seymour 
concluded: 
From out of the "slough" of misfortune brought about by mis-
government and into which Q'land has been plunged it is the task of 
the future to rescue her from, so that her people may be contented 
and have happy homes. The Labour Party believes that to 
accompUsh this it is necessary that aU adult men and women should 
have an equal voice in making the laws which govern them 
. . . Farming must be encouraged at the expense of the land grabbers 
who never use the land . . . Farmers ought to be brought in touch 
more closely to the consumer . . . by dispensing with unnecessary 
middlemen who now fleece the farmer without decreasing the cost 
of his produce to the consumer. 
When men can supply their necessities at all times and have the 
opportunity of engaging their labour productively then will our 
people be contented and labour troubles a thing of the past. Co-
operation can graduaUy but eventually take the place of competi-
tion. Political equahty and a solution for the unemployed difficulty 
is what the Labour party are after and both comprise aU that is 
contained in their detailed political platform.'*'* 
Glassey signed the manifesto and all that remained now was for the party's 
ideals to be tested by the forty-six Labor candidates who were endorsed 
for the seventy-two seats at the general election in April and May 1893. 
n 
An analysis of the occupations of the candidates who advertised them-
selves as standing for the Labor party, together with the platform and the 
speeches of the pariiamentary leader Glassey, provides some clues as to the 
nature of the new party. Twelve miners had nominated in addition to a 
further four men who were ex-miners; ten candidates were shopkeepers or 
small businessmen; there were nine skUled and eight unskiUed workers; 
four were journalists; two were farmers; and there was one barrister. Seats 
were contested in aU parts of the state except the suburban areas of 
Brisbane, the farming areas in the south-eastern portion of the state, and 
odd electorates along the coast and inland where no candidate could be 
found. This weakness of Labor in the suburban areas of Brisbane and in 
the more closely settled wheat and dairying districts in southeastern 
Queensland was to continue into the twentieth century. Each candidate 
seems to have campaigned on a combination of electoral reform — one 
man, one vote, and the aboUtion of the Legislative CouncU - his role as a 
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local representative, and the broad reform policies which the new party 
espoused. The platform had sufficient breadth to cover those whose main 
interest was the land, or industrial working conditions, or general liberal 
radicalism. 
Despite the reform nature of the platform and the obvious intention of 
the candidates, whether unionists or otherwise, to improve the economic, 
industrial, and social position of those at the bottom end of the wage scale 
and, despite the earlier invitations to working men from liberals and con-
servatives to send their own representatives into parliament, there was a 
fear among conservatives that a new era of politics had arrived where the 
lower orders might eventually take control of the colony's economic and 
poUtical power. Consequently charges of lawlessness and the destruction 
of Queensland society, which had grown out of the strikes, were hurled at 
the Labor party and its candidates. Glassey, who was contesting Brisbane 
North with Lilley against Mcllwraith, attempted to refute the charges in an 
address to Brisbane North electors on 21 April, a week before the first day 
of the elections: 
The charge that the Labor Party wanted to get hold of other 
people's property was absolutely false. What the Labor Party had 
aimed, and would aim to do, was to prevent as far as possible the 
people's property, from being nnjustly confiscated by those who had 
been hitherto, and now were, in power. The Labor Party wished to 
protect the girl behind the counter and in the shop-room from being 
sweated. They wished to protect the chUd who was unable to 
protect itself from being robbed of its education in consequence of 
the impoverishment of its parents. The Labor Party aimed at elevat-
ing and not injuring, and at establishing the right to oppose — as far 
as in them lay — wrong. 
Where the Labor party's reformism differed from that of the Griffith 
liberals was in the extent to which it was prepared to use the power of the 
state on behalf of employees and farmers, and in the absence of any 
inhibitions about establishing state business enterprises. At the same time 
it had other characteristics. Most of the leaders of its hard core in Brisbane 
— Hinchcliffe, Reid, Seymour, and Bowman — were teetotallers, seeing 
drink as being one of the evUs keeping down the working class. Religiously 
the strongest elements were low-church Anglicans and Methodists, with a 
smattering of Catholics and agnostics. There was agreement that education 
should be divorced from church control, though the aims of such educa-
tion did not extend much beyond the functional goal of learning to read 
and write in order to be able to find a job. LUley, though Chief Justice, 
had supported the unions in the strike. If he had won Brisbane North in 
1893, he might well have emerged as the Labor party's leader and given 
that party higher goals so far as its education platform was concemed. In 
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common with liberals, radicals, and representatives of the working class, 
the Labor party in Queensland maintained a strong attachment to a White 
Australia. This was not in aU cases as radically racist in essence as that of 
Lane, but most members seemed to place racial reasons at least on an 
equal plane with economic and social reasons in their desire to exclude 
non-Europeans. This was undoubtedly strongest in north Queensland, 
where Labor itself was strongest politicaUy. 
The election over, the Labor party found that it had won sixteen of the 
seventy-two seats, to become the second largest group in the Legislative 
Assembly. Admitting their lack of parliamentary experinece, the new 
members elected to sit on the cross-benches rather than attempt to assume 
the formal role of the opposition party. There were good reasons for this. 
Of the four parliamentarians who had attended the first Labor-in-PoUtics 
Convention in August 1892, only Hoolan remained. Glassey had been 
beaten in Brisbane North and again when he tried to win his old seat of 
Bundamba; HaU had been defeated in Bundaberg, while Ryan had been 
refused endorsement in Barcoo by the executive councU of the party for 
his drunkenness and indebtedness about Brisbane.'*^ Despite these losses, 
the sixteen members elected included some very able politicians including 
Anderson Dawson, Mat Reid, and Andrew Fisher. 
In its first election then, the Labor party found itself a distinctly 
northern mining and western pastoral party, with the obvious necessity of 
obtaining support in the coastal farming and urban areas if its political 
programme was to become more than a list of pious resolutions. In the 
absence of Glassey, Hoolan was elected leader of the PLP and Reid 
secretary, a position then of executive importance and one which made 
him, in effect, the deputy leader. Hoolan subsequently resigned his seat of 
Burke to allow Glassey to re-enter parliament and become leader once 
more. 
Even though it had sixteen members in pariiament, the Labor party 
faced a rather gloomy future. The combination of the big strikes and the 
depression had almost crippled unionism in north Queensland; in the west, 
the pastoral unions, which provided the major part of the finance for the 
Worker and the ALF, did not reregister under the Trade Union Act as they 
struggled to hold their members. Membership of the Amalgamated 
Workers' Union (Amal W U) formed from the Queensland Shearers' Union 
and the Queensland Labourers' Union, had dropped from 10,000 in 
January 1891 to 3,400 during 1894, while employees in the pastoral 
industry were forced to accept a general reduction in wages in July 1893 
from thirty shiUings ($3) a week to twenty-four shiUings ($2.40)."" Other 
unions, in and out of Brisbane, fared worse and either went out of 
existence or were so concerned with their own survival that any considera-
fion of poUtical acrion was dropped."*^ The ALF dreams of unions joining 
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to form district councUs was shattered and the federation stmggled on 
with the three Amal W U branches and Reid's carpenters.'*^ From fifty-
four unions with 21,379 members registered under the Trade Union Act in 
1890, the official figures of unions had dropped to nine with 780 members 
in 1894 and seven unions with 240 members by 1895. In 1896, the 
registrar noted that the registered trades unions in Queensland continued 
to be few and that they appeared in several cases merely to be kept on the 
register as a matter of convenience, should any emergency arise which 
might make it necessary for them to revive into an active state. "The 
unions appear to be dormant at present",^" he concluded. The great flood 
of optimism which had carried unionism and the Labor party into 
existence had not only ceased but was turning into a drought while the 
state slowly recovered from the depression; the buUding and printing 
industries, whose unions had been in the vanguard of the Brisbane Labor 
movement, were the last to recover. It is probably tme to say that only the 
Worker and the PLP kept the Labor party together in Queensland and 
prevented its disintegrating into a number of localized poUtical units. 
Hinchcliffe, Seymour, Bowman, Reid, and Fisher stand out in this period 
as the ones who had faith in the future of the party, and who were 
prepared to sacrifice a great deal personally to keep it going. 
The effects of the strike and the depression on the Labor movement 
were reflected in the fate of the executive councU, which had been 
elected at the 1892 convention, but which lapsed after not being recon-
stituted in January 1894. HinchcUffe clung tenaciously to the organization 
of the ALF and its newspaper, and, despite the ideals of its founders, 
began selUng advertising space in the Worker from April 1892. As long as 
the Worker survived. Labor in Queensland had a medium for its slogan 
"organise, educate, agitate". In September 1893, WiUiam Guy Higgs, 
secretary of the New South Wales Typographical Association and editor of 
the Australian Workman in Sydney, was appointed editor of the Worker, 
thus maintaining the standard of journaUsm and the optimism for the 
Labor cause which Lane had established. The indefatigable Reid continued 
his role as the chief Labor organizer, pUoting through the Legislative 
Assembly the Trades and Labour Hall Bill which enabled the trustees to 
mortgage their land to raise money to buUd the first Trades HaU. During 
the parUamentary recess, he spent his time rebuUding the political and 
industrial Labor organizations in those areas where the movement had 
waned and particularly where the principal fear of cheap coloured labour 
was most manifest. It was to one of these areas, the sugar town of Bunda-
berg, won by a "black labour" candidate in 1893 that Reid and Hinch-
cliffe directed a young Liverpool compositor Henry Boote m 1894 to 
become the editor of a new pro-Labor and pro—white-labour newspaper 
the Bundaberg Guardian. 
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In pariiament the new Labor members applied themselves assiduously 
to the task of mastering the procedures of the house and using the library 
to make up for the deficiencies in their formal education. They aU spoke 
too long and too often,^' but in the committee stages of bills dealing with 
mining, raUways, land, and working conditions, proved their value to the 
institution of parliament by providing amendments based on experiences 
that were beyond the knowledge of liberals and conservatives. They won 
the respect of their supporters with their opposition to the Peace Preserva-
tion BUl (dubbed the "Coercion BiU") which the government, in panic, 
introduced during the 1894 strike. Seven were suspended from the house 
in their attempt to delay the passing of the biU. 
Despite these efforts, however, the posifion of the Labor party outside 
the parliament remained grim. As the 1896 election approached there had 
been no attempt to reconsider the platform nor was there any administra-
tive body to organize the overall election campaign. HinchcUffe therefore 
called a meeting of the executive of the ALF and the PLP to consider 
holding a convention, but it was evident that the sheer lack of finance 
prevented this. Instead a CPE was formed, consisting of the executives of 
the ALF and PLP together wdth two representatives of a metropolitan 
body called the Brisbane district councU of the WPO. The two functions of 
this executive were the endorsing of candidates and the hearing of appeals. 
As the leader of the PLP, Glassey was elected chairman of the executive, 
though it was evident that he was no longer accepted as the most com-
petent poUtical leader avaUable. It seems that Reid and Hinchcliffe were 
angling to have Glassey replaced by a more socialist-oriented leader, less 
concerned with Liberal-Labor (lib-lab) aUiances. Reid liimself and Fisher 
were the likely contenders. 
Althougli fifty Labor candidates nominated in 1896, there was much 
less organizational and financial support for the party. Only £31 17s.6d. 
($63.75) was raised through donations compared with the £206 ($412) in 
1893. Each candidate therefore ran almost as an independent in his own 
area. The lack of campaign finance and strenuous campaigning by the 
opposition seem to have been the principal factors causing the defeat of 
the two most able pariiamentarians Fisher and Reid. Their absence from 
the PLP in the foUowing three years and the loose nature of the party 
organization was to affect the attitude of the Labor party to its own 
political role for the foUowing ten years. Reid saw the role of the Labor 
party as being simUar to that of the ParneU party in the House of 
Commons and to that of the New South Wales Labor party in its policy of 
support for concessions.^'^ Unfortunately, since the coaUtion of Griffith 
and Mcllwraith there no longer existed two equal non-Labor parties, but 
rather one large coalition - the government, known as the "continuous 
ministry" — and a group of dissident Liberals who caUed themselves the 
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Independent Opposition, consisting of only seven members in the 
1893-96 pariiament and five in the 1896-99 house. Despite this, Reid 
continued to maintain his ideal of an independent cross-bench party even 
to the extent of advocating the growth of a viable second non-Labor party 
at the 1896 and 1899 elections, so that his own party would be placed in 
an advantageous bargaining position. In line with this ideal, he shared with 
Fisher the belief that the Labor party should avoid any formal links with 
other political groups and should not be tempted into a Ub-lab coalition. 
When Labor finally came to power, they both believed it would be in its 
own fight. Consequenfly, an attempt by Charies Powers, a barrister and 
leader of the Independent Opposition, to form an alliance of Liberals, 
Democrats, Radicals, and Laborites in 1895 and again in 1896 to oppose 
the continuous government at the election was rejected by Reid and the 
ALF. 
This view was not shared by those who became the more powerful 
figures in the PLP after 1896. Glassey, re-elected leader without 
opposition after the defeat of Reid and Fisher, supported some tacit 
alliance with the other non-government parties. In this he was supported 
by Dawson and W. H. Browne, who had been elected secretary of the PLP 
in place of Fisher, after the elections. Also supporting this ideal was a far 
more able and infiuential politician, WUliam Kidston, who had been 
retumed as one of the two members for Rockhampton. After serving an 
apprenticeship to an iron moulder in Falkirk, Scofland and obtaining a 
first-class certificate in chemistry through evening study, Kidston had 
migrated to Australia in 1882 and established a book-seUing business in 
Rockhampton, the principal central Queensland port. As a major port, 
Rockhampton contained large numbers of waterside workers, seamen, 
carriers, labourers, and buUding workers, who formed the basis for the 
political Labor associations of which Kidston also became a significant 
member. His name and his poUtical views became widely known during the 
shearers' strike in 1891 through the publication in the Worker of a poem, 
"The Ballot is the Thing", the concluding verse of which ran: 
Then keep your heads, I say, my boys; 
your comrades in the town 
WUl help you yet to win a vote 
and put your tyrants down. 
Throw your old guns aside, my boys; 
the baUot is the thing 
They did not have to reckon with 
When George the Fourth was king. 
The baUot is the thing my boys, 
the ballot is the thing 
WUl show these men how long it is 
since George the Fourth was king. 
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This contrasted with the more romantic notions of revolution that Lane 
and some of his foUowers espoused and which Henry Lawson, a month 
later, in the Worker, had glorified in "Freedom on the Wallaby", where he 
concluded: 
But Freedom's on the Wallaby, 
She'll knock the tyrants siUy. 
She's going to light another fire 
And boU another biUy. 
We'll make the tyrants feel the sting 
Of those that they would throttle; 
They needn't say the fault is ours 
If blood should stain the wattle. 
It seems to be a truism of internal Labor poUtics that once he has 
estabUshed himself as a tme Labor activist, the non-manual working liberal 
or radical is soon accepted as a legitimate representative of the Labor 
movement. So it was with Kidston. In 1892, he represented the Clermont 
and Mount Morgan WPOs, as weU as that of Rockhampton at the Labor-in-
Politics Convention in Brisbane. FoUowing his defeat as a Labor candidate 
for Rockhampton in 1893, he stood as a "Democrat" in 1896, at the same 
time acknowledging that he had signed the Labor platform but denying 
any official association with the ALF. Was he shuffling and trimming or 
merely being discerning? On his election, the caucus accepted him as a 
Labor member, as did the Worker. 
After the 1896 election a disagreement over tactics began to emerge 
between the leaders of the PLP (Dawson, Browne, Kidston, and Glassey) 
and the leaders of the ALF (Reid, HinchcUffe, and Seymour). The former 
group inside parliament saw the opportunity for effecting reforms by a 
judicious and discerning use of compromise, whUe the latter had greater 
faith in the ultimate triumph of Labor and the greater reforms that would 
come with this triumph. In retrospect, Reid and Hinchcliffe were proved 
right, but to the Labor movement at the time there seemed to be a great 
deal of practical, poUtical sense in the attitudes of Kidston and Dawson. 
Apart from the significant effect of the loss of Reid and Fisher by the 
PLP, and the acquisition of Kidston, the Labor party retained many of the 
same characteristics in 1896 as it had exhibited in 1893. Fifty candidates 
had been endorsed and twenty seats won. Twelve of these were stUl west 
of the range and seven of the twelve were mining and cattle electorates in 
the northwest. The Labor vote remained high in the provincial cities 
though no new seats were won there. In the metropolitan area, the loss of 
Toowong by Reid was offset by the election of T. Dibley, a butcher in the 
south Brisbane seat of WooUoongabba, and by the election of Frank 
McDonneU, the leader of the movement for the eariy closing of shops, for 
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Fortitude VaUey. Obvious alike to Reid, Hinchcliffe, Kidston, and Dawson 
were the disadvantages Labor suffered through the Electoral Acts of 1885 
and 1892 which, while providing in theory for manhood suffrage, ex-
cluded a third of the eligible voters and certairUy many Labor voters by its 
six-months' residency clause, and which allowed obvious non-Labor 
electors to vote in each electorate where they held properties. But though 
this was of some importance, of greater significance was the looseness of 
the party itself which remained virtually an association of local organiza-
tions whose only Unks were the PLP, the Worker, and sections of the 
platform. 
The need for a more cohesive party organization was becoming 
apparent from the actions of some pariiamentarians, but it was also 
apparent from the very nature of the Labor party itself. There was a 
common acceptance among those who were clearest on Labor ideology 
that there were now two broad groups m Queensland politics representing 
moneyed interests and labouring interests. The former controUed the land, 
the most important political issue in the colony, and had the advantages of 
social prestige, favourable newspapers, control of the Legislative Assembly 
and CouncU, and economic wealth, whUe the latter had only their abUity 
to organize and educate. Any lack of unity, any woolly respectable liberal 
concepts about owing aUegiance to local electors or local bodies, could 
only serve to destroy the one power the representatives of Labor held. It 
was not a formalized Marxist class-struggle, but an obvious socio-economic 
division which the strikes had served to confirm. 
It was the ALF leaders, in and out of parliament, who sought to 
produce the necessary cohesiveness in the political and industrial move-
ment. Two events inside parliament soon after the 1896 election served to 
highlight the need for a more formal soUdarity. The first of these con-
cerned the crash of the Queensland National Bank in 1896, and the 
government's intention to provide assistance to that bank. Glassey 
supported the government, arguing that it was better to keep the bank 
operating than risk the possibUity of a further depression. Against this, the 
ALF supporters in parliament argued that the bank was a corrupt institu-
tion and that no public money should be provided to support it. However 
whUe there was no formal or binding poUcy on the banking question, there 
was on the construction and ownership of raUways, a point on which the 
Labor party was adamant that this was a matter for the state only, and on 
which it vigorously opposed the buUding of private lines. When a bUl came 
before the Assembly for a private raUway in the Mareeba-Chillagoe mining 
area it was opposed by the Labor members, with the exception of Hoolan 
and George Sim, a financier and member for Carpentaria through whose 
electorate the line was to run. Sim resigned from the party over the issue. 
To prevent simUar defections, the need for a tighter pledge such as New 
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South Wales had adopted became more apparent to those inside and 
outside the PLP. 
This was only one aspect of party organization which caUed for 
attention. The CPE formed to administer the 1896 election had ceased to 
operate after the election. However, eariy in 1898, Hinchcliffe once more 
took the initiative on behalf of the ALF and caUed a further meeting to 
organize a Labor-in-poUtics convention prior to the 1899 elections. In 
Labor party records this convention is counted as the first, despite that of 
1892, and indeed there is good reason for this. The 1896 election had 
demonstrated that the Labor party's successes in 1893 had not been 
accidental and that the party would continue as a force in Queensland 
politics. The organization and policy laid down in 1898 therefore repre-
sent the concept which the Labor party had of itself and of its role in 
Queensland politics. To ensure that the delegates attending the convention 
represented genuine functioning Labor organizations, the CPE riUed, prior 
to the convention, that each delegate would have to be elected by at least 
twenty financial members of an industrial or political organization which 
had been registered with the executive for three months prior to the 
convention. Furthermore the delegates were to represent state electorates, 
not unions, whose role was stiU seen as being part of a local PPA or WPO. 
When the forty-one delegates assembled in Brisbane on 3 June 1898, 
the bulk of the representation consisted of state parUamentarians and 
metropolitan ALF officials representing several of the more distant 
electorates. Glassey, Kidston, Browne, and McDonald were among the 
politicians who attended. Fisher, who hoped that the 1899 elections 
would return him to parliament, was also present. In all, twelve of the 
forty-one delegates were politicians. The most notable and unexplained 
absence was that of Reid. In what had become the accepted tradition, 
Glassey as leader of the PLP was elected chairman of the convention, with 
Hinchcliffe and Browme the joint secretaries. Glassey's speech at the 
opening of the conference reflected the awareness of the electoral 
weakness of the Labor party and also something of its concem for mral 
questions: 
1 am pleased to see such a large assemblage of delegates on the 
present occasion from the country districts, as it augured weU for 
the progress of the Labor Party. It showed that those districts now 
fully recognise that it was not from those who are now in power that 
they were Ukely to gain much advantage to themselves or to the 
country generally . . . I hope that in framing the platform the Con-
vention wUI adopt such means as would not only be acceptable to 
the towns but also to the farming districts. 
The convention had met to thrash out a permanent system of 
administration and to review the platform for the foUowing elections. If 
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the ideal of a broadly based party controUed by the rank and file members 
through their convention delegates was to be maintained, the larger 
number of Labor politicians in 1898 meant that not all of those could be 
members of the CPE. Its new composition reflected this desire to have the 
executive responsible to the convention and dominated neither by the PLP 
nor by the ALF. However, the right of both of these bodies to be repre-
sented directly on the CPE was accepted by making the chairman and 
secretary of the PLP and the president and secretary of the ALF ex officio 
CPE members. These four were outnumbered by the eleven members to be 
elected by and from the convention in the hope of giving a broad repre-
sentation to aU groups and regions. This hope was to be frustrated as 
meerings of the CPE were held in Brisbane, and with the size of Queens-
land only those CPE members living close to the capital were able to 
attend its meetings. Consequently though it was not the intention of the 
convention, often the majority of those attending the CPE meetings were 
members of the PLP. There is, however, no evidence that this worked 
against the best interests of the Labor party. Despite what has been 
written about divisions in the party, the effect of these can be exaggerated. 
In 1898 there was no ALF or PLP "ticket" for the election of the eleven 
delegates to the CPE, only Glassey and Hoolan of the PLP were becoming 
unpopular with the ALF leaders, whUe the parliamentarians, the ALF 
leaders, and the ordinary party members stiU held an ideal vision of how 
Labour would govern when it came to power. 
The platform that emerged continued to reflect clearly the goals of the 
Labor party in Queensland. Electoral reform remained the first and most 
important legislation sought, couched in the slogan "one man, one vote", 
with the added provision that the state should assume the responsibUity 
for enrolling voters and that adjustments should be made to the electoral 
laws to prevent disfranchisement of itinerant workers whose places of 
residence were constantly changing. With this electoral reform there 
remained coupled the abolition of the nominated Legislative CouncU. The 
first section of the platform dealing with industrial reform cleariy was 
concerned with providing the means of overcoming the central problems 
of working men — unemployment, industrial strife, long hours, poor 
accommodation, compensafion for injuries, and the guaranteeing of the 
payment of wages. These represented practical union demands which may 
have been found in a Uberal policy, though there is no evidence that 
liberals in Queensland in 1898 were anxious to push on with these at a 
very fast rate. Despite Glassey's statement regarding the farming districts, 
neither he nor the delegates present produced any practical policies which 
would appeal obviously and directly to large numbers of farmers. In the 
section headed "national work", the party clearly showed its difference 
with the liberals in its intenrion to use the power of the state to compete 
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in business enterprises with those local or interstate monopolies which 
increased the cost of production to miners and farmers and reduced the 
profits made from their labour. This section wrote in demands for national 
markets and storehouses, a state bank, a state sugar refinery, a quartz 
crushing mUl, flour mUls, and chUling works; these and state manufacture 
of raUway roUing stock, together with state ownership and construction of 
all raUways, state fire and life insurance, and a state coastal marine service 
represented the Labor party's sociaUsm and its departure from the goal of 
nationaUzing the means of production, distribution, and exchange. 
The equation of sociaUsm with state enterprises was a natural coroUary 
of the aspirations of unionized working men who were not yet educated 
for adventures in a more scientific form of socialism and who did not 
appreciate the potential power which they held industrially and poUtically. 
Unions in the colony represented only some, not all employees, and the 
Labor party in turn included only some, not all unions. It would be only 
when employees realized their potential power that the heights of social-
ism, about which a host of writers had preached, could be attained. 
Further planks speUed out the continued Australian dreams of land 
settlement, a system of free education avaUable to all in state schools, and 
the exclusion of non-white or cheap European labour. In the last third of 
the twentieth century, the racial basis of White Australia has come under 
popular fire; but, if the working man of the last third of the nineteenth 
century was a racist, he was doing no more than reflecting what he 
thought were his own observations and the attitudes of his educators in 
accepting, without doubt, the superiority of the white race and especially 
the superiority of the British section of that race of which he was a 
significant though distant part. There was no dissension on this point; all 
sections of the party accepted their White Australia policy without 
question. The same was not true of the pledge. Whereas in 1893 and 1896 
a candidate before receiving Labor endorsement was required to sign a 
pledge to support any political reforms demanded by the party and to 
resign if a vote of no confidence was passed by a two-thirds majority of 
party members in his district, for the 1899 election a candidate for pre-
selection was required to sign a pledge agreeing to advocate and support 
the principles contained in the platform, and, if he were defeated in the 
preselection baUot, not to oppose the selected candidate. 
Glassey was not enthusiastic about the pledge but signed it. R. M. King, 
the member for Maranoa since 1893, J.M.Cross, the member for 
Clermont since 1893, and Hoolan refused to sign and were refused 
endorsement. There was little chance of defeating King, a popular local 
figure in Maranoa, but the electorates of Burke and Clermont were in the 
strong Labor area, and to allow Hoolan and Cross to succeed in their 
flouting of the convention decision would have been a major setback. 
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Reid, still the best organizer in the Labor movement, was sent to bring 
them to heel. Throughout Burke he visited every mining camp, spoke to 
the men, organized them, and was certain that a "straight Labor" man 
would be returned at the next election. In an address to the Croydon 
Miners' Association and WPO he told his audience: "the Burke electorate 
is at present organized from one end to the other."^'* His organization 
must have been effective since a CPE supporter W. S. Maxwell, a miner, 
received the Labor nomination and the rebel Hoolan did not bother to 
contest the election. 
Reid's speech gave a good indication of the character and role of the 
Labor party as those who controUed the extrapariiamentary organization 
conceived it. The Labor party above all should eschew any change towards 
moderation and compromise as, Reid said, some of the new "brainy 
democrats" who had recenfly come into the party were suggesting. The 
party was at a stage where it could go forward or backward. To go for-
ward, he said, it must be composed of people of conviction, those pre-
pared to maintain an aggressive attitude on all occasions where the rights 
of the workers of the colony were at stake. He defended the party against 
the charge of its being controlled by a "Trades HaU clique", stating that 
opponents of the Labor party and those who were not reaUy Labor men 
were the only ones to complain of a "Trades HaU clique". Then, having 
"cut the political Uiroat of John Plumper Hoolan", Reid proceeded to 
Clermont "to cut the poUtical throat of John Michael Cross". Cross in turn 
was beaten by Reid, and Joe Lesina, also a journalist, became the 
candidate and subsequently the member for Clermont. Little further 
evidence was required to demonstrate the power Reid commanded within 
the party or the fear his presence engendered in Labor parliamentarians. 
Hoolan had his revenge, however, at the 1899 election and worked against 
Reid in Toowong, where the latter was defeated by a solicitor and former 
Ulster man, E. H. Macartney. 
At the 1899 election the Labor party increased its number of candi-
dates to fifty-four and though it won more seats it had presented anything 
but the united front it desired. Glassey more and more was revealing his 
unsuitabUity as a leader, though he had accepted the formal post of leader 
of the opposition in 1898. He lacked the tact of a good parliamentarian; 
he was less and less able to find common ground with the ALF leaders; 
and his essential liberalism prevented his recognizing the necessity for the 
tightness of the Labor organization. He had been the main reason more-
over for a breakdown in serious discussions which the PLP had held, with 
the blessing of the 1898 Labor-in-Politics Convention, with the Indepen-
dent Opposition. Regarding an electoral alliance, Glassey had insisted that 
he, not the Independent Opposition leader J.G.Drake, should be the 
leader of the alliance, but neither Drake nor his followers would accept 
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this.^^ With his estrangement from the Labor party, Glassey made no 
effort to act as the leader at the 1899 election but concentrated on 
retaining his own seat of Bundaberg. The absence of a leader, the un-
favourable reaction to the pledge, and the non-endorsement of Hoolan and 
Cross reacted against Labor which was fortunate to win twenty-one of the 
seventy-two seats. It remained a western and north western parliamentary 
party. 
After ten years, the party had become a permanent part of the Queens-
land political scene but had not widened its basis of support in the metro-
politan and southeastern Queensland areas sufficiently to appear Ukely to 
win office in the near future. The party's rise to power was obviously to 
take longer and to be more difficult than it had seemed in the halcyon 
days at the close of the 1880s, but there remained unanimity in the belief 
that the party had to gain power if the reforms needed in Queensland 
society were to be effected. To Hinchcliffe, the solution lay in improved 
union organization and in bringing all unions into the Labor party, whUe 
to parliamentarians like Kidston and Dawson the answer lay in a prudent 
alliance with Liberal opposition members. Both in their own way were to 
be proved correct. Into this debate about the nature of the Labor party's 
role intruded the swearing in of the first Labor government in the worid 
and the debate on federation. 
At the first caucus meeting after the 1899 election, Glassey announced 
that he would not stand again for the leadership if there was to be a ballot. 
The feeling against him in the party was too strong and Dawson was 
nominated. Glassey immediately left the meeting which elected Dawson 
leader. Fisher had been re-elected in 1899 but his absence from parliament 
for the previous three years robbed him of the caucus support to become 
leader. In any case, Dawson was a man of considerable experience, of high 
inteUectual calibre, and with a capacity to speak well and to establish 
friendly relations with other poUticians. He had become a close friend of 
the attorney general and premier, T. J. Byrnes, who had suggested that he 
should read for the Bar, but poor health, which plagued so many former 
miners, prevented his completing these studies. Nevertheless he was 
respected by the non-Labor members of the Assembly and was agreeable 
to a lib-lab alliance if this would help to enact Labor reforms, and more 
particularly electoral reform. 
The opportunity to give effect to this came at the end of November 
1899 when the continuous government, then headed by James Dickson 
who had been elected as an independent in 1896 and only recently joined 
the ministry on the death of Byrnes in September 1898, was brought 
down on a raUway bUl. Griffith, then the lieutenant governor, sent for 
Dawson as the leader of the opposition and asked him to try to form a 
government.^ ^ 
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Dawson's task was not easy. Those on the government side who had 
brought about Dickson's downfaU wanted him replaced by Robert PhUp as 
premier, not by a Labor leader. Inside the Labor caucus there were 
objections to any Ub-lab government, especially if Labor was to have a 
minority of seats in the cabinet. Outside, in the ALF, there was opposition 
to any attempt to assume office. However Dawson convinced the PLP that 
Labor should not allow the occasion to pass by to show that it was 
prepared to govern. He consulted with the leaders of the non-Labor 
factions and sought theu support for at least a minority Labor govern-
ment, especially one that would legislate for electoral reform. But when 
these indicated that they would not support him, Dawson, urged by 
Kidston, went ahead and chose a whoUy Labor cabinet which was sworn in 
on 1 December. WhUe the new ministers tried to master as much of their 
departments as possible, PhUp replaced Dickson as leader of the former 
government party. When Dawson sought a further adjournment of the 
house on 7 December, this was defeated by thirty-six to twenty-six. The 
first Labor government in the world had fallen and been replaced by a 
ministry headed by the former treasurer and TownsvUle businessman 
Robert PhUp. The Labor party's only satisfaction was in the acquisition of 
evidence of cormption and bad administration by the conrinuous ministry 
and from Mat Reid's winning the seat of Enoggera when one of Philp's 
new ministers went to the CouncU. The defeat of the Dawson government 
confirmed the view of HinchcUffe and Reid that Labor should not be too 
hasty in seeking power but, at the same time, confirmed the opinion of 
Kidston and others that Labor's future lay in pmdent aUiances, not in 
hoping or trying to govern alone. 
Owing to his continued bad health, Dawson resigned the leadership of 
the party in August 1900 and was replaced as leader and as president of 
the CPE by Browne. This did not affect the party's internal debate on its 
role since Browne, like Dawson, was prepared to accept a Ub-lab alliance if 
this would hasten the implementation of Labor's reform programme. How-
ever, the defeat of the Dawson government was soon lost in the debates 
over federation and the Boer War. As with their attitudes on northern and 
central separation and the fiscal question, the Labor party in Queensland 
had no specific policy on federation. Northern mining members like 
Dawson and Browne along with Fisher, Glassey, and Seymour had been 
strong supporters of federation in and out of parliament whUe McDonald 
vehemently opposed it as a "middle class device for diverting attention 
from the needs of Labor".^' This was a view held by many of the ALF 
leaders and the leaders of trade unions associated with the Brisbane Trades 
HaU, whUe other Labor members, notably Lesina and Reid, opposed 
federation on the grounds that it would favour the introduction of black 
labour.^ ^  However, among the state parliamentarians present at the debate 
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of the Federation Enabling BUl in May 1899 there were many more in 
favour of federation than against. Kidston opposed federation on the 
grounds that it would destroy Queensland's manufacturing and commerce, 
but like other members of the party was anxious to use the referendum on 
the federation proposals to introduce fuU manhood suffrage into Queens-
land's elections. If "one man, one vote" could be introduced for the 
federation referendum, he argued, then obviously the same principles 
could be made to apply to state elections.^^ Federation was carried in the 
referendum in Queensland principally through the heavy "Yes" vote in the 
north and northwestern areas — the strong Labor voting areas.^^ With 
regard to the Boer War, the Labor party set forward no clear poUcy, 
though there was a ready sympathy for the Boers who seemed to be 
fighting for their independence against an imperial power. Glassey, how-
ever, supported the British and foUowing a challenge from the Labor party 
resigned his seat of Bundaberg and recontested it against HinchcUffe, 
whom he defeated easily in a by-election in July 1900. His break with the 
party was now complete. 
In the federal elections that foUowed federation. Labor polled strongly 
to win four out of the nine House of Representatives seats plus three of 
the six Senate seats. In the process it lost some of its best state politicians 
in Fisher, McDonald, Higgs, and Dawson. With the departure of these and 
the uneasiness about Reid felt by state parliamentarians, Kidston though 
nominally Browne's deputy emerged as the real leader of the PLP and as 
one who would not be dictated to by those outside parliament. 
Tlie reported dominance of state Labor politicians by Trades HaU 
officials or by the ALF was more apparent than real and, despite the 
establishment of the CPE in 1898, the Labor party remained a coUection 
of local Labor associations adhering to the same platform, but wlioUy 
responsible for their own organization and selecfion of candidates. The 
CPE met only at irregular intervals whenever the president or the secretary 
thought that there was sufficient business meriting discussion. It did not 
meet at aU, for example, when the question of the Dawson government 
was raised. Moreover the Worker no longer enjoyed its dominance among 
Labor readers, as local Labor or "democrat" papers began to emerge in the 
provincial centres giving prominence to local political Labor figures and 
often defending these when they seemed to be coming under attack from 
Brisbane. 
Finance was the major problem facing the party. The 1898 convention 
had not laid down any system of financing the party administration, and, 
as the principal contributing union to the ALF, the Amal W U, was 
affected by the drought in the pastoral areas, the CPE, which stUl 
depended largely on the resources of the ALF, was further restricted in the 
organizing of the party. Funds were so short that the Queensland delegates 
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to the January 1900 conference to establish a federal Labor party were 
forced to pay their own fares and expenses. If the Labor party was to 
increase its power, it needed organized finance. Hinchcliffe with three 
years' experience as CPE secretary and ten as secretary of the ALF 
recognized that a regular income of sufficient size to provide for admini-
stration and for the conduct of federal and state elections was as essential 
as an efficient and well-organized industrial base. This income could be 
derived only from affiliated unions and from WPOs. As a tangible return 
for money contributed, the 1901 convention decided that the payment to 
the CPE of the minimum £1 ($2) registration fee per year would entitle 
members of WPOs and industrial unions to vote in the selection of local 
Labor candidates. It was hoped that this enticement would lead other 
unions to sign the party platform, pay the registration fee, and so become 
affiliates of the Labor party, as it was maintained that a candidate selected 
by local affiliated members would be responsible to them, and they would 
have some say in the calibre of their Labor politicians. Another mling of 
the 1901 convention was that, in addition to the requirement of holding a 
convention each three years or whenever the CPE thought it was 
necessary, a new convention could be called at any time on a two-thirds 
vote of affUiated unions and organizations. 
The party maintained its slow increase in electoral support at the 1902 
election, nominating fifty-eight candidates of whom twenty-five were 
elected and obtaining over 40 per cent of the valid vote in the two-member 
constituencies and almost 40 per cent in the single-member electorates. 
More importantly, for the first time, more than half the seats were won on 
the eastern side of the range, although Brisbane continued to be the 
weakest Labor area. With Reid's unexpected defeat in Enoggera, there 
remained only two Labor members in the thirteen metropolitan seats. 
Among the new members was Francis Kenna, from Bowen, who had 
edited the Worker after Higgs's election to the state parliament in 1899. As 
Kenna's election to parliament in turn rendered the editorship of the 
Worker vacant, the ALF executive appointed Henry Boote as editor. He 
turned out to be the finest editor the paper was to have and not only 
returned the Worker to the poUtical significance it had enjoyed under 
Lane, but joined with Reid, who had estabUshed himself in a taUoring 
business in Brisbane, and Hinchcliffe in forming a powerful political 
triumvirate abetted by the faithful if prosaic Seymour and by Bowman, 
who having been defeated for Warrego in 1902 was now living in the 
strong Labor electorate of Fortitude VaUey. 
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III 
Despite its impressive performance at the 1902 election, where it had 
won forty of the seventy-two seats, the continuous govemment under the 
conservative Robert PhUp was far from impressive in office and came 
under increasing criticism not only from dissidents in its own ranks but 
also from the state's financial interests and their principal organ, the 
Brisbane Courier. Among the dissidents was a group known as "the Darling 
Downs bunch", representing the wheat-growing seats, and having two 
members in the independent opposition in addition to its six government 
members. These were the political descendants of the Griffith liberals of 
the 1880s, and their unofficial leader was Arthur Morgan,^' whose famUy 
had been and were stUl prominent political figures in the southern Downs. 
Morgan had represented Warwick in the Legislative Assembly since 1883; 
he was now Speaker of the House, a personal friend of Kidston, and on 
several occasions he had expressed approval of the latter's moderation. 
Aware of the internal dispute tearing the PhUp government apart, Kidston 
announced his desire, in January 1903, for an aUiance with other progres-
sives to defeat the continuous ministry. The invitation was quickly taken 
up and in September, when PhUp introduced the bUl to extend stamp 
duties to cover a £500,000 ($1,000,000) deficit, he was left with a 
majority of only two and resigned. Browne, the leader of the opposition, 
was sent for but reported that he was unable to form a ministry, though 
with the example of the federal Labor party there was every indication 
that the PLP would provide some support for a new Liberal government. 
Among the party leaders outside there was a suspicion of Labor's being 
entangled in a Ub-lab aUiance, but there was Uttle that these could do 
except warn. The politicians were virtually masters of their ovm destinies 
provided they kept to the party platform. Moreover it appeared that Labor 
could exact from the new government, in return for support, their most 
earnestly desired reform - one adult, one vote - with a special provision 
for itinerant workers to remain on the electoral roU. Morgan in turn was 
sent for and immediately entered into negotiations with Browne and 
Kidston. However he insisted that Labor must be part of the government, 
not merely a supporter, and must have two members in the cabinet. After 
a week's debate, the caucus agreed to this, though Browne insisted that the 
party maintain its autonomy and have the right to break away from the 
coalition once the reforms sought had been achieved. The separate views 
of Kidston and the Hinchcliffe-Reid-Boote triumvirate having been at least 
parfly satisfied. Labor entered into a formal coalifion with the Liberals. 
Browne became minister for mines and public works, each weU suited to 
his interests and experience, whUe Kidston, the most able man on finance 
in the pariiament, became treasurer. Both resigned from the caucus which 
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elected as its new leader, Peter Airey, a teacher who had succeeded 
McDonald in Flinders in 1901 when the latter entered federal parliament. 
Airey therefore became one of the two PLP members on the CPE and was 
elected president in place of Browne. However, when Browne died in AprU 
1904, Airey took his place in the cabinet and George Kerr, a former miner 
and blacksmith, who had been endorsed for Barcoo in 1893 in place of 
Ryan, was elected leader of the PLP with the consequent election also to 
the presidency of the CPE. 
As 1903 closed, fortune seemed to be smUing on political Labor in 
Queensland. Apart from being in office, in a coaUtion that promised to 
bring some long-sought reforms into effect, the federal election on 16 
December produced a stunning 56.7 per cent Labor vote in the House of 
Representatives, returning seven Labor members in the nine Queensland 
seats, and a 53.5 per cent Senate vote to elect aU three Labor nominees. 
When a state election was forced in August 1904, Labor won thirty-four of 
the seventy-two seats, thanks largely to the prestige of Kidston and 
Morgan, the general popularity of the coalition, and the reUef at the end of 
the continuous ministry. Kidston in Queensland and Watson in federal 
parliament had revealed that Labor was not composed of a bunch of 
wUd-eyed revolutionaries, but of responsible politicians quite capable of 
administering the state. It was somewhat anomalous that, though Labor 
held thirty-four of the coalition's fifty-five seats, it filled only two of the 
eight cabinet positions. The truth was that whUe Labor had won additional 
seats in Brisbane and in the northern coastal areas, the political calibre of 
most of its members was not high. 
Reid had lost Toowong once more and foUowing that loss seems to 
have soured somewhat of politics and to have determined to play the role 
more completely of the guardian of the socialist goals of the party. 
Bowman however won Fortitude VaUey, giving the "straight Labor" 
officials outside the parliament their representative inside the caucus to act 
as a watch-dog on any deviation from "fundamental Labor principles". 
Bowman had little of Reid's inteUectual or organizing abUity, but unlike 
Reid had a genial, friendly disposition and came to be respected and liked 
by the Labor parliamentarians, where Reid had been feared and held in 
some awe. Of greater long-term significance for Labor were the signs of the 
revival of unionism in the state. On the other hand the increasing import-
ance of the Labor party had made more obvious the cracks in its admini-
strative and organizational structure. HinchcUffe, occupying the three key 
positions of secretary of the ALF, manager of the Worker, and secretary of 
the CPE, found that organizing the federal election campaign of 1903 was, 
even with the assistance of the secretary of the PLP, beyond his physical 
resources. His attempt to resign as CPE secretary served only to demon-
strate more clearly that some of the fundamental questions of administra-
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tion and finance had yet to be answered. It was evident that no union 
leader had either his knowledge and experience of both the political and 
industrial section of the Labor movement or such freedom of movement as 
his occupation allowed. Furthermore, though the £1 ($2) registration fee 
had provided some of the finance for administration, it had not proved 
sufficient to pay the wages or expenses of a fuU-time secretary. Con-
sequently the problem of increased finance stUl needed to be solved before 
the party administration could be placed on a sound footing by the 
appointment of a fuU-time secretary. For the time being, HinchcUffe at the 
request of the CPE withdrew his resignation. 
According to the party's rules, a convention was due to be held no later 
than July 1904. However, because of the shaldness of the coaUtion, both 
the CPE and PLP wished to avoid actions which might precipitate any 
iU-feeling between the two parties. Consequently the CPE decided that the 
convention should be deferred untU later in 1904 when the fate of the 
Adult Suffrage BiU would be known. However the August 1904 election 
further delayed the convention, which was eventuaUy held in Brisbane in 
May 1905. The 1905 convention was significant both in the history of 
party administration and in the relationship of the party to its politicians. 
For the first time a comprehensive set of rules was published and a stated 
political objective was written into the platform. Prior to the convention, 
Hinchcliffe had assembled aU resolutions passed at previous conventions as 
well as the working rules under wliich the CPE operated. These were 
incorporated into a draft constitution which the convention ratified and 
ordered to be printed. The official title, "Queensland Labor Party", was 
adopted; conventions were to be held in tum in the south, centre, and 
north of the state; and rules relating to the £1 ($2) branch registration fee 
and the requirement that convention delegates he elected by at least 
twenty financial members became part of the constitution. Candidates for 
state and federal elections were henceforth required to show that they had 
been members of an affiliated Labor organization for at least twelve 
months and to sign a new pledge binding them not only to advocate and 
support the principle of the Labor platform, to refrain from opposing 
endorsed Labor candidates, and go througli the electoral contest if selected 
but also, and most important of aU, to vote in pariiament as the majority 
of the caucus decided.^^ 
In all states the party was becoming more conscious of defining clearly 
the role of the Labor politician. Was he to be tlie political representative of 
the Labor movement or was it his role to lead the Labor movement in and 
out of coalitions and alliances, much as the political leaders of the nine-
teenth century had done? There was clearly a determinafion that the 
long-term goals of Labor in politics were not to be set aside to please the 
wliims of even acknowledged competent leaders such as Watson or 
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Kidston. Consequently, when the Labor-in-Politics Convention met, the 
role of the poUtician in the administration of the party and his role on the 
CPE was discussed at length and after a long debate a motion to debar any 
polifician from being elected to the CPE from among the convention 
delegates was defeated and a compromise resolution accepted prohibiting 
more than half the executive from being members of the PLP. One of the 
outcomes of the debates over the role of Labor in politics was the demand 
by the more radical section of the party to set down an objective towards 
which the party would aim whUe continuing to seek immediate reforms. It 
was partly a reminder to the political representatives that Labor in enter-
ing poUtics sought large changes in the economic organizafion of the 
society, not merely piecemeal reforms, and partly a reaction by the 
socialist element to what seemed the inherent slowness of constitutional 
methods. Prior to the convention, Boote in the Worker had been urging 
the necessity of returning to the fundamental principles of the movement 
now that the Adult Suffrage Act had been passed. In March he had 
written: "The movement must become consciously socialist . . . It must 
drop aU pretenfions to be statesmanlike and continue to be agitative. 
Discontent is stUl the divine gospel; we are aU damned as soon as we 
congratulate ourselves." After twelve hours spent in debating a proposed 
objective to bring about the coUective ownership of monopolies, Reid 
moved an amendment to replace "monopolies" by the phrase, "the means 
of production, distribution and exchange". This was carried by twenty-
eight to ten and Queensland Labor was given a socialist objective.^^ How-
ever, despite the arguments of Reid and Fisher, now deputy leader of the 
federal party, at the Inter-State Labor Conference in Brisbane two months 
later, the Queensland objective was rejected in favour of that of New 
South Wales which caUed simply for the coUective ownership of mono-
polies. 
To Kidston, present at the convention as an observer, the passing of 
such an 'objective revealed the unreality of those who were in control of 
the extrapariiamentary party. To him politics was the art of the possible 
and he suspected those who continually spiced their political speeches 
with reference to sacred, though Ul-defined, principles. Wlien to the 
socialist objective was added an insistence on the stoppage of all sales of 
Crown land, through which he had been rectifying the accumulated 
deficit, the breach between him and the party administrators widened 
dangerously. Kidston had the support of a majority of members of the 
PLP, who authorized Kerr to issue a statement to all newspapers seeking 
the repeal of the socialist objective, describing the plank relating to the 
sale of Crown land as impracticable and caUing on Labor supporters to 
seek a new convention. Its most significant paragraph read: 
171 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
D. J. MURPHY 
It must be evident to anyone who has studied Australian politics for the 
last ten years that many gains of Labor in the Legislative Arena have 
been won largely by a system of pmdent alliances. These alliances 
are only possible so long as the councUs of the Parliamentary Labor 
party are guided by moderation and sound sense. Not only is this the 
case, but the existence of a purely Labor Government would depend 
entirely on the practicabUity of its programmes. Hence any extreme 
proposals that alienate from Labor the sympathy and support of 
every other political party in Parliament and outside Parliament can 
only have one result viz.; the bringing back to office of powerful 
reactionary conservative government.^^ 
In response to the request from the PLP to the CPE to call a new 
convention, HinchcUffe, though personally opposed to such a convention, 
circularized affiliated Labor organizations. Of the repUes received, in the 
three weeks provided, only three were in the affirmative, whUe over 
twenty were in the negative. The result further widened the breach 
between the Kidstonite section of the PLP and the CPE, already danger-
ously opened by the refusal of Kerr as pariiamentary leader to accept the 
traditional posifion of president of the CPE. Reid became president of the 
new CPE, being the only non-politician to be the president of that body 
between 1892 and 1916. 
If some of the blame for the split in the Labor party Ues with the 
intransigence of the four "straiglit Labor men", Reid, HinchcUffe, Boote, 
and Bowman, the remainder must Ue squarely on the shoulders of Kidston, 
who had become premier in January 1906 when Morgan retired to the 
presidency of the Legislative CouncU. Always a man of independence, 
Kidston was determined from the start of the coalition that having gained 
power he would not let go easUy, nor did he consider that he as political 
leader should consult with the extrapariiamentary leaders. More than this, 
he seemed to be publicly insensitive to Labor ideals. In appointing five 
new legislative councUlors, he included only one Labor supporter, at the 
same time appointing the leader of the Anti-Socialist League. It appeared 
that he was assuring himself of a separate foUowing in the event of a split 
in the Labor ranks. 
The disastrous drop in the Labor vote in Queensland at the 1906 
federal election and the heavy anti-Socialist party vote, seemed to confirm 
Kidston's opinion of the public response to the 1905 convention. Labor 
won only four of the nine House of Representatives seats and none of the 
Senate seats. In February 1907, Kidston, emboldened by his public 
popularity, threw down his chaUenge to the Labor party in a speech at 
Rockhampton, offering the social reforms that Labor had long souglit, but 
demanding personal aUegiance of the parliamentarians to himself and not 
to the party.^^ He was demanding the impossible. 
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The Labor-in-Politics Convention in Rockhampton in March that year 
accepted the challenge. Reid, Hinchcliffe, and Bowman had organized well 
before the convention and had the addifional support of Fisher, soon to be 
the federal Labor leader. Kidston's faithful lieutenant Kerr, stUl leader of 
the PLP, found himself solidly defeated on each proposal he made, but as 
a final gesture, on the last day of the convention, he moved that the Labor 
party should support the government's, i.e. Kidston's policy, at the coming 
election. Bowman, supported on the floor of the convention by Reid and 
Fisher, moved an amendment to have all Labor candidates pledged to the 
convention platform and unhampered by any compact with another party. 
The amendment was carried by thirty-six to six.^^ Fisher and Bowman 
were directed to wait on Kerr to ascertain his future intenfions and, 
following Kerr's non-committal answer, a month later Bowman was 
elected the new leader at a special meeting of the PLP. However the 
convention had not been concerned only with the problems of Kidston 
and the coalition. The administration of the party stUl demanded 
attention, and with the resurgence of unionism in Queensland came a 
demand for direct representation of unions on the CPE, as the only union 
delegates were stiU the president and secretary of the ALF. After some 
debate, the CPE membership was expanded to include the secretaries of 
the three Queensland Australian Workers' Union (AWU) branches at 
Hughenden, Longreach, and Charieville. To overcome the multiplicity of 
local rules for selecting political candidates, Reid had drawn up a uniform 
set of plebiscite rules which the convention adopted and wliich have not 
been basically altered since. 
The convention resulted in the first great spUt of the Labor party in 
Queensland. All but fourteen of the Labor poUticians and an unknown 
number of supporters decided to foUow Kidston. At the elections in May 
1907, Labor was routed, receiving only 25 per cent of the vote and 
winning only eighteen seats. After fourteen years, it seemed that it had 
advanced Utfle on its 1893 result; nine of the seats won were stUl in the 
west, six were from coastal cities, with only one. Fortitude VaUey, in the 
metropoUtan area. The split was to have a sobering influence on the party, 
wliUe Reid became more disliked as the ogre responsible for the split and 
the one who stood between Labor and success. However, in addition to 
the advantages gained from the regrowth of unionism, the party was now 
attracting several competent liberals to its pariiamentary ranks who would 
compensate for the loss of Kidston. Among the new members elected in 
1907 were WUliam Lennon, a banker and former manager for Burns PhUp, 
who won the northern coastal sugar seat of Herbert, and John Hunter, a 
successful Roma merchant, who won the central westem seat of Maranoa. 
For the foUowing two years, Queensland politics were to suffer the 
traumas of three parties in the field, as the Labor party, the Kidstonites, 
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and the remaining conservatives under PhUp each held about a third of the 
seats. No one party could govern alone, though Labor continued to give 
Kidston support but refused any aUiance or coalition. However, as Kidston 
pushed on with his reform programme, he necessarily came into conflict 
with the nominee Legislative CouncU, and, when the governor would not 
make the additional appointments he sought,^'' he was forced to fight a 
further election in Febmary 1908 on the basis of Kidston and Labor 
against PhUp, the governor, and the CouncU. Only Labor made any gains in 
seats but, since it stUl refused any alliance, Kidston was forced to fuse with 
his old political enemy PhUip in October 1908. This was too much for 
former Labor members such as Kerr and Airey, who left his party to form 
part of a new independent opposition, reducing Kidston's majority on the 
floor of the Assembly to only one. A new election was caUed in October 
1909 and Queensland politics, for the first rime, became clearly Labor 
versus anti-Labor. 
Yet the coalition had been fruitful for the Labor movement. In 
addition to the Adult Suffrage Act, Kidston's attorney general, James 
Blair, drew up two biUs to remove the permanent veto of the CouncU. The 
first of these to be passed, the Constitution Act Amendment Act of 1908, 
provided that amendments to the constitution needed only a simple 
majority, not the two-thirds majority laid down in 1867. This paved the 
way for the passing of the Parliamentary BiUs Referendum Act which 
provided that a bUl, rejected twice by the CouncU, could be submitted to a 
referendum of the people. If the referendum was successful, the bUl 
required only the governor's signature to become law. Kidston had also 
passed a Workers' Compensation Act, a Shearers and Sugar Workers' 
Accommodation Act, an Old Age Pension Act, and a Wages Board Act 
which recognized the right of a union to act for an employee. 
It was not only Queensland politics that had taken on a new character 
by the end of 1909. A whole new Labor movement was re-emerging, not 
with the same rapidity as that of twenty years before but based on 
sounder experience. The re-establishment of a TLC in Brisbane in 1904 
and the appointment of a roving organizer, J. A. Moir, in 1909 assisted 
with the buUding of new, and the rebuUding of several old, unions many of 
which were affiliating with the Labor party. However it was in the north 
that the exciting revival of unionism was occurring. When he had visited 
the mining areas of Gympie, Mount Morgan, and Charters Towers in 1905, 
the English socialist, Tom Mann, recalled that he could nowhere find a 
unionist.^ ** Had he retumed three years later, he would have been amazed 
at the change. With the fall in the price of copper, and with other minerals 
no longer bringing the same prices, the consequent wage cuts and un-
employment on the mining fields provided the environment for the buUd-
ing of a new union. 
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It was into this fmitful area that a young miner, Edward GranviUe 
Theodore, stepped, having spent the previous four and a half years at 
Broken HUl. Theodore was physicaUy large, with a capacity for organizing 
and a zeal for reading sociaUst and economic tracts. Among the miners at 
Ir-vingbank, Herberton, and Stannary HiUs on the Atherton Tableland, he 
formed a new union at the end of 1907 called the Amalgamated Workers' 
Association (AWA), designed as a mass union in the north Queensland 
tradition, and concerned with fighting workers' battles, not with being a 
friendly society Uke some of the Brisbane craft unions. With another big-
boned miner, WUliam McCormack, Theodore buUt the AWA into the most 
powerful union in the state, eventually covering aU workers not in craft 
unions and, most importantly for the Labor party, he conditioned it to 
accept that Labor in politics was a necessary arm of unionism. 
At the 1909 election, the twenty-four-year-old Theodore regained the 
seat of Woothakata for the Labor party from the Kidstonite, Mick Woods. 
At the same election, but in the westem pastoral area, a second Labor seat 
regained was that of Barcoo, where Kerr was defeated by a thirty-
three-year-old Rockhampton barrister, Thomas Joseph Ryan, who thus 
provided the State house with a second T. J. Ryan, in the same seat. Ryan 
had been bom in Victoria of Irish immigrant farmers and had gained his 
degrees in Arts and Law from Melbourne University whUe teachmg at 
Melbourne, Launceston, and Maryborough. From here he had gone to 
Rockhampton as a teacher at the Grammar School in 1901 and established 
a law practice there in mid-1903. At the federal election in that year, he 
stood unsuccessfuUy as a Deakinite and joined the Rockhampton WPO 
soon after in 1904. Though a friend and admirer of Kidston, he stood as a 
Labor candidate against the Kidstonite member for Rockhampton north in 
1907 but was again defeated. However his many successful cases for 
unionists, involving workers' compensation and the recovery of wages, 
brought him to the notice of the powerful Longreach branch of the AWU, 
which supported him in the Barcoo plebiscite. Having won this, he had 
little trouble defeating Kerr in a two-way contest. 
It was a party of new members who met to elect Bowman leader after 
the 1909 election. Only Herbert Hardacre of the western seat of 
Leichhardt remained of the original sixteen members elected in 1893, 
though George Ryland, a Gympie miner and close friend of Fisher, WiUiam 
Hamilton, a shearer imprisoned in the 1891 strike, and WiUiam Ryott 
Maughan, a journalist from Ipswich, had been elected in 1899. Only a 
handful of the twenty-seven members of the new caucus could recaU the 
strikes or depression of the nineties. To them the Labor party represented 
the future, not the past. Putting the platform into action was more im-
portant than being dogmatically concerned with guarding old and Ul-
defined principles. As if to confirm the change that was coming over the 
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party, Mat Reid dramaticaUy resigned his offices in the party when the 
CPE overruled his objection to the re-endorsement of Lesina in Clermont. 
For him, twenty years of service to the Labor movement and to the Labor 
party had produced little. He had been the hardest working and most 
effective organizer, bringing shufflers and trimmers to heel, codifying the 
rules and constitution, and maintaining the pristine purity of Labor 
principles, aU at the expense of his own business; yet he remained one of 
the least popular men in the party. His resignation was accepted with 
barely a ripple of comment. 
IV 
The 1909 election confirmed the Labor party as a regionally based 
party, whose strength stUl lay in the mining and pastoral areas and whose 
weakest area of support was the more heavUy populated southeastern 
farming and metropolitan districts. Of the thirty seats within a hundred 
miles of the centre of Brisbane, only five were won by Labor — two in the 
mining town of Gympie, one in the mining town of Ipswich, and two in 
the dual member electorate of Fortitude VaUey — stiU the only solidly 
Labor electorate in Brisbane. Four of the pastoral seats and two mining 
seats won by Labor had contained fewer than 2,000 electors, whUe there 
were six Liberal seats in Brisbane averaging over 4,500 electors. Con-
sequently when it was learnt that Kidston proposed to redistribute state 
electoral boundaries to provide seventy-two single-member electorates of 
equal voting size, the necessity for Labor to win support in the metro-
politan and southeastern area was made more obvious. When the bUl came 
before parliament in 1910, the Labor members argued strongly for lower 
electoral quotas in the distant and sparsely populated areas. Kidston's 
insistence on equal electorates threw back on the Labor party the onus of 
widening its electoral support if it were to win government and thus to 
implement its reforms. 
Yet, despite the prospect of losing seats through the electoral redistri-
bution, the omens for Labor in Queensland in 1910 were unproving. From 
the elections of 1907, 1908, and 1909 had come competent new members, 
who were to raise the debating capabUities of the PLP. Of these, Ryan and 
Theodore were the outstanding examples. At the federal election of AprU 
1910 it was further demonstrated that where the party was not divided, as 
it had been over Kidston, and where it presented a chaUenging programme, 
it could gain a high proportion of the vote. In contrast to the 39 per cent 
Labor vote in the 1909 state election, Fisher was able to achieve a 47 per 
cent House of Representatives and 50 per cent Senate vote to win aU three 
Senate seats and six of the nine Queensland seats in the House of Repre-
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sentatives. It was still worth noting however that the three Liberal seats 
were in the southeastern area. 
In party administration, advances were also being made eariy in 1910. 
The three state elections and the federal election held between the 1907 
and 1910 conventions had re-emphasized the financial and administrative 
problems of the party. Hinchcliffe continued to hold his three positions, 
though in August 1909 the CPE agreed to appoint Lewis McDonald, a 
compositor from Fortitude VaUey, as assistant honorary secretary. When 
the Labor-in-Politics Convention met in TownsviUe in May, a ways and 
means committee was appointed to report on how finance could be 
provided for the appointment of a permanent secretary. The committee, 
chaired by Bowman, brought back a recommendation to provide that 
WPOs and industrial unions registered with the CPE should pay in addition 
to the registration fee a capitation fee of threepence (two cents) per 
member per year and that Labor members of parUament should pay three-
pence in the pound (1.25 per cent) of their salary each year. In addition 
industrial unions not registered with the CPE, but which had passed a 
specific resolution approving of the principles and platform of the party, 
could, on the payment of threepence (two cents) per member each year, 
take part in the selection of convention delegates and Labor candidates. 
These recommendations, if accepted, were expected to bring in an 
additional £320 ($640) per year.^^ Federal and state pariiamentarians 
agreed, a majority of unions and WPOs agreed, and the basis of a new 
party administration was laid. McDonald became the first fuU-time 
secretary, holding that position untU 1936. 
The 1910 convention (at which, by the way, red was officially adopted 
as the Labor party's colour in Queensland) saw Labor party policies 
moving more definitely and more confidently towards the use of govern-
ment power to intervene in the economic, industrial, and social life of the 
state, particularly through the estabUshment of state enterprises. The 
official policy since 1901 had been divided into a fighting platform of 
reforms to be implemented immediately Labor attained office, and a 
general platform setting out long-term goals. Of the twelve planks in the 
fighting platform in 1910, five were concerned with state enterprises, 
while the abolition of the Legislative CouncU and the institution of the 
initiative and referendum stUl retained priority over aU else. This growing 
desire for direct government intervention in the economic life of the state 
reflected the movement towards socialist policies as they had been inter-
preted in the Australian context. It also provided the dividing line with the 
change of Australian politics to Labor and anti-Labor, between those 
Uberals who would opt for the Conservative party and those who would 
support the Labor party. Above aU, the increasing importance of state 
enterprises in the platform reflected the optimism that the Queensland 
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Labor party felt about what Labor in office would achieve. 
Just as it had been the optimism and improving economic conditions of 
the 1880s that had produced the first spectacular growth in unionism and 
the movement of Labor into politics, so it was a second flush of optimism 
and an upward surge in economic prosperity that produced the second 
spectacular growth of unionism after 1909, which was also directed 
towards politics. By 1911 the Queensland economy was recapturing some 
of its early vigour. It was stUl primarily a rural economy, with the larger 
population growth also in the rural areas, though manufacturing, retarded 
by federation, had also begun to expand by 1911. In the north, miners 
finding this field no longer profitable were able to move into the sugar 
industry, some as farmers, others as employees, or on to the Atherton 
Tableland, where dairying promised to be a fruitful enterprise. The con-
tinued heavy government investment in raUways to serve these areas 
together with the necessity of expanding the timber, transport, and service 
industries associated with them provided additional areas of employment 
for ex-miners. It was among these men that Theodore and McCormack 
were able to expand the AWA and increase its political influence. In 
August 1910 the first Queensland Trade and Labour Union Congress had 
been held with representatives from the ALF, the Brisbane TLC, and 
thirty-seven unions. WhUe agreeing on the need for a closer federation of 
unions, the delegates also agreed that aU unions should belong to the 
Labor party where they had been offered the power to nominate and 
select candidates in return for the payment of capitation fees.'*' 
In February 1911 Kidston, exhausted after fifteen years of intense 
poUtical activity, retired to the Land Court and was succeeded as premier 
by Digby Denham, a produce merchant, who had followed Morgan out of 
the continuous government in 1903. At the same time, Kidston's treasurer, 
A. G. C. Hawthorn, who had defeated Mat Reid for Enoggera in 1902, 
retired to the Legislative CouncU. In the by-elections that foUowed, John 
Adamson, a Protestant clergyman who had held the seat of Maryborough 
in 1907 and 1908 and then retired disgusted with the intrigues of politics, 
won Kidston's old seat of Rockhampton for the Labor party, whUe the 
Liberal majority in Enoggera was reduced from 988 to 139. The omens 
were stiU favourable, though the federal Labor party's referenda in 1911 
on legislative powers and monopolies were rejected in Queensland by 
18,000 votes. This could not deter the growth of poUtical unionism, which 
continued thougli not as rapidly as had been hoped in 1910. By the second 
Trade and Labour Union Congress in August 1911, there had been some 
moves towards greater unity among unions but little real progress. The 
Brisbane TLC had been replaced by the metropolitan district councU of 
the ALF, of which the AWA, now spread to Brisbane, was a principal 
force. Theodore was becoming convinced that amalgamation of unions on 
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the AWA model was preferable to the loose ALF type of federation in 
making the Labor movement a strong industrial and political force. A 
dramatic example of this was provided while the congress met, when the 
AWA, having -absorbed the Amalgamated Sugar Workers' Union in 
December 1910, tested the new union against the powerful monopoly, the 
CSR, and achieved a forty-eight-hour week and wages increases for sugar 
workers after a long and bitter strike. It vras a convincing display of what 
good union organization could achieve and was not lost on the new Liberal 
premier Denham and his minister, who had shipped police and strike 
breakers from Sydney into the sugar areas. Nor were they slow to grasp 
the possibUities for the Labor party in having such a union as the spear-
head of its organization. 
The party now had a fuU-time administrator, it had a powerful weekly 
journal, the Worker, supplemented by an increasing number of provincial 
Labor weeklies, and it had a union basis growing stronger and more united. 
A socialist organization, caUed the Social Democratic Vanguard, existed 
but it was in no sense a significant body nor did it compete with the 
existing political Labor organization. Any increase in political activity of 
unions or other radical groups consequently assisted the Labor party. The 
party's principal weakness lay in its political leadership and its lack of 
support in the metropolitan and farming areas. Bowman was a stolid 
leader, not briUiant, but honest in his opinions and trusted throughout the 
party and the Labor movement. But now, as the party moved towards 
achieving its goal of parliamentary power. Bowman, racked with sickness 
which kept him away from parliament for much of the time, was not able 
to provide the leadership needed. Lennon, elected deputy leader in 1909, 
found himself the acting leader, after having only two years in parliament, 
and without a deputy to lean on. Though a competent member, he had no 
close links with the union movement and lacked the skiU and intelligence 
needed by a Labor leader. Consequently there was considerable jockeying 
for the right of succession to Bowman among the front bench members, 
but when Ryan, with strong support outside parliament from the AWU 
and the AWA, topped the baUot for the PLP executive for the 1911 
session,'" it was clear that he had become the outstanding figure in the 
caucus. As the 1912 election approached, Theodore sought unsuccessfully 
to overcome the leadership weakness by having both Ryan and Lennon 
appointed as deputy leaders."^^ 
Advances made by the Labor party after 1909 had cleariy been through 
the efforts of its politicians. Those with strong union backgrounds had not 
dropped their union contacts or offices when elected to parliament but 
rather used their parliamentary passes to travel tiirough the state assisting 
in union organization. That union membership in Queensland doubled 
between 1910 and 1912 was the result of the work of unionist-politicians. 
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It was not a matter of politician versus unionist, but of both working for 
common goals. A loss at this time was sustained when Boote, for personal 
and famUy reasons, left for Sydney and the Australian Worker in April 
1911. Seymour became editor and, though not at home in the new AWA-
dominated ALF, pushed on with championing state enterprises and 
reflected the mood of the parliamentary party. 
As the parliamentary session drew to a close at the end of 1911, the 
Labor party was keen to face the Liberals in a general election. Denham 
had decided to hold the election in October 1912 though the government 
backbenchers sought an earlier date, closer to the beginning of 1912. They 
had good reasons for this. The Labor party had been far more penetrating 
during the recent session; in Ryan and Theodore it obviously had two of 
the most competent and incisive members of the Legislative Assembly,''^ 
whUe the Labor organization outside parliament was not only better than 
that of the Liberals but was continually being improved. Furthermore the 
recent electoral victory of the Western Australian Labor party meant that 
now a Labor government was in power in three states as weU as in the 
federal parliament. It was not an atmosphere or time in which it would 
have been expected that a government, anxious about its own political 
survival, would bring in a controversial liquor biU. Yet this is what Denham 
did in September, producing a confrontation with tlie Legislative CouncU 
and the threat by the premier to use the Pariiamentary BUls Referendum 
Act to force the CouncU to accept the bUl. The Labor party was deUghted, 
and electoral victory seemed within its grasp. But the breaking of a storm 
which had been brewing in the English-owned Brisbane Tramway 
Company was to defer Labor's coming to power for a further three years. 
The manager of the tramway company was an arrogant, union-hating 
American, J. S. ("Boss") Badger, who refused to aUow any union to be 
formed among his employees. He was confident of the open support given 
to him in this regard by the state government. However, under the federal 
Arbitration Act, registration of a federal union could be achieved if fifty 
workmen signed a request for this. In November 1910 an organizer of the 
Australian Tramway Employees' Association had come to Brisbane and 
secretly obtained the fifty signatures.'"* When this became known, the 
lines of battle between Badger and the union were drawn, with Badger 
threatening to dismiss any man who wore his union badge, which con-
tained the Australian coat of arms, on his uniform. Not only was this an 
insult to the men's right to form a union, but there was strong nationalist 
opposition to such a decree coming from a foreigner. On Friday, 19 
January 1912, at midday, a crowd gathered at the General Post Office to 
watch the union men pin on their badges. They were immediately 
dismissed and a strike was caUed.'^ 
Believing that a general attack on unionism was imminent, other unions 
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came to the support of the tramwaymen. The waterside workers were 
wUling to come out on the understanding that a general strike would be 
caUed. Other unions expressed simUar support. In the plumbers' union, for 
example, it was decided by thirty-five votes to fifteen that the union 
would join the strike, "if a general strike is declared". The Brisbane district 
councU of the ALF called a special meeting where it was agreed that a 
general strike would be called unless a satisfactory settlement was arranged 
between Badger and the union. Though there was some consensus among 
unionists regarding a general strike, the decision to hold one was com-
pletely ad hoc. There had been no planning and there was no clear idea of 
just what was to be achieved by such a strike. It empted from the fear that 
unionism was about to be attacked by employers and the government and 
from the enthusiasm for industrial action born out of the success of the 
sugar strike and the growing strength of Labor organizations throughout 
the state. 
Though it had some of the ingredients of the spontaneous rise of the 
workers that leftists Uke Ernie Lane had dreamed about, the general strike 
in reality was not to prove an effective weapon. As Labor propaganda at 
the 1911 federal referenda had pointed out, no one state government 
could effectively control monopolies in Australia; similariy no general 
strike in any one state could hope to bring about the social revolution. The 
people convinced by headlines in the Strike Bulletin of "Brisbane ToUers 
Class Conscious at Last" were those who desperately wanted to believe 
this. As often happens, conservatives and govemment supporters over-
reacted and chose to accept literaUy the strike leaders' propaganda that 
"today the toUers refuse to toU and aU commerce, aU industry is paralysed. 
Tomorrow, when the workers of the world unite, no Government can exist 
except by their mandate."''^ They forgot the pragmatic nature of the 
Australian political and industrial Labor movement and the strong 
conservative element within the working class. 
The strike revived Denham's political fortunes as he emerged and was 
praised as the custodian of law and order. A procession of strikers on 
Friday, 2 February, was brutually broken up by mounted and foot poUce, 
eagerly supported by special constables sworn in for the strike. "Black 
Friday" or, "Baton Friday" as it was sometimes caUed, became an 
infamous day long remembered in union history. However, to those 
residing outside the metropolitan area who had not witnessed the pro-
cession and who could rely ordy on inflammatory newspaper reports, it 
was seen as an attempt at revolution condoned by the Labor party and 
prevented from producing complete anarchy only by the government's 
firmness. 
AU was not lost to the Labor movement through the strike. For years 
there had been the dream of a Labor daUy newspaper. An attempt had 
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been made in 1907 to launch a Brisbane Labor daUy but only one issue 
had appeared. However, during the strike the daUy Strike Bulletin, issued 
each evening, had once more raised the hope and possibUity of a daily 
Labor paper. A Labour DaUy Newspaper Company was fonned with a 
capital of £15,000 ($30,000) in £1 ($2) shares which were held substan-
tiaUy by Brisbane unions. The first issue of the newspaper, the Daily 
Standard, was to appear in December 1912. J. V. MacDonald was 
appointed editor. Of more immediate consequence was the election itself, 
which the Liberals fought on a slogan of "constitutional government 
versus mob rule". To make clear Labor's constitutional position, Boote, in 
Sydney, was asked to draft the Labor manifesto. He used a mixture of 
attack and concUiation, but in his concluding paragraphs revealed clearly 
the non-doctrinaire basis of the party's ideology: "The Labour Party aims 
at no sudden revolution; no dramatic breaking down of existing institu-
tions, but at such a gradual transformation of the evU features of our social 
system as wUl bring to pass a better state of things, more worthy of human 
nature and human genius."" 
When the election results were pubUshed, Labor, for the first time, had 
won six metropoUtan seats and came very close to winning a further three. 
By contrast, in the rural areas which had not been exposed to the strike, 
and where Badger's reputation was unknown, it faUed to gain ground and 
won, in aU, only twenty-five of the seventy-two seats, with 46.7 per cent 
of the vote. It maintained its popularity in the traditional Labor areas, 
though MuUan lost Charters Towers; it won seats in the coastal sugar 
towns like Bundaberg and Cairns, but it stUl had not enticed the sugar 
farmers or other primary producers from the Liberals. 
The strike had further demonstrated Bowman's unsuitabUity as the 
political party's leader. During the strike his recurrent Ulness had forced 
him to take only a minor part in the nightly raUies, whereas Ryan, being 
younger and fitter and holding a safe Labor seat which did not demand his 
presence prior to the election, became the principal political speaker at 
important raUies and acted as the tramway union's legal adviser. He soon 
emerged as the dominant political figure in Brisbane, whUe his analysis of 
the origins and developments of the strUce was used as Labor election 
propaganda in two special numbers of the Strike Bulletin. 
When the new PLP assembled after the election. Bowman was re-elected 
leader and Ryan defeated Lennon for the deputy leadership. However 
soon after the parliament resumed. Bowman coUapsed and Ryan was 
elected leader, with Theodore becoming his deputy. One of the most 
formidable pairs of political leaders in Australian history now set about 
winning political power. At the election, several of the more prominent 
members had lost their seats, but fortunately new members of equal 
political talent had joined the PLP. The election had also increased the 
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number of Catholics in the caucus, and with the strength of freemasonry 
obvious among the Liberals, and with the bitroduction of compulsory 
Bible reading into state schools, members of the Catholic Church began to 
look more favourably on the Labor party.''^ Though Irish Catholics in 
Queensland were to be found largely among those from whom Labor 
hoped to receive support, the Labor party had never attempted to solicit 
support from Catholics, but had firnUy maintained that religion should be 
divorced from politics. For the Catholic Church, the one political question 
was aid for its schools and though there was no indication that the Labor 
party would deviate from its platform of education as free, compulsory, 
and secular, the presence of Catholics like Ryan, Theodore, McCormack, 
John FUieUy, and Lennon among its leaders caused the Catholic news-
papers and clergy to drift to a position of quietly supporting Labor in the 
hope of receiving some school aid if it won a govemment. 
How to gain a larger share of the farmers' votes remained a problem. 
There were three principal groups of farmers in the state: those along the 
coastal belt engaged in growing sugar, wheat growers on the Darling 
Dowms, and those whose living depended on mixed farming, dairying, and 
fruit growing. This last group spread from the south eastern corner, inland 
and along the coast to the Atherton Tableland. There was some support 
for Labor among aU the farmers, especially those who had been associated 
with the shearing or mining unions. Gaining additional support was to be 
the function of the two leaders, Ryan and Theodore. The former having 
been born of farming parents and the latter having witnessed farmers' 
problems whUe organizing for the AWA considered struggling farmers as 
mral workers and spoke openly of the natural alliance between farmers 
and workers, producers and consumers. It was neitiier compromising 
Labor principles nor simply vote chasing, but a broadening of the anti-
monopolist and anti-middleman aUiance. Additionally it was a practical 
realization that, if rural employees were to receive their just wages, then 
the producers had to be guaranteed a sufficient profit for their crops to 
enable them to make a good living and stUl pay fair wages. In November 
1912 Ryan caUed a special meeting of the caucus to consider the PLP 
recommendations for the Labor-in-Politics Convention in Febmary 1913. 
The PLP's concurrence in his plans to gain a greater share of the farmers' 
votes came with its decision to recommend a new section in the platform 
entitled "Encouragement to Agriculture", which was to include a state 
export department and cold stores, a state line of streamers, and state 
distribution of seed at cost price.''^ 
The thesis that the Labor movement has turned from industrial to 
political action after the faUure of major strikes is difficult to sustain at 
any time. To suggest that this occurred in Queensland after the 1912 
general strike is simply incorrect. Industrial action continued. The 
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increased importance placed on political action was a reflection of the 
improved competency and capability of the PLP under Ryan and Theo-
dore, together with the scent of victory which the election results and the 
suspected weakness of Denham provided. 
At the same time a dramatic change was taking place in the union 
movement. The faUure of the general strike had finaUy destroyed the ALF, 
which was absorbed into a newly created AWU. By-passing the pious 
resolutions about the federation of unions, Theodore had amalgamated the 
AWA with the old AWU and with a number of southern mral unions — 
carriers', rural workers', and rabbiters' — and in so doing imposed the 
tight, centralized AWA organization on the new union. It was a union 
which came closest to the Labor dream of an OBU. In the process, he 
acquired for the AWU the ALF's valuable commercial assets: the Worker 
newspaper, its printery and stationery business, and the new three-storied 
Worker BuUding in Elizabeth Street, which was another monument to 
HinchcUffe's competence as an administrator. 
With the acquisition of the Worker BuUding, the AWU removed its 
offices from the Trades HaU and so established two physical centres of 
power in the Labor movement, a move which was to have significant 
long-term effects in the industrial and political areas. The eclipse of the 
ALF left the Brisbane unions resident in the Trades HaU without any 
co-ordinating body. The AWU attempted to absorb several of them, 
notably the buUding and meat industry unions, into its owm organization, 
but already there were fears of the possible development of an unrespon-
sive bureaucracy in the AWU and the lack of much rank-and-fUe control 
through its highly centralized administration, which, when added to 
traditional unionists' demands for autonomy of their own body, provided 
some limitation to the AWU's growth. In place of the ALF organization, 
the Trades HaU unions in 1914 formed the Brisbane Industrial CouncU 
(BIC), a loose Unkage of unions in which some displayed greater outward 
mUitancy than the AWU, although they could never match the latter's 
coherent and united strength. 
When the Labor-in-Politics Convention assembled in February 1913, 
Ryan, president of the CPE as weU as being leader of the PLP, was elected 
chairman and set Out in his presidential address the two areas on which 
Labor would concentrate in the following two years. The high living costs 
to wage earners and the reduced returns to primary producers were due, he 
said, to the operations of tmsts and combines, middlemen, and monop-
olists. To overcome these, Labor in Queensland would support the federal 
party's referenda and, if these faUed, move for the establishment of 
competing government business enterprises when it gained power.^ ** The 
1913 convention reflected the change that had come over the Labor party 
in the previous twelve months. No longer was it concerned so much with 
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mles and constitutions; now it devoted the first four days to debates on 
policies in which the new section on "Encouragement to Agriculture" was 
included. It was not untU the last day that the constitution and rules came 
under debate. The passing of the ALF necessitated changes in the 
composition of the CPE; the two ALF and three AWU branch delegates 
were replaced by five delegates elected by the new AWU. That no dele-
gates were aUowed from other unions was a reflection of their lack of an 
organized central body, not of any attempt by the AWU to keep them out. 
The convention over, the CPE ordered 5,000 copies of the party's 
platform to be printed for distribution in farming centres, whUe in and out 
of the parliament Labor politicians proclaimed themselves as the true 
representatives of the farmers. The divisions within the Liberal party over 
the importance of legislation to assist farmers enabled Ryan, revealing 
himself as a skilful parliamentary tactician, to play a game of divide and 
conquer as the newly emergent country Liberal group was torn between 
supporting his proposals which the farmers desired and thus bringing down 
the government or supporting the government and bringing down on their 
heads the criticisms of the farmers themselves. Furthermore, when 
Denham expressed his support for the estabUshment of the American Meat 
Trust on the Brisbane river, the Labor party was able to link him with the 
higher prices for meat in the metropolitan area. The increasing lack of 
confidence and the lack of competence of the Liberals contrasted with the 
unage of the Labor party, whose political leaders scented electoral success. 
The 1913 federal election further boosted Labor hopes in Queensland 
where Fisher won seven of the ten Queensland House of Representatives 
seats and all the Senate seats with a 54 per cent vote and, though the 
constitutional referenda were narrowly defeated nationally, in Queensland 
there was an affirmative majority of 20,000. As the Liberals, restive under 
Denham, sought to placate angry farmers, the Labor party evolved its best 
campaign organization ever. In mid-1914 a special campaign committee 
was formed and a paid organizer appointed, whUe Theodore and FUieUy 
produced a series of twenty-seven different pamphlets on defence, farmers, 
raUways, food prices, and middlemen which were distributed according to 
the type of electorate. Three — The Defence of Australia, Farmers and 
Men on the Land, and Farmers and Agricultural Machinery — were the 
most widely sought in rural areas. With the CPE now instaUed also in the 
Worker BuUding, there developed that close co-operation between the 
AWU, the PLP, and the CPE that was to characterize Labor in politics in 
Queensland for the foUowing forty years. Nor did the outbreak of war in 
August 1914 deter the Labor party from its path, though there was a 
broad agreement between the parties on the aUied war aims and, strangely, 
on the need to regulate food prices and supplies. The federal election, 
foUowing the double dissolution, resulted in a record 55.6 per cent Labor 
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vote in Queensland for the House of Representatives, where seven of the 
ten seats were again won, and a 57.4 per cent Labor vote in the Senate, 
where aU six seats were won. 
A confident Ryan delivered his election policy speech at Barcaldine, in 
his owTi Barcoo electorate, in March 1915. He charged the Liberals with 
aUowing tmsts and honourable understandings to raise prices in Queens-
land at a far greater rate than in other states. The Commonwealth statisti-
cian's figures for the last half of 1914 at least supported his argument on 
price increases if not on the cause of these. After dealing with government 
deficiencies in a number of fields from public servants to raUways and 
industrial matters, he outlined Labor policy in each field and promised an 
extension of govemment business enterprises to protect the producer and 
consumer agamst middlemen and monopolies.^' 
Labor won forty-five of the seventy-two seats with 52 per cent of the 
votes. For the first time it won a majority of metropolitan seats; it 
regained aU but one of the Kidston Labor seats and six of the former 
Labor seats lost in 1912. Seven seats associated with the sugar industry 
were won, but the wheat and daurying areas remained non-Labor. 
It was with some pride that HinchcUffe, appointed to the Legislative 
CouncU by Kidston in 1904, moved the address in reply in the upper 
house foUowing the 1915 election. The victory had vindicated his earlier 
opposition to coalitions or lib-lab aUiances and his faith m Labor's 
ultimate success. It was now a question of whether Labor in office could 
"give Queensland workers more justice tlian can be wrung from capitaUstic 
parliaments in a generation", as the ALF platform of August 1890 had 
boldly predicted. There was a general optimism about what Labor would 
achieve. For some it was the beginning of the co-operative commonwealth 
or the socialist society, for others, a better-all-round standard of living. 
Few, apart from Ryan, Theodore, Hunter, and the other pariiamentary 
leaders appreciated that Labor was in office, not in power, whUe the 
Legislative CouncU unaffected by the election, continued to exist and 
while it contained only four Labor supporters among its thirty-nine 
members. There were some in the PLP who argued that the government 
should ignore the upper house,*-^ and even for those of a more realistic 
approach there was such distaste for acknowledging the constitutional 
power of the CouncU that Ryan was forced to hold two lengthy caucus 
meetings before he could satisfactorily convince his coUeagues that a 
minister had to be appointed to the CouncU to supervise government 
business there. 
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The caucus elected eight mmisters, Ryan, Theodore, Bowman, Lennon, 
Hunter, Adamson, Hardacre, and HamUton, with the last of these being 
made minister for mines and appointed to the CouncU, a change in role for 
the shearer who had spent three years in jail for his part in the 1891 
shearers' strike. It was left to Ryan to allot the portfoUos. He took those 
of premier, chief secretary, and attomey general; Theodore was given 
treasury and public works; Bowman became home secretary; Lennon took 
agriculture; Hunter, lands; and Adamson, raUways. This left Hardacre with 
public instmction. Given Ryan's early interest in education, this was un-
fortunate, as an inteUigent and progressive minister for education could 
have done as much to lay the foundations of the new society as a treasurer 
or lands minister. However, the caucus had elected Hardacre, and 
education came after industrial legislation, land, primary production, and 
raUways in Labor's priorities. The Catholic press had hoped that FiheUy 
would have been aUotted education. However, his obvious abUity was not 
to be wasted. Two additional honorary ministers, FUielly and John 
Huxham, were elected to assist Ryan in the justice department and to 
administer the home secretary's department for the aUmg Bowman. On 
Ryan's casting vote, McCormack, who with Theodore and FiheUy had 
formed a powerful triumvirate in the caucus, had to be content with the 
Speaker's chau, where he was to be confined during Ryan's premiership.^^ 
Soon after the new government had been sworn in, the hope was 
expressed by chambers of commerce, non-Labor newspapers, and the 
Liberal opposition, that there would be no "contentious legislation" mtro-
duced and that there would be a tmce effected between Labor and capital 
during the war. There was little evidence to convince the government that 
such a truce was seriously sought, as food prices rose alarmingly and a 
perusal of the fUes on sugar and meat showed Ryan that the CSR and the 
meat companies were out to exploit the disruption caused by the war and 
to reap even greater profits.*^ Consequently Ryan and his closest 
coUeague, Hunter, took direct control of f^ ood prices, leaving Theodore to 
prepare his Labor legislation and Fihelly to seek the advice of the Western 
Australian and New South Wales Labor govemments on establishing state 
enterprises. The legislative and administrative actions of the government in 
the first half of its term confirmed that it was determined, despite the 
CouncU, to be more than "ordinary liberal". Through the Sugar 
Acquisition Act, under which the Queensland government stUl acquires the 
total sugar crop each year, and the Regulation of Sugar Cane Prices Act, 
the sugar industry was stabUized and growers guaranteed a fair price which 
would enable them to pay reasonable wages. A new Election Act provided 
for one month's residence in an electorate to be sufficient to establish 
residency and the right to claim a vote; it also laid down that aU elections 
should be held on one day, Saturday, and that women were to be eligible 
187 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
D. J. MURPHY 
for election to the Assembly. A series of acts dealing with labour provided 
for government labour exchanges, the removal of restrictions on trade 
unions, government inspection of machinery and scaffolding, new regula-
tions governing sanitary conditions, ventUation, eating accommodation, 
and meal breaks in factories and shops, and the two long-sought pieces of 
legislation on arbitration and workers' compensation. 
Among the dreams of those who had sought direct representation of 
Labor in parliament had been the provision of some means of settUng and 
avoiding strikes which affected workers far worse than their employers. In 
the ideal and to those who had imbibed something of syndicalist writings, 
the solution lay in strong unions dealing directly with employers; in the 
loftiest dreams it meant the workers taking immediate control of the 
means of production themselves. However two factors stood out: unions 
were not as strong as governments or employers, and major confrontation 
between unionists and employers had usually caused great personal suffer-
ing to the former. What the Labor movement and sympathetic liberals had 
therefore sought was a scheme of neutral arbitrators and conciliators who 
would judge the rightness of each side's case and have the fuU backing of 
government in enforcing their decisions. By this means the strike weapon 
could be reserved by the unions as an ultimate tool in negotiations, but it 
was hoped that a fair and impartial concUiator and arbitrator, able to 
obtain aU the facts, would obviate the need for any use of the strike. 
Drawing heavUy on his own reading and experience and on the ideas of the 
crown solicitor, T. W. McCawley, a friend and admirer of Henry Higgins, 
Theodore introduced his Industrial Arbitration BUl, which, though 
amended by the Council, remained a tribute to his knowledge of industrial 
legislation in Australia and overseas and to his patience and skUl in steering 
through the parliament what was clearly unpalatable legislation to those 
who had ruled Queensland since separation. ^ ^ The act established a Court 
of Industrial Arbitration with the power and jurisdiction of a Supreme 
Court and with a president who was to be a judge of the Supreme Court 
by virtue of his office. McCawley was appointed as the first president and 
a judge of the Supreme Court. It was not, however, untU the Privy CouncU 
ruled in favour of the government in the McCawley Case of 1920 that the 
legality of this was made certain. 
The court was not concerned simply with settling disputes but could 
also investigate costs and standards of living, rule on wages, hours, and 
conditions of work, and act as a concUiator. Its decisions on any industrial 
question were final. Employers were not permitted to dismiss a worker 
because of his membership of a union and though the CouncU expressly 
removed any specific reference to preference to unionists from the act, the 
two members of the Court, McCawley and A. W. MacNaughton, accepted 
that they could grant preference to unionists in any industry if they 
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thought this proper. Tacit preference to unionists in Queensland existed 
after 1917. The second important piece of legislation, the Workers' Com-
pensation BUl, under which a schedule of payments for injuries was laid 
down and, workmen protected on their way to and from work, not only 
made workers' compensation insurance by employers compulsory for all 
employees, but made it a state monopoly, creating the State Government 
Insurance Office which was to become the most successful of the state 
enterprises. The Workers' Compensation BUl, with its coroUary of reducing 
the profits of private insurance companies, was soundly defeated in its first 
appearance before the CouncU and was allowed through at the second 
attempt only through the bungling of excessively zealous insurance 
directors in that chamber.*^ 
In other areas selectors were relieved of the burden of guaranteeing the 
financial success of raUways buUt in their areas, pubUc servants were 
aUowed to plead their case before the Arbitration Court, and a Public 
Curator was established. None of the legislation was passed easUy and 
several significant bUls (to give the government power to take over and 
operate meatworks; to provide for adult suffrage in local government 
elections; to open up land on the perpetual lease system and limit the 
amount of land any one person could hold in a district; to pass certam 
powers over to the Commonwealth for the duration of the war in lieu of 
holding the 1915 prices referendum; and to pass the Industrial Arbitration 
BUl at the first attempt) were either declared "lost" or not returned from 
the CouncU. Within the caucus, the restriction imposed by the CouncU 
were a constant source of frustration and its future was earnestly debated. 
There was a division between those who wanted the CouncU abolished 
through swamping, i.e. appointing a majority of Labor members, and those 
who wanted to use the power contained in Kidston's Parliamentary BUls 
Referendum Act to have the CouncU abolished by a vote of the people. 
The governor. Sir HamUton Goold Adams, was unwilling to make the 
necessary appointments to the CouncU to allow the former course to 
proceed, but, in any case, as there was a majority in the caucus in favour 
of the second method, in November 1915a bUl to amend the constitution 
by abolishing the Legislative CouncU was introduced into the Assembly. 
Part of the success of the first Ryan govemment was due to four 
remarkable public servants inherited from the previous Liberal govern-
ment, who found in Ryan, Hunter, and Theodore capable men who 
appreciated their abUities. As under-secretary, Ryan inherited Peter 
McDermott, a scholar, literary friend of Boote, and president of the 
Queensland Irish Association; in the justice department he acquired the 
most brUliant of the four, the crown solicitor Thomas McCawley, whose 
preparation of Ryan's constitutional briefs in the foUowing three years 
enabled Ryan to become one of the nation's leading constitutional 
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barristers and whose study of labor legislation markedly assisted m the 
preparation of the Industrial Arbitration BUl and the Workers' Compensa-
tion BiU. The marketuig and sale of meat was to be the most contentious 
item during the war, and here the Labor govemment inherited the services 
of a former meat export company manager, Charles Ross, who combined 
his duties of imperial meat officer with assisting Hunter to estabUsh a very 
successful chain of state butcher shops. In London, the agent general, Sir 
Thomas Robmson, who had created the AUSN Company from the ASN 
and Queensland Steamship Companies, became Ryan's indefatigable aUy in 
the struggles to prevent the pastoralists, meat companies, and later the 
Nationalists from raising the price of Queensland meat to the aUied troops. 
In its first six months, the govemment began a programme of state 
business activity which went beyond the "colonial socialism" of the Aus-
tralian governments of the nineteenth century. The governor's speech at 
the opening of parliament made this intention quite clear: "The want of 
effective machinery to protect the community from persons who continue 
unduly to inflate prices and amass large profits out of necessary com-
modities, makes it incumbent on my advisors to seek your authority for 
measures to regulate trade and cope with trusts and combines and for a 
further extension of public ownership and the establishment of Statee 
enterprises."^' In August 1915, the Worker, now an internal propaganda 
journal rather than the prophetic and evangelistic mouthpiece of Lane, 
Higgs, and Boote, began a series of eight fuU-page weekly articles on state 
enterprises covering the method of estabUshing these, the financing of 
them, and the pitfalls to be avoided. The concluding paragraphs of the last 
article reflected something of the motives of those who most loudly 
advocated state business undertakings: "State ownership is the first move 
towards Socialism . . . Private enterprise or capitalism stands for profit 
before everything; State enterprise stands for the greatest possible service 
to the people at the lowest possible price."*^ After the first flush of 
victory had passed, state enterprises came to have a more functional role 
than that of puUing down capitalism. Theodore outlined plans in his 
budget speech in October for state sawmills and coalmines to lower the 
cost of workers' dweUings and the running of the raUways, for the pro-
vision of batteries to provide an alternative avenue for cmshing for the 
miners in north Queensland, and for the setting up of a fishery to break 
the monopoly m Brisbane, give the fishermen a fair price, and provide 
cheaper fish for Brisbane and eventually for the state. Possibly the best 
known of aU the undertakings, the butcher shops, were established not 
only to provide cheap meat but also to allow the government to ascertain 
the exact costs of buying and selling meat. Tliey were estabUshed, along 
with the state stations, to meet an urgent problem in the meat industry, 
not simply for ideological reasons. 
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However quite early in the govemment's term, the major problem of 
financing these enterprises loomed, as borrowing for war purposes took 
precedence over development. Nevertheless, the cabinet was determined to 
make a start. Cognisant of the difficulties faced by the Western Australian 
Labor government in introducing state enterprises to which the non-Labor 
Legislative CouncU was irrevocably opposed, the Queensland government 
attempted to provide the legal machinery for these by including clauses in 
both the Sugar Acquisition BUl and the Meatworks BiU giving the govern-
ment power, by proclamation, to acquire any goods and operate any 
business. The rejection of the Meatworks BiU by the CouncU necessitated 
the use of backdoor administrative actions to establish aU but the fishery 
and the insurance office. Although the one state hotel buUt, at Babinda in 
the north Queensland sugar area, proved a financial success, it was hardly 
the beginning of the nationalization, with a view to prohibition of the 
liquor trade, whUe the state stations, also a financial success during the 
war, did not supply one pound of meat to the state butchery but sold their 
meat to the British government. Only the butcher shops and the insurance 
office fulfUled, from the start, the hopes of their founders. In each case, 
competent business officials were placed in charge of the enterprise from 
the beginning and, though competing with lower meat prices and 
premiums, insured that correct business practices were followed. 
By the beginning of 1916, visible links with the Labor party of the 
nineties were passing. Frank McDonneU, one of the early heroes and now a 
member of the CouncU, had let his party membership drop as his drapery 
business, McDonnell and East, expanded, though he continued to vote 
with the Labor members in the upper house. Seymour in 1915 had 
resigned from the editorship of the Worker and been replaced by John 
HaiUon, a journalist from the Perth Daily News. In Febmary Dave 
Bowman died, whUe Hinchcliffe, no longer the key figure in the Queens-
land Labor movement, prepared to resign from his position as manager of 
the Worker and in June 1917 transferred to Sydney and the company of 
his friend Boote on the Australian Worker. 
There were more significant changes produced at the Labor-in-Politics 
Convention in February 1916, when the composition of the convention 
and the CPE were changed and when the Labor party became more closely 
tied to the fortunes and capabUities of the union leaders than it had even 
been in the previous twenty-six years. As more unions had become affUiat-
ed with the party, their leaders had sought greater direct participation in 
the administration of the party through the CPE and in policy making 
through the convention. Leading this demand was McCormack, who, since 
his election to the CPE in 1913, had argued that, because of the much 
greater amounts paid to the party by the unions than by the WPOs, the 
unions were entitled to a greater role in the party machinery. A com-
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mittee, headed by McCormack, was appointed at the convention to outline 
a series of recommendations for union representation; these, with minor 
amendments, were adopted. Delegates to future conventions were to be 
elected from affiliated unions according to their membership and from 
each state electorate. The composition of the CPE was a compromise 
between the old and the new. As before, eleven members were to be 
elected by the convention with one each instead of two from the state and 
federal PLPs, but with the real power in future CPEs being given to the 
unions, who were allowed one delegate for 2,000 members, increasing 
according to the total affiliated membership. Apart from that of W. H. 
(BiUy) Demaine, proprietor of the Maryborough Alert, president of the 
Labor party from 1916 to 1938 and secretary of the ALF in Wide Bay in 
the 1890 strike, there was Uttle opposition to the changes. Demaine, 
arguing that representation should be on the basis of electoral effort, not 
financial contributions, contended that some sections of the industrial 
movement were not contributing to fighting elections as they should, given 
that they were going to be aUowed to nominate and select candidates, 
make poUcy, and administer the party.^^ An attempt to prevent members 
of the PLP from being elected to the. CPE was again defeated. The leading 
unionists recognized that their best method of achieving their goals lay in 
representing the movement in parliament whUe maintaining close Unks 
between the unions, the PLP, and the CPE. 
Though the convention changed Uttle in the platform, it passed a 
definite motion against conscription. In addition both the AWU and the 
BIC were adamant that conscription for overseas service was agamst Labor 
principles and against the interests of the working class. Hughes, shortly 
after he had been elected prime minister, received a taste of the BIC's 
opposition when his offer of 50,000 additional troops to the British 
brought a threat of refusal of support for the Labor candidate in Fisher's 
old seat of Wide Bay. To the BIC the new recruiting scheme "looked like 
conscription, smelt like conscription and was conscription in a most 
insidious form" and they would have none of it.^*' 
Ryan went to England in March to confer with the British government 
on meat for the troops and to appear for the state before the Privy 
CouncU. During his absence, the debate on conscription deepened, with 
the unions and the Labor party forming an anti-conscription committee 
which included Theodore, as chairman, FUielly, and Lewis McDonald as 
secretary. Though there were some members of the PLP who favoured 
conscription, only Adamson openly declared himself a conscriptionist and 
jomed the Universal Service League. The British reprisals in Ireland 
foUowmg the Easter rising forced Irish Catholics closer to the Labor party, 
though ultra-Protestant criticism of the Irish and the Catholics and the 
Unking of the two with anti-conscription caused Archbishop Duhig, a con-
192 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
QUEENSLAND 
scriptionist, to adopt a neutral role in the debate that foUowed. Conscrip-
tion in Queensland must be seen as strengthening the bitter political 
division that had buUt up through the Labor party's insistence on pushing 
through its radical programme. During Ryan's absence in England, the 
CSR, pastoralists, and insurance companies challenged significant pieces of 
Labor legislation in the courts, whUe a very favourable award to sugar 
workers by acting-Judge Dickson in the Arbitration Court, when added to 
the attempts to regulate profits on meat, sugar, and wheat, represented a 
direct and constitutional attack on the economic power of those who 
considered themselves the rightful rulers of the state. In the face of this 
"socialistic" legislation and the possibUity of not having a favourable 
Legislative CouncU to protect their interests, pastoraUsts, sugar mUl 
owners, and their commercial aUies saw havoc and social ruin facing them, 
so that, when the conscription debate erupted at the end of 1916, well-
defined lines of battle were already drawn. 
During Ryan's absence, he was defeated in the baUot for the presidency 
of the CPE by Demaine. On the surface it seemed that the industrialists 
had ousted the politicians from control of the CPE, but as with many such 
simplifications of Labor ballots the reality was otherwise. Demaine had 
defeated Ryan by seven votes to six, with five of the seven absentees being 
Ryan supporters.^' The significance of the defeat was the beginning of a 
new tradition that an industrialist, not the leader of the PLP, should be the 
president of the party. There is no evidence that the PLP took the result as 
a rebuff or that Ryan was unduly concerned about the defeat. The reality 
of Queensland Labor in 1916 was that the CPE, BIC, AWU, WPOs, and the 
PLP saw themselves as belonging to the one movement, whose goals were 
clear and whose representatives in parliament were making a determined 
bid to oust the controUers of economic and political power. 
It was this broad unanimity of purpose, fortified by a healthy 
remembrance of the losses of the Kidston spUt, that was one of the factors 
preventing any split in Queensland over conscription. The other factor was 
Ryan himself Though having a background and education quite different 
from most other Labor leaders, Ryan understood the nuances of the Labor 
party as few other leaders had. He had witnessed the destmction of 
Kidston as a poUtical reformer after his break with the Labor party; he was 
conscious of the role union officials saw themselves playing in the adminis-
tration of the movement and accepted that there were times for a poUtical 
Labor leader to take the mitiative and other times for him to foUow what 
the movement demanded. Moreover, he had early determined not to enter 
into any poUtical fight without first having judicially weighed the strength 
of his own and his opponent's case. He had also resolved to avoid any such 
fight where he felt he could not win or at least come out with a reasonable 
compromise. In England, he had seen the same evidence as convinced 
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Hughes that conscription was necessary, but, when he arrived back in 
Australia in August 1916, the Labor movement and the Labor party in 
Queensland were both decisively anti-conscription. In such a situation, 
Ryan's role was to hold the party together and convince those members of 
the PLP who favoured conscription that a unified party continuing to 
support the aUied war aims was the best solution and would stUl aUow 
Labor's social and economic goals to be achieved. He was thus able to 
carry conscriptionists like Hardacre and George Barber, secretary of the 
PLP, and also Hunter and J. Harry Coyne, shortly to be minister for 
raUways, who were uncertain of the stand to take; he did this by his 
immense prestige, his obvious abUity, and his unequivocal support for 
Australia's participation in the war. Only Adamson, concemed not only 
about conscription but about what he thought was the growing strength of 
Catholicism in the Labor party,^^ finally left the party to find some solace 
in the company of Mat Reid and Peter Airey among tlie conscriptionists. 
The spectacular transformation of Australian govemments from seven 
Labor in 1915 to one at the end of 1916 gave conservatives in Queensland 
hope and confidence that they also would soon be rid of this infringement 
of their economic and poUtical rights. Tliey took heart at the stand of the 
CouncU in rejecting bUls to abolish the death penalty, to provide adult 
franchise in local government elections, to begin the first steps towards a 
system of free, government-conducted hospitals, and to introduce the 
initiative and referendum into the constitutional procedures. Fortified by 
this feeling of righteousness, the CouncU, for a second time, and despite 
the non-Labor chairman's ruUng against any interference with a money 
bUl, rejected parts of Tlieodore's Income Tax BiU which was declared 
"lost".*^^ The riglits of the men of property were being preserved. On the 
other hand, the rejection of conscription in Queensland by 158,051 votes 
to 144,200 and the inabUity of the non-Labor press to split the party on 
conscription, convinced the Labor party that it stUl had the support of the 
electorate. The federal election in May 1917 destroyed some of that con-
fidence. 
Concurrent with the federal election, the Labor government held its 
referendum to abolish the Legislative CouncU. This was to prove a bad 
tactical error. The physical and financial campaign resources of the party 
had to be divided in the fight against its two principal enemies, Hughes's 
new Nationalist party and the CouncU. The CPE opposed the cabinet and 
PLP decision to hold the referendum on the same day as the election, and, 
when the cabinet refused to reconsider its decision, the CPE declined to 
co-operate with the PLP in the abolition campaign.^ "* It had wanted Ryan 
to concentrate his abUity on the immediate question of defeating Hughes, 
and was finaUy persuaded to co-operate in the abolition campaign only 
after argument by Ryan lumself at a special CPE meeting. 
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Nothing seemed to go right in the abolition campaign. Ryan was 
involved for much of the time with the problems of the sugar industry and 
in March 1917 began one of the most important constitutional cases in his 
legal career, the Mooraberrie Case, which threatened to upset tlie legisla-
tion under which the Queensland government provided cheap meat for the 
allied troops, for Queensland residents, and for those of any other state 
which was prepared to guarantee that the meat would be sold at fixed 
retaU prices. The case eventuaUy was to be resolved at the Privy CouncU in 
Ryan's favour. In another constitutional area, a chaUenge to the validity of 
the referendum was issued by three members of the CouncU in the 
Supreme Court when they sought an injunction restraining the government 
from taking the poU. Having to concem himself witli this second case 
effectively prevented Ryan from campaigning widely for either the federal 
election or the abolition of the CouncU, though he managed to squeeze in 
a weekend at Rockhampton for the Labor candidate Francis Forde, who 
was standing in the by-election for Adamson's seat on the Saturday after 
the federal election. Adamson had nominated as an independent National-
ist for the Senate. 
When the Full Court ruled on 28 AprU, a week before the polling day, 
that the referendum should not be held,^^ Ryan contested this in the Higli 
Court, convened in Sydney speciaUy to hear the case, and on the Friday 
before the elections was given leave to proceed with tlie referendum with 
the points of law to be decided later.'' From Brisbane, Tlieodore desper-
ately endeavoured to insert advertisements in all newspapers informing 
electors that the referendum would definitely be conducted. Many areas of 
the state received their news in only weekly papers and he was not com-
pletely successful. But the foUy of holding the abolition referendum on 
the same day as the federal election and the uncertainty in the electors' 
minds about the constitutional validity of the poll was exacerbated by the 
wording on the ballot paper: 
I vote for "A BUl to amend the Constitution of Queensland by 
abolishing the Legislative CouncU". 
I vote against "A BUl to amend the Constitution of Queens-
land by abolishing the Legislative CouncU". 
To the voter on polling day, confronted with three or, if he Uved in 
southeastern Queensland, four ballot papers, it appeared, at first siglit that 
to vote for the CouncU's abolition, he should place a cross in the bottom 
square. Such a vote, of course, was for the retention of tiie CouncU. On 
the same day, local option polls under the Liquor Act were held in areas 
within a hundred miles of Brisbane. For this ballot, many large and weU-
constructed advertisements were inserted in all newspapers urging a cross 
to be placed in the bottom square against any reduction in liquor licenses. 
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The local option ballot paper read: 
I vote for the reduction of existing licenses by twenty-five per 
cent. 
I vote against any reductions. 
As many booth workers later reported to the CPE, it seemed that a 
number of voters placed a cross in the bottom square in each case 
assuming they were voting against the CouncU and against any reduction in 
drinking facUities. 
The election and the referendum results were both disappointing. All 
three Senate seats were won by the Nationalists, who had included Mat 
Reid on their ticket, and only four of the ten House of Representatives 
seats returned Labor members. Queensland's Labor vote feU to 47.0 per 
cent, though it was stiU the highest Labor vote in the Commonwealth. In 
the CouncU referendum, 179,105 voted for the retention of the CouncU 
and 116,196 against. Only thirteen of the seventy-two state electorates 
had majorities in favour of abolishing the CouncU and these were principal-
ly the long-held Labor seats in the north and west. It would be difficult to 
compare the results of the Uquor and CouncU polls held, though there is 
possibly some significance in there being 43,640 votes against reducing the 
number of hotel licences and only 23,999 for. It was comforting for Labor 
supporters to blame the courts, the wording of the ballot paper, and the 
concurrent federal election, but the size of the majority was possibly an 
indication that there was a large degree of support for maintaining a 
second chamber. 
Sectarian bitterness had been a feature of both the federal elecrion and 
referendum campaigns. As the Labor party had come under attack from a 
number of Protestant clergymen, it was not surprising that the Daily 
Standard and other Labor newspapers reported more favourably the 
speeches of Catholic priests and thus lent weight to the ultra-Protestant 
and freemason contention that Catholics had undue influence in the Labor 
party. FoUowing the results of 5 May, the Queensland Protestant League 
held a thanksgiving service at the Exhibition Ground, for the Nationalists. 
The president of the League, T. M. HaU, a member of the Legislative 
CouncU, was foUowed in his address by the oldest member of that 
chamber, F. T. ("holy Freddie") Brentnall,a former Protestant clergyman 
and now proprietor of the Telegraph, who said: "For many years I have 
worked on behalf of the Protestantism which I verily believe is the cause 
of God . . . We have assembled to celebrate a victory and to give thanks for 
that triumph. I and others have been working to organise the vast amount 
of Protestant sentunent that we are sure existed in the community."^' 
And so Catholicism came to be closely associated with the Labor party in 
Queensland. 
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The federal election and the CouncU referendum, combined with the 
defeat of the New South Wales Labor party, confirmed the isolation of 
Queensland Labor and began a defensive period when Labor became more 
conscious of states' rights. However, the results gave the whole Labor 
movement in Queensland a healthy jolt. The two years of Labor govern-
ment, with its substantial gains in industrial, rural, and electoral legislation, 
had made some sections of the movement complacent about the party's 
support among the people; others were stUl more concerned with keeping 
the party "straight" and pure with advocating total industrial control to 
prevent a Hughes or Holman emerging in Queensland; whUe a smaller 
group regarded themselves as the only true socialists and turned their 
backs on the Labor party, whose members they classed merely as re-
formers, not destroyers of capitalism. The Industrial Workers of the Worid 
(IWW) represented more clearly their concept of a political Labor organi-
zation. 
It was apparent that, if Labor was to be returned in 191 8, the political 
movement had to be rejuvenated, unity of purpose re-emphasized, and 
those flirting with the IWW rejected. In June 1917, Labor (along with the 
Nationalists) began preparing for the 1918 state elections where the future 
of Labor in politics in Australia seemed to be at stake. John MuUan, 
recently defeated at the Senate election, was appointed as an organizer; a 
136-page booklet. Socialism at Work, was produced which set out the 
achievements of the state enterprises and was sent to all major organiza-
tions in the state; whUe Ryan set out on a tour of the western and coastal 
sugar electorates. From the Nationalists, accusations of IWW influence in 
the Labor party mounted; a personal attack was launched against Ryan, 
alleging that he was drawing huge fees for his court appearances as 
attorney general; the state enterprises came under close scrutiny and also 
under heavy fire for interfering with the rights of private enterprise, whUe 
insinuations of favouritism to Catholics in the public service appeared 
frequently in the press. WhUe keeping the dogs of capUalism at bay, Ryan 
and Theodore had also to work constantly to maintain the unity of the 
Labor movement, which was basic to the party's continuing successfuUy 
on its radical path. Despite the haranguing of people like Lane in the Daily 
Standard, the initiative in the party remamed with a handful of radical 
politicians who seemed to have a clearer view than many of the union 
leaders as to what political Labor hoped to achieve. 
As the government defended its position, north Queensland raUwaymen 
began what threatened to be a long and costly strike over retrospective 
pay. In an atmosphere where revolution, socialism, and worker control 
were widely discussed among radical sections of the Labor movement and 
where the Queensland RaUways Union (QRU) was possibly the most 
mUitant union in north Queensland — an area noted for its mUitancy — the 
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situation caUed for tact and strength, but also for a wUlingness by the 
government to compromise. WhUe the govemment sparred for tune, the 
strike of railwaymen, seamen, and waterside workers in the southern states 
overshadowed that in north Queensland and gave the government's un-
wiUmgness to use the maUed fist agamst its own striking employees a 
distinctive air of reasonableness. It further gave the government a respite 
to consolidate other unions behind its promise to refer the dispute to 
mdependent arbitration. Higgins of the Commonwealth Arbitration Court 
had tentatively agreed to act as arbiter and would have performed the 
service, but was refused permission by Hughes, whose disagreements with 
Ryan over sugar, meat, and the strikes were reaching their limit. Neverthe-
less the raUway unionists returned to work, accepting that then: case would 
be examined by an independent arbiter, at the same time contrasting the 
attitude of the Ryan government in Queensland with that of Fuller the 
Nationalist acting-premier in New South Wales and Hughes in the eastern 
states. But whUe they accepted that the strike had been handled with 
more reasonableness by the Labor government than by any previous 
government, they were annoyed by the lack of sympathy displayed by 
FUieUy and McCormack. 
This was not the end of industrial strife in Queensland. RaUwaymen in 
the southern division refused to handle goods loaded in the south by 
"voluntary" labour, whUe in north Queensland the ports became clogged 
through the stoppage of coastal shipping; the maritime unions refused to 
handle any goods loaded or shipped from the south by national service or 
"voluntary" labour, and the sliipping companies refused to aUow goods in 
the north to be handled by union labour. In attempting to settle the 
disputes and return commerce m the north to normal, Ryan gave effect to 
lus long-held scheme for a state shipping line, manned by union labour, by 
using the powers of the Sugar Acquisition Act to acquire ships lying idle in 
Queensland ports. The union movement applauded this obvious deter-
mination of a Labor government to press home an attack on the shipping 
combine and the Nationalists; but to the national press, to Hughes, and to 
the shipping companies it demonstrated once more the confiscatory nature 
of Labor legislation and its socialist intent to usurp the holy role of private 
enterprise. The wily Hughes retaliated with a proclamation prohibiting the 
acquisition of any vessels trading interstate, wluch effectively curtailed 
Ryan's action. 
This attempt to take over private ships, and a later bUl to empower the 
government to requisition and man ships in Queensland waters, brought 
the whole of the conservative edifice down upon the government. Its 
legislation to reduce the economic power of the pastoralists and meat 
companies, insurance companies, and the CSR, when added to its deter-
mination to abolish the Legislative CouncU and its refusal to endorse the 
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Nationalists' proposals for "national service" labour to break the strikes in 
eastern Australia, made it the target for southern as weU as local repre-
sentatives of capitalism. The Argus and the Sydney Morning Herald, no 
less than the Brisbane Courier, fukninated agamst it in constant editorials. 
The government remained unrepentant despite a well publicized inquiry 
by a Legislative CouncU committee into the state enterprises. Seventeen 
additional butcher shops were being established between September 1917 
and March 1918, thirteen stations had been bought, exploratory drilling 
continued for future state coal mines, and a hotel was buUt; aU this had 
been done by administrative action without express legislative authority. 
FoUowing the defeat of the CouncU referendum, Ryan persuaded the 
governor to appoint thirteen new Labor members to the upper house so 
that the government would at least be able to form a quorum at aU tunes 
and have some strength in debate. Nominees were to be financial members 
of the party and had to fulfil all the conditions required for normal 
plebiscite selection, with the addition to the noi:mal pledge of a clause 
promising to support the abolition of the CouncU. Ryan was flooded with 
willing applicants. Endorsements were to be first by the PLP and then by 
the CPE. In fact the PLP was ahead of the CPE, which met to discuss the 
nominations after the thirteen new members had been selected by the PLP 
and approved by the governor. There was little doubt where the initiative 
lay in the party. Those selected were weU-proven Labor men with a range 
of backgrounds — union organizer, newspaper proprietor, farmer, and 
others. Demaine, Richard Sumner, a merchant and vice-president of the 
CPE, and McDonald were among the thirteen. 
In October, Ryan introduced his most ambitious piece of legislation, a 
bUl to establish a state iron and steel works. Next to his State Insurance 
Office, this was the project he hoped most to see brought to fruition. The 
public works commission established by the government in 1915 had been 
appointed as a Royal Commission in June 1917 to investigate the 
feasibUity of an iron and steel works. Its progress report in August 
indicated that the raw materials were present in Queensland and that 
commercial pig iron could be produced in Queensland at a profit to the 
state.^* The investigation could hardly be considered adequate in modern 
terms, though it examined thoroughly the expert witnesses who appeared 
before it. Having received their verbal report, Ryan introduced his enabling 
bUl in which he described the industry as the most important that could be 
established in a country which, because of the experiences of the war, 
needed to become self sufficient.^^ There was a measure of support from 
opposition members, but in the CouncU a ceUing of £100,000 ($200,000) 
was placed on the project. This breach of the Assembly's power over 
finance provided the excuse for Ryan's declaring the bUl "lost". In truth, 
it must be admitted that many members of the PLP were becoming less 
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than enthusiastic about government enterprises, preferring to see Labor's 
role in government in more conservative terms, whUe Theodore was having 
such a problem with finances - being forced against canons of Labor 
economic phUosophy to suspend the loan sinking fund — that he was in no 
position to provide funds for a long-term project. It nevertheless remained 
a dream of Ryan and was left in the Labor platform for another leader to 
take it up in more prosperous times. 
As the Labor and Nationalist members prepared for the coming 
election, the second conscription referendum was unexpectedly 
announced. Ryan, in Melbourne, immediately took it on himself to play a 
leading role in the anti-conscription campaign. Indeed it was to be about 
Ryan that the most remarkable events of the referendum were to revolve. 
There was no equivocation on this occasion about where Labor parlia-
mentarians stood. Hardacre made it clear that the discrepancies in 
Hughes's demands for troops had robbed the conscriptionists' case of its 
credibUity. However, the Labor movement in Queensland was Ul-equipped 
financiaUy to fight a second referendum after the industrial troubles which 
had put a large number of Queensland workmen out of work and had 
drawn heavy donations from those remaining at work. Of more moment 
was the possibUity that the Daily Standard might have to cease publication 
because of rising paper costs and the boycotting by advertisers who 
objected to its politics. The unions supplied additional levies; staff 
members donated their wages back to the company, whUe individual 
supporters made substantial donations. The paper was saved temporarUy, 
yet the directors were aware that the principal anti-conscription organ in 
southeastern Queensland could stUl be forced to close down at any stage. 
Conscription in Queensland in 1917 represented merely a continuation 
of a battle now two and a half years old. The anti-Labor forces had the 
advantage in this instance of the fuU support of the federal government 
and its heavy-handed censorship of anti-conscription propaganda. So dis-
criminatory was this, that when vital parts of Ryan's first major anti-
conscription speech were refused publication it became necessary to resort 
to using the state Hansard to have his fuU remarks published, together with 
the two anti-conscription pamphlets that Theodore and FUieUy had 
prepared.'*'*' However the government had underestimated the vigUance 
of the censors; when the Hansard was bemg sent to aU parts of the state 
through the postal services, the chief censor in Queensland stepped in, 
forbidding the publication and distribution of the Hansard. A raid by a 
squad of soldiers, accompanied by Hughes, on the government printing 
office, focussed the nation's press once more on the single Labor govern-
ment. Hughes's reputed threat to "have" Ryan and Theodore in forty-
eight hours for repeating outside parliament the censored parts of the 
speech and pamphlets was the culmination of his fmstration at being 
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thwarted over meat, sugar, shipping, and strikes in the previous year. It 
was not merely based on conscription. Both Ryan and Theodore clearly 
had no sympathy with the IWW. But after a well-aimed egg dislodged 
Hughes's hat at Warwick, where he was to make a short address. National-
ists in Queensland applauded the prime minister's vitriolic association of 
the Queensland Labor party with the IWW, Sinn Fein, disloyalty, and 
pro-German sympathies. *" In a tense and testing debate, conscription in 
Queensland was again defeated by 168,875 votes to 132,771, a majority of 
36,1.04 compared with 13,851 in 1916. The Hansard and Warwick egg 
incidents made Ryan a national Labor hero. Invitations poured in from the 
eastern states for him to address raUies. In Sydney for the final anti-
conscription rally he was met by the biggest crowd in the campaign and 
carried through the streets like a conquering Roman general. The con-
scriptionist Sydney Morning Herald reported the crowd as having been 
greater than 100,000, whUe Ryan's arch opponent, the Argus, quoted 
police as sayuig the number approached 200,000. 
Within the Labor movement, not only in Queensland but throughout 
Australia, Ryan's reputation soared as the one man capable of standing up 
to Hughes. Even those in the Labor movement who were unimpressed by 
the Labor govemment's achievements recognized his leadership of the 
Labor cause. Consequently, when the Labor-in-PoUtics Convention met m 
January 1918, Demaine insisted that Ryan, and not he, should take the 
chair. It was a wise decision. There were indications that the 1918 conven-
tion would be quite hectic. The sizable minority of mUitant delegates 
wanted not only industrial control of the Labor party, but also a definite 
anti-war, as distinct from merely an anti-conscription, stand by the party. 
In addition there was a significant section of the convention who were 
concerned with liquor reform and were suspicious of the government's not 
having introduced eariy closing of hotels during the war. Ryan's prestige 
enabled him to make rulings from the chair which would otherwise have 
been contested and would have embittered the convention. It is notable 
that nowhere in Lane's autobiography. Dawn to Dusk, does he castigate or 
even criticize Ryan as he does unmercifuUy Theodore, McCormack, 
Forgan Smith, and a host of other Labor politicians; whUe, in the tributes 
to Ryan after his death, Tim Moroney of QRU made special reference to 
Ryan's handling of the 1918 convention, as weU as his assistance to the 
unions, as his outstanding memories of the premier.'*'^ 
The main feature of the convention was the desire by the moderate 
section to head off the mUitants who wanted to progress at a faster rate 
than the majority could cope with or accept. It was not simply a right-
wing AWU versus a left-wing BIC, nor scheming politicians versus honest 
industrialists; the AWU was stUl counted among the leftist unions, though 
its size, the power of its leaders, and its desire to be the OBU in Queens-
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land were making it feared among the less well-organized BIC unions. 
There were fewer politicians at the convention than at any tune since 1910 
and, though the unions were represented directly for the first time, there is 
no evidence of their delegates' desiring or being capable of wresfling the 
initiative from the poUtical leaders. In the election of CPE members and 
Federal Conference delegates, the even mixture of mUitants and moderates 
suggests that permanent lines of division were not laid down, whUe the 
militant-moderate cleavage broke down in the debate on the repeal of the 
compulsory military training clauses in the Defence Act, when the con-
vention voted thirty-eight to twenty in favour of their repeal. McCormack, 
GUlies, Riordan, president of the AWU, Tom Jones, a long and close friend 
of Boote, and Cuthbert Butler, secretary of the anti-conscription literature 
committee, were among those opposed to the repeal, whUe Theodore and 
FUielly voted with the majority.'*'-' 
With the convention successfuUy concluded, the Labor party began 
election campaigning in earnest. The central campaign comnuttee had 
again prepared a number of policy pamphlets on the key issues of state 
enterprises, meat, assistance to farmers and returned soldiers, the profits 
being made from the war by graziers and the shipping combine, and the 
money being collected from pastoralists' associations and insurance com-
panies to defeat the government. New South Wales politicians came to 
Queensland to help organize the campaign; Senators Ferricks and Maughan 
were added to the paid organizing staff, together with two of the new 
Labor members of the CouncU. The AWU donated £300 ($600), the 
Waterside Workers' Federation gave £100 ($200), and other private dona-
tions brought in £255 ($51.0). Ryan produced a further £770 ($1,540) in 
private donations. To maintain the Daily Standard, a Liberty Fair was held 
to raise finance additional to that being provided by the unions and private 
donors. On the other side, the Nationalists became better equipped for 
campaigning with the appointment of Captain G. M. Dash, formerly 
secretary of the state recruiting committee, as chief organizer, and the 
journalist M. H. ElUs as publicity secretary. The Nationalists' main 
problem was the absence of any person capable of matching Ryan as a 
political leader. 
After an intensive campaign among the farmers in two winnable seats in 
the southeastern corner, and some placatory thougli straight talking with 
the BIC unions, Ryan left for north Queensland and the sugar electorates, 
where he delivered his policy speech. Though this manifesto'*''* dwelt 
heavUy on what the government had done in the previous three years, 
there was sufficient to indicate that the ideological fervour of 1915 had 
not died. WUh the stakes so high, it became a bitterly fouglit campaign, 
with Ellis spending much of his efforts in a personal campaign against 
Ryan, whUe posters on the roadside exhorted electors to "Keep the 
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CouncU, Keep Your Homes, Keep Your Savings Banks Deposits". It was 
largely in vain. Labor increased its majority by winning forty-eight seats 
with 53.7 per cent of the vote, the highest ever gained by the Labor party 
in Queensland. However, it was the distribution of the forty-eight Labor 
seats that was significant. The sugar seats gamed in 1915 were held; three 
near-Brisbane farming seats and two dairying and sugar seats on the near 
north coast were won; the last Kidstonite seat in the north was regained; 
but four metropolitan seats were lost. Clearly the policy of assisting mral 
areas was paying off and, not surprisingly, Labor continued after 1918 to 
place one of its more able ministers in the agriculture department and to 
advertise widely its links with the less prosperous selectors and sugar 
growers. 
Ryan, haUed as the man responsible for the victory, was heralded as the 
coming national hero in the southern Labor and Catholic presses. Not aU 
southern newspapers were pleased with the result. The Argus wrote: "It is 
a matter for concern to the otlier states that Queensland should confirm 
by a second election since the war, the reckless financial and legislative 
policy with which the Ryan ministry has been associated."' *'^  However it 
was the perceptive Boote, the revolutionary through evolution, who 
recorded the dual significance of the Labor victory: 
The sweeping victory of Premier Ryan in Queensland is a proof that 
fidelity to the principles of the Labor Movement, on the part of a 
Labor Ministry, is appreciated by the people . . . [but] I don't 
expect the result will be the advent of a mUlennium in Queensland 
. . . Much wUl be done of which Social Democrats can heartily 
approve, but changes of a fundamental nature there wUl not be. The 
people of Australia are not yet ready for drastic transformation. 
They want to get on but not too quickly.'*'^ 
Since the Nationalists and the Brisbane Courier, in particular, had made 
the retention of the CouncU an election issue, there was trepidation among 
the non-Labor members there as to what the government might attempt. 
The abolition referendum having been defeated, they feared that, with the 
Labor majority at the poU, pressure would now be applied to the governor 
for additional Labor appointments which could swamp the chamber. A 
deputation approached Goold Adams, petitioning him to protect the 
CouncU as an "impartial, deliberate and revisory chamber" against its 
being "swamped with partisan nominees". '*" Goold Adams informed 
Ryan of the deputation but had also made it clear that he would wait and 
see how the CouncU reacted to specific legislation before considering any 
further appointments. The governor's attitude was conveyed to the PLP at 
its presessional meeting. There, other matters beside the CouncU had to be 
concluded. A new cabinet of Ryan, Theodore, Fihelly, Hardacre, Huxham, 
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Lennon, Coyne, and Hunter was elected. GUlies became the assistant 
minister to Ryan in the justice department, Fihelly, now a fuU miruster, 
took railways (an unfortunate appointment), and Coyne, lands. 
McCormack was again confmed to the speaker's chair, where he fumed 
against Ryan and Hunter for their non—manual-labouring backgrounds and 
attempted to assume the role of caucus champion against the cabinet. 
Although the govemment continued to introduce legislation sought in 
the Labor platform - extension of arbitration to police, teachers, and 
other branches of the public service, legislation to provide reUef and 
assistance for unemployed workers — the war and the battle with the 
CouncU had reduced the opportunities for more radical legislation. In 
conjunction with the establishment of the Public Curator to provide legal 
assistance to anyone in the state, Ryan had hoped to reorganize the Crown 
law department to provide counsel for people appearing in the courts. Not 
only he, but also his ministers and McCawley, felt that the costs of 
Utigation were too high and that the state had an obligation to regulate 
these as it would regulate living costs.'*'* Having to devote so much time 
to political questions, like conscription, that were outside the immediate 
jurisdiction of a state government legislation, Ryan was forced to let slide 
preparations for such legal assistance. The appointment of McCawley to 
the Abritration Court, on which Theodore was insistent, also removed the 
person most able to implement this ideal. 
WhUe Ryan, FiheUy, and McCormack attended the mterstate confer-
ence in Perth, where Labor attitudes to Australia's future participation in 
the war and to compulsory mUitary training, were to be determined, 
Theodore introduced new taxation proposals. These were designed to 
make up the deficit caused by the CouncU's rejection of previous new 
taxation bUls, the increased wages granted (voluntarUy) to govemment 
employees, the repatriation of retumed soldiers, the larger spending on 
welfare institutions, and the increased interest on overseas loans. He 
proposed to increase the tax on land (with exemptions) and on higher 
mcomes. Again these were passed by the Assembly and rejected by the 
CouncU. On his return from Perth, Ryan conferred with the governor, who 
agreed that the CouncU was wrong but argued that he was unable to 
override its decision and would not appoint any new members. 
The conflict with the CouncU was causing a distinct rise in the political 
temperature of the state, with many prepared to take the side of the 
CouncU. Several hundred women temperance advocates, frustrated at 
Queensland's being the only state not to have introduced early closing of 
hotels during the war, marched on Parliament House. They claimed they 
were little concerned with the tactics of poUtics. They refused to accept 
the impossibUity of Ryan's giving in to CouncU and Nationalist demands 
for early closing when this meant rejecting his own Initiative and Referen-
204 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
QUEENSLAND 
dum BiU under which such legislation could be produced but which had 
already been defeated twice by the CouncU. When the upper house again 
refused to pass the Income Tax BiU without amendment and rejected once 
more a Land Tax BiU to allow the Land Court to increase the rentals of 
grazing properties, the gaunflet was thrown at the government's feet. The 
Brisbane Courier piously reminded Ryan that the wiU of the people was 
that the CouncU should remam. But the cabinet was firmly determined 
that this "excrescence on the constitution"'*'^ should go. A new bUl was 
drawn up to amend the constitution by abolishing the CouncU, but on this 
occasion it was coated with the provision for an advisory committee of 
members of both sides of the house to scmtinize all bUls before these were 
sent to the governor."*' The Initiative and Referendum BiU was to be 
passed at the same time and to become an integral part of the new con-
stitution. 
On this occasion the Labor party was not only to be more tactful in its 
approach, but was to find the CPE and PLP fuUy agreed on the basis of the 
campaign. Ryan was careful not to overplay his hand: it was emphasized 
that the King was to remain a part of the constitution; and, when a bUl, 
introduced at the same tune, to reduce the voting age to eighteen met with 
vociferous opposition, Ryan quietly shelved it, at the same time insisting 
that the vote be given to aU absent soldiers who were eighteen. Ryan 
introduced the new biU into the Assembly in September, and in December 
the CPE established a special Legislative CouncU Abolition Committee 
with an aboUtion campaign fund. Thus at the end of 1918 the stage 
seemed set for a second popular chaUenge to the upper house. 
The strength of the PLP in the previous six years had tended to reduce 
the significance of the CPE, known after November 1918 as the QCE. ' ' ' 
McDonald admmistered the party competently, but did not wield the 
influence of Hinchcliffe. On aU political issues except those relating to war 
- recmiting, bugle blowing, and parades m state schools, which offended 
the anti-war group - the PLP was left free to determine its attitudes and 
methods of unplementing policies, though it kept close contact with the 
QCE as a powerful administrative urut in the party, which could, if roused, 
exert considerable pressure on the party organs, the unions, and the PLP 
itself (3CE meetings, in 1918, were held fortnighfly and often lasted a fuU 
day, as issues affecting the organization of the party, the policies of the 
goverrunent, and questions raised by the branches were debated at length. 
Demaine, re-elected president in 1918, set the tone of the QCE by 
assiduously devoting himself to Labor party work and by traveUing from 
Maryborough each fortnight to chair the QCE meeting. Other members of 
the QCE, whether poUticians, fuU-time union officials, or working men 
needing time-off to attend, showed a simUar awareness of the importance 
of their role m the Labor movement as QCE delegates. By the end of 
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1918, the pressure of correspondence was such that an executive com-
mittee, later to be dubbed the "inner executive", was estabUshed to deal 
with much of the correspondence before it came to the fuU QCE. 
So long as the PLP continued to press strongly to have party poUcy 
implemented, and so long as the QCE contained delegates of strong and 
independent views, the two would co-exist as equal partners. However 
there were sections within the party which contmued to be dissatisfied 
with the slowness of constitutional changes and, with stories of the 
Bolshevik revolution in Russia fUtering in, these sought to turn the Labor 
movement from its national, pragmatic-cum-radical base to one espousing 
revolution. Their penchant for flying the red flag and preaching the 
coming workers' revolution caused more fear to conservatives than it 
should have, but by 1918 the Labor party itself was becoming concerned, 
particularly when Labor members of parliament and QCE delegates were 
among a group arrested for flying the red flag in contravention of a new 
regulation in the War Precautions Act. 
In January 1919 Ryan left for England to fight the Mooraberrie Case 
before the Privy CouncU. During his absence there began to develop within 
the party the division between those variously labeUed left and those 
labeUed right or moderate. It was, in part, a conflict between the AWU and 
the BIC for control of the administration and ideology of the Labor move-
ment; in part, it was a personal dispute between some union leaders at the 
Trades HaU and poUtical leaders Uke FiheUy, closely associated with the 
AWU; yet, aside from the problems which the physical separation of the 
BIC and the AWU induced, in Ryan's absence there was no person among 
the industrial and political leaders with sufficient prestige and tact to bring 
the groups together. Theodore certainly had the power, the poUtical 
experience, and the abUity to attempt to do so, but he was tied too closely 
to one camp and lacked those elements of charm and trust that had placed 
Ryan beyond intraparty squabbles. The problem was exacerbated by the 
Daily Standard, financed largely by BIC unions, which was not averse to 
printing articles critical of the PLP and other articles which at times 
seemed to support IWW ideas. McCormack was particularly annoyed about 
these. Both he and Theodore had grown up in a tough school of politics, 
where opponents were defeated, not allowed a liberal rein. Consequently, 
at the QCE meeting in February, Theodore launched an attack on the IWW 
and those in the party who gave it tacit support. At his instigation, a 
committee including himself and Lane, the chief propagandist for the 
IWW, was appointed to prepare a manifesto to close the party's ranks. The 
thousand-word document, entitled Solidarity or Disruption, adopted by 
the QCE at the end of March, declared that any element which deflected 
the Labor movement from its true ami was to be combated. It went on to 
point out that it was not simply attacking radical or left-wing opinions: 
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"Without the driving force of the left or extreme wing of Labor an intel-
ligent and advanced criticism, progress and virility are unpossible." The 
manifesto, with the names of aU QCE members, mUitants and moderates, 
attached, was distributed to all unions and party branches.'' -^  
Manifestos and May Day appeals for unity by Theodore could not 
convince those of an IWW bent that Labor's constitutional programme was 
anythuig more than a paUiative staving off the revolution. Only a continu-
ance of the radical legislation of the first Labor government or a crushing 
of those who continued to propound more mUitant views in the party 
could head off the challenge that was now emerging. Ryan's return was 
welcomed by mUitants and moderates in the party and in the unions as the 
means of settUng the unrest m the party and the industrial unrest which 
the postwar period was bringing." ^ However, the weakness of the federal 
Labor leadership was drawing Ryan into federal poUtics and away from 
Queensland, whUe a strike in TowmsvUle, in which shots were exchanged 
between unionists and the poUce and in which raUwaymen were suspended 
for refusing to take a train of policemen into TownsviUe, widened the gap 
between the QRU and the AWU with its close PLP links. Moreover, since 
Moroney and George Rymer, the QRU officials, were such powerful and 
respected figures among the unions at the Trades HaU, this exacerbated the 
division between the BIC and the AWU. 
At the end of August, Theodore introduced an ambitious piece of social 
legislation, the Unemployed Workers BiU, which was, in his view, "the first 
practical attempt [in Australia] to deal with the problem of unemploy-
ment in any adequate manner". The Brisbane Courier caUed it the 
"Loafers' Paradise BUl", whUe a prominent Nationalist member was 
aggrieved that "legislation such as this is going to sap our moral fibre 
instead of making us a virUe race". The main provisions of the bUl were to 
establish an unemployment councU consisting of the minister for works, 
the director of labour, and a judge of the Arbitration Court, along with 
employers' and employees' representatives; to provide relief work through 
government and local authority agencies; and to require large private 
employers to provide additional employment or invest money in some 
state developmental work. Also written into the bUl were the provision for 
the establishment of unemployment insurance and the right of every 
citizen to be able to work, with the proviso that it was the responsibUity 
of the community and not that of the individual to see that each man 
received a job.""* 
Theodore had been acting premier for eight months during Ryan's 
absence in England and it was he, not Ryan, who reintroduced the bUl to 
aboUsh the Legislative CouncU on 28 August, in accordance with the 
requirements of the Pariiamentary BiUs Referendum Act. However the 
desire for a second public confrontation with the CouncU with the 
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possibUity of a further defeat introduced a cautionary note into dis-
cussions on how the CouncU should be dealt with. Though the abolition 
campaign had been opened by Theodore in May, the severity of the 
postwar influenza epidemic, and the early federal election in December 
1919 caused the postponing of the second referendum. Gaining a Labor 
majority in the upper house, temporarUy, became the goal. 
Ryan's entry into federal politics ended the type of socialist-
radical-liberal Labor government that had characterized his period as 
premier. Hunter, Lennon, and Hardacre also retired from the cabinet and 
a major reshuffle occurred. Theodore soundly defeated FUielly for the 
leadership and McCormack, freed from the speakership, ousted Huxham 
from the poUtically important home secretary's portfolio and had hun 
demoted to public instruction. It was now a solid AWU cabinet, where the 
virtues of the practical man were to rate most highly, where rural values 
were to dominate, and where the concept of democracy was to be based 
heavily on "having the numbers". No future Labor attorney general was to 
have any legal training and the importance of "practical poUtics" was to 
override much of the dreams and ideals of pre-1915. 
VI 
The Labor party that had emerged in Queensland consisted at its 
grass-roots level of working-class reformers, populist farmers, and a 
selection of small businessmen and lower-paid professionals lUce teachers 
and journalists. There had been only a handful of prominent women: two 
of them attended a convention; none was elected to the QCE; and none 
had stood for parliament by 1922. At its higher controUing level, there had 
been combinations of liberal radicals, socialists, and union administrators, 
with the liberal radicals and socialists forming a tacit leftist aUiance. At 
this latter level, rules and poUcy were decided and submitted later to the 
"grass roots" group for ratification. However, despite claims of "grass 
roots" control, it was those who forced themselves from this group into 
the upper group who made most of the important decisions and laid down 
party attitudes. There was nothing sinister or unusual in this; the sheer size 
of the organization demanded some such mechanism. What was important 
was that there were opportunities for new men to come through the ranks 
on their own abiUty rather than through patronage. 
The thirty years of the party's history had been characterized by 
attempts by various groups, seeing themselves as the custodians of the 
party's objectives, to take control of the party administration and policy 
making. Though Reid, Hinchcliffe, and Boote had parfly succeeded in this 
during the Kidston spUt, the strength of localism in Queensland politics. 
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the absence of any permanent bureaucracy in the party before 1910, and 
the absence of any strong state-wide union organization had lessened the 
opportunities for this to become permanent. However, with the expansion 
of the AWU throughout the state, its highly centralized administration, the 
weakness of other central union organization at the Trades HaU, the 
dominance of rural over metropolitan and provincial city electorates, and 
the AWU's closer association with the PLP and the CPE, by 1920 the 
position had been reached in which one organization could exert a 
dominant influence in the Labor party. Moreover, since it was virtuaUy the 
only political Labor organization in many rural electorates, it was almost 
impossible, in a majority of electorates, for any person to attend the 
Laborin-Politics Convention or to nominate for pariiament without AWU 
support. 
In 1893, flushed with optimism and enthusiasm, the party had con-
tested Us first election. Through the faith of men like Reid, HinchcUffe, 
Fisher, Seymour, and others it had survived the combined disaster of the 
strikes and the depression to struggle on through the nmeties. By 1920, 
not only was it the governing party in the state, but its future was assured 
as a workers' political organization. The eariy figures on membership no 
longer survive, but the reports to the successive conventions after 1913 
indicate the growth of the party. These are set out in table 1. 
Table 1. Growth of the Labor Party in Queensland, 1913-23 
No. of branches 
Membership of 
branches 
No. of affiliated 
unions or branches 
of unions 
Affiliated union 
membership 
No. of unions in 
Queensland 
Union membership 
in Queensland 
(all unions) 
1913 
69 
4,277 
24 
25,373 
67 
44,768 
1916 
N.A.* 
N.A. 
39 
35,667 
89 
58,310 
1918 
230 
4,025 
52 
51,158 
96 
75,393 
1920 
200 
6,000 
63 
69,529 
106 
97,378 
1923 
N.A.** 
4,900 
(approx.) 
68 
69,817 
118 
100,900 
* Lewis McDonald, in 1916, said that the enlistments in the AIF made it 
impossible to calculate membership. 
** From 1920 onwards the actual size of the Labor party, in terms of number of 
branches, membership, and cost of election campaigns, was not reported to 
conventions. 
209 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
D. J. MURPHY 
The general fund, which accounted for the day to day running of the 
party, but not for state or federal election expenses, similarly reflected the 
increase in size and function of the party. The figures are set out m table 
2. 
Table 2. Cost of Administering the Central Party Organization 
July 1901-Sept. 1904 
Sept. 1904-Feb. 1907 
Feb. 1907-April 1910 
April 1910-Dec. 1912 
1913 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
Jan. 1919-May 1920 
Jan. 1921-Dec. 1921 
£82 ($164) 
£255 ($510) 
£342 ($684) 
£1,278 ($2,556) 
£1,241 ($2,482) 
£1,645 ($3,290) 
£1,805 ($3,610) 
£915 ($1,830) 
£1,300 ($2,600) 
£1,116 ($2,232) 
£3,654 ($7,308) 
£3,125 ($6,250) 
SOURCE: Q.C.E. minutes and Labor in Pohtics Convention reports. 
While Ryan had been the parliamentary leader, the radical liberal forces 
in the parliamentary party had been dominant, but with his retirement, 
together with that of Hunter, Lennon, and Hardacre from the cabinet, and 
the inability of the sociaUsts to produce a viable political leader, there was 
no balance to the AWU strength. The lower level of secondary industry in 
Queensland had resulted in smaUer craft unions; the Queensland TLC was 
not re-formed untU 1922; the OBU movement was never strong among 
Queensland unions; attempts to buUd a one-big-railway-union foundered 
and, given the investment in and size of railways in Queensland, such a 
union alone could have provided the nucleus for a Trades Hall balance to 
the AWU. At the same time, with the resignation of Moroney, the most 
capable of the socialists, from the QCE in protest against its acceptance of 
a delegate from the Returned Soldiers and Sailors' Labor League, the 
non-AWU unions on the QCE lost their strongest figure, whUe the con-
tinued strained relations between the Austrahan RaUways Union (ARU) 
and the QCE blunted the syndicalist and socialist pressures in the 
executive. 
The Labor party and the Labor movement from its eariiest times had 
placed great importance on unUy and solidarity. The danger the party 
faced without strong radical liberal and strong positive socialist elements 
was that the demand and need for solidarity would come to be equated 
with conformity and that the non-conformity of the radical, the intel-
lectual, or the socialist would be branded disloyalty. This is not to suggest 
that the Labor party in 1920 had ceased to be what U had always been, a 
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radical reforming party concemed with using the power of the state to 
assist wage earners and farmers and to provide government by popular wiU. 
However a change was occurring and became more evident with the 
expulsion of Rymer and Moroney in 1926, and the dissaffiliation in that 
year of the ARU. 
At the end of 1919, Goold Adams left Queensland on his six months' 
pre-retirement leave. The government had made no recommendations 
regarding a successor; indeed it had been made clear to Goold Adams that 
no more imported British governors would be sought. Amid cries of 
anguish and fury from Nationalists and the non-Labor press, Lennon was 
appointed lieutenant governor in January 1920. His elevation was to be 
partly the first step to introducing AustraUan-born governors and partly a 
guarantee that the vice-regal representative would appoint sufficient Labor 
nominees to give the government a majority in the upper house. 
In February, the CouncU again rejected Theodore's income tax 
proposals and the amendment to the Land Act to provide for a reassess-
ment by the Land Court of pastoral rent. This was to be their last defeat 
of the government. The PLP in January had agreed to appoint fourteen 
new members to the CouncU to provide for a Labor majority there. Sixty-
three candidates were endorsed by the QCE for the selection, and in 
February Lennon appointed the fourteen elected by the PLP. There was 
little doubt that the fourteen were chosen with one purpose in mind, 
abolition. They were closely associated with the trade unions; they had 
demanding positions outside the Council and like the other councUlors 
were to receive no salary. That the government did not immediately pass a 
biU through both houses abolishing the CouncU was due largely to a fit of 
human uncertainty that overtook the party now that the most significant 
and dramatic constitutional change was within its grasp. A state election 
was only twelve months away and in the previous three months Hunter's 
seat of Maranoa had been lost in the by-election, whUe Labor in Queens-
land had lost further votes in the 1919 federal election. There was un-
certainty, therefore, regarding the electors' reaction to any use of its new 
majority by the government to abolish the CouncU. There was uncertainty 
over the attitude the British government would take, since the abolition 
biU, being an amendment to the constitution, would require royal assent 
and not merely that of Lennon. Finally, there was some uncertainty inside 
the Labor party - in pariiament, the unions, and the branches - about the 
propriety of abolishing the CouncU before putting the question once more 
before the electors either at a referendum or at a general election. Tiiere 
were also some legislative councillors who were not sure that the upper 
house should in fact be abolished now that Labor had a majority. Frank 
Bulcock recalled that one Labor member of the Council, G. Page-Hanify, 
circulated a document opposing the aboUtion.' '^ Tlieodore attempted to 
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end the speculation, when speaking about the new appointees: "The 
additional members have been appointed to prevent the Government 
measures from being unceremoniously flung out of the CouncU. The 
Government will not take advantage of its new strength in the Council to 
aboUsh that Chamber. At any rate until it gets a fresh mandate from the 
people. That could be either by making the abolition the principal issue at 
an election or by way of another referendum." 
Despite the premier's remarks, a letter to the Daily Standard by Page-
Hanify, complaining of the decision of the PLP not to proceed with the 
initiative and referendum, even though it now had the power to pass this 
biU, raised some uneasy feelings in the party about what the plush seats in 
the upper house might be doing to Labor resolution. The PLP and particu-
larly the AWU members were having second thoughts about a number of 
electoral issues, and the decision not to proceed with the initiative and 
referendum after a majority had been obtained in the CouncU was 
accompanied by the dropping of a biU, rejected again by the CouncU in 
1919, to aUow eighteen-year-olds to vote. In other areas, there was not the 
same reserve. As soon as the CouncU majority had been obtained, a Profit-
eering Prevention Bill, also previously rejected by the CouncU, was passed, 
along with a Fair Rents BiU, the amendment to the Lands Act, and the 
new Income Tax BiU. Theodore further announced that the government 
would be proceeding with the establishment of the state iron and steel 
works at Bowen on the north Queensland coal field. In the meantime, a 
delegation of Sir Robert Philp, the former premier. Sir Alfred Cowley, a 
sugar planter and former Speaker, with a solicitor, J. A. Walsh, had been 
appointed from the state's conservatives to go to England to interview the 
secretary of state for colonies over the constUutional changes effected by 
the Labor government's swamping of the Council. 
At the end of February, Theodore left for England to dissuade the 
Colonial Office from appointing another British governor and to obtain a 
further loan on the London market to continue the state's pubUc works 
and railway construction.'" In London, he found that PhUp, Cowley, 
and Walsh were concerned not only with the Legislative Council but also 
with advising British investors against assisting the Queensland loan. At 
each meeting with the financiers, Theodore found that the amendment to 
the Land Act, which would increase rents principally on the British 
companies' leased properties, was being haUed as repudiation and breach 
of contract. At the same time his government's refusal to allow the 
British-owned Brisbane Tramway Company to increase its fares, and the 
government's intention of purchasing the tramways at their market value 
rather than at the company's value, were noted as further examples of the 
spleen of a Labor government against investors. Theodore was offered a 
loan only if his government recanted. He refused and returned to Australia 
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through the United States, where a smaUer loan, but at a higher rate of 
interest, was negotiated. AU round it was not a particulariy successful trip, 
since the British government had refused his request to appoint an Aus-
tralian governor. 
Another blot had been thrown on the ideal picture of Labor in politics 
and, if it was not already aware of it, the Labor party had now been shown 
the limitations that practical politics placed on a Labor government even 
when it commanded a majority in both houses. Those Labor poUticians 
who were less capable and who could not really comprehend the 
magnitude of their party's task retreated to a position of being fixers and 
wire-puUers for their constituents and concerning themselves merely with 
holding their own seats, in the belief that the system could not be 
changed, while those of greater capability, and with a clearer vision of how 
Labor ideals could be made reaUties, stuck doggedly to their difficult task. 
While Theodore was in England, the Labor-in-Politics Convention was 
held in TownsvUle. The QCE report, which McDonald delivered, noted the 
gains made in 1918 in rural areas and commended the PLP for its legisla-
tion which had favoured farmers. In delivering his presidential address, 
Demaine was more inclined to reflect the idealist Labor position, praising 
the workers in Russia and emphasizing the role that education would play 
in producing the socialist state.' ' ^ But whUe this view was stiU the party's 
ideal, McDonald's reflected more the party's reality. It would go no faster 
than it thought the people were capable of accepting and it was to be the 
PLP, not the convention, which decided that pace. The 1920 convention 
also indicated the limits of the power which it held over the PLP when the 
latter chose to ignore its decisions. A motion to delete from the platform 
voting rights for eigliteen-year-olds was lost, though no bUl to provide this 
was ever introduced by later Labor governments; a motion for the 
immediate institution of the initiative and referendum was passed, though 
never implemented, while a call for the PLP to support total prohibition of 
Uquor, which was overwhelmingly supported by the convention, was 
quietly ignored in a referendum later in the year when the electors voted 
for a continuation of liquor sales. For the first time a lengthy debate was 
held on the place of education in attaming Labor's goals. A proposal to 
hold a royal commission into the state education system was opposed by 
the cabinet ministers present and lost. There were some in the party who 
appreciated that education could be the most powerful tool in the party's 
armoury, but these were outnumbered by those who saw Labor politics in 
narrower, less radical, and more mundane terms. 
In the non-Labor press, the furore over the swamping of the CouncU, 
combined with Theodore's unsuccessful visit to London, seemed to be 
reacting against the government. Before that campaign could gain further 
momentum, and in order to take advantage of the attempt by overseas 
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capitaUsts to dictate to the govemment, the cabinet decided to caU an 
immediate election. An election on such issues could be expected to bring 
back into the party those unionists who were openly advocating a separate 
trade union party. In his policy speech, Theodore promised an additional 
tax on wealth and the raising of two mUlion pounds (four mUlion doUars) 
in a local loan. Despite the financial difficulties, he promised that the iron 
and steel works would stiU be buUt and that chUd endowment would be 
introduced and related to the basic wage; that the CouncU would be 
abolished, the initiative and referendum introduced, and adult franchise 
provided in local government elections. As the campaign developed, the 
Labor party was forced further away from its anti-capitalist stance and 
compelled to argue not only that investment capital was not leaving the 
state because of the government's actions, but also that, in fact, Queens-
land was a good state m which to uivest.'^*' 
The election produced a sharp swing away from the government, with 
Labor being returned with a majority of only four seats. The three non-
Labor parties - Country, Northern Country, and Nationalist - polled 51.4 
per cent of the primary vote to the Labor party's 47.7 per cent. The 
population movements of the previous ten years away from the Labor 
rural areas to NationaUst urban areas had produced large safe NationaUst 
seats in the metropolitan and near-metropolitan areas, while the new 
Country party was able to regain for the non-Labor parties four of the 
southeastern dairying, sugar, and mixed farming seats. 
The 1920 election result was to have long-term effects on the attitudes 
of future Labor governments. That only seven Labor members were 
returned from the sixteen seats which could now be classed as metro-
politan, reinforced suspicions about the potential of the metropolitan area 
and confirmed the beUef that for Labor to succeed in Queensland it had to 
concentrate its efforts and propaganda in the rural areas and in the towns 
associated with rural industries. It made the party doubly suspicious of 
capital investment,'^ ' of the industrial enterprises that accompanied this, 
and of the resulting larger cities which might vote against Labor. In turn 
this reinforced the belief that the practical man, holding the legendary 
virtues of the shearer, the miner, or the smaU farmer, was to be preferred 
to the city gent, the brainy democrat, or the poUtical idealist who 
generally came from the cUy. The capital costs and losses in some areas of 
the state enterprises had again come under fire during the election, 
reducing further the enthusiasm of many members of the PLP for this 
version of socialism. 
PoUtical power was to be used in future to ameUorate the worst evUs of 
capitalism, rather than to engage that system in the frontal attack that 
Ryan and Theodore had pursued from 1915. Labor policies in future 
would concentrate on opening land for closer settlement, guaranteeing 
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farmers a fair return for their produce, and providing their employees with 
fair wages, hours, and conditions. Labor governments would legislate to 
control the prices of food and other commodities, to perfect the arbitra-
tion and conciUation system to provide a more equal basis for industrial 
negotiations, and use the state machinery to guarantee employment for as 
many working men as possible. The idealism of the early movement had 
been tempered by the reaUties of politics and, whUe the grand schemes 
passed so easily at successive conventions had not all come to pass, enough 
had been achieved in the previous five years to repay the faith of those 
who had argued that Labor should enter politics in its own right and not 
simply tag along as part of a Ub-lab coalition or as part of a Liberal party. 
WhUe the initiative and referendum was not introduced in the new 
parliament, adult franchise for local government elections was passed and, 
later, the only bUl in Australia before the depression to provide for un-
employment reUef and unemployment insurance. It might well be argued 
that granting adult franchise in local government elections was as much an 
attempt to break the local power of anti-Labor landholders as a desire to 
implement a Labor ideal. The uncertamty about how to deal with the 
CouncU remamed; however, when J. C. Peterson, the Labor member for 
Normanby, defected to the Country party in 1921 and there was the 
possibility of a second defection, Theodore quickly introduced a bUl to 
provide for the aboUtion. There was a fear in the Labor party that a 
Nationalist government, -with the new British governor. Sir Matthew 
Nathan, a London financier, could reswamp the CouncU with NationaUsts, 
while there was no guarantee that the elective CouncU which the Country 
party sought would not be chosen on a restrictive franchise. The biU was 
quickly passed through both houses and, despite a deputation to the 
colonial secretary from the non-Labor members, the British government 
decUned to refuse royal assent and so Queensland became the first state to 
be governed by a single elected chamber.'^^ Ryan's proposed advisory 
committee was not included in Theodore's bill, but instead the solicitor 
general was requu-ed to peruse each bUl before the third reading to certify 
that it was in order. 
The major constitutional planks in the platform had been effected. The 
way, theoretically, was now open for the development of a model Labor 
state. But if this was not achieved, and if Labor governments after 1922 
were not as radical as the first Ryan government, it was because of the 
extreme difficulty of finding men with capabilities to match the aspira-
tions of the party. 
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ADAMSON, John. b. Tudhoe (England), 1857; d. Brisbane, 1922. Clergy-
man. MLA (Maryborough), 1907-9; (Rockhampton), 1911-17. 
Secretary for raUways, 1915-16. Senator (Nationalist), 1919-22. 
Convention delegate, 1913. CPE member, 1913-16. 
AIREY, Peter, b. Barrow-in-Furness (England), 1865; d. Birkdale (Qld), 
1950. School teacher. MLA (Flinders), 1901-7. MLC, non-Labor 
1907-8. MLA (South Brisbane), non-Labor 1908-12. Leader, PLP, 
1903—4. Secretary for mines and pubUc works, April 1904. Home 
secretary, 1904—7. Minister without protfoUo, July—November 
1907. Treasurer, 1907-8. President, CPE, October 1903-May 1904. 
BOOTE, Henry Ernest ("Touchstone"), b. Liverpool (England), 1865; d. 
Sydney, 1949. Printer and journalist. Editor, Bundaberg Guardian, 
1894-97; Gympie Truth, 1897-1902; Brisbane Worker, 1902-11; 
Australian Worker (Sydney), 1914-43. Author of A Fool's Talk, 
1915; Guilty or Not Guilty? An Examination of the l.W.W. Cases, 
1916; The Case of Grant: Fifteen Years for Fifteen Words, \9\l;Set 
the Twelve Men Free, 1918; The Land of Wherisit, 1919; The 
Human Ladder: The Story of a Labor Renegade, 1920; The Siren 
City, \92Q\ As I Went By: Poems, 1933; I Look Forth, 1931; May 
Day, 1938; The Dim Rainbow: Poems, 1951. Tmstee of the Public 
Library of NSW, member of the Mitchell Library Committee, 
1926-42. 
BOWMAN, David, b. Bendigo (Vic), 1860; d. Brisbane, 1916. Bootmaker, 
newsagent , union organizer. MLA (Warrego), 1899—1902; 
(Fortitude VaUey), 1904-16. Leader, PLP, 1907-12. Home 
secretary, 1915-16. Convention delegate, 1898, 1901, 1905, 1907, 
1910, 1913. Convention chairman, 1910. Federal Conference dele-
gate, 1908, 1912. CPE member, 1892-94, 1895-96, 1898-1916; 
vice-president, 1892-94, 1905-9; president, 1909-12. Organizer, 
Bootmakers' Union, 1889-91. ALF organizer, 1891-93. Amal W U 
organizer, 1894-99. Vice-president, AWU, 1913-16; Member, 
IVor/cer board of trustees, 1913 — 16. 
BROWNE, WiUiam Henry, b. Pimlico (London), 1846; d. Brisbane, 1904. 
Miner. MLA (Croydon), 1893-1904. Secretary, PLP, 1896-1900; 
leader, 1900-1903. Secretary for mines and pubUc instruction, 1-7 
December 1899. Secretary for mines and public works, 1903—4. 
Convention delegate, 1898, 1901; chairman, 1901. CPE member, 
1898—1903; president, 1901-3. President, secretary. Amalgamated 
Miners' Union, Croydon, 1889-93. 
COLLINGS, Joseph Silver, b. Brighton (England), 1865; d. Brisbane, 
1955. Grocer, boot-factory manager, journalist, political organizer. 
MLC, 1920-22. Senator, 1932-50. Minister for the interior, 
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1941—45. Labor leader in the Senate, 1935—46. Convention dele-
gate, 1905, 1913, 1916, 1918, 1920, 1926, 1929, 1932, 1938. 
Federal Conference delegate, 1927, 1930, 1932. CPE-QCE member, 
1905-7, 1912-35. Qld organizer, 1914-15, 1919-35. Editor, 
Strike Bulletin, 1912. President, Federated Clerks' Union. 
CRAMPTON, WaUer Russell, b. Sydney, 1879; d. Brisbane, 1938. Meat-
worker, union official. MLC, 1917-22. Convention delegate, 1913. 
Federal Conference delegate, 1912. CPE member, 1910-13. 
Organizer, secretary, Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union, 
1908-15. Director of Labor, 1915-17. Director, Worker, 1913-16. 
Manager, Daily Standard, 1917. Alderman, Greater Brisbane City 
CouncU, 1935-38. Member of the Senate, University of Qld, 
1916-19. 
COYNE, John Harry, b. Melbourne, 1865; d. TownsvUle, 1926. Bush-
worker, shearer, organizer. MLA (Warrego), 1908 — 23. Chairman of 
committees, 1915 — 16. Secretary for railways, 1916-18. Secretary 
for public lands, 1918-20, 1920-23. Convention delegate, 1901, 
1910, 1913, 1916. Federal Conference delegate, 1912. CPE member, 
1910-16. AWU organizer, 1904-8. ALF president, 1906-13. 
President, Combined Unions' Strike Committee, 1912. Member, 
Worker board of trustees, 1913. Member, Qld Land Court, 
1923-26. 
DAWSON, Andrew (Anderson), b. Rockhampton, 1863; d. Brisbane, 
19 10. Miner, j ou rna l i s t , editor. MLA (Charters Towers), 
1893-1901. Leader, PLP, 1899-1900. Premier and chief secretary, 
1—7 December 1899. Senator, 1901—6. Minister for defence, AprU— 
August 1904. CPE member, 1895-96, 1898-1900; president, 
1 8 9 9 - 1 9 0 0 . Federal Conference delegate, 1900. Organizer, 
president, Miners' Union, 1887—93. Chairman, Charters Towers 
Strike Committee, 1891. Vice-president, ALF, 1891. Member, 
Charters Towers Republican Association. Joint proprietor and 
editor. Charters Towers ij-flg-fe, 1893-1900. 
DEMAINE, WUliam HalliweU. b. Bradford (England), 1859; d. Mary-
broough, 1939; Printer, newspaper proprietor. MLC, 1917-22. MLA 
(Maryborough), 1937-38. Convention delegate, 1892, 1901, 1904, 
1907, 1910, 1913, 1916, 1918, 1920, 1923, 1926, 1929, 1932, 
1935, 1938; vice-chairman, 1916, 1918; chairman, 1923. Federal 
Conference delegate, 1916 (special), 1919 (special), 1921, 1924, 
1927, 1930, 1932. CPE-QCE member, 1892-94, 1901-38; 
president, 1916-38. President Maryborough Eight Hour Union, 
1882. Secretary, Wide Bay ALF, 1890-91. Mayor, Maryborough, 
1 9 3 3 - 3 8 . F o u n d e r , ed i to r , manager, Maryborough Alert, 
1899-1939. 
DUNSTAN, WUliam John. b. El Dorado (Vic) 1873; d. Brisbane, 1930. 
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Miner, union secretary. MLC, 1920-22. Federal Conference 
delegate, 1915, 1916 (special). AWU organizer (S.A.), 1899; repre-
sentative. Broken Hill 1906; organizer, Adelaide, 1909. President, 
Adelaide AWU and United Labourers' Union (ULU) of SA, 1910. 
Secretary, AWU, Qld, 1913-25. Delegate, AWU conference, 
1911-25. Delegate, OBU conferences, 1914-25. Qld delegate to 
AU Australia Trade Union Congress, 1914-25. Member, Queens-
land Board of Trade and Arbitration, 1925-30. Director, Labor 
Papers Ltd., the Daily Standard. Chairman of directors. Worker 
newspaper. 
FERRICKS, Myles Aloysius. b. Maryborough, 1875; d. Brisbane, 1932. 
Journalist. MLA (Bowen), 1909-12; (South Brisbane), 1920-29. 
Senator, 1913-20. Convention delegate, 1923, 1926. Federal Con-
ference delegate, 1918 — 19. Federal Executive member, 1920—23. 
Editor, Ravenswood Mining Journal; Bowen Independent. 
FIHELLY, John Arthur, b. Timoleague (Ireland), 1882; d. Brisbane, 1945. 
Clerk, journalist. MLA (Paddington), 1912-22. Secretary, PLP, 
1914. Assistant minister for justice, 1915 — 18. Secretary for raU-
ways, 1918-20. Minister for justice, 1919-20. Attorney general, 
1920. Treasurer, 1920-22. Secretary for public works, 1920-22. 
Deputy-premier, 1919-22. Convention delegate, 1913. CPE-QCE 
member, 1914-16, 1918-20. Federal Conference delegate, 1918. 
Alderman, Greater Brisbane City CouncU, 1925-31. Member of the 
Senate, University of Qld, 1920-21. 
FISHER, Andrew, b. KUmaurs (Ayrshire, Scotland), 1862; d. London, 
1928. Miner. MLA (Gympie) 1893-96, 1899-1901. Secretary for 
raUways and public works, 1—7 December 1899. MHR (Wide Bay) 
1901-15. Deputy-leader, federal PLP, 1904-7; leader, 1907-15. 
Minister for trade and customs, 1904. Prime minister and treasurer, 
1908-9, 1910-13, 1914-15. Privy CouncUlor, 1911. High com-
missioner in Great Britain, 1916—21. Convention delegate, 1892, 
1898, 1907. Federal Conference delegate, 1905, 1908, 1912, 1915. 
CPE member, 1895-96. Chairman of directors, Gympie Truth. 
GALLOWAY, WUliam. Seaman, outfitter. Chairman Eight Hour Day Com-
mittee, 1882-85. First president, Brisbane TLC, 1885. First 
political Labor candidate, 1886. Delegate, fourth ITUC, 1886. 
Alderman, Brisbane City CouncU, 1884-91 ; mayor, 1889. 
GLASSEY, Thomas, b. Market HUl (Armagh, Northern Ireland), 1844; d. 
Brisbane, 1936. Miner, auctioneer. MLA (Bundamba), 1888-93; 
( B u r k e ) , 1 8 9 4 - 9 6 ; (Bundaberg), 1896-1901. Leader, PLP, 
1894-99. Senator (Protectionist), 1901-3 . Convention delegate, 
1892, 1898; chairman, 1892, 1898. CPE member, 1892-94, 
1895-96, 1898-99; president, 1892-94, 1895-96, 1898-99. 
Secretary Miners' Association, Bundamba, 1887-94. Joint chairman 
of directors, Ipswich Standard, 1896-1905. 
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HAMILTON, WUliam. b. Melbourne, 1858; d. Brisbane, 1920. Shearer, 
miner. MLA (Gregory), 1899-1915. MLC, 1915-20. Secretary for 
mines, 1915-17. President, Legislative CouncU, 1917-20. Conven-
tion delegate, 1901. Secretary, strike committee, Barcaldine, 1891. 
Convicted during shearers' strike and sentenced to three years at St. 
Helena. 
HARDACRE, Herbert Freemont. b. Dayton (Ohio, United States), 1864; 
d. Brisbane, 1938. Butcher. MLA (Leichhardt), 1893-1919. 
Secretary for pubUc lands for agriculture, 1-7 December 1899. 
Secretary for public instruction, 1915-19. Convention delegate, 
1898, 1913. CPE member, 1898-1901, 1907-10. Secretary, 
Butchers' Employees' Union and Tramway Employees' Union, 
1890-93. Member of the Senate, University of Qld, 1915-19. 
Officer of the Land Reform League. Member of the Queensland 
Land Court, 1919-31. Author of The Dawn of Settlement in Aus-
tralia (Brisbane, 1926). 
HIGGS, William Guy. b. Wingham (NSW), 1862; d. Kew (Vic), 1951. 
Printer, journalist. MLA (Fortitude VaUey), 1899-1901. Senator, 
1901-6. MHR (Capricornia), Labor 1910-20, NationaUst 1920-22. 
Treasurer, 1915 — 16. Convention delegate, 1898. Federal Conference 
delegate, 1900, 1902. CPE member, 1895-96, 1898, 1901, 1905-7. 
Secretary, NSW Typographical Association, 1886-89. Editor, Aus-
tralian Workman, 1893; Worker (Brisbane), 1893-98. Author of/I 
Plea for the Better Treatment of the Mentally Afflicted (Melbourne, 
1931). 
HINCHCLIFFE, Albert, b. Ashton-under-Lyme (England), 1860; d. 
Sydney, 1935. Compositor, manager. MLC, 1904-22. Convention 
delegate, 1892, 1898, 1901, 1905, 1907, 1910, 1913; Secretary, 
1898, 1901, 1905, 1907, 1910. Federal Conference delegate, 1900, 
1902, 1905, 1908. CPE member, 1892-94, 1895-96, 1898-1916. 
CPE secretary, 1892-94, 1896-1910. Founder and secretary Qld 
Typographical Association, 1884-92. Secretary, Brisbane TLC, 
1887-89. Secretary, fifth ITUC, Brisbane, 1888. Secretary, London 
Dock Strike Fund Committee, Brisbane, 1889. Secretary, ALF, 
1890-1913. Manager, Worker (Brisbane), l^90-\9M; Australian 
Worker (Sydney), 1917—25. Member of the Senate, University of 
Qld, 1915-17. 
HOOLAN, John. b. Bathurst (NSW), 1857; d. Diamantina (Qld), 1911. 
Miner, journaUst. MLA (Burke), 1891-94, 1896, non-Labor 
1897-98. Leader, PLP, 1893-94. Convention delegate, 1892. CPE 
member, 1892—94. Editor, Croydon Mining News; Mundic Miner 
and Etheridge Gazette, Georgetown, 1888-95. 
HUNTER, John McEwan. b. Pittsworth (Qld), 1863; d. Brisbane, 1940. 
Merchant. MLA (Maranoa), 1907-19. Secretary for public lands, 
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1915-18. Vice-president of the Executive CouncU, 1918-19. Con-
vention delegate, 1913, 1916. Agent general, 1919-22. 
HUXHAM, John. b. Ivybridge (Devon, England), 1861; d. Brisbane, 1949. 
Merchant. MLA (South Brisbane), 1908-9; (Buranda) 1912-24. 
Assistant home secretary, 1915 — 16. Home secretary, 1916—19. 
Secretary for public instruction, 1919 — 24. Convention delegate, 
1910, 1913 (part), 1916. CPE member, 1910-16. Agent general, 
1924-29. Memberof the Senate of the University of Qld, 1919-24. 
KERR, George, b. BeadneU (Northumberland, England), 1853; d. Bris-
bane, 1930. Blacksmith. MLA (Barcoo), 1893-1906, non-Labor 
1907-9. Leader, PLP, 1904-7. Secretary for raUways, 1907-8. 
Secretary for raUways and public works, 1908-9. Convention dele-
gate, 1901, 1905, 1907; chairman, 1905. Federal conference dele-
gate, 1905. CPE member, 1895-96, 1901-7. CPE president, 
1904-5. 
KIDSTON, WiUiam. b. Falkuk (Scotland), 1849; d. Brisbane, 1919. Iron-
moulder, bookseller. MLA (Rockhampton), 1896-1906, non-Labor 
1907-11. Treasurer and post-master general, 1-7 December 1899. 
Treasurer, 1903—6. Premier, chief secretary, vice-president of the 
Executive CouncU, 1906-7, 1908-11. Convention delegate, 1892, 
1898. CPE member, 1898-1901. Member of the Qld Land Court, 
1911-19. 
LANE, WUliam. b. Bristol (England), 1861; d. Auckland (NZ), 1917. 
Journalist. Founder and editor of the Boomerang, 1887-90. Editor, 
the Worker, 1890—93. Leader, New Australia colony in Paraguay, 
1893-99. Editor, Auckland Herald, 1900-17. Author of The 
Workingman's Paradise (1892), White or Yellow? A Story of Race 
War in A.D. 1908. 
LENNON, WUliam. b. Dublin (Ireland), 1849; d. Brisbane, 1938. Banker, 
auctioneer. MLA (Herbert), 1907-20. MLC, 1920-22. Deputy-
leader , PLP, 1909-12. Secretary for agriculture and stock, 
1915-19. Speaker, 1919-20. President of the Legislative CouncU, 
1920-22. Lieutenant governor, 1920, 1925-27, 1929. Convention 
delegate, 1907, 1910, 1913. CPE member (during Bowman's Ulness), 
1911-12. 
McCORMACK, WUliam. b. St. Lawrence (Qld), 1879; d. Brisbane, 1947. 
Miner, union secretary. MLA (Cairns), 1912—30. Speaker, 1915 — 19. 
Home secretary, 1919—23. Secretary for pubUc lands, 1923—25. 
Premier, chief secretary, treasurer, vice-president of the Executive 
CouncU, 1925-29. Convention delegate, 1910, 1916, 1918, 1920, 
1923, 1926, 1928. Federal Conference delegate, 1918, 1921. CPE-
QCE member, 1912-26, 1928-32. Secretary, AWA, 1909-12. 
Vice-president, AWU, 1913-16. Member of the Senate, University 
of Qld, 1915-19. 
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MacDONALD, John Valentine, b. Opotiki (NZ), 1880; d. Brisbane 1937. 
JournaUst. Senator, 1922, 1928, 1932-37. Convention delegate, 
1916, 1923, 1926. Foundation member, Australian Journalists' 
Association, 1910. Editor, Daily Standard, 1912-22. 
M C D O N A L D , Charles. b. Melbourne, 1861; d. Melbourne, 1925. Watch-
maker. MLA (FUnders), 1893-1901. MHR (Kennedy), 1901-25. 
Chairman of committees, 1906, 1907-10. Speaker, 1910-13, 
1914-17. Convention delegate, 1898, 1901, 1905. Federal Confer-
ence delegate, 1900, 1905. CPE member, 1898-1903. Founder and 
organizer, Miners' Union and Shop Assistants' Association, Charters 
Towers. President, ALF, 1890-91. 
M C D O N A L D , Lewis, b. Lanark (Scotland), 1881; d. Brisbane, 1936; 
Printer, secretary. MLC, 1917-22. Convention delegate, 1913, 
1916, 1918, 1920, 1923, 1926, 1928, 1932, 1935. Convention 
secretary, same years. Federal Conference delegate, 1912, 1915, 
1916 (special), 1918, 1919, 1919 (special), 1921, 1924, 1927, 1930, 
1936. CPE-QCE member, 1909-36. CPE assistant secretary, 
1909—10; secretary, 1910—36. Queensland Federal Executive dele-
gate, 1915 — 36. Secretary, Anti-Conscritpion Campaign Committee, 
1916-17. 
M C D O N N E L L , Frank, b. Ennis (Clare, Ireland), 1863; d. Brisbane, 1928. 
Draper's assistant, merchant. MLA (Fortitude VaUey), 1896-1907. 
MLC, 1907-22. Convention delegate, 1898, 1901, 1905. CPE 
member, 1898-1903. CPE treasurer, 1902-3. Secretary, Eariy 
Closing Movement, 1888—1900. Founder, secretary. Shop Assist-
ants' Union. Labour representative on Shops and Factories Com-
mission, 1891. Trustee, Brisbane Trades HaU. Member of the Senate, 
University of Qld, 1915-22. 
MAUGHAN, WUliam John Ryott. b. London, 1863; d. Sydney, 1933. 
Journalist . MLA (Burnett) 1899-1902; (Ipswich), 1904-12. 
Senator, 1913-20. Convention delegate, 1907, 1910. CPE member, 
1907-9, 1910-13; vice-president, 1909-13. Editor, Standard 
(Ipswich), 1894—97. Owner, editor, Moreton Leader (Ipswich), 
1902-9. 
MOIR, John. b. Aberdeen (Scotland), 1878; d. Redciiffe (Qld), 1955. 
Union organizer, manager. Organizer, Brisbane TLC, 1909. 
Organizer, ALF, 1910—13. Secretary, General Strike Committee, 
1912. Alderman, Greater Brisbane City CouncU, 1934—37. Manager, 
Worker, 1943-53. 
MORONEY, Timothy, b. Brisbane, 1890; d. Brisbane, 1944. Union 
secretary. Convention delegate, 1918, 1923, 1926 (expelled). QCE 
member, 1916-20. Secretary, QRU; Qld branch, ARU, 1918-44. 
President, ARU, 1935-44. 
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MULLAN, John. b. Dublm (Ireland), 1871; d. Brisbane, 1941. Clerk, 
public servant. MLA (Charters Towers), 1908-12; (Flinders), 
1918-32; (Carpentaria), 1932-41. Senator, 1913-17. Minister 
without portfolio, 1919-20. Attorney general, 1920-29, 1932-40. 
Convention delegate, 1910, 1918, 1920, 1923, 1926, 1928, 1932, 
1935, 1938, 1941. Federal Conference delegate, 1936. QCE 
member, 1920-41 . CPE organizer, 1917-18. Organizer Charters 
Towers Miners' Union, 1905-6. Organizer, Associated Workers' 
Union . Charters Towers, 1906-7. General secretary, AWA, 
1912-13. 
PAGE, James, b. Bethnal Green (London), 1860; d. Melbourne, 1921. 
Bushworker, publican. MHR (Maranoa), 1901-21. Convention dele-
gate, 1910. Federal Conference delegate, 1916 (special), 1919, 1919 
(special). Qld federal executive delegate, 1915-19. 
REID, Matthew, b. Dalmellington (Ayrshire, Scotland), 1856; d. Brisbane, 
1947. Carpenter, taUor. MLA (Toowong), 1893-96; (Enoggera), 
1 8 9 9 - 1 9 0 2 . Secretary, PLP, 1893-96. Senator, non-Labor 
1917-35. Convention delegate, 1892, 1901 (part), 1905, 1907; vice-
chairman, 1905; chairman, 1907. Federal Conference delegate, 
1905, 1908. CPE member, 1892-94, 1895-96, 1901-9; president, 
1905-9. 
RYAN, Thomas Joseph, b. at sea off Mauritius, 1852; d. (?). Shearer. MLA 
(Barcoo), 1892-93. Convention delegate, 1892. CPE member, 
1892-94. Member of the Barcaldine Strike Committee, 1891; 
acquitted of conspiracy charge. Secretary, Qld Labourers' Union and 
Central District CouncU, ALF, 1891-92. Vice-chairman, New Aus-
tralia Settlement Association; did not go to Paraguay. 
RYAN, Thomas Joseph, b. Port Fauy (Vic), 1876; d. Barcaldine (Qld) 
1921. Teacher, barrister. MLA (Barcoo), 1909-19. MHR (West 
Sydney), 1919-21. Leader, PLP, 1912-19. Deputy-leader, federal 
PLP, 1920-21 . Premier, chief secretary, attorney general, 1915-19. 
Vice-president of the Executive CouncU, 1915-18. Convention dele-
gate, 1913, 1916, 1918; chairman, 1913, 1916, 1918. Federal Con-
ference delegate, 1918, 1919, 1919 (special). CPE-QCE member, 
1 9 1 2 - 1 9 ; president, 1912-16. Graduate in Arts and Law, 
Melbourne University. King's Counsel, Qld and NSW. Member of the 
Senate, University of Qld, 1915-19. 
RYLAND, George, b. Attyconnor (Westmeath, Ireland), 1855; d. Bris-
bane, 1920. Miner. MLA (Gympie), 1899-1912. Convention dele-
gate, 1892, 1910, 1916, 1920. CPE member, 1892-94, 1903-5, 
1910-12. Organizer, AMA, 1890. DUector, Gympie Truth. Director 
of lands. Northern Territory, 1912-14. 
SEYMOUR, Charles, b. Dublin (Ireland), 1856; d. Brisbane, 1924. Sea-
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man, bookkeeper, journaUst. Convention delegate, 1892, 1898. CPE 
member, 1892, 1895-96, 1901-5. Secretary, Brisbane branch of 
the Federated Seamen's Union of Australasia, 1885; secretary, Qld 
branch, 1892. ITUC delegate, 1888, 1889. Member, Maritime Strike 
Committee, Sydney, 1890. Treasurer, ALF, 1889-99. Secretary, 
board of trustees. Worker, 1890; sub-editor, 1893-1900; editor, 
1911-15. 
SUMNER, Richard, b. Bolton (Lancashire, England), 1859; d. Brisbane, 
1927; Farmer, fruit canner, merchant. MLA (Nundah), 1907-9. 
MLC, 1917-22. Convention delegate, 1913, 1916, 1918, 1920, 
1923. Federal Conference delegate, 1915, 1919 (special), 1924. 
CPE-QCE member, 1913-26. CPE vice-president, 1916-19. Qld 
federal executive delegate, 1919—20. Controller of prices, 1915 — 17. 
THEODORE, Edward Granville, b. Port Adelaide (SA), 1884; d. Sydney, 
1950. Miner. MLA (Woothakata), 1909-12; (ChUlagoe), 1912-25. 
MHR (DaUey), 1927-31. Deputy-leader, PLP, 1912-19; leader, 
1919-25. Deputy-leader, federal PLP, 1929-31. Treasurer and 
secretary for public works, 1915-19. Premier, chief secretary, and 
vice-president of the Executive CouncU, 1919 — 25. Treasurer, 
1919-20; 1922-25. Federal treasurer, 1929-30, 1931. Convention 
delegate, 1910, 1916, 1923, 1926. Federal Conference delegate, 
1919, 1921, 1924. CPE member, 1912-13, 1917-25. AWA, Broken 
HUl, 1902-7. Organizer, AWA, 1907-9. President, AWU, 1913-16. 
Vice-president, ALF, 1910—13. President, Qld Trade and Labour 
Union Congress, 1911. Member of the Senate, University of Qld, 
1917-19. 
WALKER, Alfred, b. (?); d. London, late 1890s. Secretary, Brisbane TLC, 
1887. Co-founder, business manager. Boomerang. Agent for New 
Australia Settlement Association in Argentina, 1891; settled in Para-
guay. 
NOTES 
1. W. G. Spence, Australia's Awakening, p. 175. 
2. A good account of the early attempts to form trade unions and political 
Labor movements in Brisbane is given in W. J. H. Harris, First Steps 
3. Brisbane Courier, 3 May 1886. Galloway's election dodgers said he was a 
Liberal candidate and a white labour candidate who stood for the development 
of native industries. 
4. See also D. J. Murphy, "Two Administrators", in D. J. Murphy, R. B. Joyce, 
and Colin A. Hughes, eds., Prelude to Power, chap. 17, and R. J. Sullivan, 
"Early Labour in Queensland with Special Reference to Albert Hinchcliffe". 
5. See also Gavin Souter, A Peculiar People, and G. Hannan, "The New Australia 
Movement". 
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6. The Boomerang was owned by Lane, Alf Walker, secretary of the Brisbane 
T.L.C., and J. G. Drake, a barrister and postmaster general in the first federal 
cabinet. 
7. G. C. Bolton,/I Thousand Miles Away, chap. 9. 
8. Brisbane Courier, March 1888, quoted in Official Report of the Fifth Inter-
colonial Trade Union Congress (Brisbane, 1888), p. vii. Emphasis added in the 
report. 
9. Ibid., pp. 10 -11 . 
10. Ibid., p. 26. 
11. Ibid., p. X. 
12. Other candidates advertised as being Labor were W. L. Davis in Charters Towers 
and T. Hunter in Carvarvon, while future Labor members included 
J. P. Hoolan, standing as a Radical in Burke, J. S. Collings, as a Griffithite in 
Bowen, and John Fogarty, as an Independent Protectionist in Toowoomba. 
13. See S. A. Rayner, "Thomas Glassey - First Labour Member", in Murphy et al., 
Prelude to Power, chap. 14, and the Glassey papers. 
14. See Murphy et al.. Prelude to Power, p. 315, for a table of unionists in Queens-
land, and J. Laverty "The Queensland Economy", ibid., p. 36, for employees in 
Queensland. 
15. Boomerang, 1 February 1889; C. Seymour in the 0//zci2/^epo^f o/f/!e5a:f/; 
/ r t / C (Hobart, 1889), p. 9. 
16. This was a closely knit association within the buUding trades unions which 
went beyond the talking shop of the TLC and proposed through a sohd front 
to protect members against blacklisting, to consolidate the eight-hour system, 
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ONLY ONE MORE TO CO. 
The Queensland Worker of 3 June 1915 records the sixth government in Australia 
captured by Labor (Courtesy MitcheU Library) 
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The history of the United Labor party of South Australia up to 1920 
falls naturally into six phases. First is the story of its origins in the trade 
union movement of Adelaide in the 1880s, and its entry into the political 
arena in the early 1890s. Then comes a period of trial and error, a search 
for appropriate roles in the political environment of the 1890s. In the 
years 1898-1903 a distinct recession of power and enthusiasm can be 
detected, matched by a resurgence of conservative forces in the state's 
politics. But out of adversity was to come strength, for the party entered a 
fourth phase, of revival through organization and extension, from 1904 to 
1910. In this period the parliamentary Labor party (PLP) provided two 
members of a coaUtion government, including Tom Price, Australia's first 
Labor premier (except for the short-lived Dawson ministry in Queensland 
in 1899). From revival to power was the fifth, and natural, progression, 
when in 1910 Labor formed its first government unrestrained by coalition 
arrangements. This period of power was broken in 1912 over the question 
of the powers of the Legislative CouncU: it was a period of unstable 
equUibrium in federal and New South Wales politics too, and in each case 
Labor ministries returned, even stronger than before. In South Australia, 
as elsewhere, the next phase was the coUapse of the party's poUtical 
fortunes brought on by the conscription crisis, and the subsequent efforts 
to clarify the party's purposes and organization. As the elections of 1921 
approached, the South Australian branch of the Labor party was once 
again challenging the Liberal Union for political power. 
I 
The first men elected to an Australian parliament as members of a 
Labor party, pledged to its platform, committed to its organization, and 
promoted specificaUy as Us representatives were David Charleston, Robert 
Guthrie, and Andrew Kirkpatrick. They were aU members of the United 
Labor party of South Australia (ULP), and in May 1891 they were elected 
to the Legislative CouncU of South Australia. Charleston and Guthrie were 
returned first and second for Central District, which included Adelaide, 
gaining 2,942 and 2,155 votes respectively. There were seven other 
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candidates for the two vacancies, and 10,707 votes cast. 
Charleston was bom in Cornwall in 1848. He came to AustraUa in 1884 
after working in the United States and China. He was an engineer by trade, 
a member of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, their representative 
on the Adelaide United Trades and Labour Council (UTLC), its president 
for twelve months in 1889—90, and president of the Women's Trade 
Union. He was appointed to the magistracy m 1888. Even before migratUig 
to Australia he had been active in land reform societies in London, whUe 
m the colony he was a speaker on behalf of the single tax.' Guthrie was 
born in Scotland m 1857, and came to Australia in 1878. He was a 
seaman, and from 1888 secretary of the Port Adelaide branch of the 
Seamen's Union. He too was a member of the UTLC, as weU as being 
president of the Maritime Labour CouncU at Port Adelaide in 1890. He 
represented the Seamen's Union at the Intercolonial Trade Union Congress 
(ITUC) in 1885 and again in 1887. He was on the executive of the Home-
stead Block League, and he had been chief ruler of the Independent Order 
of Rechabites, which means, almost certainly, that he was a Primitive 
Methodist. Like Charleston, he was a Justice of the Peace.^ Kirkpatrick 
was born in London in 1848. He was a composUor, and president of the 
local Typographical Society. He was president of the UTLC, and of the 
Eight Hours Union at the tune of the elections. Kirkpatrick (2,325 votes) 
was elected for the Southern District, along with R. C. Baker (2,478 
votes). There were three other candidates and 9,548 votes cast. Propor-
tions of this sort were to remain typical of Labor's vote for the next 
twenty years, untU the political situation settled into the groove of a 
two-party competition. 
Why this success, in 1891, in the Legislative CouncU elections, by the 
United Labor party of South Australia? FUst it is necessary to consider the 
social and poUtical environment in the colony. 
The population of the colony in 1890 was 320,000, of whom 42 per 
cent lived in Adelaide and its suburbs. The tradUions on which the colony 
sustained its self-identity were those of freedom and individual achieve-
ment. This was the "paradise of dissent" which had become the respec-
table society, untainted by convictism, with a restricted range of economic 
and social differences, only a few very wealthy or destitute, and with most 
accepting the Victorian bourgeois Uberal ethos of sober self-help and 
proper conformity, yielding a fairly open-meshed society with consid-
erable, though contracting, opportunities for upward mobility. 
The dommant economic activities of the colony were rural, and in 
particular the production of wheat, together with the decUning copper 
mines of Moonta, WaUaroo, and Burra. Meanwiiile the total value of the 
activities conducted in Adelaide and its suburbs was probably rising 
proportionately to all the others. Clearly the original Wakefieldean vision 
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of a colony of prosperous, independent yeoman farmers had been given 
substantial, though not by any means total, reality. 
Nonetheless, in 1891 there were 870 factories in the colony, employing 
12,600 males (about 13 per cent of aU males aged 16—65) and over 2,000 
females.^  WhUe some of these workers (approximately 3,500) were 
employed in small concerns such as forges and miUs in rural areas, there 
was a considerable degree of factory concentration in the city of Adelaide 
and in the suburbs reaching out to Port Adelaide. There were 20 factories 
in this area with more than 100 employees (a total of 3,800), another 30 
with 20-29 workers (1,300), and 400 employing 3-19 people (4,000). 
The most notable of these were in the boot, iron, clothing, timber, 
taniung, and tobacco industries, the larger retaU trade, and the transport 
and maritime industries. 
Unions had emerged in most of these urban industries and trades in the 
1870s and 1880s.^ Some of the unions were based on crafts, with smaU 
membership and with concern for the skUls and income they enjoyed as 
craftsmen — for example the saddlemakers whom F. W. Coneybeer 
represented. But there were already unions of the unskUled - the Port 
Adelaide Workmgmen's Association (established in 1873), the Seamen's 
Union (1874), the Shearers' Union (1886), the Suburban and Port Road 
Drivers' Association (1877), the RaUway Service Mutual Association 
(1870). 
The nature of politics in South Australia up to the mid-1890s reflected 
the dominant liberal bourgeois values, both rural and urban, which were 
current in the community. In the constUution inaugurated in 1856 aU 
adult males received the vote for the House of Assembly, a radical step at 
that time, widely remarked on throughout the British empire. The Legis-
lative CouncU, however, was elected on a far more restrictive franchise, 
and one which became increasingly so as the years went by: £50 ($100) 
freehold, £20 ($40) leasehold, or residence in a house of an annual value 
of £25 ($50). In effect, the propertied interests of the colony, in good 
whiggish style, were entrenched ui the upper house. 
PoUdcal behaviour in the Assembly was based on parliamentary 
factions clustering around men of talent and energy — for example, in the 
1890s, C. C. Kingston, T. Playford, J. Downer. Tliese factional groups had 
no formalized extrapariiamentary support: contemporary thought 
frowned on such breaches of the doctrines of independence and the 
promotion of the common good. To some degree there was a division of 
political opinion in the colony, conservative versus liberal, but it had been 
long since instUutionalized. Conservatives dominated the Legislative 
CouncU, while men of liberal outlook, mostly Adelaide residents, fUled the 
House of Assembly. In the Assembly the groups had not, up to the entry 
of the Labor party, polarized in any significant way around such issues as 
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free trade or protection (as was beginning to occur in New South Wales). 
Rather they fluctuated unpredictably in membership, exhibiting a low 
degree of cohesion, with frequent examples of confused cross-voting, 
concerrung themselves with the fate of the government and their own 
separate special concerns. 
The UTLC was established on 31 January 1884, with aUns of "uniting 
more closely the various trade societies, discussing unitedly any question 
affecting the welfare of any society, a n d . . . having more political 
influence in the colony".^ It drew its support from the urban-based unions 
noted earlier. Within three years, nineteen societies were sending forty-
three delegates, representing 3,000 workmen, to the meetings of the 
CouncU. Moreover, by 1887 the Port Adelaide Labor societies had also 
formed a representative body, the Maritime Labour Council.^ 
The business of the UTLC during the 1880s suggests a fair degree of 
common purpose among aU these unions. It concerned itself in the 
conduct of industrial disputes, and in such matters of public concem as 
the Chinese question, the tariff, payment of members of parliament, 
employer liabUUy, land tax, the franchise, and education. Not aU these 
issues yielded unanimous decisions, for there were tensions, for example, 
on the tariff in the meeting of 1 May 1885. But, as the aims of the UTLC 
show, there was a general conviction "that to be anything we must be 
political", a remark made in that debate on the tariff question. It was not 
long, therefore, before a parliamentary committee was appointed, on 26 
June 1885, in response to the advice given on the subject at the 1884 
ITUC. 
Broadly, the established organs of public opinion, for example the 
newspapers and politicians, quickly came to approve of the activities of 
the UTLC, even if they spoke of "that noble fusion of capital and labour 
under which each man will work for aU and everyone wiU work for his 
fellow".'^  It was to be on the basis of this community acceptance of the 
concept and the activities of unionism that the successful development of 
a Labor party was to be buUt in South Australia. The craft unions were 
most obviously moderate in theU approach to working conditions and 
community problems, and it was from these groups that most of the 
UTLC and early ULP spokesmen came. AU these unions emphasized their 
roles as benevolent societies, and as concUiators in times of industrial 
trouble. As yet the unionization of the unskUled had not proceeded far 
and so the impact of an angrier, more forceful style of union behaviour 
was not yet - in the late 1880s - apparent in South Australia. 
Several Adelaide politicians, while thoroughly middle-class in social and 
economic background, took positively pro—workmg-class — or at least 
radically Liberal - posirions on a number of issues m these years. Men 
such as Dr. J. A. Cockburn and C. C. Kingston spoke and wrote 
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favourably of the UTLC and its social and poUtical ambitions. To such 
men, and to the bourgeois-dominated community generaUy, the trade 
unions were acceptable entities worthy of a place in the system of power 
and prestige. 
It was the parliamentary committee of the UTLC which took the 
irutiative in identifying public issues for the attention of the CouncU, and 
in waiting in deputation on politicians, e.g. on the immigration question in 
June and July 1885, when on the committee's advice the Council con-
vened a public meeting which resulted in a series of resolutions being 
presented to the government. It was this committee, at the direction of the 
CouncU on 7 August 1885, which formulated a policy in order that 
"people in the country might know what the poUtical views of the CouncU 
were". The platform, adopted at the CouncU meeting of 21 January 1887, 
was payment of members; protection for protective, not revenue purposes; 
increase in the current land tax; extension of employers UabUity to 
merchant seamen; introduction of a factory and workshops act; a mining 
on private property act. These were the issues upon which Adelaide 
working men were united in demanding action by the politicians. Payment 
of members was crucial to getting working men into parliament, whUe the 
other points clearly related to the conditions of work of the CouncU's 
member unions. These urban groups were seeking to mount sectional 
pressure in the political field in order to improve these conditions of 
working and living. This notion of sectional pressure on the political 
system had long been accepted. It had been integrated with the older, 
Burkean, notion of independent representatives of the whole community 
by the practice of the sectional groups endorsing but not controUing the 
parliamentarians through whom they sought to present their views. It was 
this practice with which the four-year-old UTLC began to experiment in 
the elections of 1887. It was not unique in proceeding along these Imes. 
The ITUCs had been discussing the idea of direct Labor representation, 
notably at the 1886 congress in Adelaide. That ITUC was itself evidence of 
the growing sense of identity buUding up among working-class groups m 
many centres of Australia. Much in European and American example and 
propaganda assisted in this process, and in broad terms its effects must be 
presumed to have filtered through to Adelaide. David Charieston was 
certainly one obvious transmitter of such ideas; many other UTLC leaders 
had experienced or were aware of these overseas examples too. There is no 
need to rehearse these contexts again. 
On the local scene there had been abortive efforts in the 1870s to give 
working men direct political influence, in the United Tradesmen's Society, 
the National Liberal Reform League, and the Labour League.^ They had 
all foundered from poor support, itself a sign that working men in 
Adelaide in the 1870s were not able or willmgto see themselves as needing 
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a specific political voice. Instead, organization developed along trade union 
lines, and graduaUy out of this grew, first the UTLC, and then the effort to 
achieve positive parliamentary representation. 
On 3 November 1886 the UTLC (on the morion of its secretary, 
W. Robinson) referred to member unions of the CouncU a scheme 
prepared by the parUamentary committee to raise the necessary funds to 
support direct working-class representation in parUament. The proposal 
was also given an airing at the Adelaide ITUC in September 1886. But, 
until such time as the unions would adopt the idea of a per capita levy, the 
CouncU had to rely on middle-class politicians who seemed worthy of 
support, and of course, to press for payment of members. 
Consequently, prior to the 1887 Assembly elections the UTLC 
discussed supporting several candidates for city electorates in return for 
their adherence to the CouncU's platform. As a result, nine politicians, 
including C. C. Kingston, J. G. Jenkins, and T. Scherk were adopted. Only 
A. A. Kirkpatrick, a candidate in the Port Adelaide electorate, had close 
UTLC affiliations. He and one other of these nine were defeated. Indeed, 
the Council seems mostly to have supported liberals who were certam to 
be elected with or without UTLC endorsement. 
In the 1888 Legislative CouncU elections, the UTLC invited 
G. W. Cotton, a retired carpenter and land agent, to stand for the Central 
District. He had been first elected to the Legislative CouncU in 1882, and 
had gained UTLC approval for his energetic championing of working-class 
causes, especiaUy small landholdings (or "blocks"). Cotton was returned, 
and continued his passionate espousal of Labor interests. At times he gave 
the impression that he regarded himself as a direct Labor representative, 
for example in the 1891 Conciliation BiU debate. He died in 1892.^ 
SimUarly, a range of nineteen safe bourgeois liberals (plus Kirkpatrick 
again) were selected for the 1890 Assembly election, on the basis of an 
expanded platform, adopted on 28 February 1890, which called for "pro-
tection for the purpose of encouraging local industries and for the further 
development of the resources of the colony"; a lien biU; a workshop and 
factory act on the Unes of the New Zealand biU; payment of members; 
progressive tax on land value, without exemption; tax on foreign bottoms; 
inspection of land boilers; free education, with maintenance of present 
standard; an absent seamen's voting bill; reform of the Legislative CouncU 
in the direction of manhood suffrage and shorter terms; workingmen's 
blocks and loans to blockers; provision of a Trades HaU site, or a sum on 
the estimates for that purpose; the removal of duries from tea, coffee, 
cocoa, kerosene; a reciprocUy treaty with Queensland; the amendment of 
the RaUway Commissioners Act; the establishment of a department of 
labour; and a redistribution of seats bill. Fourteen of these twenty adopted 
candidates were elected, but none of them ackiiowledged the UTLC as 
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their poUtical guide or patron after the elections were over. 
Two events transformed this restricted, fundamentaUy passive approach 
to the political scene, in which neither Labor candidates nor self-
consciously Labor voters seemed to exist in large numbers. The first was 
the passage in 1890 of the biU making permanent the payment of members 
of both houses wluch had been passed for the Ufe of one parUament in 
1887. It had been promoted for nearly twenty years by radical liberals 
mainly on the argument that payment was necessary to free representa-
tives from improper sectional influences. In the minds of some supporters, 
however, including the UTLC, the measure would permit the proper repre-
sentation of hitherto excluded groups.'*^ The implications were obvious. 
No longer would working men be excluded from pariiament for want of 
funds. Moreover, societies could join together more readUy in sponsoring 
candidates now that the matter of finance was removed from their 
concern. Again, reUance on middle-class candidates of independent means 
and outlook, never a satisfactory or certain practice, would no longer be 
necessary. Payment of members had thus opened up the possibUity of a 
decisive change in the colony's pariiamentary structure. 
The other crucial event of 1890 was the maritime strike.'' It affected 
South Australia in a number of ways. The conUict originated in the eastern 
colonies, and was taken up in South Australia out of a sense of Labor 
solidarity. It was exacerbated by the belligerence of the members of the 
Employers' Union in Adelaide who were engaged in interstate shipping and 
who were linked with their competitors in Sydney and Melbourne. There 
was little difference in the degree of support accorded to the marUime 
Labor bodies in Adelaide by the societies of skilled and unskilled workers: 
if anything, the skilled societies were more enthusiastic in their support 
than were the unskiUed. Between them they contributed £10,000 
($20,000) to the local strike fund. 
The unionists were defeated in Adelaide, as in the rest of Australia, 
with a few exceptions: the Port Pirie wharf labourers secured a reduction 
in the working day; the marine engineers made a satisfactory agreement 
for three years; the marine officers retained the recognUion of their 
association and the wage increases gained earUer.'^ The main product of 
the strike in Adelaide, as in Sydney, was a bitter feeling towards the 
employers, and a heightened willingness to explore other avenues by which 
influence could be exerted, and in particular by which industrial issues 
could be settled without recourse to strikes. It is clear that this did not 
mean working men in Adelaide turned for the first time to seek parlia-" 
mentary representation. But U did mean a tremendous fillip to the 
organizational efforts already being mounted. It reinforced the sense of 
class-identity that was being expressed in those efforts, and summoned 
forth sufficient effort to induce workers to organize and to vote for direct 
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Labor candidates simply because they were members of their own social 
and economic class.' ^ 
The critical organizational step aimed at capUalizing on this feeUng was 
the recommendation of the UTLC Parliamentary Committee on 12 
December 1890 that a public meeting be held, to which aU constituent 
societies of the Council should be invited, to discuss the return of "bona 
fide labor candidates at the forthcoming [Legislative CouncU] elections". 
This election marked the fuU reconstruction of the Legislative CouncU 
under an act of 1881, which provided for the division of the province into 
four Council electorates, each of wliich was to return six members, to be 
elected at three-yearly intervals with eight members retiring each time. In 
1891 the last three members of the Legislative CouncU returned by the 
whole province, plus two members for the Central District and one from 
each of the other three electorates, retired. Thus there were in all eight 
vacancies to be filled. 
This special meeting was held at the Selborne Hotel, Pirie Street, 
Adelaide, on 7 January 1891. It was agreed that direct Labor candidates 
should be selected to contest the forthcoming CouncU elections for the 
Central and Southern Districts. A list of potential candidates was to be 
drawn up and a plebiscite taken of aU members of workingmen's clubs and 
trade unions in the area. An election fund was to be established with a levy 
of 6d. (5 cents) per member. A committee was named; U comprised the 
parliamentary committee of the UTLC, the secretaries of the Maritime, 
BuUding, and Iron Trades CouncUs, of the South Australian Democratic 
Club, the German Workingmen's Association, and the North Adelaide 
Workingmen's Social and Patriotic Association. 
This committee is referred to in the UTLC minutes as the "Legislative 
CouncU Elections Committee"; but it soon became the CouncU of the 
United Labor Party of South Australia. For the immediate future — i.e. 
January to May 1891 — it is the ad hoc nature of the decision which must 
be emphasized. Organization had been going on, experience gained, 
momentum had been buUt up, and now, with these vacancies in the Legis-
lative CouncU to be contested, an opportunity to act presented itself. No 
doubt, if another Assembly election had been held instead, U would have 
provided an opportunity for testing the plans. However, in the unmedi-
ately preceding months the UTLC had expressed its dissatisfaction with 
the Legislative Council's decisions on the Chinese question, on land 
valuation, and on the education biU.''* They were not unaware that the 
constitution gave the Legislative CouncU virtually equal powers to those 
possessed by the Assembly. Nor did any final provision exist for settling 
deadlock between the houses. Under legislation of 1881, disagreement 
expressed by the rejection in the CouncU in successive parliaments of 
Assembly legislation (the second rejection by an absolute majority) could 
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lead to a dissolution of both houses or the election of an additional repre-
sentative for each Council district. The legislation made no further pro-
vision: if disagreement continued, only private negotiation and concession 
could alter the situation. Nor was this situation unusual, because the distri-
bution of Council districts and the restrictions on the franchise for Us 
electors meant that it was always dominated by wealthy rural property 
holders. Clearly any reduction in this dominance was attractive to the 
UTLC. 
The four months succeeding the public meeting in the Selborne Hotel 
were marked by busy activity on the part of the election committee and 
other members of the various societies. One unportant and very early 
decision concerned who was eligible to be adopted as a candidate. It was 
agreed to accept those persons as candidates who were "eUgible to become 
a member of a trade or labour society, which trade or labour society is 
eligible to become affUiated with the UTLC".'^ This underlined the 
working-class character of the group — even if some of the supporters of 
the Democratic Club might have been middle-class radicals and possibly 
single-taxers (although as yet the necessary research has not been done on 
this point). The committee also decided that, before acceptance as candi-
dates, appUcants would be required to pledge themselves to work as a 
separate party in parliament, and to refuse office in a non-Labor ministry. 
Candidates were also to agree to resign from parliament if a plebiscite was 
conducted resulting in a vote unfavourable to the member concerned. Here 
was firmly stated the clear intention to achieve a separate identity for the 
Labor party and for the organization to have control over its representa-
tives — neUher of which traits were characteristic of the existing factional 
poUtical situation. The organizational independence unplied was in due 
course to transform the politics of South Australia, as it did elsewhere in 
AustraUa. Unity and accountabiUty, hallmarks of the trade union 
movement, were now to be transported to the political arena. 
The next task was to arrange the selection of the candidates. In the 
established pattern of the 1880s, a number of already declared candidates 
wrote to the UTLC seeking its endorsement. However, the plan to select 
candidates by and from the Labor movement was adhered to: none of 
these applicants was listened to. Instead, a list of twelve names was sub-
mUted in February 1891 to a vote by members of the selection com-
mUtee's constituent societies, and out of these Charleston, Guthrie, and 
Kirkpatrick were chosen, as the UTLC learnt on 6 March 1891. 
An intense campaign was then mounted. At Port Adelaide a "Parlia-
mentary and Vigilance Committee" was established.'^ Charleston and 
Guthrie spoke almost nightly, while Kirkpatrick had a heavy programme in 
the Southern District. Prominent advertisements were placed in the news-
papers.'' Circulars, how-to-vote tickets, and the agreed platform were 
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widely distributed. This platform varied from that of 1890 in the follow-
ing ways. "Progressive Tax on Land Values" was qualified by "or faUing 
this, an increase in the present tax, with exemptions for smaU holdings" 
(not really the single tax, but a bow in the direction of that radical 
reform). "Workshops and Factories Act" was spelt out: "for the purpose 
of securing adequate breathing space, to regulate and limit the hours of 
labour, limit the age at which young persons may be employed, and 
provide proper sanUary arrangements in all buddings used as workrooms 
and factories" (a typical trade union demand about practical working 
conditions). "Tax on Goods and Passengers carried intercolonially in 
foreign vessels" expanded item 6. "Manhood suffrage" was dropped from 
the Legislative CouncU plank; while "Redistribution of Seats BiU" grew 
wUh "on the basis of population, and the adoption of Adult Suffrage". 
Items added to the platform were "Supporting the principle of Taxing 
Land Values, as embodied in Part XIX of the Municipal Corporations Act 
of last session", "Establishment of a State Bank", "An Act to secure to 
Tenant Farmers just compensation for their improvements", "An Eight 
Hours BiU", and "Opposed to Free and Assisted Immigration", while Uems 
4 and 9 were dropped.'^ The emphasis was on social justice, wUh a 
qualified acceptance of land taxation, and some recognUion of the need to 
secure votes in the country. The platform and the vigorous campaigning 
meant the ULP was away to a flying start. 
Campaigning in the rural areas to the south and east of Adelaide was 
difficult and expensive for Andrew Kirkpatrick, for U cost £300 ($600)." 
But he was helped, as were Charleston and Guthrie, by the comprehensive 
appeal of their platform, with its urban and rural proposals, and by his 
own personal qualities. All three were leaders of the Labor movement. All 
devoted themselves wholeheartedly to the campaign. These were to 
become permanent characteristics of Labor candidates in subsequent 
campaigns. The advantage in 1891 lay in their exploitation of these techni-
ques when few if any of the other candidates adopted such practices. 
Some other, more fortuUous, events may be briefly noted: but noted 
they must be, for the resounding success of 1891 gave a critical initial 
impetus to the existence of the Labor party in South Australia. WUhout 
that success, it could have been twenty years before a simUar opportunity 
presented Uself, an opportunity, that is, matched by a strong corporate 
sense of identity and a desire to express it in political terms. 
These events were conferences in Adelaide of the Amalgamated 
Shearers' Union (ASU), and the General Labourers' Union (GLU), a 
campaign to win support for the striking Queensland shearers, and the visit 
of Sir George Grey.^° The fifth conference of the ASU and the first 
conference of the GLU were held in February 1891. W. G. Spence was 
active in both gatherings, where frequent references were made to the 
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importance of united action and to pariiamentary representation. A party 
of delegates from the two conferences made the same points to a meeting 
of the UTLC on 13 February 1891. Soon after, the shearers' strike in 
Queensland again emphasized the point of common identUy of workers: a 
local defence committee was set up, and Spence, a Queensland delegate to 
the ASU conference, and D. M. Charleston campaigned in several centres 
on behalf of the shearers. Sir George Grey, the veteran radical, and of 
course one-tune governor of the province of South Australia, toured Aus-
tralia after the Federal Convention meetings in Sydney. He continually 
urged the adoption of the system of one man, one vote. In Adelaide his 
meetings were triumphs, as he spoke of democracy and the single tax. He 
was greeted with vociferous cheering and rapt attention. It could not help 
but be valuable propaganda for the Labor movement a month before the 
elections. In all, these events helped to excite and sustain a sense of 
identity and involvement which finally came to have its expression on the 
election days in May, when three seats were won. 
NaturaUy, there were moments of rejoicing when the elecrion results 
were announced. David Charleston picked up some of the strands at a 
celebration at the Selborne Hotel on elecrion day: "He hoped that now 
the labor party was represented there would be no more recourse to the 
barbarous system of strikes, but that theu difficuUies would be adjusted 
by intelligent and honorable means. He hoped a new era was dawning — 
not an era of selfishness and individualism, but of co-operation . . ."^' In 
Charleston's remarks the main emphasis was on rational co-operation 
based on mutual recognition of interest. The Labor representatives would 
be the spokesmen of the working-class section of the community in the 
forum where community problems were discussed and resolved. One of 
the three new councUlors came from an unskiUed and highly vulnerable 
occupation, the other two from crafts that had won their place among the 
aristocracy of Labor. As yet they were aU townsmen, which was to remain 
true of the ULP for the next fifteen years. But it was the beginning of 
direct Labor representation in the parliament of South Australia. 
II 
The formal constitution of the ULP of South Australia soon followed. 
Unfortunately, the evidence is not as certain as we would wish. Since the 
minute books of the councU of the ULP survive only from 1900, we must 
largely rely on the reports recorded in the minutes and letter books of the 
UTLC for these early years. From there and other sources it can be said 
that the secretary of the Legislative Council Elections CommUtee was 
J. A. McPherson (who was also the UTLC secretary), and that he wrote on 
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11 July 1891 convening a meeting to construct a list of candidates for the 
expected Assembly elections.'^^ In this circular he referred to "the weU-
being of the UnUed Labor Party". He also indicated that the Legislative 
CouncU Elections Committee had been constUuted as "a permanent Parlia-
mentary and Vigilance commUtee, whose duty it will be to consider and 
report from time to time on aU matters affecting the interests of the 
party". The constituent members were now: the pariiamentary commUtee 
of the UTLC; the secretaries of the BuUding and Iron Trades CouncU, the 
South Austrahan AUg. Deutsches Verein, the Democratic Club, the North 
Adelaide Working Men's Society, the Port Adelaide Parliamentary and 
Vigilance CommUtee; and the president of the Port Adelaide Working 
Men's Association. Once again a fighting fund based on a levy of Is. (10 
cents) per member was proposed; in other respects the rules already agreed 
on for the selection and behaviour of the candidates were to stand. By 
December 1 891 reference to the United Labor party had become habitual 
in the UTLC minutes. Thus, it would seem that in retrospect the meeting 
in the Selborne Hotel in January 1891 must be regarded as the constitutive 
meeting which established what was to be caUed the CouncU of the United 
Labor Party of South Australia. 
There was no general election during 1892, but a by-election for East 
Adelaide was held in February, at which J. A. McPherson was successful. 
He had been born in Aberdeen in 1860 and had emigrated to Australia ui 
1882. He was a compositor and frequently held office in the local Typo-
graphical Association, he was secretary of the UTLC from 1890 to 1896 
and of the ULP from 1891 to 1896, and he was elected first leader of the 
parliamentary Labor party (PLP) in 1893. From all these onerous tasks he 
was released by death in December 1897. Nor, as we shall see, was he the 
last such loss. MeanwhUe the original plebiscUe arrangements for the 
general election were carried through. Sixty-two members of the ULP 
nominated, covering a wide range of skUled and unskilled employment. 
There were seven bootmakers and four compositors among them. The 
fifteen successful candidates, chosen in a first-past-the-post ballot, gained 
from 2,603 to 1,019 votes. They were Buttery (cabmet maker), 
McPherson (compositor), Robinson (coach trimmer), McGiUivray (steve-
dore), Gould (bootmaker), Rogers (printer), Hourigan (tanner), OUivier 
(trade union official), Coneybeer (coUarmaker), Archibald (labourer), 
Stokes (labourer), Wheeler (draper's assistant), Adams (patternmaker). 
Wood (blacksmith), and Batchelor (engine fitter). They were then allocat-
ed by the ULP councU to contest the various multi-member constituencies 
in Adelaide, and also the Legislative CouncU vacancy, in consultation with 
such district committees of the party as had been formed.^ ^ 
As weU as this preselection activity, funds were accumulated — about 
£500 ($1,000) in 1891^"^ - and the platform revised. Not unexpectedly 
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the platform had grown and become more specific. Cessarion of land sales 
was now at the top of the list; eariy closing had been added; electoral law 
was now to be amended to permit greater faciUties for the transfer of 
electors from one district to another, to control election expenses, to 
redistribute Assembly seats on the basis of population, and to give the 
CouncU vote on the basis of a £10 ($20) rental. Immigration policy had 
also become more explicit: "Prohibiting the influx of Asiatic and servUe 
races, and restricting the introduction of immigrants bound to service 
before arrival in South Australia." Introduction of the referendum was 
called for, and also the creation of a state export department. As always 
wath the ULP, it was a series of poUtical and economic demands reflecting 
the sectional interests of the working classes.^ ^ 
The preparation of rules in January 1893 governmg the operation of 
district committees in each constUuency was a further step in the growth 
of the organization of the ULP.^^ Membership was open to any elector 
who would sign a declaration of support for the objects and platform of 
the party. Control of the district commUtees lay finally with the executive 
committees of the ULP. Local committees were provided for, ui the hope 
that these would be established in every subdivision. Their tasks were 
essentiaUy those of getting electors qualified, and to the poUs. The district 
committees were to have one representative on the executive of the party. 
Thus two sorts of orgaruzations now constituted the ULP - funcrional 
and territorial, urUons and district committees. This dual arrangement 
provided the potential for conflict, but nothing of this sort is recorded in 
the early years, a fact which emphasizes the unity of purpose and identity 
which had been achieved in launching the party. An unportant organiza-
tional and educational step taken by the party was the publication of a 
newspaper, the Weekly Herald, in 1894. The company was controlled by 
directors appointed by the ULP and UTLC. Its editorial and news cover-
age, though by no means revolutionary, provided an important ouflet for 
alternative poUtical commentary to the existing organs (Register, conserva-
tive;/I cfver/zser, liberal). 
The Weekly Herald carried frequent reports of the activities of the 
district committees. Based on the electoral boundaries, they were the key 
points at election time in cleansing the rolls and mobUizing the voters. 
They also provided for political education, and strengthened the numbers 
and hence the finances of the party, holding discussions of general and 
specific issues, and commenting on the performance of their parliamentary 
representatives. The best example of the working of such a committee is 
contained in three retrospective articles on the East Adelaide committee 
pubUshed in the Daily Herald in March 1919. Written from the minute 
books of the first ten years, the story begins on 20 March 1894 (though a 
commUtee to aid J. A. McPherson had operated in 1892). McPherson was 
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the first secretary of the committee. Meetings were held in the club rooms 
of the Democratic Club, FUnders Street, Adelaide, and later the Trades 
HaU. Canvassing was conducted in the Hindmarsh and Young Wards of the 
cUy. Election figures were analyzed to identify weaknesses in Labor voting 
patterns. Socials were held in the Selborne Hotel. The rolls were checked, 
party plebiscUes conducted, opinions expressed on proposed legislarion, 
and by 1899 two candidates, not one, were being run for the two member 
seat — a sign of the growing Labor dissatisfaction with the Kingstonite 
liberals. 
The terms of eligibUity for Labor candidates also became controversial 
when in July 1893 the exclusion of non-unionist members of the ULP was 
removed.^' This decision drew some criticism from union delegates, who 
feared for the independent existence of the party and their influence on U, 
and the matter was referred to a plebiscite.'^^ The result, dated by Wallis 
as 13 December 1894, gave 1,291 votes for the more exclusive and 99 for 
the more open version of the rule. Craig claims that this reversion to the 
original position raised a "storm of criticism". The only evidence found of 
this reaction is in a series of articles in the Weekly Herald in 1894 entitled 
"On the Track Towards Freedom". On 30 November 1894 the author, 
"Bluey", made his hostility plain: "The United Labor Party surely ought 
not to feel so strong that it can dispense with any section, or that it can in 
the end gain anything by Umiting its own field of choice." 
The more general attitude was a pragmatic recognition that both groups 
needed one another. Thus in practice, if the biographical data pubUshed in 
the Herald is to be relied on, there were occasional relaxations of the rule. 
As yet there were no district committees outside the metropolitan area. 
WhUe constituencies were contested outside this area, especiaUy for the 
Legislative CouncU, the ULP found it difficult to establish permanent 
bases in the rural hinterland of the colony. It was a problem to which the 
Herald turned its attention from time to time: by reporting the mass 
forays to such country centres as Mount Gambler of a party of speakers 
from Adelaide, by urging the organization of the country districts, and by 
editorial discussions of the true interests of the farmers.-^^ In effect, there-
fore, the ULP was an Adelaide-based party, wUh perhaps the ambition of 
doing something more. 
It was not geographical distribution, however, but the acquisUion and 
exercise of poUtical power which gave purpose and coherence to the ULP. 
Therefore the onrush of elections buUt up high peaks of party acrivity, to 
be followed by the endeavours of the men elected to parliament as the 
party's representatives. 
The ULP had a number of advantages in campaigning for the 1893 
elecrions beyond the organizational developments just reviewed. The 
depression was at its worst in the winter of 1892 and for months foUow-
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ing, with bank closures, a smaUer harvest, and the strike in Broken Hill all 
intensifying the depressed economic conditions in the colony. In parlia-
ment discontent saw the successive defeat of the Playford and Holder 
ministries in 1892. Downer, the thud premier of that year, faced the 
electors in April 1893 advocating nothUigmore than "a period of rest and 
quiet".^° In this fust election for the Assembly which the ULP contested, 
the party was able to exploit the momentum buUt up by its Legislative 
CouncU successes. Ten Assembly seats, and a fourth in the CouncU, were 
captured. Eight were Adelaide seats contested by ULP candidates, while 
Hooper (WaUaroo) and Poynton (Fluiders) identified themselves vwth the 
PLP when parUament assembled, even though they had signed no pledges. 
The much weakened Downer ministry was decisively defeated in the sub-
sequent no-confidence debate, and C. C. Kingston took office, with the 
enthusiastic, if mdependent, support of the Labor party. (See Appendix 1, 
p. 280 for election results, 1893-1921.) 
That the Labor members should have been so wUling to support Kings-
ton was not surprising. He was weU known as a radical liberal. He had 
often written approving letters to the UTLC.^' The Advertiser was the 
mouthpiece of liberal opinion in Adelaide in the 1890s. Its reaction to the 
ULP manifesto of 1893 shows that as yet it was not necessary to draw out 
the differences between Kingston's liberalism and the ambitions of the 
ULP: "There is much in the rest of the comprehensive platform v/ith 
which a moderate Liberal can warmly sympathise . . . we faU to detect any 
trace of undue radicalism in the proposals for workshop and factory legis-
lation, liens for the better protection of workmen's wages, the extension 
of the system of workmen's blocks and the further restriction of the 
importation of contract and servUe labour."''^ No doubt the edUorial says 
as much in its sUence on taxation and land poUcy as it does by Us outright 
approval of legislation of factory conditions. Nevertheless, Kingston's six 
years as premier saw the enactment of many radical pieces of legislation 
well suited to the demands of the ULP: women's franchise, industrial 
arbitration, a state bank, viUage settlements, the export department, work-
men's lien, factories regulation. His active public works programme helped 
to mitigate the effects of the depression. His public pronouncements and 
the poUcies he pursued make it plain that he actively supported wader 
government intervention in the affaus of the community with a view to 
greater poUtical and social justice. 
Kingston's position as a faction leader in these years was based on his 
obvious abiUty and his commitment to a range of radical-liberal pro-
posUions about the proper structuring of society. He was a lawyer from a 
respectable famUy, and a flamboyant character always anxious to 
dominate the poUtical Umelight. In the Assembly he was certain of about a 
dozen votes, and confronted by Downer's faction of about seventeen. 
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Another group (about fourteen) sometimes called the "Country party" -
a phrase more relevant to their electoral origins than any organizations -
generally preferred Kingston's brand of progressive-Uberal government to 
the stoUd unimaginative efforts on behalf of the wealthy and successful 
promoted by Downer. The PLP group of twelve now entered as a fourth 
main group in the House of Assembly. Obviously their support was im-
portant for Kingston's survival. But equally clear was the fact that for the 
ULP no alternative faction leader had anything like the same attractions as 
Kingston. Thus the modern notion of the "balance of power" which 
presumes an otherwise stable two-party system was irrelevant to the situa-
tion confronting the PLP in 1893. Instead, they had to deploy their 
strength as best they could in search of possible sectional advantages. It 
can be shown that theu numbers, in both Assembly and CouncU, criticaUy 
contributed to the passage, and sometimes also to the shape, of some, but 
only some, of Kingston's legislation. A few of the early enthusiasts for the 
ULP made much of these successes, claiming them all for the Labor 
party.^•^ But aUowance must be made for the propaganda intent of these 
pamphlets. On the other hand there is Uttle point in becoming too serious 
in revising these claims.^ "* Clearly the party publicists, in speaking and 
voting from their convictions about working-class demands, were support-
mg measures widely acclaimed in the community, so that Kingston could 
congratulate them at one point - unctuously? - for their "loyalty and 
devotion to the cause of liberalism". SunUarly Tom Price, a PLP member, 
spoke of the process as getting "a little, and then a Uttle more of what one 
wanted".^ ^  However, only one act originated by Labor members was 
enacted with at least some of the original provisions in the period 
1893-1900.^^ This was the Marine Board BiU of 1894. In a few other 
cases the votes of ULP members in divisions were critical to the passage of 
a bUl - the Adult Suffrage BiU of 1894, the ConcUiation BiU of 1894, the 
Factories BiU of 1894, Chinese Immigration Restriction BiU of 1891, and 
the Education Act Amendment BiU of 1891. Here then were the lUnUs of 
the parliamentary power of the ULP as they confronted the electors and 
parliament through the first decade of their existence in South AustraUa. 
They were a sectional group among the general body of liberals, another 
faction m the Assembly. 
Ill 
The elections of 1896 at which twelve seats were won, and 1899, eleven 
seats won, saw little increase in the share of seats held by the ULP in the 
Assembly, whUe m the CouncU the high-water mark of 1894 — six seats — 
was steadUy eroded. Economic conditions had improved; the incidents 
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which had encouraged working-class solidarity were less frequent; the 
bona-fides of Kingston's liberalism were coming to be questioned. More-
over, other politicians were coming to imitate Labor's organization, ui an 
attempt to minimize vote-wasting competition; for example, the National 
Defence League was formed in May 1891 by conservative politicians such 
as R. C. Baker, with the ULP as much as any other group in mind. Again, 
federation attracted much attention. It proved to be a proposition about 
which the ULP entertained grave doubts. FinaUy, election figures make it 
clear that the ULP was not continuing to mobiUze its supporters with the 
same effect as in 1893, whUe the more conservative poUticians had become 
more adept at extracting electoral advantage from their followers. Indeed, 
the National Defence League, aimed at achieving some extrapariiamentary 
support and legitimization for conservatism, was the sign of response, a 
recognition of the need to organize that yielded significant conservative 
victories by the end of the decade. Therefore, the late 1890s was a period 
of conservative reaction and loss of nerve among the liberal forces in South 
Australia. 
There were other, more particular, clues to the loss of momentum by 
the Labor party in these years. In the early 1890s the churches and the 
Labor party had scarcely intersected: a sign of the social, theoretical, and 
practical distance of the two groups. But at the 1896 and 1899 elections 
the issue of state aid for church schools was much discussed. It brought 
the ULP into disfavor with the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church. 
The Southern Cross, the newspaper of Adelaide Roman CathoUcs though 
not directly subject to dioscesan control, had spoken sympatheticaUy of 
the Labor party under the editorship of J. V. O'LoghUn.''^ But in 
1897—99, under pressure from the new archbishop (O'ReUy) and with a 
new editor, the paper was much harsher on the ULP. For the next few 
years the ULP was given little prominence, and often handled in a far from 
friendly manner. The ULP platform was described as "hardly within the 
limits of practical politics".^^ Ironically, the successor to O'Loghlui under 
whom this policy was carried out was W. J. Denny, who had worked as a 
telegraphist, then trained as a lawyer. He succeeded Kingston as the 
member for West Adelaide as an independent Liberal in 1902, and a Uttle 
later joined the ULP. He was elected for the seat of Adelaide in elections 
from 1905 tUl 1933. He served as attorney general in the Labor govern-
ments of 1910-12, 1924-27, and 1930-33. 
The platform of 1896 was Uttle different from that of 1893. "Mortga-
gors UabUity Umitation biU", "encouragement and development of the 
mining industry", and "federation on a democratic basis" had been 
added.^^ The platform to which exception was taken m 1899 by the 
Southern Cross expUcitly caUed for household suffrage for the Legislative 
CouncU; the department of labour was to be "extended" (U having been 
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created by the Factories Act); tramways were now to be state-owned; 
"State insurance", "old age pensions", and "in favour of any equUable and 
reasonable claims of women for the amendment of the laws" had been 
added; and the plank on the Commonwealth referred now to "union" "on 
a democratic basis".'*'* 
DespUe the fact that state aid was an open question in the ULP, during 
the 1899 election campaign Archbishop O'ReUy aUeged that "the tyranny 
of the Labor leaders was the worst tyranny from which Catholics suffered 
in South Australia".'*' This was foUowed by an exchange of invective 
between the Southern Cross and the Weekly Herald during May 1899. 
Whether Roman Catholic working-class voters were thereby constrained 
from supporting ULP candidates remains unproven. Denny's success in the 
heart of working-class Adelaide as a Liberal in 1902 suggests that perhaps 
this was the case.^^ 
The role of the other churches in aiding or resisting the ULP was 
minimal. With the exception of J. V. O'Loghlin in the Southern Cross, 
"the churches showed only a moderate incUnation to speak out on behalf 
of the working man in the conflict between capital and labour or to 
advocate the poUcies of the Labor party".^^ There was some clerical 
intervention on behalf of the workers during the maritime strike.'*^ There 
are few other clues, as church spokesmen, whether from disinterest or 
convictions, remained virtually sUent on the Labor movement, or spoke 
incautiously, only to be criticized roundly by the Herald. 
Another incident dramatized and contributed to the weakening 
position of the ULP. It was the fracas surrounding the exit of 
D. M. Charieston from the party in 1897."*^ Charieston had become un-
acceptable to many members of the party because of his repeated faUure 
to support caucus decisions about party voting in the Legislative CouncU. 
First E. A. Roberts, the member for Gladstone, and then Tom Price, the 
member for Sturt, publicly accused him of disloyalty to the party. Charges 
and explanations flew back and forth. Charieston withdrew from the 
party, resigned his Legislative CouncU seat, and in a hotly contested 
election, which included the publication of telegrams from Kingston con-
demning Charieston, he defeated the ULP candidate by 762 votes in a 50 
per cent poU. It was distressing, and it showed the need for continuing 
cohesion and loyalty in the party. 
Meanwlule the parliamentary situation at last began to change. At the 
commencement of the 1898 session, the first no-confidence motion which 
Kingston had faced as premier was tabled. The Weekly Herald greeted the 
motion with an editorial distinctly cool to Kingston, criticizing him for 
mere talk, for legislation actively supported by the opposition, and for an 
attUude of supercUious confidence.'*^ W.O.Archibald, E. L. Batchelor, 
and Tom Price, the PLP spokesmen in the House of Assembly, echoed the 
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Herald's remarks, making it clear that the Labor party could conceive of 
limits to their support of Kingston. Archibald argued that "the time had 
arrived when he and there were others with him felt somethmg more than 
an ordinary remonstrance should be made".'*' Batchelor, who was born m 
Adelaide, and who had succeeded McPherson as PLP leader, listed his 
dissatisfaction with the Closer Settlement Act, the Factories, Employer's 
UabUity, and Workmen's Lien Acts, and demanded action on direct taxa-
tion and early closing. He refused to have aU the unpopular acts of the 
government heaped on the ULP, and stated the mtention of his party "to 
take a more independent position".'*^ A succession of amendments to the 
motion found the Labor party in a minority against Kingston, who was 
therefore being supported by Downer's opposition group, but when 
Downer's original chaUenge at last came to the vote the Labor party voted 
against it and in support of Kingston. In the end they realized Kingston 
was preferable to the known hostUity of Downer, Baker, and the National 
Defence League. 
Possibly as a response to this check, Kingston became active once more 
on the issue of Legislative CouncU reform. During the 1898 and 1899 
sessions he introduced biUs providing for the drastic widening of its 
franchise. Both were passed by the Assembly and one defeated in the 
CouncU, after much angry debate. In November 1899 Kingston applied to 
the governor for a double dissolution based on the CouncU's actions, past 
and anticipated, but was refused. FoUowmg this, two Labor members, A. 
Poynton and Roberts, both representing country electorates, transformed 
the political situation when they crossed the floor to defeat the Kingston 
ministry.^^ V. Solomon, another of Kingston's opponents, formed an 
admirustration but on its first appearance in the House of Assembly a few 
days later it too was brought down. Roberts had switched again, though 
Poynton remained firm in his opposition to Kingston.^*' 
In the recriminations which followed^' it emerged that Roberts and 
Poynton felt no commitment to the ULP organization: after aU they had 
not signed its pledge, and were confident of theu standmg with their 
electorates, independent of the city-based ULP. But they had acted with 
the ULP men in the PLP caucus up to this point. Probably they reflected 
Labor party anger with Kingston, who had brought matters to a stalemate, 
and who was threatening parliament with an unwanted election. The alter-
natives for the PLP were either to support Kingston in his intransigence or 
to see Solomon drop CouncU reform altogether. Poynton and Roberts, by 
first defeating Kingston, contrary to the final caucus decision, and then 
Solomon (in Roberts's case), opened the way for another solution. By 
accepting appointment to the delegation proceeding to London to 
negotiate on the Commonwealth of Australia BiU, Kingston withdrew 
from the scene. Holder, long his Ueutenant, formed the new ministry on 
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the basis of a modified plan to reform the CouncU and talk of an election 
was dropped. This the Labor party decided to accept, as well as the 
appointment of their leader, E. L. Batchelor, as minister of education. 
Why the PLP tolerated Batchelor's elevation is not clear. The party had no 
particular commitment to that portfolio, although there is evidence that 
Batchelor himself had already developed a substantial uiterest in this 
subject. Perhaps too Batchelor was anxious for his own prospects; more 
probably, the PLP calculated they would have a greater influence over the 
government through Batchelor. But the unpleasantness aroused by these 
incidents did the parliamentary Labor party little good. Poynton was no 
longer a member; Roberts was suspect; Batchelor's motives in accepting 
office could be called into question, and his services as leader were lost. It 
was not a happy moment for the party. 
Tom Price, who was elected by caucus to succeed Batchelor, was a 
conscientious man who evoked great loyalty and feeUng in the party, both 
during his Ufe and as a legend since his death in 1909. He was born ui 
Wales in 1852 and grew up in the slums of Liverpool. As a boy he attended 
a Wesleyan Methodist Sunday School, and remained an ardent Methodist 
aU his life. In this he was representative of a significant proportion of the 
ULP in South Australia. He was also a vigorous and lifelong temperance 
advocate. Price foUowed his father's trade of stonemasonry and was an 
employer of ten to twenty men at one stage. In Liverpool he had joined 
the liberal Reform Association. In 1883 he migrated with high hopes to 
Australia on medical advice, but arrived just as South Australia was drift-
ing into twenty-five years of economic stagnation. His capital resources 
were swallowed up in land whose value promptly plummeted, and soon he 
was searching for employment as a stonecutter agam. By 1890 he was 
representing the Bricklayers and Masons' Society in the UTLC. The scanty 
evidence avaUable suggests that he continued to take a concUiatory and 
co-operative attitude towards employers, as a man of practical common 
sense and perhaps as the classic petit-bourgeois seeking upward mobilUy. 
He entered the House of Assembly in 1893 with the first wave of Labor 
men, there claiming that "he was not ashamed to be a delegate of . . . 
labour . . ."^^ Like most of his ULP colleagues, he was at pains to 
dissociate himself from European sociaUsm, which to him was revolution-
ary and anarchic. This did not prevent hun, again in a manner typical of 
the ULP, from advocating control over such public services as the post 
office, or sewers, such functions as would assist producers in time of need 
— e.g. the state bank and the produce department.^ ^ 
Again in tune with his coUeagues, Price expressed his growing dis-
enchantment with the Kingston ministry during the 1898 no-confidence 
debate, claimuig that the bureaucrats were being aUowed by ministers to 
ignore the proper claims of the working classes.^'' He repeated his 
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criticisms in the Crown Lands Amendment BiU debate of October 1898 
and during the Loan BiU debate in December 1898, accusing the "great 
apostle of public works in times of depression [i.e. Kingston] [of] backing 
down".^^ He entered into his task as leader, therefore, very much the 
spokesman and representative of the ULP of the 1890s. 
An issue on which the ULP experienced difficulty in the 1890s was 
federation.^ ^ The UTLC had been cautious about the 1891 draft constitu-
tion. By 1896 the party platform called for federation on a democratic 
basis.^' Four ULP parliamentarians (McPherson, Batchelor, McGregor, 
and Charleston) were run in the liberal (or Advertiser) federal convention 
ticket, but none was elected: instead four Liberals and six candidates 
supported by the National Defence League were successful. In AprU 1898 
the ULP convened a meeting in opposition to the proposed constitution, 
caUing for a unitary state, the abolition of the Senate, and firm guarantees 
of Uiterstate free trade.^^ In the referendum, thougli the total South 
Australian vote was in favour of federation, there were large concentra-
tions of negative votes, and some of these were ui centres of Labor 
strength in Adelaide, where economic interests clearly seemed threatened 
by federation.^^ The basically urban Labor party's suspicions had been 
overborne in the vote by middle-class and rural enthusiasm. It was dispirit-
ing for the ULP, and what is more the Charieston affair was to emerge out 
of the debacle of the convention elections. 
The poUtics of the first years of the new century brouglit out into the 
open the relative accession of political strength by the Conservatives. 
G. C. Kingston's Legislative CouncU seat (which he had gained in a 
contrived by-election aimed at putting him back into pariiament after his 
return from England), vacated in his move to federal politics, was won by 
a Conservative; nor was the seat Charleston held, likewise vacated, regained 
for the ULP. In the first federal elections Batchelor was successful, but 
Price was not. Batchelor was not replaced in the state cabinet by another 
Labor man. As the state by-election results came in, U was clear the ULP 
had lost one seat in each house. The Herald emphasized the financial 
strength of opposing candidates, poor organization, and community 
reaction to the effects of the Early Closing Act. In addition, there was an 
obvious lack of excitement in these elections, reinforced by then 
frequency and the accumulating effects of defeat on Labor supporters. But 
worse was to come. One widely canvassed proposal in 1901 was a reduc-
tion m the number of state poUticians now that federation had been 
achieved. The 1902 general elections were held after legislation to this 
effect, and the accompanying electoral boundary adjustments had been 
made. Labor's strength dropped from ten seats in a house of fifty-four to 
five seats out of forty-two. 
Labor supporters did not hesitate, meanwhUe, to express their in-
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creasing disUke for Kingston's heirs. Even Holder had become suspect 
before he left for federal poUtics. He was accused of "spUieless inconsist-
ency" in yielding important clauses of a Workmen's Compensation BUl 
under pressure from the opposition, despite the support given by the ULP 
to keep him in office, and of postporung aU controversial measures.^^ 
Batchelor, (at this point stUl in state politics) voting with cabinet col-
leagues, was called on to resign. 
Jenkins, Holder's successor as premier, proved even less satisfactory. His 
reduction in the number of legislators was viewed criticaUy, as was his 
opposition to adult franchise in the CouncU. What is more, it was now 
clear that the opposition and some unattached Liberals were keeping 
Jenkins in office. "The Government play at liberalism without a shadow of 
its reaUty in their hearts."^' Tom Price joined the Herald during the 
election campaign in AprU 1902 in castigating Jenkins for seUing out to 
the Conservatives.^^ The 1902 and 1903 parliamentary sessions were little 
better. The Herald's strong language expressed the stark political realities 
confronting the small band of Labor men in parliament, and the frustra-
tion it meant to the ULP: 
This session of Parliament wUl be chiefly memorable for the in-
famous conduct of Jenkins and the members of his Ministry who 
have been false to their political faith, despicable traitors to their 
country, and cringingly subservient tools of the National Defence 
League and of John Darling, its parliamentary chief. The one great 
gain in bringing the session to an early close is not that thereby there 
will be any saving of expense to the country worth considering 
. . . the real gain wUl be that opportunity wiU be shut off for doing 
any further political mischief in carrying out the reactionary policy 
of that notoriously vUe firm of political humbugs - JerUcins, DarUng 
&Co ^^ 
Price took the initiative at the beginning of the 1903 session in expres-
sing this angry frustration at Jenkins's administration. He spoke "through 
Hansard as a Liberal to the country", for he knew his party must rebuUd a 
wide electoral appeal. He called on the opposition to accept the responsi-
bUity of governing now that they were the largest party in the House. '^^  
The task lay before them: their opposition was cleariy defined. The chal-
lenge was to revitalize the ULP. 
IV 
During 1903-4 such a resurgence was achieved as the party struck out 
in search of an independent identity. At the organizational level eariy signs 
and causes of this revival were the ULP CouncU decisions that candidates 
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would be bound by referendums held by the party, and by majority votes 
of councU and caucus.^ ^  There was discussion in 1900 about a proposal 
moved by Frank Lundie (of whom more later) to forbid members of the 
PLP joining a ministry unless it contained a majority of Labor members, 
but no firm decisions were made.^^ The 1902 elections drew the usual 
invitations by the Herald and the UL^ CouncU to subscribe funds, select 
candidates, offer amendments to the platform, stUnulate local effort, and 
mobUize voters on election day.^' The party's manifesto for the 1902 
election, after reviewing past achievements, placed Legislative CouncU 
reform, i.e. adult franchise and a provision to deal with deadlocks between 
the houses, at the head of the Ust. It is notable that two other planks 
which were to become persistently contentious issues over the next twenty 
years had been added to the platform - clearly a sign that the party was 
updating its demands. These were for "concUiation and compulsory 
arbitration" and a "minimum wage of 7s. [70 cents] per day for aU adult 
males employed by the State or on State Contracts". Other changes in the 
platform from 1899 were: the tariff, labour department, immigration, rent 
distramt, and federation clauses dropped; state ownership now to extend 
to the wharves; the Early Closing, Workmen's Liens, Wages Boards and 
Workmen's Compensation Acts were all to be amended.^* 
In the wake of the 1902 election a committee was appointed by the 
councU of the ULP to advise it on the best means of reviving interest in the 
party. Its report was received in August that year, but no further action 
was taken. The secretary (F. W. Coneybeer, member for East Torrens, later 
minister of education in the 1910 Labor government, and then Speaker) 
had to lament in September 1904 that a Legislative CouncU seat had been 
lost. He was "sorry so many of the working people did not take the 
trouble to turn out and record their vote . . ."^^ 
But signs of resurgence at last began to appear. At the federal elections 
in December 1903 Labor won aU three South Australian Senate vacancies 
with 51 per cent of the vote. The reasons for this success probably relate 
to federal politics. However, it could be evidence of the true balance of 
votes overall in the state, when unaffected by franchise and boundary 
constraints. A significant decision was taken on 14 January 1904, to 
establish a committee charged with orgarUzing country branches. This 
decision was foUowed in subsequent months by reports of visits, speeches, 
and new branches. Even more momentous was the decision taken in March 
1904, on the recommendation of that organizing committee, to convene 
an annual conference whose main purpose would be "to definitely fix the 
Labor Platform" (for up to this pouit the councU adopted the platform, 
which was usually written by ad hoc sub-committees dominated by parUa-
mentarians). To permit the attendance of country delegates, the confer-
ence would be held during Show week, normally early ui September. Here 
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was the sign of Labor's organizational advance outside Adelaide, and a real 
attempt to broaden the party's base of support beyond its urban industrial 
core. 
WUh the approach of the 1904 session, evidence began to accumulate 
that the poUtical sUuation was about to change. There was a meeting at 
Gawler of "unattached liberals" (mostly parliamentarians representing 
rural electorates), the tone of which was critical of the government. The 
Weekly Herald looked with mUd approval at this expression of discontent 
with Jenkins, though it urged a clear-cut two-party arrangement.'° These 
"Liberals", as they called themselves, naUed their colours to the mast very 
soon after parliament met by moving a sudden-death adjournment motion 
on 13 July 1904. The PLP were unwilling to yield the initiative, and, 
preferring to have a fuU-dress no-confidence debate, voted to support the 
Jenkins government.'' Price argued that discussion was necessary in order 
that Dariing's Conservatives could be made to take responsibUity for 
supporting Jenkins. A UtUe later m the address-m-reply debate, both 
A. H. Peake, leader of these country Liberals, and Price moved no-
confidence motions which were dealt with on 28 July. The breakaway 
Liberal group's motion was lost seventeen to twenty and the Labor party's 
was defeated eighteen to nineteen, both groups supporting the two chal-
lenges to the government. 
The ULP's first annual conference convened on 8 September 1904.'^ It 
carried out the annual executive elections, hitherto conducted at a councU 
meeting. It also considered the platform, and a virtually new set of rules 
constituting the structure of the party. The sixty-two delegates attending 
the conference Ulustrated the organizational development of the party. 
The list published in the Herald included thUty-three delegates represent-
ing twenty-seven unions, the parliamentarians, and nineteen district 
branches. There were fourteen delegates representing organizations outside 
Adelaide. (DetaUs of attendance at ULP conferences 1904—20 are shown 
in Appendix 2, p. 282.) 
The evidence that this conference was dominated by the desUe to work 
out an organizational and ideological compromise with the country voters 
is very strong. Not only, as we have seen, was its convening stated to be for 
this purpose, but also both platform and rules were altered to give signifi-
cant expression to the country point of view. Moreover, in view of the 
later criticisms of the United Labourers' Union (ULU) and the Australian 
Workers' Union (AWU), the country voters who were being wooed m 1904 
were clearly the small farmers. 
The platform was specificaUy divided into a fighting and a general 
section. Changes were considerable: there were now twenty-six planks 
instead of sixteen. The emphasis of flie 1890s on a single-tax approach to 
land and finance, which had even survived the demands of trade unionists 
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for protection against foreign goods, was decisively reversed. The land tax 
clause was altered from one calling for an overaU uicrease in the land tax 
to one proposing a progressive land tax. Provision for the repurchase of 
large estates and a demand for a more equitable system in the aUotment of 
Crown lands were both inserted. In aU of this the desUe to win over the 
smaU farmer can be seen, set against the famUiar Henry George doctrines 
so hostUe to land alienation, so confident of the land as the source of aU 
revenue. 
Other developments in the platform to be noted were the introduction 
of a clause in the fighting platform calling for the "public ownership and 
control of aU raUways, tramways and wharves", another for the "abolition 
of the Legislative CouncU, faUing that, adult suffrage for both houses". 
This latter clause was a significant step forward, an expression of the 
growuig anger of the ULP with the Legislative CouncU. Then foUowed the 
significantly altered plank calling for a "compulsory concUiation and 
arbitration bUl". Borrowing for public purposes was to cease, in line with 
the depression experience of crushing govemment debt burdens. 
The additional planks in the general platform included another country 
flavour — "conservation of Murray River water for irrigation and naviga-
tion", together with such new matter as "abolition of plural voting in 
municipal elections", "maintenance and extension of present system of 
education", "amendments of Food and Drugs Act with a view to better 
safeguarding the public health", and "Amendment of Landlord and 
Tenant Act, to place aU creditors on an equal basis". 
It was a much stronger set of demands. It was much broader ui its 
reference. In particular, three of the seven planks of the fightuig platform 
were about country problems. Moreover, it was a platform committing the 
party to a much greater degree of imperative government action, and one 
in which the ameliorative qualUy of the party's outlook, its eclectic search 
for social justice, can be seen. 
The controls exercised by the party over its parliamentary representa-
tives were not changed: but the internal organization was. The summoning 
of an annual conference was provided for. The executive committee of the 
party was abolished — though not the executive offices. A scale of repre-
sentation for conference was laid down in which country local branches 
were specifically provided for on flie same scale as affiliated organizations. 
In addition electorate committees (of which three were city, and nine were 
country) were given one delegate each to conference. The newly arrived 
country delegates were treated generously. The councU was now to be 
made up of delegates from affiliates, again including country local 
branches, together wdth four delegates per electorate committee. Also 
given membership of the councU were the executive officers and members 
of parUament, and each local committee; on the other hand, two original 
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constitutive organizations, the pariiamentary committees of the UTLC and 
the Port Adelaide District Trades and Labor CouncU (TLC) lost theu 
representation. The conference was to settle the platform and the party's 
constitution, the councU acting in its name for the rest of the year. 
Country branches were given a large degree of autonomy, includmg the 
right to decide on their own candidates, and were only required to pay 
threepence (two cents) per member annuaUy to the central fund, which 
was one quarter of the normal affUiation fee per member. This last pro-
vision was carried only narrowly, pointing to the limits some of the exist-
ing members of the party were sensing in the search for country support. 
In this way the ULP spread the roots of its support much more broadly. 
The danger of the effect of a junta ruling the party — especially the 
executive committee — was removed. The essential supremacy of a broadly 
democratic annual conference was affirmed. The leading strings of the 
UTLC were broken, a substantial increase in the representation of non-
urUon affUiates was provided for, and a real attempt had been made to 
reach the country areas, without winch the party could never hope to gam 
a majority in its own right. 
Thus strengthened through mutual encouragement, the party faced the 
prospects of an election in 1905 with confidence. They watched as Peake 
pressed his position as leader of the opposition in the face of a specific 
coalition by Jenkins and the Conservatives led by Darling which led to a 
reconstruction of the ministry on 4 July 1904. They joined Peake v/iUingly 
on 9 November 1904 to vote twenty-one to seventeen in favour of a biU 
for the reform of the Legislative CouncU against the wishes of the govern-
ment. It faUed for want of an absolute majority of the whole house.'^ 
During December and January four lengthy articles entitled "The Labor 
Movement" appeared in the Weekly Herald, exuding the sense of con-
fidence and the sense of national responsibUity, rather than mere Adelaide 
trade society sectionalism, which now pervaded the party. The auguries 
continued to be good. Jenkins resigned as premier and went off to London 
as agent general. Richard Butler, once a Kingstonite, took over as premier, 
leading a ministry which was, like Butler, becoming more conservative.''* 
Tom Price, therefore, had much to attack in his election speech of 26 
AprU 1905, which the Herald ran under the banner, "The Fight for 
Justice". He castigated the rush for jobs among government supporters 
(referring to the two cabinet members, Jenkins as agent general, and 
Homburg as judge in the Supreme Court), and attacked Darling's Conserva-
tives for their hidden support for Jenkins. He proudly proclaUned the 
public and democratic way in which the Labor party made its decisions. 
He scorned Butler's election policy as one of "drift, bluff and deception". 
His main proposal was for Legislative Council reform. For the rest his 
speech was buUt on the party platform. The report of his peroration ran: 
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"The policy of the Labor Party was one of development and progress, and 
they would not be frightened by the nonsense that had been talked about 
Socialism. The Labor Party stood for expansion of business as far as South 
Australia was concerned, and they meant to bring about prosperity and 
honest govemment. . . The bluff and misstatements of their opponents 
would not impede the triumph of the Labor Party." Here was the leader of 
the only really organized political party in South Australia appealing for 
support from the whole community. 
The Jenkins and Butler administrations had been facing a difficiUt 
economic situation and, as m the early 1890s (and again in 1914—15), the 
ULP was to gain electorally from the effects of the situation. The 1 9 0 3 ^ 
fiscal year yielded a government shortfaU of £32,000 ($64,000) m 
£2,543,000 ($5,086,000) expended. Savage drought had struck the 
northem areas in 1901—2, and the wheat harvests of 1901—2 and 1902—3 
were poor. Metal prices also fell by 15 per cent. To these difficulties the 
government responded with an. economy drive which won them few 
friends among retrenched public servants, overworked school teachers, and 
unemployed day-labourers. 
The Jenkins government had also exposed itself to ridicule and con-
demnation over proposals to hand the city's tramways over to a private 
business, and for another to buUd a light raUway to Darwin in return for 
90 million acres of freehold land. With Unprudent and quixotic proposals 
of this sort, together with the accusation of subservience to Darluig'S 
Conservatives hung about them, Bufler's followers could make little head-
way in the election campaign. Some effort to raise the bogey of socialism 
was made, but it had Uttle effect. 
The disarray of the non-Labor groups was evident ui the fragmented 
way the elections were contested. The results saw Labor's strength rise 
from five to fifteen, eighteen Conservatives gathered around Butler, whUe 
Peake called himself the leader of eight Liberals. Price and Peake promptly 
entered into negotiations for a coalition government. The Labor party had 
faUed in this election to gain enough seats to fulfil its aim of governing in 
its own right, but increased strength meant that the day of pressure-group 
manoeuvring for support in return for concessions was over. After he was 
defeated on the floor of the house, not by one but two sudden-death 
motions in which fifteen Labor men and nine Liberals voted against 
seventeen Conservatives, Butler resigned.'^ Tom Price introduced himself 
as premier on 27 July 1905. The terms of the coalition between the PLP 
and Peake's Liberals were important. Price made it clear he and Kirk-
patrick (chief secretary) were not binding the Labor party by entering the 
government. They had been given a free hand by the PLP, but, foUowing 
the precedent adopted by Batchelor, they ceased to attend the party 
caucus. The Weekly Herald explained that, whUe the PLP approved of 
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Price's actions, U was not in coalition with any other party: " . . .The 
Labor Party accepts no responsibUity for ministerial actions . . . there is no 
more official connection between Party and Ministry than there was 
between the Party and the Kingston team, or that led by Mr. Holder which 
included Labor member Batchelor . . ."'^ To this extent the party con-
tinued Us practice of acting as a pressure group rather than as the govern-
ment. The opportunity was being taken to exploU the situation for what it 
was worth. It was probably Price himself who was most enthusiastic for 
the arrangement, and it was probably loyalty to Price which led the PLP to 
trust hun. 
. From Peake's point of view it was a good bargain. Two of the four 
cabinet posts were his. He emphasized the common sympathy of the two 
groups, and that the differences were those of speed, not principle. The 
two groups agreed to put forward the Liberal proposal on Legislative 
CouncU reform of a £15 ($30) franchise and the dual vote. This suggests 
the anxiety of the PLP to secure immediate reform of the CouncU. The 
two groups agreed to push it to a double dissolution if need b e . " Beyond 
that main proposal was a range of unproving plans drawn from the 
common stock of aspirations in the two parties, including an extra 
minister of the Crown, closer settlement, expansion of the government 
produce department, arranging the Commonwealth's takeover of the 
Northern Territory, establishing irrigation colonies, extended credit for 
farmers, extended land tax, a cautious public works programme, amend-
ments to the Workmen's Compensation and Factories Acts, legal appeal on 
the River Murray arrangements, compulsory school attendance, a food and 
drugs bUl, and an increase in the number of judges. 
It was reform of the Legislative CouncU which had provided the 
common ground in the elections and for the coalition. It dominated parlia-
ment's proceedings for the life of the ministry. During the 1905 session a 
number of minor acts were passed, but the CouncU would only amend, not 
accept, the reform biU. Moreover it threw out bUls on compulsory re-
purchases, factories, judges' appoUitment, land value assessment, taxation, 
and municipal tramways, and caused the shelving of bUls on the state 
savings bank and an increase in the number of ministers. It was not sur-
prising therefore that the 1906 session was convened early, to deal with 
the reform bill once more. On its further defeat by the CouncU, a double 
dissolution was granted to Price and the 1906 election was fought on the 
issue of CouncU reform. 
To the ULP conference in September 1905 the Price-Peake government 
presented something of a challenge. Before it were resolutions from the 
interstate conference urging that no aUiances be undertaken beyond an 
existing parliament, that no promises of electoral immunUy be made, and 
that cabmets be elected by the caucus. The proposal on aUiances was 
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accepted, but that on cabinet construction was not.'^ For the rest, this 
conference was a quiet gathering; it agreed not to alter the platform, whUe 
much consideration was given to the prospects of a daily paper. 
Twelve months later the party conference heard Price hammer the im-
portance of Council reform again. It was a good raUying cry. The 107 
delegates were also informed that twenty-seven new branches and com-
mittees and four more trade unions had affiliated, all signs of continuing 
expansion of the party organization in response to the work of Price and 
his colleagues.'^ 
The elections held on 3 November 1906 were brought on specifically to 
test the issue of reform in the CouncU. The ULP increased its strength 
from fifteen to nineteen, and the Liberals theirs from nine to ten, but in 
the CouncU conservative strength remained unaffected. This obviously 
meant that the movement for parliamentary reform was blocked by the 
existing CouncU franchise, for the constitution provided no further 
solution but mutual agreement, despUe the victory of the reformers in the 
lower house. 
This indeed was the Une taken by Price ui the 1907 pariiamentary 
session after yet another rebuff from the CouncU. A conference of the two 
houses produced agreement that a referendum of Legislative CouncU 
voters would be held, and the vote would be binding.^^ The Labor party's 
leader, Archibald, had already made the PLP position clear, that aU other 
business should be laid aside and a double dissolution pressed for if the 
CouncU resisted.^' Price was disappointing the party, frustrated as he was 
by the balance of votes, but the PLP alone was poweriess to impose 
Legislative CouncU reform. 
Despite the stalemate on CouncU reform, the achievements of the Price-
Peake government were stiU considerable. The administration was helped 
by good rain and good harvests after 1906. The community responded to 
the improving economic conditions with a higher marriage and birth rate, 
and a halt to the surplus of emigration over immigration. The treasurer 
therefore could report government revenues in surplus in 1906. But this 
did not lead Price and Peake into a generous public works programme. 
They preferred to redeem some of the state's outstanding debts, and to 
live on revenue alone — an attitude best understood in the light of the 
extensive and possibly ill-judged borrowing of the 1880s and 1890s, which 
meant heavy interest burdens and repayments. Price was proud (if in-
consistent) that a debt redemption loan of £1.5m ($3m) was successfuUy 
floated in Australia on South Australian securities during 1908. 
A field that saw hesitation and compromise was taxation. The ULP was 
committed to the policy of progressive land taxation and compulsory 
repurchase of large estates, both aimed at breaking up large estates and 
thus helping the smaU farmers. The CouncU rejected such moves, in 1905 
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and 1908, whUe L. O'Loughlin, the Liberal commissioner of Crown lands 
made clear his party's opposition even to ceasing sale of Crown lands. 
But the Liberals did accept the govemment's decisive reversal of the 
Butler plan to turn the transport system of Adelaide over to private enter-
prise. The MetropoUtan Tramways Trust was the result. It was a piece of 
practical government action. EquaUy positive and practical was the 
development of the Outer Harbour to provide facUities for much larger 
vessels than could use the Port River. So was the decision to commence 
weir-construction on the Murray, rather than wait for the finalization of 
the agreement with New South Wales, Victoria, and the Commonwealth. 
At the urging of the trade unions, the Factories Act in 1906 included the 
creation of wages boards. This decision reflected Price's belief in the 
possibUity of amicable relations between employers and employees in 
each industry without the interference of the govemment: " . . . every 
trade must be alive to its own uiterests, it must keep employers up to 
scratch, and not use the Government as a whip to do it."^^ 
Again in a practical vein were the decisions on the Northern Territory 
and education. Price reached agreement with Deakin in February 1907, by 
which the Commonwealth agreed to take over the Northern Territory, 
assume responsibUity for its debt, and take over the Port Augusta to 
Oodnadatta railway and link it with a line from Darwin. He then pushed 
the agreement through parliament in October against the criticisms of 
Butler that it was a loose, "grossly unfair" settlement. The important 
pouit was that it was a settlement of a burden long borne by South 
Australia.*^ 
Price as minister of education took one important though controversial 
step. He appointed Alfred WUliams, headmaster of Norwood school, as 
director of education, ignoring the claims of several more senior officers. 
WUliams's tenure was to be brief, for he died in 1913, exhausted by his 
efforts. But under him a considerable reform of the attitudes and stand-
ards in the South Australian education service was achieved. It was Price's 
contribution, having selected WUliams, to support hun to the fuU.^ ^ 
During much of 1908 the ULP, lUce the government, were fairly quiet. 
Price was overseas, largely in an attempt to recover his health. In April, the 
ULP discussed in regretful terms, the departure of Kirkpatrick to London 
as agent general, whUe in July U was ruled that unionists were entitled to 
automatic membership of the party electoral committee of their district. It 
was a hint of tension between two forces wUhin the party. At the annual 
conference something simUar seemed to be in the air: selection of candi-
dates was to be put in the hands of the electorate committees whUe the 
CouncU would retain a right of veto (if the constUuent branches approved 
the proposals). There was also a hint of dissatisfaction with the PLP in the 
resolution requiring the PLP to report back to conference on all matters 
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referred to it.^^ Both these proposals seem to be eyidence that the trade 
unionists, and especially the representatives of the general unions, were 
becoming suspicious of the politicians and of the influence of the local or 
non-union membership of the party. The coalition of the 1890s had in-
cluded middle-class radicals. Now they were being chaUenged: the cres-
cendo was yet to come. 
Politics received a sharp jolt with the untimely but not unexpected 
death of Tom Price on 31 May 1909. A generous, though liberal, tribute 
was paid by the Advertiser, on 1 June 1909: 
One of South Australia's ablest and most useful public men . . . One 
of the remarkable feats that Mr. Price accomplished was that of 
securing general confidence without sacrificing avowed principles. 
He was too clear-headed to be led away by fantastic schemes for 
revolutionizing society, but he alUed himself with progressive move-
ments . . . [his] sympathetic interest in his fellow-workers was 
developed as a necessary consequence but he never lowered himself 
to the level of a demagogue. He knew what to do and what to leave 
undone, how far to go, and when it was good policy to accept a 
compromise. 
The ULP had lost an able, intensely practical, and very attractive parlia-
mentary leader. Caucus elected John Verran to succeed Price. Verran was 
born in CornwaU in 1856 and was brought to South Australia at the tender 
age of seven months. He grew up to be a copper miner at Moonta. He held 
various posts in the Amalgamated Miners' Association (AMA), and Uke 
many Cornish miners was a Primitive Methodist, a lay preacher, and a 
RechabUe. The PLP would only continue the coalition government 
arrangement with Peake if a Labor member were premier, sUice theirs was 
the larger party. But Peake, already actUig premier, refused. Caucus also 
wanted the ministry to commit itself to inserting in the constitution a 
deadlock clause simUar to section 57 of the Commonwealth constitution. 
This, too, Peake would not accept. He negotiated adroitly, forming a new 
ministry from among his own nine foUowers ("the nimble nine") alone, 
and when parliament convened was able to indicate than an arrangement 
had been reached with Richard Butler. The Conservatives had promised 
general support for the session, at the end of which a coalition govemment 
would be formed.^ ^ 
This loss of power, this unceremonious dumping, was frustrating and 
disappouiting for the ULP. The ULP CouncU approved the action of the 
PLP, beUeving that Peake had broken the arrangement reached in 1905. 
The Weekly Herald pointed out that Peake had exploited the advantage of 
his position as acting premier whUe Price was overseas.*' Peake had 
meanwhile been actively promoting the affaus of the Liberal and 
Democratic Union, and according to the Herald, presenting its policy as 
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that of the government. This the Herald angrily rejected. So was Peake's 
argument that the ULP had destroyed the coahtion. 
The break was probably inevitable. Price had been the uniting force m 
the coalUion, and now he was gone. Peake's liberalism must have found 
the limits of its radicalism: the attraction of continued office as premier 
proved to be too great. The Conservatives under Bufler knew they once 
again could exercise the balance of power. So now the Labor party was the 
official opposition, in the words of the Herald, "watchful, strong, and 
united . . . We trust that Labor wUl henceforth attend exclusively to its 
own affairs straining every nerve to make the Party's Policy something 
more than a printed leaflet."** The evolution of the party as an inde-
pendent political force, the alternative government, was now complete. It 
remained for it to win power at the poUs. That as yet has never fuUy 
eventuated in South Australia, for the Legislative CouncU continues to be 
controUed by Labor's opponents. But a majorUy in the House of 
Assembly, and the treasury benches were to prove withUi their grasp. 
The remaining months of 1909 were much taken up with manoeuvres 
by Peake to achieve a similarly united party organization to confront the 
ULP.*^ His own Liberal and Democratic Union had to negotiate wdth the 
Australasian National League (R. C. Baker's National Defence League 
under a new name), and the Farmers and Producers' Political Union, 
formed in 1904 because the producers "thought it was quite time they 
took a hand in the management of the affairs of the state".^'^ The Weekly 
Herald watched sardonically as detaUs of the negotiations leaked out, 
noting on 1 January 1910 "the hoUowness of [Peake's] pose as a 
democrat . . . [he] stands convicted as a political adventurer of the worst 
type." In the short run, because they and their organizations were stUl not 
agreed, the three non-Labor groups were routed at the polls in 1910. This 
was the main factor which finally pushed them into fusion in 1911. When 
they did agree, it was clear that the Liberal and Democratic Union salvaged 
least of its ideals in the new organization. But they did at least have Peake 
as the new Liberal Union's parliamentary leader. 
MeanwhUe, at the ULP conference in September 1909 the party's 
platform was revised after a good deal of discussion. The main changes 
included putting adult suffrage for the Legislative CouncU, with the object 
of Us ultunate abolition, at the top of the fighting platform. The education 
plank was made explicit: "to extend free education to aU citizens of the 
State, up to and inclusive of Universities, and that school books and other 
requirements for school chUdren be provided free." The functions of the 
state bank as "deposit, issue, exchange and reserve" were spelt out - being 
drawn from the federal platform. A plank was added on housuig to pro-
vide advances to workers to buUd homes. 
On the other hand an attempt to ameliorate the implications of the 
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progressive land tax plank was lost, as was one to finance aU pubUc works 
from income. The parliamentarians present opposed it vigorously. The 
housing clause emerged after a great deal of angry discussion about high 
rents and poor housing. Motions in favour of compulsory voting, a stat-
utory eight-hour day, state ownership of aU flour mUls, the tobacco 
industry, and the Uquor industry were all lost, as was one calling for 
annual parliaments and a proposal for redistributing electoral 
boundaries.^' 
It is clear that these arguments were reflecting a more complex 
grouping in the party. There were new delegates from a much expanded 
AWU — very much a country union — and from the growang ULU, the 
voice of fruit pickers, salt scrapers, raUway navvies, public works labourers, 
and the like. These men were mUitants, as their remarks at this conference 
on several issues revealed. They let their suspicion of the country branch 
delegates be known, as they pressed for increased government ownership, 
and the extension of the land tax. The land tax was of course stUl the 
centre of attention for the remaining single-taxers. MeanwhUe the 
moderate city trade union and parliamentary group sought to hold the 
peace, with some degree of success. Cleariy there was grass-roots impa-
tience at the pragmatism of the parliamentary leaderslUp, and in particular 
there was real pressure to repudiate the deal with the farmer-voters which 
had been achieved in 1904. Should this occur, obviously the party's 
chances of success in country electorates might be endangered, unless the 
AWU claim to replace farmer votes with country workers' votes could be 
substantiated in considerable volume. Nevertheless, compared with the 
difficulties of their opponents the ULP was well prepared and strong in 
unity. 
The next state election campaign began in February 1910. Verran, as 
Labor leader, emphasized the uidependence of the ULP, and Us commit-
ment to "moderate measures of much needed reform".^^ Tliat much 
longed for publication, the Daily Herald, was launched on 5 March 1910 as 
part of the ULP election effort. The party sought to exploit the sense of 
outrage at the way Peake clung to power, and the obvious weakness in the 
non-Labor forces. 
The ULP won all twelve city seats, and another ten in the liinterland, 
sufficient to form a government in its own riglit. One happy supporter 
greeted the victory thus: "Glory HaUelujah, but are we not doing splen-
dacious, oh its spiffmg . . . let every town and country district join ui 
having a united Labor Jubilization thanksgiving, every band and tin whistle 
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out, and with banners (Red) ah march, march the streets, to our own 
parks, or showgrounds, say next Sunday afternoon 24/4/10 and rightly 
celebrate the triumph of progress and freedom and right and truth for the 
cause and aims of Labor stand for all these . . ."^ ^ 
Because it was a Labor government there was no need for Verran and 
his cabUiet to withdraw from caucus. There is no doubt that the men 
Verran had chosen as his ministerial coUeagues were tried and true Labor 
workers — Verran, Coneybeer, F. S. WaUis, and J. P. Wilson aU had trade 
union backgrounds. Wliether this meant a resurgence of Adelaide craft 
union power over the pressure of non-unionist local branch members, or 
the growing influence of the AWU, is another matter. For ideals, the Daily 
Herald (on 3 June) and Verran (on 11 June, in an address to the UTLC) 
emphasized the aim of steady humanitarian reform, though both were weU 
aware of the difficulties posed by the Legislative CouncU. Verran in 
particular was at pains to remind the UTLC that the govemment must be 
permitted to get on with the task of administering the whole state, not 
simply focussing on industrial questions, an attitude which strengthens the 
case for arguing that this ministry was one dominated by Adelaide artisans, 
men of respectabUity and good sense,.or so they might have thought of 
themselves. 
In his policy speech in the House of Assembly on 5 July 1910 Verran 
promised Legislative CouncU reform as his first priority, then legislation 
for locks on the River Murray, a progressive land tax, the completion of 
the transfer of the Northern Territory, compulsory acquisition of land for 
closer settlement, more wages boards, advances to settlers, and a string of 
other administrative matters. It was a large programme, and, since the 
CouncU stood to bar his way, an optimistic one. But broadly it was a 
reformist programme, concerned with social justice and with redistribution 
of wealth. It might have been called socialistic by the opponents of the 
ULP, but that was as much theU label for opposing any change in the 
existing system of class, status, and power. It is undeniable, nonetheless, 
that the Verran government, and the Vaughan government of 1915, and 
behind them the ULP, wanted a large increase ui the powers of the state 
for the purpose of enforcing variations in the existing economic, social, 
and political systems. 
MeanwhUe the party convened once more in annual conference.^^ 
Selection of candidates for elections was again discussed, and again it was 
decided that this be done by electoral committees, for the 1909 decision 
had faUed on remission to affUiates for ratification. The appointment of a 
full-tune, paid party secretary was canvassed at length once more, this time 
favourably, though the matter was referred to the delegates for final 
decision. A wide range of other issues was aued — most focussed on the 
possibUity of the government intervenuig to alter the existing economic 
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relationships. Verran's address was a fine example of Labor rhetoric: 
. . . [the party] advocated a policy designed for the welfare of the 
whole of the people. It was a poUcy that would better the conditions 
of every man who worked; it would enter into the homes of all men 
and help the wives, daughters, and young chUdren. It was a policy 
which was in itself intelligent, and appealed to every man who gave a 
thought to his fellows' wellbeing . . . The Labor Party would never 
have succeeded as it did had it not been that, attracted by the 
policy, there had been men and women who had given theU lives to 
its cause. There had been a sacrifice of time, money, and ambition, 
and the party had been buUt up by this and the amount of inteUec-
tuality that had been devoted to its service . . . 
It appears to have been an amicable gathering, which concluded with the 
singing of "The more we are together". 
The government were confronted with a great deal of uidustrial unrest 
in 1910. There is no doubt that economic pressures were making living 
conditions difficult. Prices were risUig, and the real buying power of wages 
was being eroded.^^ The expansion of economic activity in 1910—11 
probably provided that contraction in the numbers of unemployed and 
part-employed which guided some unions to seek improved conditions. 
Ten or twelve uidustrial incidents aroused concem in Adelaide.^^ The 
most publicized of these were the tarpavers strike in Rundle Street and the 
drivers' strike. In the first the government was referred to at the UTLC 
meeting as "the so called Labour Government" by Frank Lundie of the 
AWU and the United Labourers' Union. The government had to face angry 
trade union delegations and calls for the enforcement of law and order. 
The attorney general, Denny, did succeed in gaining a settlement - but the 
publicity for the union movement and the government %vas poor. 
The drivers' strike, in December 1910, was even more controversial. 
Direct action in support of their claims for eight shiUings a day and an 
eight-hour day included stoppuig virtually all commercial traffic in the 
city. Rumours of famine were rife; there was violence, police action, a 
series of pained statements from the government, and cries that the 
workers "had miles of proof that when the Labor man got into power, 
they forgot about the class that put them in there".^' Once more, how-
ever, the workers gained most of their demands and once more the govern-
ment lost much presitge. In AprU—May 1911 there was a bitterly argued 
strike at Renmark, where Lundie's United Labourers' Union was agam 
mvolved. The Daily Herald saw the Labor party as unjusfly blamed for aU 
this industrial trouble: certainly the range of possible govemment action 
was greatly restricted. For example its legislative response - an arbitration 
bUl, which expanded the wages board system, linked it with an Industrial 
Court, provided uruon preference, and made strikes Ulegal — was dras-
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ticaUy transformed in the Legislative CouncU and so the plan was shelved. 
This revelation of the party's legislative unpotence was galUng. 
Evidence of a conservative political resurgence began accumulating 
during 1911. The federal Labor government's referendum proposals (AprU 
1911) were defeated in South Australia, as they were ui general: the "No" 
vote was about 62 per cent of the votes cast. A Legislative CouncU by-
election for the Central District in August saw the Liberal candidate win 
by 1,300 votes in nearly 20,000.^* There were reports of the Liberals 
organizing preselection baUots, requiring pledges, and expoundUig plat-
forms.^^ Tills activity evolved from the plain desUe of the various non-
Labor groups to defeat the ULP, and then sense that the opportunity 
might be at hand. The Liberal Union, which had emerged by the end of 
1910 as the political vehicle of this eager anticipation, received a further 
boost in the success of the Liberal candidate for the vacancy in the federal 
seat of Boothby consequent upon the death of E. L. Batchelor (Labor), 
on 14 December 1911. By the time of the elections ui 1912 Senator 
Vardon, a leading figure in the Liberal Union, could write: "It is NOT the 
people versus the Legislative CouncU (merely pretext). The real issue is the 
LABOR SOCIALIST POLICY versus the true Uiterests of the whole 
community. We stand for the PEOPLE against SOCIALISM. Remember 
the Drivers' Strike."'"^ 
Already the Legislative CouncU had rejected the government's upper 
house reform bUl in September 1911. The succeeding months were 
enUvened by Verran's announcement of a succession of appeals to the 
British government for direct legislative intervention to impose Legislative 
CouncU reform, aU of which appeals were rebuffed. At last a crisis was 
manufactured: the CouncU rejected tacked appropriations for a state brick 
works and timber yard in December 1911.'°' 
It was ground well chosen: an apparently iUegal attempt to introduce 
that dreaded socialistic regime which was anathema to good bourgeois 
liberals. It hid the rejection by the CouncU of a large number of similar 
efforts at social reconstruction — taxation, land values, raUway com-
missioners, household suffrage, industrial arbitration, among others. 
Elections for both CouncU and Assembly were held in February 1912 after 
Verran gained a double dissolution from the governor. In tiiem the Liberal 
Union gained twenty-four seats, the ULP sixteen. It was a victoiy for law 
and order, for established security, for the existing power structure, for 
weafth both city and country, "for greed and ingratitude".'"^ It was the 
clunax of the most comprehensive attempt to reform the Legislative 
CouncU and it faUed. In the years that foUowed, although there were some 
ULP governments, the party did not come so close to success on this vital 
issue of CouncU reform untU 1973. 
The sense of exhaustion, the loss of momentum, evidenced by the 
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election defeat had to some extent been apparent Ui the 1911 annual 
conference. A few variations to the platform were agreed to. The terms of 
appointment of a fuU-time secretary (salary £250 [$500] p.a.) were 
ratified. Verran issued a warning about their "tendency to move in 
sections". He went on to say that "he was of opinion that there was a 
sUght eruption going on in their midst, but he urged upon them to forget 
any little differences and to always consider the principles which they had 
in front of them . . . The Labor Party had a big responsibUity on it and 
they could not afford to allow any friction to exist amont them . . ."i03 
Evidence of this tension was to recur over the next few years until it 
was given focus and expression in the conscription split of 1916—17. In 
the meantune the party concerned itself with castigating the new Liberal 
government and husbanding support with a view to winning power once 
more. The years 1912—14 were years of economic distress and confusion. 
Unemployment caused agitation, deputations, and pressure for extensive 
government action.'°^ These were large sticks with which to beat Peake 
and Butler, the Liberal premier and treasurer. Worse for the community 
was the severe drought of 1913-14, when rainfaU was half the average, 
and when wheat yields were as low as 1.41 bushels per acre for the 
state.'"^ This generated severe hardship in country areas. The government 
refused to construct a complete grain purchasing scheme, as urged by rural 
opinion. The administration, moreover, appeared to bungle the city 
dweUers' need in times of drought for adequate drinking water. Govern-
ment revenue fell, and Butler, preferring not to seek more credit on a 
difficult London market, moved to uicrease taxes and contract public 
activity, which included making retrenchments in the pubUc service. It 
gave political humorists scope to point out that drought, recession, and 
Richard Butler once more coincided, as they had done m 1903-4. 
The Peake government's legislative proposals succeeded in arousing 
further Labor ire. The PLP fouglit every step of the Industrial Arbitration 
BiU which imposed severe restraints on strikes.'"^ They opposed the 
Liberals' version of a constitution amendment bUl for the CouncU which, 
whUe it meant a minor advance in CouncU franchise, was mere tinkering 
from the ULP standpoint: especially when it implied the co-equal control 
by the CouncU over money biUs.'°' They battled angrily against the 
redistribution of electoral boundaries brought forward in 1913. The ULP 
claimed that it was designed by Peake to make even more complete the 
numerical disparity between rural and city voters in Assembly elections, 
thus ensuring a strong and permanent liberal bloc in parliament. The bUl 
increased the number of seats from forty to forty-six, and consequently 
meant the rewriting of divisional boundaries. It appeared that, for 
example, instead of Labor holding the four old Adelaide seats, U would 
only WUl the three new ones, with the two new North Adelaide seats going 
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to the Liberals. Peake in reply claimed that the new electorates were more 
securely based on community of interest than before. This was true, but U 
did not stop angry criticisms from proponents of one man, one vote.'"* 
Efforts to strengthen the basic support for the party were slow to 
develop in 1912. The appointment of a paid organizer for the metro-
politan area was opposed by the affUiates because of the expense 
involved.'"^ The conference of 1912 was characterized by "great 
enthusiasm" — or so the Daily Herald thought. Certainly thirty-five new 
branches were affUiated, while thirty-six unions paid increased fees."" 
The conference joined in vigorous condemnation of the govemment's con-
stitutional proposals, and supported compulsory miUtary service for Aus-
tralian boys by fifty-two votes to forty-two. By December 1912 there 
were two paid organizers checking on supporters and their eligibUity to 
vote. This presumes that the objections to the cost had been overcome. 
What is more, this report in the ULP minutes is the first typewritten 
document there: signs of mcreasing efficiency at the centre! 
But there was difficulty on another flank. These same months of anger 
at the government found the Daily Herald warning against "The Syndical-
ist and His Folly": " . . . The propaganda of the Australian Labor Party m 
no degree embraces syndicalism — that fooUsh and hysterical idea . . . 
Syndicalism stands for the total destruction of the existing industrial 
organisations and the transfer of all means of production from their 
present possessors, the wage payers, to the wage earners. Such an ambUion 
vaults higher than the dream of the wdldest Socialist, and is destined to 
overreach itself."'" This outburst was against the extremists of the 
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), who had made their formal 
appearance m Adelaide on 6 May 1911."'^ They were seen by the ULP as 
revolutionaries attempting to reconstruct the economy and society on a 
whoUy new set of premises. Their influence in South Australia has been 
very difficult to gauge. NaturaUy the party's propaganda organs gave them 
orUy unfavourable notice if any at aU. There were, however, a growing 
number of working men engaged in large-scale industrial activity, notably 
at Port Pirie. To these men the increasing pressures of inflation and the 
apparent immobUity of the ULP were goads that pushed them from time 
to time into mUitant industrial action. Their spokesman was often Frank 
Lundie, as we have already seen in the case of the strUces of 1910. But 
there does not seem to be any evidence that the attempt at a new, radical, 
political solution along IWW Unes ever got much support among the work-
ing classes of South Australia. 
The parliamentary orgaruzation saw change at the commencement of 
the 1913 session. John Verran stood down from leadership of the PLP, 
deeply distressed at the Ulness of his wife and conscious of the electoral 
defeat of 1912. Crawford Vaughan was elected to succeed hun. He was 
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eighteen years younger than Verran, and had been educated at Prince 
Alfred CoUege. He worked as a clerk and a journalist before election to 
parliament in 1905. He had been treasurer in Verran's cabinet, when he 
emerged as the PLP's most able debater. After he broke with the ULP ui 
1917 he toured the United States in connection with the war effort. 
Subsequently he went on further lecture tours of the United States, and 
then became interested in cotton growing in Australia. He was an un-
successful candidate for New South Wales and federal seats — appearing in 
1931 for Adelaide as an unofficial "Lyons-Latham" candidate. In his later 
years he Uved quietly in Sydney writmg novels and plays on Australian 
historical themes, and died in 1947. 
The ULP sought to maintaui political pressure on Peake during 1913. 
Long sittings in the house were matched by angry Herald editorials, 
especiaUy on the "gerrymander" proposals, and followed up by meetings 
of public protest. The Herald commented; "the whole policy of the Con-
servatives is manifestly one of fearing the people, and of taking every 
possible precaution, no matter how fraudulent it may be, to prevent the 
people governing themselves.""^ The 1913 party conference yielded 
reports of improving party funds, extending branch strength, and amend-
ments to the platform. The most unportant of these amendments focussed 
on rural problems. The Land Board was to aUot land with a much stricter 
regard for equality; revenue from land sales was to go to debt redemption; 
tax on personally earned income from land was to be abolished, while that 
on absentee landholders and on probate was to be sharply increased; a 
Land Court of Appeal was to be established; another board was to be 
estabUshed, to regulate the wheat industry, with grower, government, and 
buyer representation. All of these proposals were clearly in response to the 
existing adverse rural conditions and the opportunities these provided for 
the party to attack the government and to offer a more attractive alter-
native to the community. In addition, the platform caUed for proportional 
representation. Commonwealth takeover of state debts, and control of 
state borrowuig, the school leaving age to be raised from thUleen to four-
teen years, state or local government home buUding, state-provided pure 
milk, and earlier closing of hotels. Generally, it was a more detaUed pro-
gramme, and as a result more realistic'' ^  
By the end of the year fruits of the renewed mterest in the party could 
be found m increased Labor success at municipal elections, and a landsUde 
victory at the by-election for (federal) Adelaide.'' ^ Vaughan was on the 
stump in the southeast in AprU, assaulting the government and appealing 
to the farmers. In July, at the opening of the 1914 parliamentary session, 
he launched a no-confidence motion, charging the government with sub-
servience to the Legislative CouncU, with inactivity, deUberate electoral 
gerrymandering, a coercive Industrial Arbitration Act, an ungenerous Land 
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Act, and with equivocation over demands for government-backed buU< 
wheat handling.'' ^  
MeanwhUe, an interesting point was reached in the Ufe of the Daily 
Herald, the party's newspaper. A. C. Pratt was succeeded by E. H. Coombe 
as editor on 2 May 1914. E. H. Coombe had been the most radical critic of 
the Jenkins regime, the most radical of Peake's followers, and the maverick 
when the Liberal Uruon was formed. He stood as a Labor candidate in 
1912, but was unsuccessful. His first editorial statement in the Herald, on 
4 May 1914, was an unequivocal commitment to radical gradualism rather 
than revolution, to the drive for social justice for the working classes. He 
argued that the party had staked its chances on the political machine - a 
slow but sure means of success. "The aim of the Labor Party is to secure 
political equality and economic Unprovement." The message was perhaps 
more general than that which Guthrie or McPherson might have spoken, 
but the terms of reference and the objectives were unchanged. 
When news of the war in Europe reached Adelaide the parliamentary 
efforts to embody these ambitions for social justice were dampened. 
Debate on Crawford Vaughan's no-confidence motion was halted by the 
PLP. Peake, however, insisted the motion be put to the house, but then 
the Labor party abstaUied from voting. The same day parliament was 
prorogued after the fervent singing of the national anthem, and cheers for 
"the King, God bless h i m ! " ' " 
The 1914 party conference heard the secretary report that twenty-one 
further trade societies and eleven local branches had affiliated wdth the 
party, and that paid-up membership totaUed 25,168. An attempt to dis-
affUiate the democratic associations was made, but it faUed. FoUowing 
this, the method of conference representation was canvassed, and it was 
not for the first time. The existing arrangement of largely proportional and 
institutional representation was preferred to the card vote.' ' 
Tlie war brought little joy to the economy of South AustraUa. Broken 
HUl's German markets were closed"^ which meant a rapid faU in the 
South Australian raUway receipts and in the income the community of 
South Australia derived from the many services provided to Broken HiU; 
for example, the Port Pirie smelters were affected drastically. MeanwhUe 
farmers suffered as drought continued unabated. Deputations seeking 
assistance beat their way to the doors of Peake and Butler, but the govern-
ment could do little to revitalize the economy, for it was difficult to raise 
loan finance at home or abroad as the demands of the war gathered pace. 
There were claims that the shortage of seed grain was being exploited, and 
that the government was not encouraging fodder conservation. When 
parliament reconvened. Us time was much occupied with discussion of 
drought relief, starving stock, seed wheat, unemployment, and faUing 
water supplies. All this was grist to the opposition's miU.' ^ ^ 
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The election campaign began in February 1915. Vaughan, in his policy 
speech, gathered up these accumulating economic and political grievances 
and buried them at the government.''^' The party received its reward and 
its commission: U won twenty-six seats, an increase often, and took office 
for the second time. WhUe comparison with the 1912 election is difficult 
because of the redistribution, and with the 1918 election because of the 
conscription spht, it is clear that the ULP broke into country electorates, 
as well as winning all fifteen city seats. Coombe took one seat in Barossa, 
while aU the Victoria, Newcastle, Port Pirie, and WaUaroo seats, plus two 
in the Murray, were won. Even Peake was defeated, only scrambling back 
in at a by-election contrived by the resignation of another liberal. Using 
the 1912 voting patterns, the ULP could only have expected to win four-
teen of the forty-six or nineteen of the old forty seats.'^^ It is clear, 
therefore, that a severe shift away from the Liberals had occurred. 
The cabinet, elected by caucus, later drew critical comment from trade 
unionists. J. H. Vaughan, in the Legislative CouncU and attorney general, 
was the premier's brother and a lawyer. C. Goode, commissioner of Crowoi 
lands, was the premier's brother-in-law and a farmer. A. W. Styles, also Ui 
the Legislative CouncU, was chief secretary and an accountant. He had 
been a union official. R. P. BlundeU, minister of industry, had long been a 
union official and working man, whUe Harry Jackson, commissioner of 
public works, was a smelting worker and wharf labourer from Port Pirie. 
Norman Makin claimed in 1918 that this cabinet "from its inception could 
not claun the confidence of many supporters of Labor", that the "black-
coated brigade" were too influential, and that "rumblings of discord could 
be continually discerned".'^^ However, there is difficulty in assessing the 
ULP's attitude to this ministry because the problem has been over-
shadowed by the split on conscription, with the consequent desire to trace 
everything back as far as possible. One point to notice is that popular 
resentment at the economic troubles of the state — drought and war being 
the main causes — contmued to be heaped upon Uie government, which 
happened now to be Labor. Another point to make is that Verran, a trade 
unionist's trade unionist, had felt this sort of tension and criticism whUe 
premier. Therefore it is not adequate to begin a discussion of the explosion 
in 1916 by arguing that it simply revealed the long-hidden "hypocrisy of 
many who claimed allegiance to the cause of Labor".' ^* 
The programme which the Vauglian Labor government launched was 
ambitious, but oriented to the demands of the party's platform. The biUs 
included advances to settiers (intended to provide easier credit facilities), 
Murray waters (ratifying the long drawn out negotiations on works for the 
development of the river), education (the fruit of substantial enquiry, 
which proposed a school leaving age of fourteen, a structure of secondary 
education and a reorganization of the department), industrial arbitration 
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(removing the power to imprison, applying the act to government 
employees, repealing power to compel Uidividual unionists to pay 
penalties, giving the court power to deregister), public service (to create a 
board with power to classify, and then a commissioner to control the 
service). Some of these, and others, suffered at the hands of the Legislative 
CouncU — for example an adult suffrage bUl, a taxation bUl, and a health 
bUl were to be negatived or lapse there. But the session saw the passage of 
fifty-three acts, includmg those on education, arbUration, Murray waters, 
soldier settlement, and the wheat pool. It was the most voluminous legisla-
tive output to date. The breadth was considerable, some of the legislation 
far reachuig. The war had proved no barrier, nor the CouncU a drastic 
hurdle, to a government and party fuU of energy and zeal. 
SimUarly, the 1915 party conference was a busy gathering. Amend-
ments to the platform were postponed to the next conference, but forty-
four resolutions were passed. These were, as always, a mixed bag: they 
were concerned with famUy allowances, maternity provisions, liquor, 
arbitration, factories, day labour, roads, bread, libraries, venereal disease, 
and opticians. Much time was taken in dealUig wUh the behaviour of a 
legislative councillor, J.P.Wilson, miruster of industry in the Verran 
government, who had accepted election to a parliamentary committee 
contrary to caucus direction. Though expeUed, WUson defied the con-
ference. The issue of voting strength was again aired: Frank Lundie 
successfuUy opposed a proposal to permit individual voting by aU members 
of the ULP in pre-selection plebiscites, because the trade unions "would 
lose their hold of the political movement. The bulk of the finance came 
from the unions and it would be greater if the card system were adopted." 
The premier emphasized the difficulties in providing employment which 
the war Unposed. The party secretary spoke the rhetoric of loyalty and 
sacrifice. The conference made explicit its belief "that any members of the 
ULP opposing the platform of the ULP be expeUed from the ULP", but 
put to one side a proposal to urge a referendum before the introduction of 
conscription. There were, however, several expressions of frustration at the 
PLP and the government: Labor members of the Legislative Council were 
to sign the current platform, in addition to the one on which they were 
elected; the government was urged to exercise "more authority over the 
officers of their various Departments"; the PLP was told not to enforce a 
penal dissolution of parliament without party authorization;activation of 
the 1913 Arbitration Act was condemned.'^^ 
But it was the issue of conscription which dominated the affairs of the 
party for the next eighteen months.'^^ Continuing economic difficulties 
in the state, expanding administrative constraints, and flie Legislative 
CouncU's rejection of much govemment legislation, together with the 
continual stream of casualty lists and war reports, aU provided the context 
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for the arguments within the party on the subject of compulsory overseas 
mUitary service. 
VI 
In December 1915 the ULP CouncU directed its delegates to the inter-
state conference to support conscription only in conjunction with com-
pulsory service of wealth. It was a directive specificaUy reaffirmed ui 
March—AprU 1916. At the same time, sections of the party were already 
taking up more precise positions on conscription. Vaughan in January 
announced his willingness to countenance conscription if necessary.'^' 
The UTLC decided during February, March, and April to call for con-
scription of wealth first, and conscription of men only as a last resort, and 
then orUy after a referendum. By June 1916 the UTLC had resolved to 
"oppose conscription by all lawful means . . . and to oppose all Labor 
members of parliament who supported conscription". The UTLC then 
issued a circular to Labor members making it clear that they would oppose 
"any member of parliament on the next plebiscite, who dares to support 
the perrUcious policy of Conscription".' ^* 
Manoeuvring became more intense as the annual conference 
approached. A gathering of trade unionists who were delegates to the 
conference was held in the AWU rooms under Lundie's leadership, despite 
the angry criticisms of Crawford Vaughan that this was improper.' ^^ This 
group considered not just the conscription issue, but the whole range of 
resolutions to be considered at the conference. This strengthens the argu-
ment that there was a radical trade-unionist versus reformist-pragmatist 
tension — but it should be noticed that some unions were for this very 
reason dissociating themselves from the UTLC, which they believed to be 
too radical.' ^" Thus the sUnple division between industrialist and 
poUtician is not enough to categorize the movement in these months of 
crisis; to it should be added the notion that the unions of the unskUled 
(AWU, United Labourers' Union — both dominated by Lundie), with non-
Adelaide bases, were chaUenging the metropolitan craft union pragmatists. 
The party conference in September 1916 was given drama and con-
fusion by the attendance of W. M. Hughes. Study of events at the con-
ference is confused by the absence of written minutes, the custom of the 
previous few years. In their place the occasionally laconic Daily Herald 
account must be used, which the next conference adopted as the official 
version, despite the fact that it had suffered at the hands of the censor, at 
least to the extent of having no account of Hughes's speech nor of the 
response to it. Discussion on conscription came after the usual range of 
resolutions. The decisions taken on this contentious issue seem to have 
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been, first, to resolve to support Hughes in his conduct as prime minister, 
but secondly, and separately, to support the proposal that a referendum 
on conscription be held. This motion carried a second phrase "but is 
against conscription of human life". Three more explicit resolutions, two 
hostUe to conscription under any cUcumstances, the thud simply caUUig 
for a referendum (moved by Vaughan) were aU defeated in what was 
cleariy a long and exhausting discussion. The motion which was accepted 
passed by only 119 votes to 90, narrowly enough for a fauly general 
resolution wliich was meant to be the moderate compromise. 
Unfortunately, the motion was open to varyUig interpretations. 
Vaughan and his parliamentary coUeagues took the rejection of the 
stronger motions, and the absence of any threats in the motion passed, to 
mean that aU had the right to express their opinions freely.'^' But 
opponents of conscription had an entirely different view. The ULP 
CouncU resolved on 21 October 1916 "that this CouncU emphatically and 
definitely declares that the resolution approved at the Conference 
absolutely binds every member to oppose conscription, and Uiat we 
declare that any member favouring conscription is disloyal". 
The national conscription referendum ensued: it was an angry and 
heated time in South Australia as in the other states. Vaughan made his 
support for the now expeUed Hughes public and explicit.' ^ Perhaps with 
distaste, pro-conscription Labor men found themselves campaigning with 
erstwhUe political enemies. But in the eyes of their opponents they were 
thereby disloyal to the party, despite the fact that the platform had been 
made a buiding test of loyalty Ui this way only at the 1915 conference. 
The referendum vote in South Australia was 119,236 against and 
87,924 in favour of conscription. It was the action taken to foUow up this 
vote which irrevocably split the party. No doubt Vauglian had been con-
fident - and with him the other nineteen Labor members of the Assembly 
(of twenty-six) and five members of the CouncU (of seven) who had 
supported conscription - that a majority "yes" vote would be achieved. 
No doubt, too, they believed their platform rhetoric that it was "treacher-
ous", "disloyal", "anti-British", "pro-German" to oppose conscription. 
But they could not have anticipated the promptitude and rigour of their 
treatment on the morrow of the referendum. 
Once agaui a caucus was held in the AWU rooms,' ^^ and then at the 
ULP CouncU meeting specially convened on 2 November to discuss the 
subject, it was decided (by 198 votes to 100) to bruig forward aU parlia-
mentary plebiscites, both federal and state. The meeting heard Vaughan 
complain tiiis was a plot by the industrialists. The next evening the meet-
ing continued, carrying a motion critical of those members of the ULP 
executive who had supported conscription, flien one naming as disloyal 
the thirty-one state and federal pariiamentarians who had supported con-
274 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
SOUTH AUSTRALU 
scription, and thirdly one recognizing L. L. HUl, J. Gunn, E. H. Coombe, J. 
Carr, J. JeUey, T. Butterfield, and J. Price as the South Australian PLP. 
NaturaUy enough Vaughan and Lundie exchanged arguments — the one 
claiming injustice, improper caucussing, and gagged discussion, the other 
critical of the Labor government and concerned for the opinions of the 
rank and file trade unionists.'^'* But the anti-conscriptionists had the 
numbers to confirm their interpretation of the situation at CouncU meet-
uigs in November and December, if only narrowly. Plebiscites for all state 
and federal candidacies were held in January 1917, after a last-minute 
attempt in the ULP councU to postpone them. About 24,000 ballot papers 
were distributed for the statewide Senate plebiscite, but only about 30 per 
cent were returned, a figure which was said to be lower than average.' ^ ^ 
None of the pro-conscriptionists were successful, which was clear evidence 
of grass-roots anger at their behaviour. 
A special conference was then caUed in February as a last resort. Again 
the anti-conscriptiorust industrial group caucussed, planning to confirm 
the party's opposition to conscription and to expel those pariiamentarians 
who had supported it.'^^ Even more obviously than in September 1916, 
this group had the numbers. There were twenty-eiglit delegates represent-
ing the AWU (in which Lundie had just succeeded W. G. Spence as 
national president). Some of these delegates came from branches heard of 
neither before nor suice (for example. Mount Gambler).' ^ ' 
The peacemakers, led by the 1916 chairman, Hugh GUmore,caUed for 
unity in the interests of the movement buUt up with such agony over its 
twenty-five years. He argued in his remarks at the opening of the February 
conference that the party was facing political doom. Urging that all in-
volved were acting from conscientious conviction, he asked if such 
behaviour should be labeUed disloyalty. But his plea went unheeded. 
Immediately following these remarks the valid admission of the parlia-
mentarians was challenged, but they were admitted. They were then con-
fronted by a demand of the conference that they give written assurance 
they would abide by decisions of the conference. All the pro-
conscriptionist parliamentarians who were delegates refused, and withdrew 
in a huff. There is no other word for it. The conference proceeded to 
declare all executive posts vacant and elect new office-holders, Frank 
Lundie not unexpectedly being elected to the chairmanship of the party. 
It then confirmed the branding of the parliamentarians as disloyal, and 
made resolutions of conference binding on parliamentarians. Tlie victory 
of the anti-conscriptionists was complete. The gulf seemed — indeed was — 
unbridgeable. Perhaps a little tolerance on tlie part of the industrialists 
might have opened the way for a reconcUiation. There is no doubt that the 
pro-conscriptionists were pursued ruthlessly. But their opponents were 
bitterly resentful of the campaign of vUification they had been made to 
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endure, and of the walk-out of Hughes and many others from the federal 
caucus. Feelings had hardened untU opinions in craft unions, industrial 
unions, electoral and local committees, in cUy and country centres, aU 
flowed in the one direction.' ^^ 
The censured parliamentarians met promptly and formed themselves 
Uito a new political party, the National Labor party (NLP), whose mani-
festo appeared on 3 March 1917. The tiny PLP met to count heads: U 
numbered five.' ^^ A few unions supported the NLP but most continued 
their existing aUegiance; for example the Port Adelaide Working Men's 
Association voted 504—309 for the ULP.''*" Some competition ensued in 
the district branches, but again the weight of support lay with the 
ULP.'^' After a certain amount of jockeying, control of the Daily Herald 
was retained by the ULP.''*'^ But at the 1917 federal poUs and in several 
state by-elections the community at large refused to support the ULP. 
Boothby and Huidmarsh, two federal seats, were lost, as were East Torrens 
and Barossa in the state Assembly.'^^ The NLP lost aU seats contested. So 
Peake soon became premier, ejecting Vaughan with little ceremony and 
ignoring his pleas for a national government under Vaughan's leader-
ship.''*'* The ULP members took no part in this voting'"*^ and like the 
Daily Herald concentrated on denigrating the "Vaughanites". 
In the months which foUowed the Daily Herald reported with acid 
superiority the twists and turns to which the Nationalists resorted in an 
effort to retain power. Vaughan refused to serve under Peake. The Liberal 
Union fmally accepted some NationaUsts as worthy of electoral immunity, 
and two were admitted to the cabinet.''*^ By establishing its position as 
the sole working-class party, the ULP hoped to recuperate its electoral 
strength. 
However it is clear that through 1917—18 the pro-conscriptionists and 
the new ULP leaders alike misjudged electoral opinion. The former had 
expected a "yes" vote to be foUowed by efforts to heal the divisions in the 
party. The latter, observing the "no" vote, pursued their erstwhUe col-
leagues, confident that Labor would win at the elections. Just as a wide 
range of social factors produced the "no" vote, so the suspicion of the 
electorate at the disarray and inexperience of the ULP led to repeated 
electoral defeats. It left the party in opposition for years to come. 
The party's regular organizational structure was mauitained. There were 
220 delegates to the 1917 conference, aU of whom were required to pledge 
loyalty to the party objects and platform. This conference reflected rising 
pressure on wages in its demands that the state Arbitration Court fix wages 
in real terms. There were resolutions on the welfare of soldiers, on the 
wheat pool, on peace, and on card voting (which was lost). The 
Vaughanites were expunged from the sight of the party. The party's title 
was altered, ui conformity with interstate decisions, to "The Australian 
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Labor Party [ALP], South Australian Branch". The objective of the party 
was spelt out, also in line with interstate discussion, and consonant with 
the more radical character of the party: "To secure the adequate repre-
sentation in Parliament, and other public bodies of organised workers and 
producers for the purpose of securing to each person the fuU result of his 
or her labor, by the coUective ownership and democratic control of the 
means of production, distribution and exchange, and to ensure to each 
person fuU religious, political and social freedom."''*' 
The second conscription referendum absorbed the energies of the party 
in November and December 1917, as it acted wholeheartedly to oppose 
conscription. Perhaps it refurbished the party's organization, but it could 
not have been cheap. 
As we have seen, the preselection plebiscites for the 1918 elections 
were completed in January 1917. A study of the candidates for this 
election reveals some differences with the established pattern, and it is 
therefore a conveiUent point at which to consider this matter generally. 
Information about aU Labor candidates from 1893 is uicomplete: the 
Daily Herald was not quite total in its provision of biographical sketches. 
From these, however, some facts emerge. The average age of candidates 
was 4 1 ^ 2 years tUl 1910, when it rose to 4 7 ^ 8 , at which figure ft 
remained tiU 1918, when the average dropped to 40-41. The place of 
buth of candidates was dominated by the British Isles untU 1905, when six 
of the twenty-eight had been born in South Australia. This proportion 
grew SteadUy tUl there was a majority of AustraUan-born in 1915. By 
1918, of the forty-six, thirty-one were Australian-born while data for 
another ten were not avaUable. The religion of the candidates was over-
whelmingly Protestant — for a long whUe Denny was the lone Roman 
Catholic. By 1912 four of the thirty candidates were Roman Catholic. 
This figure grew to eight in 1918 (but no data were avaUable for fourteen). 
There were very few, if any, cases where existing members did not become 
candidates for the next election. Nearly aU candidates had working-class 
experience in their careers, and many were honorary or paid trade union 
officials. For the whole period a small sprinkling had secondary or tertiary 
education. Therefore it would not be true to argue that the character of 
the party's candidates changed dramaticaUy in 1918, though they were 
younger, and more of them were Roman Catholics. 
As part of the 1918 election campaign Norman Makin's A Progressive 
Democracy was published. This pamphlet caught and recorded the newly 
built party's mythology about the experiences of the previous two years. 
He clauned that the Vaughan ministry never had the confidence of the 
party, and even that "from 1912 the Labor movement lived within the 
precincts of a veritable volcano".'^^ It was a comforting, sUnplistic 
assertion which did not take the complexities of the situation into 
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account. However, it was not the past, but the future, which reaUy con-
cerned Makin and HUl (the latter was state president and contributor of a 
foreword to the pamphlet). Makin's preface spoke of theu belief in the 
ALP as "the foremost movement of reform, and the leaders of an enlight-
ened Democracy". They sought to create "conditions that wiU produce a 
higher standard of human beings" through the provisions of the objective 
and the planks of the party. Tliis was the tradUional - and authentic -
voice of the Labor movement. 
In the immediate context of the elections the ALP pushed the theme of 
"cleanUig up" politics.' ''^ Shortage of funds limited their efforts, especial-
ly in the matter of the Legislative CouncU and, naturaUy, interstate 
speakers were greatly appreciated. The party was conscious that the newly 
organized farmers' party probably took votes from the ALP.' ^" But stUl, 
to recover from three to seventeen in the Assembly was encouraging, as 
was the virtual disappearance of the NationaUsts. Nevertheless, the Liberals 
with twenty-eight seats were comfortably ensconced in power. The Labor 
party had seen its support shrink from the great days of 1915 to the hard 
core of industrial centres in Adelaide, Port Pirie, and the mining areas. 
WhUe it was to gain office in the 1920s, it is doubtful whether the party 
regained the breadth of community support it had in 1915 untU, perhaps, 
1962. 
For the immediate future, the task was to buUd the party to regaui 
power, and to evolve the policies appropriate to the onset of peace. The 
Daily Herald carried frequent editorials in 1918 exuding a sense of con-
structive appraisal of the tasks ahead: there were references to greater 
worker control, and to increasing his share of the returns of industry. The 
Nationalists were watched as they sank from political view, rejected by the 
ALP and discarded by the Liberal Union. At the 1918 conference many 
unions and district branches reaffiliated.'^' The bonds of control over 
candidates were strengthened, and the big unions at last gained tiieir 
objective of the card vote (although the experiment was shortlived, being 
abandoned at the 1921 conference). Perhaps because they were satisfied 
with the rotundities of the 1917 objective, the interstate Labor conference 
objective was not adopted (thirty-five votes to thirty-three). Again 
cautiously, support for the idea of One Big Union (OBU), so much the 
current fashion in trade union circles, was expressed only in an innocuous 
motion referring largely to the AWU. 
Despite these deliberate efforts at strengthenUig the party, the pariia-
mentary session of 1918 had to be written off as "barren and useless". The 
government had refused a statutory living wage to employees under state 
awards, had done little else, and was simply holdmg onto office.'^'^ The 
ALP claimed that the issues of postwar administration were becoming 
urgent: the cost of living, the lack of employment, and the adjustments to 
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peacetime required vigorous government attention. 
These were the issues gathered up in the Daily Herald's assessment at 
the commencement of the 1919 conference. It opened with the reworded 
objective of the federal party: "the emancipation of human labor from all 
forms of exploitation and the obtaining for aU workers the fuU reward for 
their industry by the coUective ownership and democratic control of the 
coUectively used agencies of production, distribution and exchange."'^^ 
It spoke of the need for international and Australia-wide federation of 
labour. It emphasized the ALP's acceptance of the role and powers of the 
Commonwealth — uideed argued for their extension. It acknowledged that 
in South Australia the party had never held power without hindrance. 
UntU the absurd and unfair distinction in franchise for the CouncU was 
removed, it would be hopeless to look for thoroughly democratic legisla-
tion or administration. The parUamentary representatives of the party 
were worthy of all encouragement in the immediate and difficult situation. 
The ALP conference represented the people, not the profiteer: it was for 
such gatherings to show that they had sound and practical policies for 
dealmg with those questions which the anti-Labor parties had so miserably 
faUed to handle in the best uiterests of the people. All this, plus the 
endeavour to stand apart from the "extremist element withui", and to 
prefer the "orderly, constitutional manner", epitomized the ALP in South 
AustraUa as it entered the 1920s. In the words of the outgouig president, 
Norman Makin: [the ULP] sought to exalt Ufe, to demand justice and 
opportunity for all who furnished creative service to the world. It pro-
tected the weak and oppressed and destroyed the power of the 
arrogant.' ^ '* 
The party had grown out of a sense of injustice among trade unionists 
in Adelaide. It had been informed by liberal, reformist ideals. It had pro-
vided sectional support to a liberal coalUion in the 1890s, then to a 
Liberal-Labor coalition, and had then become in parliament the fuUy 
developed and accepted opposition, the alternative government. Even 
when in power, however, the ULP was persistently and successfuUy 
resisted by the Legislative CouncU. Sometimes, too, it had been restrained 
by pressure mounted by angry, frustrated uidustrial workers. 
Its character was reformist and radical, but never revolutionary. It was a 
popularly based poUtical organization, with considerable sectional support, 
seeking to gain poUtical power wUhin the existing structure, committed to 
the struggle for distributive justice and sustained by doctrines of potential-
ly far-reaching effect. At the core of its support was an homogenous 
working class, based on Adelaide and its suburbs, conscious of its own 
interests and anxious to promote them. Sometimes even that base proved 
to possess internal dynamics, as employees of new, large-scale industry and 
suburban craftsmen took up different positions. Beyond the urban work-
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Uig classes, the party looked to attract suburban middle-class voters, and 
also rural voters discontented with the existing situation. It was a process 
whose success tended to fluctuate with the state of the economy and the 
validity of the party's pose as an alternative govemment, together with the 
competition of the principles of self-interest and social justice in the minds 
of these fringe supporters. 
APPENDIX 1 
South Australian House of Assembly: ULP Performance at Elections 
Year 
1893 
1896 
1899 
Total 
Valid Vote 
87,701 
160,983 
160,258 
ULP 
% 
18.77 
24.29 
25.43 
Total 
Seats 
54 
54 
54 
ULP 
Seats 
Contested 
12 
20 
18 
ULP 
Seats Won 
10 
12 
11 
1902 5 member: 58,069 34.57 
4 member: 59,265 15.81 
3 member: 135,990 14.02 
2 member: 875 0 
27 
2 
Totals 42 11 
1905 5 member: 103,657 55.13 5 5 
4 member: 27,971 37.46 8 7 
3 member: 180,264 35.14 27 14 
2 member: 1,172 7.34 2 1 
Totals 42 27 15 
1906 5 member: 79,854 
4 member: 66,608 
3 member: 173,173 
2 member: 695 
5 
8 
27 
2 
5 
6 
14 
0 
5 
4 
10 
0 
Totals 42 25 19 
1910 5 member: 116,328 54.87 5 5 
4 member: 80,287 53.17 8 5 
3 member: 205,473 44.23 27 17 
2 member: 1,071 48.93 2 2 
5 
4 
12 
1 
Totals 42 29 22 
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Year 
1912 
Totals 
1915 
Totals 
1918 
Totals 
1921 
Totals 
Total 
Valid Vote 
5 member: 
4 member: 
3 member: 
3 member: 
2 member: 
3 member: 
2 member: 
3 member: 
2 member: 
160,690 
101,853 
278,714 
-
241,148 
92,284 
-
200,480 
124,167 
-
252,252 
149,593 
-
ULP 
% 
50.10 
51.44 
43.15 
-
47.67 
41.26 
-
43.93 
45.92 
-
40.41 
51.71 
-
Total 
Seats 
5 
8 
27 
40 
24 
22 
46 
24 
22 
46 
24 
22 
46 
ULP 
Seats 
Contested 
5 
5 
20 
30 
18 
11 
29 
24 
17 
41 
22 
20 
42 
ULP 
Seats Won 
9 + 3 
6-H8 
3 
4 
9 
16 
uncontested 
uncontested 
26 
7 
10 
17 
4 
12 
16 
SOURCE: 
COMMENTS: 
C. A. Hughes and B. D. Graham, A Handbook of Australian 
Government and Politics, 1890-1964, pp. 538-51 . 
(1) Voting voluntary, plumping permitted. 
(2) ULP figures 1893-1902 include country candidates not pledged 
to ULP, but described as "Labor" in contemporary accounts, 
and counted as such by Hughes and Graham. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Attendance at ULP Annual Conference 1904-20 
1904 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 (Feb.) 
1917 
1918 
1919 
1920 
Representing 
Unions 
33 
32 
41 
N.A. 
75 
82 
67 
83 
93 
97 
N.A. 
118 
123 
164 
150 
153 
H I 
91 
Representing 
Local Branches 
and Societies 
22 
39 
57 
N.A. 
38 
52 
54 
50 
iS 
57 
N.A. 
106 
94 
72 
61 
76 
60 
39 
Parliamentarians 
5 
0 
2 
N.A. 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
0 
N.A. 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
Total 
62 
71 
100 
127 
115 
136 
122 
135 
153 
164 
c. 240 
226 
218 
237 
212 
230 
173 
131 
SOURCE: Weekly Herald and Daily Herald. 
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ARCHIBALD, WUliam Oliver, b. London, 1850; d. SA, 1926. Arrived 
Australia, 1879. Piano-maker and labourer, locomotive carriage 
maker, and union official. CouncU member of Railway Service 
Association, and chairman of Port Adelaide Working Men's Associa-
tion 1896. MHA (Port Adelaide), 1893-1910. MHR (Hindmarsh), 
1910-16, non-Labor 1916-19. 
BATCHELOR, Egerton Lee. b. Adelaide, 1865; d. Vic, 1911. State school 
teacher and locomotive engineer. President of RaUway Association, 
1896. Secretary, ULP, 1893-96. President, Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers, and theu delegate to TLC, 1890-93 . Treasurer TLC 
1892. Leader, PLP, 1897-99. MHA (West Adelaide), 1893-190l' . 
MHR (Boothby), 1901-11 . Minister of education, and minister of 
agriculture, 1899-1901. 
BLUNDELL, Reginald Pole. b. Norwood (SA), 1872; d. SA 1945. 
Tobacco twister and union official (Tobacco Twisters' Union). 
President, TLC, 1905. President, Women Employees' Mutual 
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Association. Secretary, Drivers' Union. Member, Richmond Demo-
cratic Club. Senator, 1906. MHA (Adelaide), 1907-17, non-Labor 
1917-18. MHR (Adelaide), 1919. Minister of mines, and minister of 
marine, 1915 — 17. Minister of agriculture, minister of repatriation, 
1917-18. 
CHARLESTON, David Morley. b. CornwaU (England), 1848;d. SA, 1934. 
Engineer and marine engineer. Member of Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers from 1870. Delegate to TLC; president of TLC, MLC 
(Central District), 1891-96, non-Labor 1897-1901. Senator, 
1901-10. 
CONEYBEER, Frederick WUliam. b. Bristol (England), 1859; d. SA, 1950. 
Arrived Australia, 1865; Adelaide, 1881. CoUar maker and union 
official. Druid, lodge, and friendly society member. General 
secretary, Saddlers' Trades Society. President and vice-president, 
TLC, 1888 and 1892. Member of parliamentary and managing com-
mittee of TLC. MHA (East Torrens), 1893-1902; (Torrens), 
1902-15; (East Torrens), 1915-17, non-Labor 1917-21, 1924-30. 
Minister of education, 1908-9, 1910-12. Speaker of House, 
1915-21. 
COOMBE, Ephraim Henry, b. SA, 1858;d.SA, 1917. Journalist and news-
paper editor. Commissioner of Crown lands and immigration, and 
minister of agriculture, 1909. 
DENNY, WiUiam Joseph, b. Adelaide, 1872; d. SA, 1946. Lawyer. CUy 
councUIor, 1898. Editor, Southern Cross. MHA (West Adelaide), 
1900-1902; (Adelaide), 1902-33. Attorney general, minister of 
irrigation, minister of repatriation, and minister of housing, 
1925—27. Attorney general, minister of raUways, 1930—33. Minister 
of local government, 1930. 
GOODE, Clarence, b. SA, 1875. Farmer and grazier. Councillor, Gladstone 
Town Corporation. MHA (Stanley), 1905-15; (Victoria), 1915-17, 
non-Labor 1917-18. Commissioner of Crown lands and immigra-
tion, and minister of agriculture, 1915-17. 
GUNN, John. b. Victoria, 1885. Lorry driver and union official. President 
and secretary. Drivers' Union. MHA (Adelaide), 1915-17. MHR 
(Boothby), 1917; (Adelaide), 1918-26. Leader, PLP, 1918-26. 
Premier and Treasurer, 1924-26. Minister of irrigation, and minister 
of repatriation, 1924 — 25. Minister of railways, 1925—26. 
GUTHRIE, Robert Storrie. b. Scotland, 1857; d. Victoria, 1921. Arrived 
Australia, 1878. Seaman and union official Secretary, Seamen's 
Union. President, Maritime Labour CouncU, Port Adelaide, 1890. 
ITUC delegate, 1885, 1887. Executive of Homestead Block League. 
MLC Central District, 1897. Senator, 1903-21 , Labor 1904-16, 
non-Labor 1916-21 . 
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HOURIGAN, Francis John. b. Limerick (Ireland), 1852; d. SA, 1901. 
Tanner's beamsman and union official. Vice-president and president 
TLC. Founder and president. Tanners' and Currier's Union. MHA 
(West Torrens), 1893-1901. 
JACKSON, Harry, b. England, 1876; d. SA, 1951. Smelting worker and 
wharf laboiuer. Town councUlor, Port Pirie. State president, ULP. 
MHA (Stanley), 1906-15; (Port Puie), 1915-17, non-Labor 
1917-18. Speaker, 1911-12. Commissioner of public works, 
19 15 — 17. Commissioner of Crown lands and immigration, 
1917-18. 
JELLEY, James, b. Scotland, 1873; d. SA 1954. Carpenter, porter, and 
engine cleaner. Member, Woodville District CouncU. President, Eight 
Hours' Celebration Union. MLC (Central District), 1912-15; 
(Central District No. 1), 1915-33. Chief secretary, 1924-27, 1930. 
Minister of raUways, 1924-25. Minister of marine, 1930. Miruster of 
repatriation, miruster of local government, minister of irrigation, and 
minister of immigration, 1930-33. 
KIRKPATRICK, Andrew Alexander, b. London, 1848; d. SA, 1930. Com-
positor. Founder and first president. National Liberal Reform 
League. Chairman and president ULP. President, Typographical 
Society. President, Eight Hours Celebration Union. President, TLC. 
ParUamentary leader of state ALP, 1917-18. Acting SA premier, 
then agent general, 1909. MLC (Southern District), 1891-97; 
(Central District), 1900-1909. MHA (Newcastle), 1915-18. MLC 
(Central District No. 1), 1918-28. Minister of industry, 1905-09. 
Minister of mines, minister of marine, nunister of local government, 
and minister of immigration, 1924-27. 
LUNDIE, Francis Walter, b. Port Adelaide (SA), 1866; d. (?). Farm worker 
and union official. Member ASU (later AWU) from 1887. Vice-
president, SA branch, 1888; president, 1889-90; state organizer, 
1892-1900; state secretary, 1900-16. State delegate to AWU con-
ferences , 1 8 9 5 - 1 9 1 7 . Pres ident , AWU, in succession to 
W. G. Spence, 1917—(?); Port Adelaide and Adelaide city councUlor. 
President, ULP, 1917-18. 
McPHERSON, John Abel, b. Aberdeen (Scotland), 1860; d. SA, 1897. 
Arrived SA, 1882. Compositor and uruon official. Vice-president, 
president, trustee, Adelaide Typographical Society, 1890-96. Dele-
gate, secretary, TLC. Fust secretary, ULP. MHA (East Adelaide), 
1892-97. Leader, PLP, 1893-97. 
POYNTON, Alexander, b. Victoria, 1853; d. SA, 1935. Came to SA, 1888. 
Miner, land agent, and union official. Member, AMA. Secretary, 
treasurer. Port Augusta branch. Shearers' Union. MHA (Flinders), 
1893-1901. MHR (Grey), 1901, 1910-19. 
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PRICE, Thomas, b. Wales, 1852; d. SA, 1909. Arrived SA, 1883. Stone-
mason, member of Operative Masons' and Bricklayers' Association. 
MHA (Stur t ) , 1893-1902; (Torrens) 1902-9. Leader, PLP, 
1899—1909. Premier, commissioner of public works, 1905-9. 
Minister of education, 1905—8. 
ROBERTS, Ernest Alfred, b. England, 1868; d. Vic, 1913. Seaman, wharf 
labourer, journalist. MHA (Gladstone), 1896-1902; (Adelaide) 
1905-8. MHR (Adelaide), 1910-1913. 
VAUGHAN, Crawford, b. SA, 1874; d. NSW, 1947. MHA (Torrens), 
1905-15; (Sturt) 1915-18. President, ULP, 1908. Government 
whip, 1909. Treasurer and commissioner of Crown lands and immi-
gration, 1910-12. Leader, PLP, 1913-15. Premier, treasurer, and 
minister of education, 1915-17. 
VERRAN, John. b. CornwaU (England), 1856; d. SA, 1932. Miner. 
President, Moonta Miners' Association. MHA (Wallaroo), 1901-18. 
Leader, PLP, 1909. Premier, commissioner of pubUc works, minister 
of mines and water supply, 1910-12. Senator, 1927-28. 
WILSON, James PhUlips. b. Wales, 1853; d. SA, 1925. Bootmaker and 
miner. MLC (Central District), 1906-15; (Central District No. 1), 
non-Labor 1915 — 18. Miruster of agriculture, 1910—12. 
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I 
A "Labor party"* in Victoria contested its fust general election in 
1892. Sixty years were to elapse before any of its successors could claim 
an absolute majorUy in the Legislative Assembly althougli a minorUy 
Labor government limped througli oblivion from 9 to 22 December 1913. 
There were four further minority ministries in 1924, 1928, 1929—32, and 
1943-45. By the time Victorian Labor won Us first majority in 1952, 
Labor in the other states had already been in office for periods ranging 
from ten to thirty-four years. Yet in the years after the gold rush the 
Victorian Labor movement had occupied a posUion privUeged in the 
Australian colonies and indeed in the worid. In 1856 the eight-hour day 
was secured by stonemasons, one of whose number entered pariiament in 
1859. The Trades HaU CouncU (THC) was a respected part of society and 
its leaders occupied themselves with affairs of state, particularly protec-
tion. So in 1889 when the past-president of the councU, WiUiam Arthur 
Trenwith, was elected to the Legislative Assembly and found four 
sympathetic but unmarshalled supporters, the stage seemed set for the 
appearance of a dominating Labor party. FaUure to fulfil this promise 
must be accounted for initially in light of the precedUig development of 
Victoria's society. 
Even if Victoria was not the richest country in the world in the forty 
years after 1850, its cUizens certainly beUeved that it was and that it 
would continue to be so. This wealth was by no means shared evenly and 
there were the submerged poor within nineteenth-century afUuence just as 
there are today. Although thUigs had been bad in the 1860s, by the 1880s 
even the unemployed had ritualized their grievances. Eric Fry disting-
uished six features of Melbourne's unemployed at this time: they were 
small in number; theu condition was temporary and seasonal; they were 
unskilled; they would not leave the city to work in the country; they 
*Although there was a "Labor party" in the Victorian Legislative Assembly from at 
least 1892, there was no official Labor party in Victoria for another ten years. In 
this chapter I have used "Labor party" to refer to a parliamentary faction and 
have reserved Labor party for the Political Labor Council (PLC) after 1902, 
since it alone sustained a parliamentary caucus pledged to an outside mass 
organization. 
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demanded work from the govemment as a right and unmediately turned to 
publicity and poUtical agitation. "This in turn reflected a background of 
economic confidence, large scale pubUc works and poUtical democracy."i 
Trade unionism in Victoria had proved viable and its growth was as 
extensive as in New South Wales, as can be seen from the lists of trade 
societies appended to the Inter-Colonial Trade Union Congress (ITUC) 
reports. The 1884 report lists Melbourne's THC with fifty societies 
comprisUig 10,000 as against New South Wales TLC's twenty-four societies 
and 8,000 members. More Unportant was their relative composition. In 
July 1890 the New South Wales TLC had twenty-one craft and twenty-
three unskiUed unions as agamst Melbourne's thirty craft and thUteen 
unskiUed.^ The THC was a gatherUig of the trades, of responsible and 
respected cUizens. It would be wrong to see the Victorian unions as passive 
or docUe. They were in fact quite active on purely economic questions and 
whUe they were always most anxious to concUiate they were equaUy 
insistent in negotiation that they should receive their share of the benefits 
from the boom. This appUed particularly to the newer unions which 
accompanied the upsurge of Ught secondary industry after 1880 and which 
were endeavouring to establish their position. 
Factory discipUne proved the seed-bed of soUdarity needed for united 
action and there were important strUces by taUoresses in 1882—83 and by 
bootmakers in 1884—85. Fry listed another thuteen trades organized 
between June 1882 and June 1883. Theu primary aim was the eight-hour 
day which by 1890 was enjoyed by half of Melbourne's wage-earners; this 
had the additional advantage of producing extra pay for hours worked in 
excess of the eight hours. Wider aims, such as amendments to the Factory 
Act, were not subjects for strike action but for legislative and social 
pressure. Union tactics were thus restricted though theu aims were less so. 
When the unions did engage in wider issues, which was most of the time, 
they did not see themselves participating in a battle of classes having no 
common interests, because their experience made it impossible to see 
Victoria in these terms. This was made inevitable by protection which in 
its ideaUzed form was a partnership of labour and capUal under the benign 
guidance of the government, to provide jobs for the workers, profits for 
the manufacturers, the benefits of a high wage economy and economic 
growth for the colony. Protection remamed to bedevil the Labor party 
untU weU after the adoption of "new protection" by the Commonwealth.^ 
There was an intangible but very real import to Victoria's poUty in the 
years after the gold rushes. It was congruent with material prosperity but 
had sources and a life of its own which in turn influenced the way in 
which that prosperity was encountered by wage-earners. Victorian 
liberalism,'' so difficult to betray since it was impossible to define with 
precision, was nonetheless part of the achieved inheritance of Victoria's 
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labouring classes. For them Us most obvious expression was the eight-hour 
day but this had been won - and continued to be debated — m terms of 
inteUectual and moral Unprovement. 
For sunUar reasons plural voting was totaUy unacceptable to the 
labouring classes. It is impossible to appreciate the intensity of feeUng that 
this issue generated if its abolition is seen merely as a means to the end of 
political power which would in turn result in improved economic con-
ditions. Plural voting was a moral affront to the labouring man since it 
classed him as less valuable than someone else's property. Perhaps if he had 
perceived himself as property he would not have felt so outraged. Because 
he was so far from being a wage-slave in his self-perceptions, he was 
indignant at what he considered to be a political castration of his 
manhood.^ 
In its material prosperity and confidence, in its notions of colonial and 
racial superiority, in its political radicaUsm and social reformism, in its 
imperialist schemes and protectiorUst poUcies, Victoria in the 1880s was a 
vast companion piece to Joseph Chamberlain's Birmingham. Different in 
detaU as geographic considerations demanded, Victoria and Birmingham 
were the products of a similar conjuncture of British unperialism. Vic-
toria's entire work-force can be seen as an aristocracy of labour, withui 
which the Melbourne THC operated as a House of Lords. 
The Unport of this brief sketch of the totality of Victoria's society^ m 
the years before the appearance of a "Labor party" is essential if its faUure 
vis-a-vis the other colonies is to be understood. True, the party's practices 
compounded its initial difficulties. But the inheritance of Victorian 
Liberalism, ideological and organizational, meant that there was no Labor 
party in Victoria tiU after 1900 and that when it did emerge U would be 
confounded ui the struggle to exorcise Liberalism's spectre. In this struggle 
for an identity, Victorian Labor often isolated itself from those groups 
whose support could have given it greater parliamentary power. Yet these 
groups, particularly the smaU farmers, had received their share of the 
Uiheritance as weU, and were not as susceptible as theu counterparts in 
other colonies. 
II 
Victoria's unionists were by no means apolitical before the maritime 
strike of August 1890. The mining unions were well advanced in this 
respect if only because mining communities offered a viable electoral base 
and a group of radicals was consistently returned from the minmg elec-
torates. Those who survived into the 1890s maintained a decidedly 
ambiguous relationship wdth the THC-dominated "Labor parties". Some of 
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the Amalgamated Miners' Association's [AMA's] unwUlingness to be tied 
to the "Labor parties" sprang from the miners' attachments to their 
existing representatives. Nor did the Melbourne-based unions ignore 
polUics. The eiglit-hour pioneer, Ben Douglas, unsuccessfuUy contested 
CoUingwood in 1871. More continuous were the activUies of the THC's 
parliamentary committee which had the responsibUity of presenting the 
unions' point of view to poUticians. The parliamentary committee 
appointed by the ITUC in 1 884 was instructed "to obtain for labour duect 
representation in Pariiament". In its report to the 1885 congress the 
committee concentrated on the question of direct representation, and was 
once again given widespread approval. 
When it is remembered that the committee consisted entirely of leaduig 
Victorian uruonists, it is at first surprising to learn of the opposition within 
the THC to a resolution to bring forward candidates to contest the 1896 
election. After a series of special meetings of the councU the motion was 
wUhdrawn."^ This apparent defeat for "duect representation" must be 
understood in the context of the developing struggle between the old and 
new unionists: the old guard was headed by Ben Douglas, who was chau-
man of the Trades HaU trustees, whUe the new men of power were led by 
William Trenwith, who became THC president in March 1886. Trenwith's 
forces finally gained control but only after years of negotiations and a 
sensational court case. FaUure to obtain THC endorsement did not prevent 
F. H. Bromley, W.A. Trenwith, and W. E. Murphy from contesting seats at 
the 1886 election: what is significant about these three is that they had 
been president, treasurer, and secretary of the pariiamentary committee 
appointed in 1884. Their beUef in duect representation had thus found an 
opportunity to develop an organizational cohesiveness. WhUe none was 
successful, none poUed disgracefuUy. Certainly there was reason to hope 
that the Labor vote could be improved into a winning position. 
As the 1889 election approached, the THC adopted a fourteen-point 
platform and urged aU workmen to vote only for those candidates who 
supported its demands. No specific candidates were endorsed. Murphy and 
Trenwith again contested seats, with the latter being successful in Rich-
mond. This victory brought an immediate change in the THC's posUion as 
it passed a resolution appreciating "the service of aU members who worked 
for Labor candidates". The councU's response to Trenwitii's success leaves 
no doubt that it would have endorsed him (and others) at the next 
election.^ His long battle had been won without the intervention of the 
1890 strike. 
Thus the THC's decision in March 1891 to form local district com-
mittees in the electorates was not a "turning point" so much as the 
fiUfilment of a long process; a change of emphasis, not of duection. 
Almost immediately a vacancy occurred for one of the two CoUingwood 
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seats and the parliamentary committee recommended endorsing a 
candidate: John Hancock, secretary of the Typographical Society and 
chauman of the Maritime Strike Committee, was selected and eventually 
headed a poU of four.^ This local success reminded the THC of the 
tremendous victory which theu New Zealand confreres had achieved in the 
previous January. In addition, the Shearers' Union announced its intention 
"to organise the Labor vote in the country"''* and the ITUC in BaUarat 
came out strongly in favour of "duect representation". 
The THC organized a political Labor convention for the last week-end 
in May 1891. Thirteen representatives attended, two from each of the 
Trades CouncUs in Melbourne, BaUarat, Bendigo and Geelong; two each 
from the Amalgamated Shearers' Union (ASU) and the AMA, and one 
from the Social Democratic Federation. They agreed to form the Progress-
ive Political League (PPL) of Victoria. The choice of name with Us inten-
tion of appealing to a wider constituency than labour, shows that the 
consensual underpinnings of Victorian Liberalism had survived Uitact. The 
political platform which they announced called for the aboUtion of plural 
voting; the repeal of Conspiracy Acts; a legaUy enforced eight-hour day; 
and the "Federation of the Colonies on a Democratic basis"; as weU as 
sixteen other items which showed no appeal to rural interests. Seventeen 
rules were adopted including an objective: 
to secure for all classes such legislation as will advance their interests 
by 
(a) the enrolment of all persons desirous of promoting progressive 
legislation. 
(b) the return of Candidates to Parliament pledged to support the 
Platform of the League. 
This moderation was reinforced in the preamble which asked for 
nothing more than that aU the great interests receive a "fair proportion" of 
the parliamentary places so that the legislature could function satis-
factorUy. Rule 1 5 gave "Each Branch . . . absolute freedom in selecting 
Candidates . . ." This lack of central control cut across the concept of a 
pledge and was to create grave tension when attempts were made to alter 
U . i i 
The PPL's platform provoked immediate adverse comment from the 
rigidly Protestant executive councU of the AMA, which demanded the 
addUion of a plank calUng for the "Maintenance of the Education Act" 
before it would affiliate. At the AMA No. 1 Colonial District conference at 
Bendigo fresh approaches were made by Trenwith, who attended 
specifically for this purpose. The most the AMA would agree to was to 
support individual PPL branches which accepted the AMA's secular educa-
tion policy. Spence moved for complete support but was overwhelmingly 
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defeated.'-^ The rift between the miners and political Labor in Victoria 
persisted for another seventeen years and was one of the important factors 
inhibiting Labor's electoral success and organizational growth outside the 
metropolitan area. 
Absence of finance was part of the overaU economic collapse in the 
colony. Some indication of the extent of the depression can be gauged 
from incidents such as the decision in 1892 to make Melboume's trams 
run at 12 mph instead of 9 mph so that fewer cars could make the same 
number of trips; by 1894 the Melbourne Metropolitan Gas Company had 
repossessed 6,233 gas stoves — about half of those on loan in 1890.'^ 
Many unions had spent heavily on strike funds in the preceding eighteen 
months: the Melbourne Typographical Society had given £1,400 in the six 
months to May 1891. With rising unemployment there was a fall in income 
wUh an increased demand for benefit payments: "In one year from 
October 1892, the Australian branches of the Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers paid out the massive sum of £7,137 in donation benefit . . ."^^ 
Poor union response to PPL requests cannot be seen as lack of poUtical 
interest; it was more generally the lack of money to give. 
The thud meeting of the PPL central councU on 30 January 1892 
sought an alUance with the unemployed, an understanduig with the 
farmers, and unity with the AMA. FaUure to achieve any of these in its 
first half-year of existence accurately foreshadowed the league's overaU 
future. 
Choosing candidates for the 1892 elections presented some real 
difficulties, particularly in Fitzroy where the "anarchists" S. A. Rosa and 
W. F. Fleming sought endorsement. Rosa headed the pre-selection poll but 
was replaced at the insistence of Trenwith. A similar situation occurred in 
Carlton South where W. D. Flinn, a foundation member of the PPL as the 
representative of the Social Democratic Federation, was replaced as the 
endorsed candidate. The free-thinking Josh Symes was given even shorter 
shrift in CoUUigwood.' ^  Far more typical was F. H. Bromley who told his 
cheering audience that "he had no prejudices against any class".^^ So the 
party's nature was determined as much by its candidates as by its stated 
policies. 
As the obvious, though unelected, leader of the PPL, TrenwUh deserves 
further attention. His dUemma was how to live up to and live down the 
revolutionary reputation that he had had thrust upon hun by the Argus for 
his role in the marUime strike. He chose simply to explain that he had 
never "counselled strikes . . . [but had] . . . hundreds of times prevented 
them . . . [always urging] . . .that strikes are barbarous and cruel methods 
of attempting to settle labour disputes".''^ Reporting to his constituents 
at the Riclunond Town HaU on 25 February 1892, Trenwith showed his 
support of protection to be as much a "roads-and-bridges" issue as a 
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matter of national poUcy as he listed the naU factories and leather shops he 
had helped, thereby increasuig local employment. He had other claims to 
fame since the Mallee lands had been opened up at his initiative: the 
importance of rural escape routes for Richmond's factory workers was a 
question of continuing concern to their astute representative.'^ Here is 
that persistent but often overiooked combUiation of land hunger and state 
action which constituted so much of what passed as sociaUsm in late 
nineteenth-century Australia. 
As if poor orgaruzation, lack of funds, and a diminishing electoral base 
were insufficient problems for the fragile PPL, it was faced with some of 
the argument over free trade and protection which was concurrently 
racking the New South Wales Labor party. Moreover, neither of the issues 
most in the public mind in AprU 1892 could be turned to the league's 
specific advantage. Allegations against the raUway commissioners were the 
preserve of the Age and any benefit to be gained went to its immediate 
political coterie. But by far the most excUing thing ui the papers during 
the election campaign was the Deeming murder sensation. 
Undeterred, the PPL's paper Commonweal (16 April) issued a pre-
election "Manifesto of Progressive Democrats" indicatmg that the old 
liberalism was out in force. The manifesto declared against class mle and 
for "peaceful and constitutional" reforms to "elevate the general con-
ditions of aU classes". An editorial appealed to "farmers, shopkeepers, 
artisans, labourers, producers and distributors of all kinds" to vote for the 
league and against "the encroachments of the idle few". 
Victorian Liberalism was not only ideologically well-prepared to absorb 
a Labor chaUenge, it also had state-wide organizational linkages which 
could be turned to purely poUtical ends. Contacts established through the 
Australian Natives' Association and the Protectionist Associations could be 
employed for the liberals, whUe young imperial federationists estabUshed 
the Victorian Patriotic League in March 1892 to support the Conserva-
tives. 
Considerable relief was expressed in the Argus the day after the election 
since the PPL had increased its membership merely from six to thirteen Ui 
a house of ninety-five. Hancock had lost his seat and three of the PPL 
members had won by majorities of only 107, 97, and 25. The ^^e (22 
AprU) was content to affirm its consensual principles by pointing to the 
impossibiUty of a "purely sectional institution" gaining political strength. 
Of the thuteen PPL members who were elected, one immediately 
defected; another joined the ministeriaUsts within a year; and two of the 
remauider expued before their terms and theu seats were lost in the sub-
sequent by-elections. A Victorian Labor party had been stUl-born. A 
month after the elections Commonweal expressed a strategy which fuUy 
recognized the extent of Labor's faUure: 
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It is cleariy understood that our Party is to avoid the serious 
mistakes made by the Labour Party in New South Wales, notably 
that primary error which placed the party in a posUion of hostUUy 
to aU other sections of the Parliament. The Victorian Labour Party 
constitutes Uself a wing of the Liberal Party, and is prepared to 
support a Liberal Government so long as that Govemment promotes 
genuine democratic legislation in the interests of all classes, workers 
included. New Zealand should furnish us a model. 
Financial trouble hit Commonweal and in September 1892 it launched 
an appeal fund. By the end of May 1893 it had been reduced from eight to 
four pages and it ceased publication entirely on 1 July that year. In the 
preceding February the THC had replaced its permanent secretariat paying 
£4 a week with an honorary one at £1 a week. If the incidence of 
Commonweal reports is any criterion, there was a sharp decline in PPL 
branch activity after the elections. The central councU contmued to meet 
monthly but reported little organizational work. The fate of the BaUarat 
West branch was perhaps representative. After much discussion as to 
whether it coiUd afford to support a candidate it nominated one, only to 
find after the election that its liabUities exceeded its assets by more than 
£57. The July meeting lapsed for want of a quomm and the mUiute book 
contains no further entry. In the enthusiastic expectation provoked by 
New Zealand and New South Wales successes the PPL had overreached 
itself with fatal results.^" 
Seven years of Conservative-Liberal coalition government m Victoria 
had ended in November 1890. Budget deficits brought down three govem-
ments in the next four years suice faUure to balance the budget was taken 
as proof that a govemment had faUed to cure the depression. These depres-
sion deficits raised other problems: how to make up the difference? 
Should expenditures be cut? Or revenues increased? And if so, how? AU 
this questioning eventually produced doubts conceming protection. 
Legislative form was given to these doubts by the Conservative ministry of 
James Patterson in his 1894 budget. For the first tune in over twenty 
years, Victoria's protectionist policy was faced with real opposition from a 
govemment.^* Confronted with this direct conservative thmst, the THC 
was fortified in its resolve to broaden the base of its political organization. 
Invitations to a conference "to devise some method of political action" 
were extended to aU societies affUiated wUh the THC and with the TLCs 
in Bendigo, BaUarat, Geelong, and Horsham; to the AMA, the ASU, the 
Eight-Hours Movement; and to the Democratic Club, the Women's 
Suffrage Society, the Protectionist, Liberal and Federation League, and to 
aU extant PPL branches. The conference met late in June and drew up a 
platform for a United Labour and Liberal party (ULLP) which was slightiy 
more radical than the PPL's had been;^^ the budget crisis which occurred 
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ui August meant that the new party would be even less radical in practice 
than its predecessor. Even the "socialist" G. M. Prendergast declared 
hUnself to be a Liberal.^ ^ 
Patterson's government was defeated on 29 August 1894 and an 
election was caUed for 20 September. Because of the clear-cut nature of 
the issue — Protection or Free Trade — the campaign was vigorously con-
tested. Sectional groups such as Temperance and Scripture leagues were 
absent, thereby helping to sharpen the basic conflict. Candidates did have 
to compete with the footbaU grand finals for the voters' uiterest. Since it is 
uncertain how many ULLP candidates were endorsed it is Unpossible to 
decide how many were elected but it was somewhere between sixteen and 
eighteen.^^ What is beyond doubt is that Patterson was soundly defeated 
and that George Turner's Liberal supporters won over two-thuds of the 
seats. EquaUy apparent was Labor's enthusiasm for the new premier, 
despite some annoyance at being excluded from the ministry.'^ ^ 
Liberalism had re-established its hegemony via protection. The differ-
ence between Liberals and Conservatives after 1894 was sufficiently great 
on this issue, so vital to the THC, that there was no opportunity for Labor 
to trade support for concessions. The PPL's earlier faUure to break through 
was compounded, and untU 1902 the Trades HaU party could do no more 
than act out the role prescribed for it by the Age — that of advance guard 
for Liberalism. In this environment it is Uttle wonder that the BaUance and 
Seddon Governments in New Zealand were taken as ideal models for 
Liberalism in Victoria to foUow. Every new reform across the Tasman 
provided another opportunity to remind Turner that, as a Liberal, he 
should do likewise. As the 1890's progressed, and Turner did not. New 
Zealand's "lib-lab-socialist" governments became a yardstick agauist which 
to measure the faUings of Victorian Liberalism. Criticisms derived from 
these comparisons eventually assisted in creating organizational autonomy 
for political Labor in Victoria. Yet this was achieved under a debt to 
Liberalism,fl/Z»e/Y a Liberalism twelve hundred mUes away. 
In 1896 LiberaUsm scored two victories which reinforced Us hold over 
the allegiance of the Victorian electorate. One of these was of general 
appeal: a balanced budget. The other was aimed directly at the working 
classes: wages boards^^ which were subsequentiy extended to many 
categories of workmen. The boards established minimum wages and thus 
attempted to spread the benefits of protection to the employees: the unity 
of class interests being given a further practical demonstration. 
The attempt at a ULLP had never reaUy passed beyond the wishes of 
the Labor side, so yet another organization was launched Ui May 1896 
when the THC adopted the constUution of the United Labor party (ULP) 
of Victoria. The policy of the "new" party was barely distinguishable from 
that of the ULLP. Organizationally the changes appeared more substantial 
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since a pledge was to be obtained from all aspuUig candidates to support 
the platform. This was stiU a long way from the "caucus pledge" suice the 
Victorian pledge was to be given through the nominating organization 
which could be any "trades and labor union [or] democratic bodies" 
affUiated with the ULP.^^ The THC maintained a proprietory interest in 
the new party. 
Internal dissension was the most important fact facuig the ULP as it 
contested the 1897 election. Some discontent with Trenwith's passive 
support for the Turner ministry, and with Liberalism Ui general, had been 
present for some tune but it was not untU 1897 that it came to the fore. 
The radicals were centred round Tocsin, a paper they launched on 2 
October 1897 with a platform of seventy-four points which showed that 
there was little specifically socialist about even the radicals. Or as the first 
editorial put it: "The functions of a Labour Paper in a new community 
Uke Australia are necessarUy greater, and less sectional and factional, than 
they are in older countries. There such an organ voices the clauns and the 
despair of the hunted and cornered, and the aspuations of those of them 
who have been left long enough unmolested to have tune to aspire; here U 
voices, or should, and must voice, the clauns and reaUsable hopes of the 
whole community." The area in dispute was that of organizational 
autonomy from Turner and David Syme's Age. 
Before the election of 14 October 1897 there was Uttle open criticism 
of Trenwith by his feUow ULP members, who concentrated theu fue on 
Turner and the Age. This led to Turner attacking the ULP in his policy 
speech for not giving hun all the support it could have in the previous 
parliament, a suggestion denounced at the THC and denied by Trenwith, 
who was nonetheless critical of some of his coUeagues. It was the Age 
which presented the matter most succinctly: the difficulty arose because 
"some members of this party . . . are no longer content to consider them-
selves as owning any aUegiance to Liberal homogeneity. They declare for a 
policy of separation and segregation".^^ Accepting this chaUenge the Age 
went aU out to defeat its perpetrators, who had been encouraged by the 
presence of the British dock strike leader, Ben TiUett. 
Once more it is difficult to be certam how many ULP candidates were 
returned, but the most likely figure is thirteen, which meant that Labor's 
numerical strength was unchanged but the confidence of its radical wing 
had taken a beating, especially with the defeat of Prendergast. The Age 
summed it up thus: "The net result of this part of the contest has been 
exactly what the Government asked for. The Labor party has suffered a 
check, but not sufficient to discourage it altogether. The effect should be 
to make it Liberal without going into impractical extremes . . . there is no 
standing room in Victoria for the people who look to Mr. TiUett as the 
long-expected Messiah of a Socialist MiUennium".^ ^  
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The radicals' attempt to establish the ULP as the official opposition had 
faUed, and by the tune the next elections occurred in 1900 the homo-
geneity of Liberalism had been re-established. The intervening years were 
marked by the disintegration of the ULP; the proliferation of other 
"Labor" organizations; and the regrowth of the trade unions. Each of 
these wUl now be examined briefly. 
The coUapse of the ULP proceeded both inside and outside the Parlia-
ment. Shortly after the 1897 election Tocsin hit upon one of the com-
plaints against Trenwith when it asked if "the duties of the leader begin 
and end with his Parliamentary work, or whether he should also exert a 
guiding and active influence in the work of outside organisation". ^ 
FaUure to break out of Melboume certainly was the heart of the difficulty, 
but Trenwith's reluctance to take part in organizing country seats was part 
of the general attitude of the movement and was by no means a mere 
personal fault, although his faUing sight must have affected his attitude. 
Discontent came to a head in June 1898 when Hancock unsuccessfuUy 
chaUenged Trenwith for the leadership. 
Four months later Trenwith gave a very revealing interview to Tocsin in 
which he Usted the three important measures which the "Labor party" had 
secured: firstly, the ending of the alienation of land in the MaUee; 
secondly, the luniting of the area of land to be held by an individual; and 
thudly, the securing of the minimum wage and eight-hour principle. Sigru-
ficantly "land" occupied the leading positions. The rest of the interview 
should explain by itself the state of the ULP: 
Q. Do you think it is advisable to admit membership of the Labour 
Party who never speak at Labour meetings, or who never 
identify themselves directly with the Labour Party unless at 
election times? 
A. 1 do, certainly; why should a man continuaUy parade his poUtics 
or the poUtics of his party any more than his religion. 
Q. I hear it is the intention to exact a written pledge from all Labour 
candidates in future, and . . . 
3 2 
A. Ah, well that is one way to get rid of me . . . 
It was this set of conditions which led Tocsin into its bitterest attack. 
In an editorial for 10 November 1898 it denounced "The policy of diUy-
dally, drift and disaster" which marked the ULP: "Plan of campaign it has 
none, democratic work U does none. It never meets as a party to decide on 
measures to be introduced . . . It is leaderless, functiordess, out-classed: its 
existence is as a constitutional abortion, with neither the cohesion of a 
Party, nor the daring and initiative of a guerUla band or a company of free 
lances . . ." 
If the ULP was to continue, increased THC intervention was inevitable 
and early in 1899 it decided to re-write - yet again — the rules and 
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platform. The new proposals were finally adopted on 20 October. Com-
menting on the new programme the Age pointed out that "there is not one 
of its fourteen items which has not received the sanction of many staid 
and sober thinkers and writers". After examining each plank the editorial 
concluded that "so far from the aspirations of this political organisation 
being violent or mischievous, they are but a few short forward steps in 
advance of the main body of Liberalism".^ ^  With the defeat of the Turner 
government two months later Liberalism's ideological dominance was to 
be given organizational Unkages far stronger than had previously existed. 
Late in 1899 U appeared that the re-organization of the ULP might 
have come too late. Defeats and divisions associated with three by-
elections certaUily lent weight to this view. Tocsin's fury at these defeats 
knew no bounds and in an edUorial, "Labour's Bunglers and Log-Rollers", 
it attacked Trenwith's treachery and bewailed the lack of organization. 
EditoriaUy the Age expressed its genuine concern at the "acrimonious 
denunciations" and "aimless vituperation" which were put forward Ui 
place of penetrating evaluation of ULP's parlous position. It was desuable 
that the party should recover so that it could spur Liberalism "into 
renewed activity by the admonitions of men who can speak for the 
sections of the community where the impulse towards democratic reform 
must always fUid its source". Unfortunately the ULP did not have the 
confidence of the labouring classes and if it was to come into its own 
politicaUy it would need to accept this truth. This gloomy but accurate 
picture augured inauspiciously for the future of the refurbished ULP as it 
faced a new century. 
In the absence of a vigorous Labor party it was hardly surprisUig that 
the partial vacuum would be fiUed by grouplets and even by organizations 
attempting to supplant the ULP. Such groupings had long existed and it 
would be unwise to ignore the implicit warning of theu weakness Ui 
Bernard O'Dowd's verse: 
And all who wear clothes good or neat. 
Their life's blood we will scatter; 
We'U make red rain drip on the street. 
With Anarchistic patter. 
Yes, ye shall hear our warning dmm 
Ere many more Decembers, 
And Shriek, "The Melbourne Anarch's come 
With half-a-dozen members!" 
Tocsin, which O'Dowd edited, never developed into the centre of 
organized opposition that Us edUorials suggested and its press provided 
for. Rather it saw itself as a clearUig-house for ideas and as an organizing 
journal for aU groups.^"* 
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The Workers' PoUtical League (WPL) was the UkeUest contender for the 
ULP's right to represent Victoria's labouring classes. Its platform con-
tained Uttle to distinguish it from the ULP but its organization appeared to 
have resolved the dUemma which had impeded the growth of political 
Labor Ui Victoria for almost a decade. The League's headquarters were ui 
Creswick and its officers included two members of the Legislative 
Assembly, two past presidents of the THC, the secretary of the BaUarat 
TLC, the secretary of the AWU, and the ex-president of the AMA. What-
ever prospects it had were cut short by the THC's reorganization of the 
ULP during 1899. Also active, from 1898 onwards, was the Rochdale-style 
co-operative Victorian Labour Federation (VLF), of which Frank Anstey 
was president. As weU as selUng tea to raise funds, the VLF organized a 
bookshop, a quadrille club, and relief for the unemployed. By the end of 
1900 it was in severe financial difficulties and Anstey stood down as 
president. A Victorian Socialists' League was formed in 1898 and existed 
tUl 1902 when U emerged into the Social Democratic party, but Us own 
influence was slight. The Knights of Labour held picnics, sang the 
"MarseUlaise", and marched behind a red flag; and Hegemony Club con-
templated a war for position on the ideological front but went cycUng; and 
the Marxian Club held social evenings, where very pleasant times were had 
by aU. None of the above groups seriously challenged the THC's control of 
the political movement and if they had it is unlikely that they would have 
been any more successful in overcoming the besetting problems. The effort 
that went into them meant that the ULP was deprived of this energy and 
enthusiasm, a loss U could iU-afford, but a consequence that was inevitable 
in light of its own failing prospects. 
After the coUapse of unionism in Victoria in the face of the depression 
there was a period of quietism with few if any unions reforming. An 
attempt to reorganize the trade societies was undertaken at the THC early 
in 1900 with exceUent results, and, by the end of July, eight unions had 
been formed in Melboume and four in Geelong. Within a year, over 
twenty-five new unions had been formed, half-a-dozen amalgamations 
arranged, and eight unions resuscUated.^^ This revival of unionism did not 
automatically mean a revival of the ULP since the organizing work was 
directed towards industrial rather than pohtical ends. Nor did aU the 
unions affiliate with the ULP. But the success held out hope for the ULP. 
Ultimately the increase in membership of the THC, and of the union 
business it needed to conduct, forced it to sever its controlling interest ui 
the ULP. This could have proved disastrous had it not freed the party at a 
time when it could benefit from other forces at work — the Common-
wealth, the arrival of Tom Mann, and the break-up of the old Liberalism. 
Before they were reached the ULP suffered from two more upheavals: the 
Boer War and federation. 
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In the early stages of the Boer War the Victorian Labor movement split 
down the middle. Trenwith supported the war, for which Tocsin described 
him as "a compromiser, a lickspittle to Liberalism and a recreant".^^ 
When the THC president reported that he had attended a banquet to mark 
the departure of the Victorian troops to the Transvaal he encountered 
strong opposition but his action was endorsed by a narrow majority. 
Tocsin remained hostUe to the war throughout and lent its support to the 
Peace and Humanity Society, of which Dr. Maloney, a state member of 
parliament, was treasurer. Tocsin's primary objection was that the war was 
engineered by Jew capitalists^^ to replace white labourers with blacks and 
Chinese.^* It was forced on 21 June 1900 to admit that the 
" . . .,Victorian Labor Party, with one or two notable exceptions, are 
intensely Jingoistic, because the majority of the people favour the war". 
Although the Labor movement as a whole supported the war, the 
opposition of a mUiority not only deepened divisions within the ULP but 
made the whole ULP suspect by association. 
The ULP was no less at odds with itself and the electorate over federa-
tion. Demands for a democratic federation had been part of Labor's 
political programme from the start but this created little interest untU the 
preparations for the 1897 convention were underway. By 1898 Tocsin was 
completely opposed to the draft constitution which it scarified as "Fat 
Oration". The vote against adoption of the constitution in Victoria was 
less than half that which any of the "Labor parties" had achieved at any 
election since 1892.^^ 
The split in the liberal party, by which Allan McLean had become 
premier late m 1899, gave fresh life to the unity of ULP and Liberal 
interests. Addressing an election meeting the ULP candidate for Carlton 
South and THC secretary, J. G. Barrett, announced that "as a member of 
the Labor Party, the advance wing of the Liberal Party, he would, if 
returned, sit in opposition, if Sir George Turner was in opposition . . . He, 
for one, had every confidence in Sir George Turner, who, he considered, 
would be the only person who could reunite the Liberal Party".^'' Tre-
nwith was on the platform when Turner gave his policy speech and the 
Liberal caucus around Turner endorsed aU the metropolitan ULP candi-
dates. At least sixteen ULP candidates stood, of whom possibly twelve 
were successful, which meant no numerical change. One important change 
was that ULP members held the balance of power in the Assembly. There 
was no attempt to bargam for concessions and all ULP members attended 
a caucus caUed by Turner a week after the elections. Trenwith was 
appointed commissioner of public works and minister of raUways on 17 
November and resigned his leadership of the ULP six days later; there was 
no suggestion that he did not have the approval of his colleagues. Bromley 
was elected the new leader on 3 December. 
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There were signs of increased activity by the ULP after the 1900 
elections: parliamentarians agreed to donate towards an organizing fund; a 
few new branches were launched. Important alterations were made to the 
ULP, renamed the Political Labour CouncU (PLC), at a meeting on 23 
February 1901. A federal platform was adopted calling for "one adult, one 
vote"; constitutional amendments to provide for initiative and referen-
dum; a White Australia; old age pensions; and protection. The state plat-
form remained unaffected.^' Partly as a consequence of this reorganiza-
tion, the preparations for the federal elections due at the end of March 
were painfully slow. Only four of the twenty-four federal seats were con-
tested by the PLC of which two were won, as was one Senate place. 
A conference was caUed by the PLC for Thursday 26 June 1902 "to 
devise the best method of organising the Labour vote in Victoria". 
Tocsin's excitedly jubUant headlines were quite justified as this was the 
first truly representative political Labor conference held in Victoria. As an 
indication of the PLC's electoral weakness only eight branches were repre-
sented compared with forty-seven unions. The most important decision 
was "that a contribution of 6d. per annum per member be paid by the 
unions and branches towards the organising fund of the PLC". The AWU 
was empowered to organize the country electorates and the PLC agreed to 
endorse its candidates."*^ Although this - the fourth poUrical "Labor 
party" launched in Victoria in little over a decade - managed to survive 
and grow, it was not free from serious initial problems, not the least of 
which was the refusal of some unions to affiliate. As the PLC began to 
exert its infiuence, it ran into the accumulated difficulties of the preceding 
decade, particularly the unregulated existence of suburban branches. 
Having persisted for so long without central duection, many branches and 
some members of parliament were reluctant to be brought into line. 
Ted Findley's victory in the Melboume seat was the orUy surprise in the 
ULP's 1900 state election results and the conservatives were most put out 
that their financial centre was represented by a Labor man. Largely in 
response to a hue-and-cry initiated by the Argus, Fuidley was expelled 
from the Assembly on 25 June 1901 on the charge that he was responsible 
for an issue of Tocsin which had reprinted "UbeUous" extracts from an 
attack on Edward VII m the Irish People. In fact Findley was a mere 
figure-head; he apologized for the article and dissociated himself from it. 
Spence claimed that Findley's expulsion was crucial in altering the PLC's 
attitude towards the city Liberals, but this is unUkely as evidenced by the 
statement of the parliamentary leader, Bromley, in the Argus of 21 
November: " . . . I do not think that would tum one vote from our 
members against the Government. Mr Irvine was more bitter on that 
question than Mr Peacock." The Findley episode did point towards the 
shape of thmgs to come. 
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A. J. Peacock's liberal ministry was defeated on the floor of the house 
on 3 June 1902 on the grounds that it had not pushed ahead vigorously 
enough with retrenchments and economies. The new government was led 
by William Irvine, who made his attitude clear wUh his claim that "the 
regeneration of poUtics in Victoria may be taken to date from the time 
when I brought forward my want-of-confidence motion", because up to 
that time the government had been controlled by the "Labor party".^^ 
This exaggerated view of Labor's importance was the basis of Irvine's 
intention to put Labor back in its place, which was out of politics al-
together. 
Two major legislative measures were before the parliament in August 
1902: reduction in public service salaries and the re-enactment of the 
Factories and Shops Act. As part of its general economy drive, the Reform 
ministry introduced the Members' and Public Service Retrenchment BiU 
which was designed to cut aU salaries over £125 p.a. When the government 
was defeated on an amendment, it chose to go to the people. This had two 
important consequences: U forged an alliance between the PLC and the 
public service; and it meant that the wages boards and theu ruUngs no 
longer had legal force. Wages boards had been introduced in 1896 for a 
trial period of three years; in 1899 they were renewed for two years, after 
which they were to remam in force untU the end of the next session of 
parliament, which was unexpectedly cut short whUe the re-enactment 
legislation was before the CouncU. Some thirty-six trades were covered by 
its provisions and its future was of vital concem to aU unions. Its abeyance 
during the 1902 election was a considerable spur to union support for the 
PLC. Labor made the wages boards and public service salaries the centre-
pieces of its campaign. It was this second aspect which was novel since U 
brought into direct union with the PLC, workers who had hitherto been 
hostile or at best apathetic. IntemaUy the PLC was ui almost as great a 
state of disorder as ever. At attempt to enforce a fairly loose pledge 
succeeded, much to everyone's surprise. There was a sizeable improvement 
in the vote cast for Labor, even aUowing for the increase in the number of 
candidates. Tocsin claimed eleven "pledged" members, all from metro-
politan seats. However the overwhelming return of Irvine supporters was 
the dominant feature of the results. This presaged a new era in Victorian 
politics. 
Ill 
The advent of the Commonwealth had four consequences for the PLC. 
Firstly, because Melbourne was the seat of the national government tUl 
1927, there were a fau number of interstate Labor politicians who could 
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be used as speakers to carry Labor's message into new areas. Secondly, 
because the Senate was a state-wide poll, it became necessary to extend 
Labor's electoral machinery into hitherto unexplored rural districts. 
Thirdly, the electoral success of the federal Labor party within the first 
decade of the twentieth century provided a source of confidence to the 
Victorian branch which it could never have obtamed by itself. Voters who 
swung to Labor at the federal level often stayed to vote Labor in state 
elections. But the most important result of federation seemed to offer 
anything but promise to the future of the PLC. The consensus of Victorian 
Liberalism broke under the impact of a largely one-sided class struggle in 
the early years of this century. This is not to say that most of the causes 
had not been present for some time. Rather it is to direct attention to the 
suigle most important change in Victorian pohtics, namely, the removal of 
the protection issue from the state arena by the creation of the Common-
wealth. Protection had been the basis of the virtual one-party rule in 
Victoria from 1883 onwards. Moreover, it had allowed the Dealdn-style 
Uberals to set the stage. When federation removed most of the leading 
liberals and theu raison detre from the state sphere, it became possible for 
the conservatives to fulfil their long-felt desire for a "cheap government" 
campaign. Since the conservative Free Traders could no longer endanger 
protection, it simultaneously became possible for the electorate to support 
such a campaign to the extent that Victoria had its most conservative 
government since self-government. 
Initially the conservative upsurge centred on the Kyabram 
movement,'*^ which expressed rural demands for reform, that is, cheaper 
and more efficient government. The mood of austerity was heightened by 
the drought which reached its clunax in 1902 when the wheat yield was 
1.3 bushels per acre, about a quarter of an average harvest. In these 
circumstances rural discontent could be easily mobUized agamst the 
rapacious city. 
As a result of the 1902 state elections the^^e suggested separate repre-
sentation for public servants so as to break theu alUance with the PLC. 
The Constitution Act of 1902 provided for this, the object being to teach 
the Labor movement a lesson - perhaps to the point of its destruction. 
Thus the raU strike of May 1903 must be seen as a link in a long causal 
chain extending back to Kyabram. Wage-cuts and retrenchments had 
created grave discontent in the service. In AprU 1903 Irvine precipitated a 
confrontation by issuing a decree that all raUway unions must withdraw 
their affiliation from the THC or have their executive officers dismissed. 
Most of the unions refused and the threat was carried out. The engine-
drivers struck immediately. Irvine hurriedly introduced a Coercion Act 
under which aU strikers were dismissed, losing aU pension and retirement 
rights. The commissioners had power to re-employ on such terms as they 
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felt warranted. Three days before the act was passed by the Assembly, the 
strikers agreed to return unconditionally. The act proceeded and its pro-
visions were carried out in fuU. It was this strUce rather that the 1890 
maritime dispute which established the organizational autonomy of Labor 
in Victoria. It was "Iceberg" Irvine, rather than "Firelow" Price, who 
loosened the bonds which had limited Labor's independence to an 
uichoate Liberalism. 
Commonwealth poUtical concerns became central ui the twelve months 
after the raU strike. Tocsin decided that "the Federal ParUament is the 
Victorian workers' poUtical hope" because adult franchise would operate 
as from the 1903 federal elections. In June 1903 the federal platform and 
pledge which had been drawn up at the Commonwealth Labor conference 
Ui the preceding December were adopted "with provision for ensuring the 
Victorian members being pledged to the New Protection policy".^^ In 
1903 four PLC candidates stood for the four Senate vacancies and Ted 
Findley was returned. Three of the eleven House of Representatives seats 
contested by the PLC were (eventually) won for Labor. OveraU Labor had 
almost doubled its strength, so that the House of Representatives was 
divided evenly into thirds. Late in AprU 1904 Deakin resigned after his 
ConcUiation and Arbitration BUl had been amended, and Watson formed a 
minority ministry from 27 AprU to 17 August when it too was defeated on 
a proposal to extend arbitration to public servants. It was highly signifi-
cant for the fate of the proposed Labor-Liberal alUance that Deakin's 
supporters should defeat Watson on an issue so intimately related to the 
raU strike of recent memory. Watson's govemment stayed in power with 
the tacit support of a section of the Liberals for whom the federal Labor 
party requested electoral immunity. This presented special difficulties in 
Victoria, and not simply because most of the radical Liberals came from 
there. Partly because the PLC was anxious to retain its newly acquired 
uidependence, and partly because it was stiU smarting from the hammer 
blows of reaction which in the main had been supported by the Liberals, 
there was strenuous opposition to granting the requested unmunity. 
If the lib-lab alliance was dead at the state level there was stiU life in it 
at the federal, and elements on both sides set about reinvigorating it. 
WUhin Victoria most of this inUiative came from the Liberal side, smce the 
1905 PLC conference had unanimously supported an addition to the state 
pledge which bound politicians not to joUi any alUance or coalition, or 
other combUiation, without the sanction of the organization to be deter-
mined "by a general or special conference". The year 1906 saw renewed 
pressure from the federal Labor caucus for electoral immunUy for the 
radical Liberals such as Isaacs, Higgins, Mauger, Hume Cook, and Crouch. 
With great reluctance the PLC executive left the final decision to 
individual branches. The aUiance lingered on untU the elevation of Higgins 
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and Isaacs to the bench in October 1906. 
Throughout this dispute the PLC never denied that it had considered 
itself part of the old Liberalism but it blamed the so-caUed radical Liberals 
for its break-up. In reply to an attack by the Age, Tocsin declared on 26 
October 1905 that "with a Seddon at the head of a progressive Govern-
ment, it is unlikely that the Labour Party as we now know U, would have 
come into existence, for the simple reason that U would not have been 
required." Indeed the preface to the 1906 PLC constitution Uisists that 
"the Political Labour CouncU came into being about 1902, as a result of 
the disappearance of genuine Liberalism from Victorian poUtics". 
In the middle of these disputes a state election was held in Victoria. 
Labor fielded its largest team so far — thirty-nine for the Assembly, which 
had recently been reduced from lunety-five to sixty-eight members. When 
the new parUament met. Labor held seventeen seats, which was absolutely 
and proportionately the best result yet. It had not only survived the 
"Reform" onslaught but had emerged strengthened and secure with a 
recently tightened pledge. Yet it was still only half-way to gaming a 
majority within an electoral system which was weighted heavUy towards 
rural interests, which did not provide for adult franchise, but which stUl 
retauied a form of the property vote. And if aU these could be overcome 
there remained the powerful Legislative CouncU, to which Labor returned 
its first two members in 1904. Nor was there any prospect of "giving 
support for concessions"; alliances were now out of the question. The 
reaUzation of Labor's impossible situation in state politics provided the 
field in which two otherwise unconnected but important developments 
occurred — the rise of John Wren, and the relative success of Tom Mann 
and the Victorian Socialist party. (VSP). 
Happy indeed would be the historian who could define precisely the 
range of John Wren's influence in Australian politics. Opinion ranges from 
those who see him as a dominant figure in three states to those who 
dismiss him as being unable to control even the CoUingwood branch of the 
party. For Victoria before 1920 there are inconclusive clues which should 
not be ignored. One Labor member, Robert SoUy, told the Assembly that 
he knew "Mr Wren to be a man with force of character, and people admire 
a man with force of character, although when that force is used ui a 
certaUi direction it cannot be admired. Napoleon was a man with force of 
character — a man who was determined as far as he could with his great 
inteUect and abUity to have his way in controUing the world . . . I thmk 
the same thing applies to John Wren.'"*^ Perhaps the most intriguing item 
is the £100 which Wren sent in 1916 to the PLC to estabUsh a fund for the 
widow of his "boyhood friend" and PLC president, Laurie Cohen, who 
had, although a reputed teetotaller, fallen to his death from a hotel 
wdndow in Adelaide only six months after the fatal robbery at the Trades 
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HaU, of which Cohen was assistant secretary."^^ And why is there such 
voluble but empty resistance to a call to nationalize the totalisator at the 
1915 PLC conference? No answers have been found to these questions: 
only more questions. They are reproduced so that readers wUl not neglect 
the possibUUy that - if the PLC was controUed from TattersaUs Club 
rather than from the Trades Hall - this account wiU be entirely irrelevant. 
No further detaUed reference wUl be made to Wren, but this sUence should 
not be interpreted as acquittal.^* Indeed, one might reflect on his in-
fluence Ui any discussion of control of the liquor traffic. 
Temperance and prohibition persisted as minor themes throughout the 
history of the Labor party in Victoria well into the 1930s. If there was 
general agreement that alcohol was not the cause of poverty, there was 
nonetheless widespread support for the view, expressed by Dr. Maloney ui 
the 1899 report of the board on habUual dmnkards, that "when a working 
man becomes a drunkard he very often, on that account, loses his employ-
ment, and as a drunkard does not save money, he wUl either at once, or 
very soon become destitute".^^ This led to an acceptance of temperance 
as an ideal although total abstinence found supporters in the THC as a 
1905 debate revealed. At the political level this was expressed as a policy 
of nationalization of the drink traffic by which means the commercial 
drive to create drunkards would be removed, and a motion to this effect 
was carried at the 1905 PLC conference. 
In the foUowing year legislation was introduced to the state parliament 
to reduce the number of hotels and to impose a tune-limit on compensa-
tion payable to hotelkeepers. F. W. Eggleston commented that "the Labor 
party, although a great number of them were total abstainers, were far 
more enthusiastic for compensation to hotelkeepers than for compensa-
tion for compulsory purchase under the Closer Settlement Act; indeed 
with one or two exceptions, such as Mr Lemmon, the Labour Party voted 
with the trade".^"^ This opposition undoubtedly arose from the fact that 
most of the hotels to be closed were in working-class areas and since they 
were Uttle more than famUy affaus the loss of compensation would be a 
real hardship both to the famUies and to the election funds they 
supported. A motion at the 1915 PLC conference calUng for prohibUion 
was amended to "the Socialisation of the liquor traffic with a view to 
prohibition". From correspondence to Labor papers and from union and 
branch resolutions it is clear that Uquor reform was of genuine concem to 
the labouring classes. To their parliamentary representatives it presented 
an embarrassment but one which could occasionally be turned to tactical 
or debating advantage when prohibUion without compensation could be 
attacked as less moral than socialism. 
Two days before the 1902 election, Tom Mann, the famous British 
union leader, arrived in Melbourne. Before the end of the year he had been 
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appointed organizer for the THC-PLC with a fund of £600,half of which 
was to be his salary.^' Throughout 1903 Mann formed branches in 
country areas where Labor's case had never been heard before. His style 
was superbly captured by a Labor politician, George Elmslie: 
He seems to say to the audience, "You've got hearts and brains; I'm 
going to reach them". And reach them he does. What a time we 
have . . . No mincing or smoodging; no toning down; straight out; 
the real thing, clear, pomted, and explicit. What! . . . Surely this is 
not socialism? . . . Authorities are supplied, cheers for the Labor 
Party and Tom Mann are heartUy given, and those who are favour-
able to the formation of a branch are asked to stay behind. 
Tom does not sit down — before you know where you are he is in 
the middle of the room explaining the rules of the PLC, and taking 
names down . . , they don't want you to enrol them. They want to 
give their names to Tom. Brother , sing a Labor song; right; 
anything; stand on your head or try to fly, it's all the same. Let it go 
— "The March of the Workers", "Coming of the Light". This is 
another success; another branch formed, secretary appointed, and 
night of meeting fixed. 
The long-term effectiveness of his organizing is open to doubt. Elmslie 
hinted at this in the conclusion of his report by pointing out that "if more 
system be not displayed, the splendid effort of Tom Mann wUl end in a 
fiasco". 
This is a criticism of the PLC's inabUity to follow up Mann's break-
throughs, rather than a criticism of Mann's style. WhUe the PLC's orgaruza-
tion was extended significantly under Mann's guidance, several factors 
undermined even greater success. Firstly, there was the lack of foUow-up 
from head office and the refusal of some politicians to join in the work. 
Secondly, there was Mann's own ambivalent attitude to the task: for about 
half the time he was under the shadow of his own resignation. In addition 
there were his interstate speaking tours and from 1904 he spent more and 
more time with the Social Democratic party. But Mann's principal contri-
bution was to that vital but immeasurable dimension of ideology. 
Various socialist political sects existed in Australia before 1920 but 
none was as important numericaUy or ideologicaUy as the VSP. In 1905 
Mann organized a social questions committee (SQC) to investigate un-
employment in Melbourne and by October it was so successful that the 
metropolitan district councU of the PLC expressed its fear that the SQC 
might undermine the esprit de corps necessary for electoral success. At its 
first half-yearly meeting in March 1906, the SQC had 758 members and it 
agreed to change its name to the VSP and to publish the Socialist with 
Mann as editor. The VSP was not conceived as an electoral opposition to 
the PLC but as a gjnger-group for socialism. 
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In June 1907 at Us peak membership of 1,500 the VSP participated in 
moves for the federation of the disparate socialist groups throughout Aus-
traUa. The VSP wanted the new organization to continue working withui 
the Labor parties but this move was defeated. As this controversy raged 
within the VSP Us membership declUied. Two VSP candidates were 
endorsed for the 1908 state elections, polUng 167 votes between them. By 
1909 membership had faUen to 430 and acquiescence to the hard line 
against the PLC was losing support even amongst the remaining member-
ship. Because most of its membership remained active in the wider stream 
of the Labor movement it was able to exert an ideological influence on the 
Labor party.^^ 
Mann preached a two-pronged message - socialism and internationalism 
— and for each his achievement is ambiguous, although socialism found a 
readier audience. At the 1905 federal Labor conference the Victorian 
delegation urged a thoroughgoing socialist objective, and one delegate, 
Harry Scott Bennett, a state Labor member and associate of Mann's, 
opposed the racial purity clause on strictly internationalist grounds. Mann 
concentrated his internationalist propaganda to breaking down 
xenophobia towards other Europeans. On altering attitudes towards non-
Europeans there was little success, and the PLC's attitude was perfectly 
expressed in a Tocsin editorial, 4 October 1906: "We do not object to a 
man because his complexion or the cast of his eyes differs from our own, 
but because his complexion and the cast of his eyes are inseparably con-
nected in our experience with certain qualities of mind to which we do 
most emphatically object." An article, "The Slant-Eyed Idolator", in 
Labor Call, 21 July 1910, argued that "if the Chinaman is going to be 
suppressed and repressed in the Commonwealth, he must be registered and 
numbered, even if he has to carry a brass plate or coUar. To walk in some 
streets of Melbourne now would make one fancy he was in Canton so 
plentiful is the Chinaman, and the rising mongrel between hun and the 
whUe woman." Racism was to reveal its significance more fuUy in the 
conscription debates of the First World War. 
Once established the PLC settled down to a decade of uninterrupted 
dullness which achieved Us finest moment in 1913 with the formation of a 
pre-Christmas Labor ministry. Thus the organizational aspects became 
dominant, as they wiU in this account. Comment wiU be made on the 
central organization, the branches, relations with unions. Labor papers, 
and women's organizations. WhUe none of these are totally new develop-
ments in themselves, their combinarion around a pledged pariiamentary 
party meant that they were very often qualitatively different from their 
antecedents. 
A full-time secretary was not appointed until the middle of 1907, when 
P. J. Heagney received £156 p.a., which was far from satisfactory; Heagney 
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subsidized his income by contributing anonymous Labor news to the 
Argus. When this was discovered in August 1909, the executive passed 
what amounted to a motion of censure and in December Chas, Gray took 
over as acting-secretary, whUe Heagney tendered his resignation on 
grounds of "iUness", By implication a report to the 1910 conference was 
extremely critical of Heagney's entire stewardship, for it considered "it 
absolutely necessary that in future, copies of all outward correspondence 
should be kept; all correspondence received should be properiy filed for 
the information of the Central Executive and future reference",^'* These 
failings were partly the result of Heagney having to do aU the office work 
himself until the second half of 1909 when he gained some part-time 
assistance. Having been re-elected at the 1910 conference, Heagney shortly 
afterwards again resigned and was finally replaced by Arch Stewart from 
the Australian Workers' Union (AWU) in BaUarat. 
The ordinary conference in 1910 had instructed the executive to revise 
the party's constitution before its next publication by omitting redundant 
matters and by a more convenient arrangement of the items. At the same 
time it was agreed that the executive should "draw up a scheme to give all 
leagues and unions affiliated, fair representation at Conferences, such 
scheme to be submitted to aU unions and leagues for consideration before 
next Conference".^ ^ Despite and because of the variety of suggestions and 
interests involved a simUar motion was carried at the 1912 conference, 
which did manage to adopt a new plan for organization. It was not until 
1915 that the upper limit on four delegates from any one organization was 
lifted, so that henceforth every thousand members in excess of the first 
thousand entitled a branch or union to an additional representative. The 
AWU was the prime beneficiary under this scheme, its conference delega-
tion in 1916 increasing to ten. 
After the resignation of Tom Mann as organizer late in 1904, the PLC's 
country work suffered a severe decUne which the continuous rearrange-
ment of party structures did nothing to reverse. FinanciaUy matters were 
also precarious and "labour Tea" was sold for Id. a pound royalty. 
Sporadic meetings were held in country centres, but by May 1905 the PLC 
executive was forced to admit that its organizing attempts were neither 
widespread no effective. Some of this was due to intimidation by rural 
employers and the Property Owners' Association. One stalwart advised the 
executive that he had "received the parcel of Labor leaflets on Thursday. I 
was discharged on Friday, and, therefore have plenty of time to distribute 
them."^^ In its report to the 1907 conference the PLC executive noted 
that "generaUy speaking, the Labor forces during the past year have been 
and StiU are, in a state of disorganization".^^ In the final quarter of the 
year the organization sub-committee reported a desperate situation with 
no money to employ an organizer and little or no interest in election 
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meetings anywhere. This malaise was partly due to the growing independ-
ence of Mann's Socialist party. 
From this languishing state the AWU, whose Victorian segment had 
only recently been restored to Ufe, deUvered them when U affiliated in 
1905. The way forward was cleared in 1907 when facsimile voting slips in 
the Worker were accepted by the PLC for state and federal preselection 
ballots. Having thus secured its influence over future candidates, the AWU 
extended its interests to the branches and in April 1908 generously 
appointed J. H. ScuUin as its political organizer to work with the PLC. 
ScuUin's efforts were concentrated in the country electorates such as 
Corangamite which he successfully contested in 1910. Within a year of his 
appointment twelve country branches had been revived and thirty-nine 
new ones formed, compared with four in the metropolitan area. The PLC 
directory published in Labor Call registered an increase from ninety-eight 
branches on 23 April 1908 to 186 on 9 June 1910. In less than three years 
the AWU had secured control of the two fuU-time positions of organizer 
and secretary, had been instrumental in forming almost half of the PLC 
branches, and could influence the selection of candidates for public office 
and party conferences through the facsimile voting procedure. 
Relations with other unions were not always so close. In June 1907 the 
PLC executive reported that of twenty-five unions recently approached for 
affiliation only two had agreed. But in 1908 and 1909 there was an 
absolute increase of almost 4,000 affiliated unionists each year. Despite 
this general improvement there were stiU thirty-seven unions unaffiliated 
at the end of 1910. Disputes arose between competing unions, and the 
THC persisted with its demand that only unions affiUated with it be 
granted affiliation with the PLC.^^ By the 1911 conference at least one 
long-standing gap was overcome with the affiUation of a significant section 
of the miners. The public service and raUway unions, although sympa-
thetic, were prevented by law from affiliating. 
Increased union affiliation was certainly helpful to the growth of the 
PLC, but of even greater importance was the nature of unionism after 
1905. Instead of being dependent on a small coterie of Melbourne-based 
trades, it now had access to and derived benefit from the organization of 
unskilled and non-metropolitan workers. Unionization also assisted Ui 
creating the climate of opinion in which rural workers were prepared to 
vote Labor. 
Labor papers in Victoria in the 1890s came and went with even greater 
ease than did Labor parties. Commonweal was the official PPL weekly 
from 1891 to 1893, while the Shearers and General Labourers'Record and 
later the Worker were Shearers' Union papers which gave some support. In 
addition there were Henry Hyde Champion's Champion from 1895 to 
1897, and Boomerang for a few weeks in 1894. 
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It was not untU the appearance of Tocsin on 2 October 1897 that 
Victoria saw the beginnings of a continuous Labor paper. Tocsin did not 
commence as an official publication but as the brainchUd of three public 
servants, especially the poet Bemard O'Dowd; the technical side was 
handled by the poUtical aspirants, George Prendergast and Ted Findley. 
From the start there were some very doubtful financial dealings and the 
paper was never very successful, requiring constant subsidies from 
J. P. Jones, a sympathetic taUor. In a letter dated 12 May 1899 the lawyer, 
MarshaU Lyle, advised Jones to sever all connections with the Tocsin 
company, which he alleged was "open to grave charges of mismanage-
ment" and "sweating".^^ Jones however mauitained his support and 
Tocsin lived from crisis to crisis untU it was adopted as the official organ 
of the PLC on 4 July 1904. On 9 June 1905 the THC dismissed a series of 
allegations concerning the paper's management, but this was a mere 
prelude to the stormy scenes at the two annual general meetings in the 
following October when the attendance of the poUce was requested. 
If these internal ructions were insufficient to undermine the paper's 
strength, it was being challenged by other contenders. As weU as the VSP's 
Socialist, there were three schemes under way to launch a Labor daily, 
which meant very little if any new capital was available for Tocsin. Tocsin 
itself had initiated the demand for a Labor daily in an editorial (11 June 
1903) immediately after the raU strike. This general proposUion gained 
support and by October there were plans for a Daily People, a National 
Independent supported by Trenwith, and Progress as the proposed organ 
of the THC-PLC. An amalgamation was arranged into National Progress, 
whose directors included Senator Trenwith as chairman, Robert SoUy, a 
state member, and representatives from the PLC and the THC. Despite this 
backing, it proved almost impossible to seU shares in the company. More 
than 2,000 people attended a rally in support of the new paper but only 
eighty shares were sold; by the end of June 1905 a mere £650 worth of 
shares had been sold and Trenwith had resigned from the board. Worse stiU 
U was costing as much to run the board as was being coUected in shares, 
and so on 3 July a new policy of "rigid economy" and "increased activity" 
was adopted. By February 1906 the board was left wUh almost £800 and 
decided to negotiate for the purchase of Tocsin, which was eventually 
achieved, so that Labor Call commenced on 2 November 1906. Although 
the new paper was more soundly conducted, the PLC was as far from 
publishing a daily as U had been three years eariier, despUe a tremendous 
expenditure of effort and enthusiasm. 
This failure did not end hopes of starting a Labor daily. Once again it 
was the AWU whose resources offered a solution to a long-standing organi-
zational problem. After hearing an address from W. G. Spence, the 1910 
PLC conference pledged Us support for a paper to which the AWU 
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promised £70,000 if the rest of the Victorian Labor movement could raise 
£30,000. By AprU 1911 the THC had agreed to contribute £25,000. 
Spence reported progress to the 1912 PLC conference: an eight-storey 
buUding was under construction in Sydney and it was expected to have the 
New South Wales edition out before the 1913 federal elections; once this 
was weU established it would expand into other states. War interrupted 
these plans, but the demand for a Labor daily naturally intensified during 
the conscription campaigns. After a THC sub-committee investigated the 
question for almost a year, it was decided that nothing could be done 
whUe war-time shortages and costs persisted. 
To some extent the plans for a metropolitan daUy were justified in 
BaUarat, where a weekly Labor Vanguard had appeared in conjunction 
with the 1910 federal elections. In 1912 AWU officials were engaged in a 
"hurry-up scheme" to obtain an extra 10,000 subscriptions m three 
months for the Evening Echo, which came under their control and then 
under the editorship of SculUn in 1913. The Echo played an important 
role in the conscription campaign when special editions were brought to 
Melbourne where they sold very weU. By May 1918, however, SculUn was 
appealing to the THC for financial assistance. Labor Call may not have 
been the best paper in Australia but it did appear every week for almost 
half a century, which gave it certain advantages over the iUusory Victorian 
Labor daUy. 
The growing radicalism of the twentieth century spawned a range of 
sectional journals including Ross' Monthly, Industrial Solidarity, Labour 
Light, Proletarian, OBU, and the One Big Union Herald. While they in-
evitably added to the store of socialist ideas, none appears to have had an 
identifiably individual influence on the Labor movement at large. 
From 1903 women were permitted to vote in federal elections, but 
they were not enfranchised for Victorian elections untU 1909. The first 
Labor platform in 1891 called merely for "manhood suffrage", but from 
1894 all subsequent Labor parties advocated "adult suffrage", and Tocsin, 
under O'Dowd's influence, was particularly sympathetic to the cause whUe 
Dr. Maloney persisted with the fight in the Assembly. However in 1903 
the PLC came into conflict with the major movement for women's rights 
— the Women's (Federal) PoUtical Association led by Vida Goldstein,^^ 
who unsuccessfully contested the 1903 Senate elections as a feminist in-
dependent. Goldstein was a social reformer and agreed with the Labor 
party on all issues but refused to sign its pledge, which she pointed out was 
honoured more in the breach than in the observance. Non-Labor women 
organized the AustraUan Women's National League, which quickly con-
stituted the backbone of the conservative political machine in the 
Melbourne area. A women's committee of the PLC was formed in August 
1903 to organize the vote for the forthcoming federal elections, after 
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which the committee declined severely. Attempts were made to reform U 
every year thereafter, but it had a fitful and largely social life untU June 
1909 when a Labor women's poUtical convention met with thirty-three 
delegates from electorates and thirteen from unions. Up tiU this con-
vention the PLC women's commUtee had consisted of a majority of men 
who organized women into fund-raising activUies at which they were very 
successful: nearly £350 was raised at a fair in March 1909, thereby doubl-
ing the PLC's income for the year. 
After the resignation of Tom Mann as organizer. Miss LUlian Locke was 
employed on a temporary basis in 1905, and in the following year Miss 
Powell was taken on as a recruiting agent. Demands for a fuU-time "lady 
organiser" were fulfUled in AprU 1909 when the THC agreed to employ 
one at £156 a year; this was half the salary that had been paid to Mann six 
years earlier and £50 less than the amount originally proposed by the PLC. 
Lower wages seemed to have been at the heart of the PLC's desire for 
"lady organisers". It was in this frame of mind that the 1906 PLC confer-
ence unsuccessfully invited the Countess of Warwick to campaign in the 
1906 Federal elections in order to attract the women's vote on the 
grounds that a titled "lady organiser" would make a great Unpression. 
While women could join their local PLC and there exercise the same 
formal rights as men, they were also able to form separate women's com-
mittees which were used to convene a PLC front, known as the women's 
convention, every two years. The local electorate commUtees were very 
much organizational bodies, whUe the conventions were sounding boards 
for Labor policies and discontents and lacked any genuine power to alter 
the party ideologically. Moves to remedy this were made at the 1912 
women's convention and came before the next PLC conference in 1914 in 
the form of a motion to "provide for the creation of a permanent CouncU 
of Women, consisting of delegates to be elected annuaUy by the electorate 
women's organising committee . . ." Speakers in support concentrated on 
the electoral advantages to be gained wlule those in opposition stressed the 
unity of Labor's struggle and deprecated any division on sex lines. After a 
debate extending over two days tUe proposal was defeated by sixty-eight 
votes to sixty-seven; at the 1915 conference the vote against was eighty-
eight to forty-nine. By the 1917 conference this had changed into a 
ninety-six to fifty-three majority in favour of a "Central CouncU of 
Women, composed of PLC members and affiliated unionists . . . whose 
function shaU be to propagate the principles of the Labor party's platform 
and organisation, and to assist in the better education of women, socially, 
industriaUy and politically". At least one woman spoke against on the 
grounds that U was impUcU discrimination.^' 
This change in attitude was due in part to the decidedly political role 
undertaken by women in the anti-war and anti-conscription campaigns. As 
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early as September 1915 the women's convention entered "an emphatic 
protest against the present methods of enforced recruiting - namely by 
starvation. Further, that all the delegates pledge themselves to work, speak 
and write against conscription in any form, and desire a definite statement 
from the Prime Minister as to his attUude on the matter."^^ Women such 
as Adela Pankhurst, Mrs. Baines, and Miss Suter were arrested, and the first 
of these gaoled, in the anti-conscription battles which foUowed and there 
was a widespread belief in the Labor movement that conscription had been 
defeated by women to whom propaganda such as the "Blood Vote" verses 
had made direct appeal. Certainly the conscription fights presented Labor 
women as poUtical beings and not mere brewers of tea and carters of 
cakes, since "the history of working-class women only begins in revolu-
tionary periods. For U is only in times of great social upheaval that the 
proletarian woman, the lowest of the low, is buoyed up on the radical 
upsurge to become visible to the historian."^'' Unfortunately this libera-
tion was not fulfiUed or complete, and women were never entirely freed 
from their fund-raising "social" activities: in 1918—19 the women's 
central organizing commUtee raised over £1,000 which U dutifuUy handed 
over to the central executive. 
As a parliamentary party the PLC's entire efforts at organization and Us 
policy arguments were all intended to improve its electoral achievements. 
Comment upon these wiU now be made at the federal, municipal and state 
level. Partly because the federal parliament was in Melbourne, but largely 
because of the impossible electoral and constUutional system in Victoria, 
the PLC's attention was directed towards federal elections. While its share 
of the Senate vote clUnbed steadUy from 13 per cent in 1901 to 33 per 
cent in 1906, its seats in the House of Representatives rose from two to 
four. This was not due to lack of preparation as some electorates had 
organized their campaign commUtees as much as eighteen months before 
the poUs on 12 December 1906. Nor was foresight lacking at the centre, 
since Senate preselection results were announced at the end of March 
1906. Some electorates were eUher less prepared or the selection process 
produced severe disruptions as in Batman and in Melbourne Ports, where 
the sitting member. Rev. J. B. Ronald, was defeated five to one in a pre-
selection baUot. The nomination of two farmers and a stock agent for the 
Wannon preselection indicated in Tocsin's words "that the men on the 
land are taking an active and leading part in the Labour Movement". There 
was, if anything, an embarrassment of contenders; "some of them 
decluie[d] to join the organisation or sign the pledge" and were thus 
rejected outright. A decade eariier they would have been welcomed with 
open arms. Money was still scarce, and the PLC conducted a self-denial 
fund of 5s. squares at 3d. a section. However it was necessary for the 
redoubtable J. P. Jones to advance £75 for the deposits of three candi-
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dates. 
The improved condition of the PLC's organization was evident in the 
1910 federal campaign, when a majority of the candidates were selected at 
least ten months before poUing day, 13 AprU, and the PLC showed Uself 
to be a vote-getting machine of hitherto undreamed-of proportions. Three 
PLC senators were elected, and the Senate vote, which is the best indicator 
of the party's overaU standing, increased by a half to reach 48 per cent; U 
Unproved slightly in 1913, but reached an aU-time peak in 1914, when U 
rose to 53 per cent. In the House of Representatives PLC candidates won 
eleven of the twenty-two seats in 1910; nUie of twenty-one seats ui 1913; 
and twelve out of twenty-one in 1914. These performances show that 
Victorians are not congerUtaUy anti-Labor.^'* 
Long before 1890 labouring men stood for municipal elections with 
occasional success but they were independents Ui every sense; it was not 
untU the 1890s that Labor candidates stood as teams, and it was not untU 
1901 that the first Victorian labor mayor was elected. If caucus alignments 
were insecure in the Legislative Assembly, they were often non-existent in 
councU meetings, and there was some difficulty enforcing the pledge after 
1902. PLC interest in municipal affairs intensified because control of a 
councU meant an opportunity to enforce minimum wages and other 
ameUorative portions of the party's platform which were important 
because the immediate condition of the labouring classes was determined 
by the admuiistration of local affaus as much as by the decisions of 
parliament. Control of a councU also meant the prospect of relief works 
for the unemployed, and, less wholesomely, it led to jobs for the boys. 
Municipal poUtics attracted what a Labor pariiamentarian later described 
as "the diversified type of Labourer adventurers . . . the conduct and the 
motives of whom are to say the least very questionable".^^ 
Having survived so weU the Tory onslaught of 1904, the state parlia-
mentary Labor party remained a compact and stoUd faction of the 
Assembly for the next twenty years. Something of its tone can be gauged 
from George Elmslie's advice to the Glenelg electors Ui 1906 to vote for 
the PLC candidate "if they could, but in any case to be sure and record a 
vote".^^ When Prendergast led the party to the poUs in AprU 1907 there 
was a net loss of two seats under what the executive's report to the next 
conference described as "unusuaUy adverse" cUcumstances: "Thousands 
of Labor voters were disfranchised by the sudden act of the Government 
in rushing the elections. Candidates had not sufficient time to place theu 
views before the electors, or to organise theu supporters."^^ The editorial 
of the Australian Typographical Journal for January 1907 had a different 
explanation of the PLC's malaise and listed sectarianism. Wren, brewers, 
and cliques as the root causes.^^ Certainly the new gaming and Uquor laws 
had infiamed sectarian passions once more, but three non-metropoUtan 
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seats were lost because the government and opposUion parties had 
arranged electoral immuruty for each other so that Labor could not 
benefit from three-way contests. 
After a ministerial crisis had brought down the Bent govemment, 
elections were held on 29 December 1908 under what were indeed 
"unusual" circumstances. Labor's vote remained steady at 35 per cent, but 
to theu great amazement theu share of the seats increased by a third, to 
twenty-one. Some of these wins resulted from the reappearance of three 
-way contests. A. R. Outtrun, who had been a member of the Assembly 
since 1884, adhered to Labor for the first time; ScuUin's organizing was 
also beginning to show results and the westem district seat of Port Fairy 
was won; deposits for Unprovident candidates were provided as usual by 
J. P. Jones. Labor's unexpected success at such short notice, combuied 
with the far better results in the federal elections in 1910, to make the loss 
of one seat at the 1911 state poU a bitter blow. 
Within two years, however, the party was to have office somewhat 
casually dropped upon it. During a debate on a bUl to redistiibute elector-
ates the government of W. A. Watt was defeated by the defection of a 
conservative faction of its supporters. Watt resigned, and on 7 December 
1913 George Alexander Elmslie was commissioned to form a ministry, 
which he did after a ballot of his supporters. It was then that what could 
have been a melodrama was turned uito a low farce. Newly elevated 
salaried ministers were stUl obliged to resign their seats in Victoria and face 
the will of theu electorates. Thus six of the Legislative Assembly members 
of the Labor cabinet were not on the floor of the Assembly when parUa-
ment reassembled on 9 December; their govemment, however, faced a 
want-of-confidence motion. WUh a third of his supporters and aU the best 
debaters temporarily relegated to the gallery, the unfortunate Elmslie saw 
his government defeated on 16 December without as much as being able to 
say a word ui its defence. The lieutenant governor refused EUnslie a dis-
solution, and Watt was recommissioned on 22 December 1913. Elmslie 
had been nominal premier for less than two weeks. This period Ui office 
left an indelible stamp on the minds of aU members of caucus, as theu 
parliamentary tactics throughout the next sixteen years were designed to 
recreate the events of 3 ^ December 1913. They never realized who had 
done what, with which, and to whom. 
When compared with the near chaos that marked Victorian labor 
politics in the 1890s, the key achievements of the PLC were stabUUy and 
order, so that by 1914 no one doubted that a Labor party was a viable and 
independent part of the state's poUtical make-up. Organizationally tUe 
PLC was free from total dependence on the unions for survival, althougli 
its expansion was contingent on AWU patronage. In state politics U 
offered Uttle and received less; in the federal sphere U had been inUially 
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the recipient but repaid the federal party's investment with compound 
interest. WhUe there were areas of dispute around John Wren, sectarianism, 
and the Socialist party, the future appeared to hold nothing but further 
success. 
IV 
As the 1914 state elections approached, the question of religious educa-
tion was placed increasingly before the PLC, which had added "secular" to 
its education plank in 1908. The Catholic chaUenge took organizational 
form in the Australian CathoUc Federation which fust approached the 
government and then the Labor party without success; next it decided to 
run candidates of its own, but with even less result. The PLC moved 
decisively and declared the federation to be a proscribed organization 
under rule 38 (g). In the face of its faUure to succeed independently the 
federation set about capturing control of the PLC from within. However, 
this policy had no tune to succeed by the 1915 PLC conference, where 
rule 38 (g) was strengthened by a vote of 98 to 48. A proposal to define 
"secular" as meaning "secular instruction given in state or registered 
schools" was crushed by 137 votes to 18. 
Bishops Carr and Mannix wamed that they would organize a Catholic 
Labor party, but on 1 September a Catholic Workers' Association was 
inaugurated by Catholic members of the PLC and industrial unions. Its 
declared policy was to secure state aid for Catholic education and to work 
"through the PLC to improve the social and industrial conditions of the 
workers".^^ This meant that it was outside the provision of rule 38 (g) 
although group action by PLC members was quickly but ineffectively 
proscribed by the central executive. In the early months of 1916 Labor 
Call was fuU of arguments and news items about secular education and 
Catholic penetration of PLC branches. When the conference met on 21 
AprU 1916, rule 38 (g) was rendered inoperative by a vote of 124 to 30, 
and the extension of aU benefits enjoyed by state school chUdren to 
chUdren attending registered schools was supported. As Victoria's 
Catholics exerted their influence at the PLC conference, the Easter 
rebellion raged in Dublin. The significance of the Catholic penetration can 
be fully appreciated only by asking "what would have been the fate of 
conscription in the Labor movement if Mannix had carried out his threat 
to establish a separate Catholic labor party?" 
Opposition to the growth of mUitarism in the Australian Labor move-
ment in the pre-war years was most pronounced in Victoria, largely as a 
result of the influence of Tom Mann's VSP, but tiiere remained general 
support for a citizen volunteer army. The adoption of compulsory mUitary 
323 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
HUMPHREY MCQUEEN 
training by the 1908 interstate Labor conference urUeashed such great 
opposition that it was decided to hold a special conference to disavow this 
policy. Shortly afterwards the THC voted against conscription whUe the 
AWU expressed its support. Less than a fortnight before the special con-
ference was due to meet, Andrew Fisher formed his first government and 
there was a reluctance to rock the boat. When the conference assembled, 
the president's ruling that it had power to alter the federal platform was 
disagreed with by forty-three votes to thirty.^*' Anti-nuUtarist attacks 
persisted and were often directed against the Fisher government, especially 
at Senator George Pearce, who was described by Labor Call as "A MUitary 
Czar of Tom Thumb dimensions". WeU before 1914 the Victorian Labor 
movement possessed a significant and vocal anti-mUitarist minority which 
was to become the core of the anti-conscriptionist movement m Australia. 
The division of Labor opUiion was apparent in August 1914. Two days 
after war was declared. Labor Call warned that U was aU a capitalist plot to 
defeat Labor at the elections, and the Sandringham PLC passed a "general 
strike" resolution to end the war. Late in August the THC affiliated with 
the Victorian Peace Alliance. However these moves were marginal to the 
true temper of the time, which can be judged from the cancellation of 
many union meetmgs because members were engaged in "patriotic out-
bursts", and from the jingoistic programmes of the "People's Concerts" 
conducted at the Temperance HaU in conjunction wdth the THC. Pro-war 
attitudes amongst Victorian Laborites persisted well into 1916, including 
enthusiasm for the "heroic deeds" performed at the DardeneUes. 
In the second half of 1915 there were indications that sections of the 
Victorian Labor movement were less happy with the continuance of the 
war: the THC passed a resolution calling for a statement of the terms for a 
negotiated settlement, whUe the PLC suggested an international confer-
ence of workers to settle disputes by arbitration. Opposition to a conser-
vative call for conscription was far more precise. 
Growing disenchantment with the war did not proceed in isolation but 
was tied to opposition to the Labor government's general policy. Senator 
Pearce, defence minister, was the first to be attacked for his faUure, and 
later for his apparent refusal, to enforce preference for unionists Ui 
Defence Department work. No less severe were the attacks on Hughes, 
who later in 1915 was described as a "bosses" representative when pre-
conscription criticism of the Labor government reached its peak with the 
dropping of the powers referendum in November 1915;^' this was taken 
as final proof that Hughes had no intention of curbing prices and profits, 
or of ending unemployment. It was a particularly bUter blow to the Rail-
way Union and to its secretary, Frank Hyett, who had been banking on 
the extension of Commonwealth powers to escape from the continuing 
consequences of the 1903 strike. Right from the very start of the war the 
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Victorian Labor movement was deeply involved Ui the fight against censor-
ship; when in June 1915 Frank Anstey resigned from the federal parlia-
mentary Labor party over the War Precautions Act, his stand was 
supported by the THC. A Labor split had begun. 
Hughes certainly did nothing to bind up the wounds. Early ui 1916 he 
referred to his Labor opponents as "devils in swdne" which led at least one 
PLC branch to declare unanimously that he was no longer a Labor man. 
Shortly afterwards the PLC executive caUed on the cabinet to resign and 
for caucus to elect a new mirustry. A motion to support this resolution 
was defeated at the THC by fifty-one votes to thirty. However attitudes 
hardened after the mUitary raided the THC on 29 JiUy and seized anti-
conscritpion pamphlets. Even without conscription it was highly unlikely 
that the Labor party could have remamed formally united for very much 
longer. Certauily the dissatisfaction up to August 1916 would not by Uself 
have caused the split — nor would it have caused Hughes to be the loser. 
But the contUiuance of the war would have inexorably exacerbated the 
causes of discontent to the point of open division. To this extent con-
scription was contingent to a Labor split. 
If Melbourne was the ideological heart of the anti-conscription move-
ment, so too was it the organizational centre sUnply because the federal 
pariiament was located there: the Australian PoUtical Labor Executive at 
its first meeting in June 1915 appointed as its secretary Arch Stewart, who 
was also secretary of the PLC; in 1916 the secretary of the aU-Australian 
trade union conference (E. J. HoUoway) and of its anti-conscription com-
mittee (John Curtin) were also Melboume-based. 
Concern at the possible introduction of conscription started in earnest 
around the middle of 1915: an Anti-MiUtarist and Anti-Conscription 
League was formed in Melbourne in July, while the No Conscription 
FeUowship held its first meeting on 4 October. Many THC delegates were 
reluctant to act as long as conscription remained no more than a 
possibUity. However as discontent with the govemment over economic 
matters intensified and as Hughes prepared to go overseas, the anti-
conscriptionists in Victoria became more active. Robert Ross organized a 
United Peace and Free Speech Committee in January 1916 and the 
Militant Propagandists began work in PLC branches shortly afterwards. 
Progress was made at the THC meeting on 2 March when Frank Hyett, 
RaUways Union secretary, initiated moves for a congress of aU affiliated 
unions in Australia to discuss conscription for overseas service. A further 
breakthrough came four weeks later when Hyett moved for the appoint-
ment of "a propaganda committee to bring the matter of conscription and 
the forthcoming congress before the Australian Trades Unions". The 
congress which met in Melboume on 11 and 12 May 1916 recorded "its 
uncompromising hostUity to conscription of Ufe and labor" by a card vote 
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of 258,018 to 753; on 6 July the THC agreed to its secretary, HoUoway, 
taking on the job of secretary of the no-conscription campaign but 
pressure of work demanded his almost immediate replacement by John 
Curtin. Rank-and-file opposition to the war as such remained ambivalent 
to say the least; when a meeting of Melboume's printers voted narrowly 
against conscription in AprU 1916, "the defeated group began singing the 
National Anthem which was then taken up as heartUy by the other side". 
In October a baUot of prUiters voted 570 to 439 m favour of donating £50 
to the PLC for its anti-conscription campaign; almost a thud of those 
eligible faUed to express an opinion.^^ When Hughes announced his 
support for conscription at the end of August, the THC stepped up its 
activities and resolved that unions should make as many of theu officials 
as possible free for the campaign. The national executive of the trades 
union conference called a 24-hour stop-work for 4 October against 
Hughes's proclamation caUing up single men for service withUi Australia. 
In November THC approval was given to establish machmery which could 
proceed to a general strike if the proclamation was not withdrawn. 
Voting in Victoria favoured conscription by a margin of 25,000 but it 
was defeated overaU. The executive of the trade union anti-conscription 
congress handed its responsibUity to a committee of six, to be appomted 
from the THC and the PLC, with a reminder from Hyett that conscription 
was StiU possible and that to disband completely would be premature, if 
not disastrous. Much of the drive and most of the finance for the "anti" 
campaign in Victoria had come from the THC, with Hyett playing a con-
spicuous part. Hyett had been assistant-secretary of Mann's VSP and had 
somethmg of Mann's charisma amongst other unionists: he was young, 
effective, personable, and a Sheffield Shield cricketer. No doubt the THC 
would have opposed conscription if he had not been there; but whether its 
opposition would have been as much, as soon, or as effective is less certain. 
Hyett's influence on the anti-conscription campaign was but part of the 
residue of the internationalism which Mann had sponsored in the Victorian 
Labor movement. 
Defeat for conscription should not be seen as the triumph of a popular 
internationalism. Indeed xenophobic responses to Asia were at the centre 
of most anti-conscription arguments; the largest banner at the women's 
anti-conscription rally in Melboume on 21 October 1916 read "Vote NO 
and Keep Australia WHITE and FREE". The Japanese assumed the 
position of dominant threat after the war against Russia, when Tocsin on 
18 February 1904 clauned that "no white Australian can legitimately back 
up a semi-nigger agamst a European race". Once the Great War began ui 
1914, fear of Japan intensified: "Japan has joined in the general 
slaughter . . . Before many years this same power wUl dominate the Pacific, 
and then good-by to Wliite Australia";^ ^  or, as Frank Anstey would have 
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it; "Between the Jap and the Jew - shoddy and shentage - Australia and 
the Australian worker in particular is going to have a hot heU of a time."^'* 
With an unmediate threat of conscription Japan loomed even larger. 
Anstey published an open letter to John Earle (ex-premier of Tasmania) in 
reply to Hughes's denial that he (Hughes) had negotiated with the 
Japanese ambassador Ui London. Anstey threatened to make public the 
content of Hughes's report to caucus - a report which, according to a New 
South Wales Labor member, would make every man and woman in Aus-
tralia vote no. Throughout 1916-17 Lafeor (Tbr//regulariy ran articles with 
rifles such as "The Mighty Japanese", "The Rising Sun", and "The 
Japanese Empire Bids for a New Continent", which coloured a grotesque 
charade on 21 June 1917 when representatives of Uie THC, the PLC, the 
Australian Catholic Federation, and the Rubber Workers' Union urged the 
Victorian premier to prohibit the manufacture and sale of contraceptives 
on the grounds that Australia had to populate or perish.^ ^ 
Neither the state pariiamentary leader, EUnslie, nor Victoria's leading 
federal Labor politician, Tudor, was a militant anti-conscriptionist. In 
September 1916 Elmslie resigned as leader because of a "nervous break-
down" but was granted "leave of absence" instead. Tudor had grown 
firmer in his opposition by the time the referendum was announced and he 
played an active part whenever he could get away from the recruitmg 
platform. Senator E. J. Russell was the only one of Victoria's seventeen 
federal Labor members to go with Hughes. Of the twenty-two state Labor 
members only three were expelled — the first on 26 September, that is, 
over a month before the referendum. PLC eagerness to deal wdth the 
conscriptionists is weU expressed in Labor CalVs comment early in October 
that only "a split can save the Labor Party". WhUe the THC fouglit Hughes 
on the hustings, the PLC worked against liim within the party machinery, 
and on 4 November 1916 its central executive caUed for a special mter-
state Labor conference to expel the conscriptiorUsts. At this special confer-
ence in Melbourne on 4 December the expulsion resolution was moved by 
two Victorians, ScuUin and Stewart. 
Preparations against conscription persisted throughout the first half of 
1917, so that on 7 June the THC set aside its meeting night for a dis-
cussion with representatives of the Trades CouncUs of BaUarat, Bendigo, 
and Geelong, the RaUways Union, and the Mining Employees' Association, 
from which a call was made for an interstate conference of state Trades 
and Labour CouncUs (TLCs) with power to act in the manner deemed 
most effective against the introduction of industrial conscription: a general 
strUce was never far from the minds of Victoria's industrial mUitants at this 
time. 
The effect of the split on the orgaruzation of the PLC can be seen from 
table 1: The declUie between October 1914 and October 1915 can be 
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attributed to the inevitable dropping away after the major election drives 
of 1913 and 1914; the increase between December 1916 and AprU 1917 is 
to be explaUied by the renewed activity in preparation for the federal 
election of 5 May 1917. 
Table 1. Number of Branches Listed in Labor Call 
Federal Electorate 
BaUarat 
Corangamite 
Corio 
Flinders 
Indi 
Maribyrnong 
Melbourne 
Wimmera 
8 October 
TOTAL: 
23 
59 
23 
24 
48 
6 
3 
8 
194 
1914 7 October 1915 
20 
35 
liS 
17 
31 
8 
3 
7 
137 
14 December 
10 
21 
7 
13 
18 
7 
3 
5 
84 
1916 26 Aprill917 
14 
23 
10 
19 
24 
8 
4 
12 
114 
The 1917 federal and state elections were far from disastrous for the 
PLC. It lost five of its twelve House of Representatives seats but this stUl 
enabled it to constitute one-thud of the federal caucus. At the state level 
the three seats of expeUed conscriptiorUsts were lost but the party 
managed to win eighteen others. PLC supporters were even more cheered 
late in December 1917 when Victoria swung against conscription at the 
second referendum. For a party unaccustomed to success this was no mere 
consolation prize. 
Total war ruptured Australian society and resulted ui the expansion and 
deepening of its proletarian segment. This was not simply a matter of 
Unported ideas or statements by leaders but can be discerned at the branch 
level: YarraviUe PLC early in 1916 agreed to co-operate with the Foo-
tscray Industrial Workers of the Worid (IWW) club; at its December 1918 
meeting the Brighton Australian Labor party (ALP) unanimously pro-
tested at the prohibUion of the red flag and at the unprisonment of those 
who had flown it; Ui 1919 the North FUzroy branch"^^ carried resolutions 
supporting the flying of the red flag at the THC, the One Big Union 
(OBU), and caUing for the release of political prisoners. W. A. HoUnan 
exaggerated somewhat when in late 1916 he described the Victorian Labor 
party as being "in a most unfortunate position, having apparently, 
succumbed almost unanimously to the pressure brought to bear by the 
workers", but he had rightly sensed the nature of the future developments. 
Examination of the scheme to fly a red flag over the THC buUding; of 
attitudes towards the war; of the response to the Russian revolution; of 
the adoption of a socialist objective; of the establishment of the Labor 
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CoUege and of the attack upon racism wUl demonstrate the contours of 
this leftward trend. 
Hying the red flag over the Melbourne Trades HaU was no quixotic 
gesture but a poUtical act in the finest traditions of propaganda by deed. 
The debate commenced in May 1916 when it was moved that "as the 
Labor Movement is (and must be) international, some non-national 
emblem ought to be recogrused and exhibited as a symbol of that spuit". 
The debate intensified, as did the wrath of the bourgeoisie, until a special 
THC meeting on 12 September 1918 decided that "the red flag be 
declared to be the flag and the color the color of the Labor Movement, 
and that the flag be flown upon days to honor any Labor event, and every 
other day determined upon by the Executive of the THC". Throughout 
these months a continuous debate ensued Ui the Labor press, at union and 
at branch meetings where the issue was argued out in terms of sociaUsm, 
the war ajid uiternationalism including support for Soviet Russia. The 
demand for theu own flag indicated a growdng awareness by a section of 
the workers that they were a class and that the Australian flag was the 
symbol of theu oppressors. 
Opposition to the war remained the central political issue as opUiion 
hardened after the conscription split. On 18 January 1917 the THC 
resolved to "begin a peace campaign by holdUig public meetings, at which 
the people might be shown how their interests wUl be better served and 
their aspirations more thoroughly attained by a settlement of this war 
through negotiation . . . and that the Executive of the PLC be invited to 
co-operate". On 26 July the THC caUed upon the PLC executive to 
request aU Labor politicians "to refuse to assist in recruiting" and both 
wings of the Victorian Labor movement recommended a "yes" vote in the 
federal ALP baUot to determine whether the party should discontinue 
supporting voluntary recruiting. Nor was the parUamentary section sUent, 
and on 6 August 1918 Prendergast, who had regained the leadership on 
Elmslie's death three months previously, moved an amendment, caUing for 
"Unmediate negotiations" to arrange "equitable terms of peace", to the 
premier's resolution which demanded "inflexible dttermination to con-
tinue" the war "to a victorious end". Prendergast ended a forceful speech 
by declaring that "this is not a time to have any braggadocio Ui connection 
with the war, but a time to try to get conditions of peace for the future, so 
that Democracies may grow up irrespective of juntas and jingoes on one 
side, and profiteers and price-raisers on the other." The war made it im-
possible to speak of an industrial wing in the old sense, as political strikes 
and actions had become regular parts of the THC's programme; in line 
witU this trend was the THC's decision on 21 June 1918 to appoint a 
committee to present "an agenda of post-war problems" which would be 
discussed at subsequent councU meetings. One of the problems encounter-
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ed was the demand by some returned soldiers for employment preference 
over eligibles who had not erUisted. Despite the establishment of labor-
oriented returned men's organizations and the holding of special confer-
ences at the THC, at least one section of the soldiers declared theu Ui-
tention to organize industrial unions to fight "Official Labor". 
Victorian Labor sympathy for a revolution in Russia dated back to the 
1905 uprising and persisted throughout 1917 to 1920, largely irrespective 
of the changing composition of the revolutionary government. Lenin was 
quoted favourably in Labor Call as early as 18 October 1917 and the 
foUowdng issue reprinted H. N. BraUsford's defence of the Bolshevik 
leader. Favourable reports of the Soviet government appeared regularly in 
Labor Call throughout 1918 and on 18 July that year there was a front-
page article by Peter Simonoff, the Soviet "consul" in Melbourne. The 
1919 Victorian Labor conference protested at allied intervention in 
Russia; expressed sympathy for Simonoff, who had been gaoled by the 
Australian authorities; and hoped for the success of Bolshevism because U 
sought "the common ownership and workers' management of the means 
of production". Labor Call occasionally carried materials critical of the 
Bolsheviks from Russian resident in Australia, but its editor, Maurice 
Blackburn, expressed the more usual position in an article celebrating the 
third anniversary of the Bolshevik coup: "With the Russian Revolution go 
the hearts and the hopes of men and women in the Labor movement aU 
over the world; we are rebuffed in its reverses. We succeed in its successes 
after three years of the mightiest struggles wdth the foe without and the 
foe wUhin, wdth the problems of economic reconstruction and of military 
defence, there endures and flourishes amid the rejoicing of its friends and 
the confusion of its enemies, the world's first Socialist Common-
wealth."^^ Bolshevik methods, however, were not to be imitated in 
Australia no matter how necessary they might have been in Russia.^^ 
Although the Russian revolution was seen as necessary for Russia, the 
prescriptive demands of Marxism did not penetrate very deeply into the 
Victorian Labor movement.'^ In AprU 1919 the Victorian Labor party 
conference rejected the OBU revolutionary objective in favour of Maurice 
Blackburn's amendment wliich caUed for "the peaceful overthrow of the 
capitalist system" and the instUution of "democratic control of industry". 
This previsaged the situation that emerged at the 1921 federal conference 
when a newly adopted socialization objective was once more given a Black-
burn interpretation. Blackburn had published a number of articles in 
Labor Call in 1919-20 outlining a scheme of national guUds along the 
lUies proposed by G. D. H. Cole in Britain. In addition he objected to the 
abandonment of political struggle, which he saw as the consequence of 
OBU-ism;^" ironically he was even then further to the left than many of 
those who were supporting Bolshevik methods. 
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Another instance of this leftward movement occurred with the 
establishment of the Labor College in July 1917. Only two years eariier 
the THC had participated in the launching of a Workers' Education 
Association in Victoria, but this was now repudiated by the left because 
"its teachers are University professors" whose "teachings are an intel-
lectual justification" of the middle classes. In contradisfinction, "the 
Victorian Labor CoUege offers the workers a revolutionary culture. It pins 
its faith to trade unionism as the hope of the economic world . . . Its 
teachings wiU be conditioned by the exigencies of the class struggle, the 
fundamental fact of our economic life."^' The college taught an amalgam 
of guUd socialism, as personified in Reverend F. Sinclaire and Maurice 
Blackburn, and Marxism from Guido BarracUi. Frank Hyett and the 
Victorian Railways Union were equally active, and the coUege had Us 
headquarters in the union's Unity HaU. 
Indicative of the strength of the leftward shift was the appearance of 
anti-racist material in Labor CaU, which early in February 1917 quoted 
Debs on the colorless nature of the class struggle. Reports of strikes and 
other union activity in Japan were given favourable treatment, although 
the tone was often that expressed by the regular contributor, W. WaUis: 
"We believe in a White Australia, but we welcome the native of his own 
hearth, who strikes a blow against the devouring capitalist." Sympathetic 
reports of coloured workers uicreased once Maurice Blackburn became 
editor in 1918 since he believed that the Australian Labor movement had 
"no hope of success except as part of the international movement".^^ 
Most of the attacks on racism came in the publications which were more 
directly inspued by the Russian revolution, the One Big Union Herald 
demonstrating its proletarian internationalism with headlines such as 
"Wake-up White Australians; Turn Red and follow the Example of Your 
Despised YeUow Brothers". The long haul against racism had begun. 
WhUe the most exciting political events in the Victorian Labor move-
ment from 1916—21 were definitely occurring outside the pariiamentary 
arena, the PLC was above all a parUamentary party and no matter how 
thrUled or disgusted, encouraged or frightened, individual parliamentarians 
might have been by the mass stirrings in society, electoral demands had to 
be met. After weathering the federal election in May 1917, the PLC had to 
prepare for a November state election which saw the entry into politics of 
the Victorian Farmers' Union candidates, who won four seats. It had been 
in an attempt to ward off such a chaUenge that the state pariiamentary 
Labor party had split over a want-of-confidence motion in Sir Alexander 
Peacock's government in July 1917. John Bowser, soon to be premier, 
moved an amendment to the address-in-reply censuring the government for 
not making "necessary savings in State expenditure" and for imposing 
"increased fares and freights on raUway transport wdthout the consent of 
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ParUament".^^ All five non-Melbourne Labor members voted for the 
amendment, leaving theu coUeagues to provide the premier with a bare 
majority of two in a vote of sixty. If country members were forced to vote 
for freight concessions, metropolitan members could hardly support 
retrenchment which would have brought increased unemployment; nor 
had Irvine's 1902—4 economy drive been forgotten. 
The Labor party's country network was reactivated after July 1918 by 
the appointment as organizer of yet another AWU man, ex-Senator 
McKissock. State elections ui October 1920 resulted in the defeat of one 
Labor member by the Farmers' Union, which increased its membership to 
thirteen, gairUng the balance of power.^'* A referendum on prohibUion, 
conducted in conjunction with this election, revived the debate on 
"Nationalisation with a view to prohibition" within Labor's ranks. In 
CoUUigwood the sitting member, Martin Harmah, was defeated at a pre-
selection ballot because of his support for liquor reform; he eventually 
won the seat as an independent Labor candidate; Hannah's opponent was 
backed by the bookmaker, Robert Roberts, a close associate of John 
Wren.^^ The old patterns would force their way through more clearly as 
the leftward shift lost impetus after 1921.^^ 
Three phases of political Labor in Victoria have been discerned: 
1891 — 1902 was a period of confusion, dependence, and defeat; 1902-14 
were years of organizational coherence and of Umited success; 1915—21 
saw the end of steady growth and the emergence of a significant leftward 
shift. This periodization cannot conceal the uneven development and lags 
which occurred, and by 1921 many of the organizational problems of the 
1890s had returned — Labor Call, for instance, was in severe financial 
difficulties. The leftward shift affected all sections of the post-1916 party, 
but to such varying degrees that it created divisions no less important than 
those which had split the party at the time of conscription. The early 
postwar years witnessed the passing of many of those who had been part 
of the Victorian Labor party almost since its inception. These deaths were 
the occasion for summing up the achievements of the Labor party at a 
tune when the need for its existence was being questioned by left-wing 
critics who were meiely articulating the deep-felt doubts which the war, 
•reland, and the Russian revolution had implanted in the minds of men as 
sober and as patient as James ScuUin. 
In its report to the 1919 conference the central executive presented a 
sombre but proud account of how the ALP had "saved the liberties of 
Australia" by waging principled rnd united struggles. By continuing in this 
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manner it hoped to turn "temporary defeat into a lasting victory". Robert 
Ross was less sanguine, and in the September 1920 issue of Ross's Monthly 
he traced three causes of Victorian Labor's long-standing electoral malaise. 
He pointed to the combination of unequal electoral districts and the 
highly concentrated nature of Victorian industry which prevented a wider 
geographic distribution of workers and thus kept the party's support 
centred on Melbourne and the country centres of Geelong, Bendigo, and 
BaUarat; in addition, Melbourne had fewer daUies, so that none felt the 
need to chase Labor supporters in order to boost its circulation. Whether 
one agrees with the adequacy of Ross's diagnosis or not, he is certainly 
correct to look for reasons other than the conscription split when account-
Uig for Labor's chronic weakness in Victorian polirics. But he should have 
menrioned the poUtical inheritance of Victoria's Liberalism as an equally 
important consideration inhibiting the emergence and then constricting 
the growth of the party especiaUy in state politics. 
Whether the Labor party in Victoria was a success or a faUure depends 
upon what one considered its aim to be: for the minorUy who always 
expected the socialist commonwealth there was nothing but disappoint-
ment; for those who wanted a state Labor government there was the mere 
farce of December 1913; for those who sought through Parliamentary 
place to assist their feUows at a personal level there were ample rewards. It 
is appropriate that the last word on the Victorian Labor party before 1921 
should concern that typical labor man, Frank Tudor, whose death drew 
the foUowing obituary from the OBU Herald; 
His electorate (Yarra) comprised Protestants and Catholics, Sinn 
Feiners and Orangemen, Loyalists and Pacifists, Socialists and Con-
servatives, How to represent this jumble of interests would present a 
difficult problem to the ordinary man, but Mr Tudor tactfuUy solved 
it by doing nothing — that is, unless his accepting and retaining the 
Presidency of the Richmond Football Club can be regarded as a 
definite political achievement, , , . and no matter how loudly Labor 
in Conference might declare for the social revolution it did not 
affect Mr Tudor inside the "House" or out of it. The only time the 
Capitalist parties feared him was when he spoke on the tariff.^'' 
APPENDIX 
The figures for the Victorian "Labor parties" in the first edition of 
Huglies and Graham's Handbook of Australian Govemment and PoUtics 
are not so much wrong as disputable. Because the pre-1902 "Labor 
parties" in Victoria were often little more than factions of the Liberal 
party, it would be exceedingly difficult to apply any universally acceptable 
criteria to determine their parliamentary membership. Table 2 provides 
333 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
HUMPHREY McQUEEN 
variant readings and is foUowed by some explanatory comments where the 
conventions foUowed are those employed in the Handbook. 
Table 2. Number of "Labor" M.L.A.s by Source 
Year of Hughes and Graham* Spence** Labor Papers*** 
Election 
1892 11 lOa- 13b-
1894 18C- 16d- ISe-
1897 8 ISf 
1900 9 IBS- 12h. 
1902 12 ll i- IIJ. 
* CoUn A, Hughes & B, D, Graham, 4^ Handbook of Australian Government and 
Politics (Canberra, 1968), pp, 467-74, 
** W, G, Spence, Australia's Awakening (Sydney, 1909), pp. 202-3 and 210-11. 
Spence's hsts agree with ones pubUshed by G. M. Prendergast, Z.a6or Call, 23 
April 1908, and these are probably Spence's source. 
*** Commonweal, 23 April 1892; Worker (Melbourne) 22 September 1894; Tocsin, 
8 November 1900 and 16 October 1902. The absence of an official Labor paper 
in Victoria for much of the 1890's adds to the confusion. 
a. Omits Emerald HUl; Port Melbourne; and Richmond (Bennett). Includes 
Stawell; and Warrnambool. 
b. Includes Albert Park; and Borung which was won by J. H. Dyer who renounced 
his "Labor" endorsement the day after the polling. 
c. This is almost certainly wrong, since it omits Dr. Maloney. 
d. Omits Dandenong and Berwick; Essendon and Flemington; Fitzroy (2); Gran-
ville (Kerr); Prahran; and Richmond (Bennett). Includes CoUingwood (2); East 
Bourke Boroughs; Warrnambool; Emerald Hill; Stawell; and Melbourne West. 
e. Largely agrees with Hughes and Graham but is very difficult to follow as it 
attempts to distinguish between "Labor" members, of whom it hsts ten, and 
"good-as-Labor" members, of whom it Usts another eight. It makes no mention 
of Maloney. 
f. Includes CoUingwood (Wilkins); Stawell; Warrnambool; Emerald HiU; and 
WiUiamstown. 
g. Includes CoUingwood (2); Emerald HiU;and StaweU. 
h. Includes CoUingwood (2); and Emerald HiU. 
i. Both omit Sandhurst. 
In an interview in Tocsin, 28 October 1898, the "Labor pa r ty" leader, 
W. A. Trenwith, claimed to be the leader of a party of at least sixty. But 
the researcher's best advice comes from John Murray, MLA for Warrnam-
bool, in reply to a questioner at an election meeting: "I leave it to his 
superior intelUgence to form his own conclusion as to whether or not I 
belong to the Labor pa r ty . " (Warrtwmbool Standard, 2 October 1897) 
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BIOGRAPHICAL INDEX 
ANSTEY, Frank, b. London, 1865; d. Melbourne, 1940. Arrived Australia, 
1874. Seaman. MLA (East Bourke Boroughs), 1902-4. MLA 
(Brunswick), 1904-10. MHR (Bourke), 1910-34. Deputy-leader, 
federal PLP, 1922-27. Minister for health, 1929-31. Published The 
Kingdom of Shy lock (1915). 
BLACKBURN, Maurice McCrae. b. Inglewood, 1880; d. Melbourne, 1944. 
Graduated m Arts, 1906, and Law, 1909. MLA (Essendon), 
1914-17; (FUzroy), 1921-27; (Clifton HUl), 1927-34. Speaker, 
Legislative Assembly, 1933-34. MHR (Bourke), 1934-43. ExpeUed 
from ALP, 1935 and 1941. 
BROMLEY, Frederick Hadkinson. b, Wolverhampton, 1854; d, Mel-
bourne, 1908, Arrived Australia, 1879. Decorative artist. Founda-
tion secretary, Japanners and Tin Workers' Union, 1883. President, 
THC, 1885-86, MLA (Carlton), 1892-1908. Fust secretary, state 
PLP. Leader state PLP, 1900-4, 
CHAMPION, Henry Hyde, b, Poona (India), 1859; d, Melbourne, 1928, 
Journalist. Senior office bearer, VSP, UnsuccessfuUy contested 
various elections. Published "The crushing defeat of trade unionism 
in Australia", Nineteenth Century (Feb, 1891); The Root of the 
Matter (IH95). Editor, the Champion, 1895-97. 
ELMSLIE, George Albert, b. Lethbridge, 1863; d, Melbourne, 1918. 
Stonemason. MLA (Albert Park), 1902-18. Leader, state PLP, 
1913-18. Premier, treasurer, 1913. 
HYETT, Francis WiUiam. b. Melbourne, 1882; d. Melbourne, 1919. 
Secretary, Victorian RaUway Union, 1911-19. 
JONES, John Percy, b, Hobart, 1872; d, Melbourne, 1955, TaUor and 
company director. MLC, 1910—40, Minister without portfolio, 
1913. Commissioner for public works inter alia, 1924, 1927 — 28, 
1929—32, 1932 — 35. Resigned ALP in support of Premiers' Plan. 
MALONEY, WUliam Robert NuttaU. b. Melbourne, 1854; d. Melbourne, 
1940. Doctor of medicine. MLA (Melbourne West), 1889-1903. 
MHR (Melbourne), 1904-40. Published Flashlights on Japan 
(1905). 
MANN, Tom. b. Foles HUl (England), 1856; d. Grassington (England), 
1941. SociaUst lecturer and organizer. Arrived Australia, 1902; 
depar ted, 1910. Founder-secretary, VSP, 1905-9. Organizer, 
Combined Unions CommUtee, Broken HUl, 1908-9. PubUshed The 
Labour Movement in Both Hemispheres (1903); SociaHsm (1905); 
The Way to Win (1909). Editor, Socialist, 1906-9. 
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MURPHY, William Emmett. b. Dublin, 1841; d. Dalesford, 1921. Arrived 
Melbourne, 1867. Soldier and cabmetmaker. Secretary, THC, 
1883-87. Unsuccessfully contested elections, 1886 and 1889, 
Published History of Eight-hour Day (1 896). 
O'DOWD, Bernard, b, Beaufort, 1866; d, Melbourne, 1953, Graduated 
Bachelor of Arts, 1889; Master of Arts, 1891. Public servant, 
1 866-1935, PubUshed Collected Poems (1941), 
PRENDERGAST, George Michael, b, Adelaide, 1854;d, Melbourne, 1937, 
Printer, President, THC, 1893-94, MLA (North Melbourne), 
1894-97, 1900-26; (Footscray), 1927-37, Leader, state PLP, 
1904-13, 1918-26. Chief secretary, 1913, Premier, treasurer, 1924. 
Chief secretary, 1927—28. PubUshed Labor in Politics: Its influence 
on Legislation (1926). 
SCULLIN, James Henry, b, Trawalla, 1876; d. Melbourne, 1953. PoUtical 
and un ion organizer, and storekeeper. MHR (Corangamite), 
1910-13; (Yarra), 1922-49. Leader federal PLP, 1928-35. Prime 
minister, 1929-32. Editor, BaUarat fc/zo, 1913-19. 
TRENWITH, WiUiam Arthur, b. Launceston, 1847; d. Melbourne, 1925. 
Bootmaker. Secretary, Operative Bootmakers' Union, 1883. Presi-
dent, THC, 1886-87. MLA (Richmond), 1889-1903. Senator, 
1904-1910. Delegate, Federation Convention, 1898. Leader, state 
PLP, 1892—1900. Commissioner public works inter alia, 
1900-1902. 
TUDOR, Frank Gwynne. b. WUliam.stown, 1866; d. Richmond, 1922. FeU 
hatter. President, THC, 1899. MHR (Yarra), 1901-22. Minister 
customs, 1908-9, 1910-13, 1914-16. 
WREN, John. b. CoUingwood, 1871; d. Melbourne, 1953. Bootclicker, 
sportsman, and financier. Teetotaller and non-smoker. 
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After fifty years of struggle. Western Australia seemed by 1880 to be at 
last under way. It had an almost viable economy based on primitive farm-
ing, sheep raising, timber cutting, and pearl fisheries. It had been granted 
representative government under a crown colony constitution, thougli real 
power StiU resided in a governor appointed from London. Despite this 
apparent maturity, however, the imperial convict establishment, which had 
only stopped importing unwUling Unmigrants in 1868, stiU cast a long 
shadow. Of a population estimated at 26,000 in 1874, 5,000 to 6,000 
were time-expired men. Harassed continually by an overmanned and over-
zealous police force, these men preferred, when they could, to seek freer 
and greener pastures in the east. Because of the lingering stains of felony, 
and an oppressive Master and Servant Act, free immigrants, too, preferred 
the east and there was, therefore, a perpetual labour shortage which the 
Legislative CouncU obstinately but unsuccessfuUy souglit to solve by im-
porting coolies. The only political activity was a gentlemanly round game 
in which local dignitaries formed temporary combuiations, to thwart the 
governor or to secure public works for their own district. West Australian 
poUticians beUeved firmly wdth Edmund Burke that the member should be 
responsible only to lUs own conscience — a theory which left room for 
poUtical parties.' 
In 1879, the discovery of fme pastoral land in the far north stimulated 
a minor land boom. Making bold use of loan funds, governors Sir WiUiam 
Robinson and Sir F. Napier Broome embarked on a vigorous programme 
of railway and telegraph construction wluch attracted workers from the 
east. Among them were the first trade uruonists. Hitherto, working-class 
activity in Perth had been located either in the Mechanics' InstUute, a 
cultural organization confined rigidly to the free, and the Working Men's 
Association, a social club which tended to cater more for the old lag.^  On 
29 May 1883 the city press gave a scandalized account of a disorderiy 
meeting at the rooms of the Working Men's Association chaired by T. 
Donnelly, "An importation from the other side" - a meeting devoted to 
the formation of a Labor League.•^  Despite its name, DonneUy's Labor 
League played no part in poUtics, but in February 1884 the first stable 
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union, a branch of the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners, 
was successfuUy formed at Fremantle. 
The Kimberley goldrush brought more immigrants, who began to work 
a fundamental change in the political scene. The movement for responsible 
government which had existed rather hopelessly for many years under the 
leaderslup of the native-born lawyer, Stephen Henry Parker, was suddenly 
rejuvenated by a group of Unmigrant business and professional men. They 
formed a Liberal League,^ which in 1886^ began organizing an Eight 
Hours Association, mainly for the benefit of the League's candidate for 
the Perth seat in the Legislative CouncU, a middle-aged, rabble-rousing 
Irish lawyer from New South Wales caUed John Horgan. Horgan failed at 
his first attempt but in 1888 won a by-election, aUegedly because of strong 
working-class support. His parliamentary performance was disappointing, 
however, and he was defeated at the next election. 
Encouraging gold discoveries at PUbara and Yilgarn in 1889, followed 
by the estabUshment of a responsible government in 1890 under the 
dynamic leadership of John Forrest, began to attract unionists discouraged 
by eastern strike disasters. The fust wave included Hugh De Largje, George 
F. Pearce, and James M. Fowler, all of whom became prominent later on. 
Early in 1891, PhUip P. Rowe, who had worked on a Labor paper in 
Rockhampton, established a small weekly paper called the People wdth the 
backing of the Liberal League. Rowe's advanced ideas soon frightened the 
Liberal League, and having meanwhile become associated with a Fremantle 
Lumpers' Union he sought the support of a Trades and Labor CouncU 
(TLC) formed in August 1891 to float the People as a union-owned 
company. Receiving Uttle or no support because of jealousies between 
Perth and Fremantle,^ he abandoned the People to work for a country 
paper, and died in Coolgardie in 1896. 
In October 1891 John MarshaU, who had just contested GranvUle un-
successfully for the New South Wales Labor party, arrived in Perth and 
began advocating the formation of Labor Electoral Leagues (LEL).'' Like 
Rowe, he was unduly optimistic. The seven or eight existing unions saw 
nothing beyond their own trade, and the limited unity achieved by the 
TLC was already evaporating in inter-vUlage feuds between Perth and 
Fremantle.^ Soon afterwards MarshaU left the city, and after spending 
some time in the southwest became a lughly respected citizen of Kal-
goorlie, where he rapidly drifted away from the Labor movement. 
The population of Western Australia actually decreased by 351 Ui 1888, 
but from then on the tide of increase contmued to flow for nearly twenty 
years. Between 1890 and 1891, the annual increase leaped from 2,592 to 
6,995 and remained close to this figure for the next three years. WUh a 
more Uberal franchise and an expanding population, the conditions for 
Labor poUtical organization were rapidly improving and on 20 October 
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1893 the TLC decided to organize a Progressive PoUtical League (PPL).^ 
The moving spirits in the scheme were George Chitty Baker, a 32-year-old 
English printer with experience in the United States and Europe, and 
George Foster Pearce, a young South Australian carpenter.'^ Pearce, a 
tall, quiet, reserved man with a heavy moustache, was the archetype of the 
steady, reliable, self-educated tradesman. His absolute honesty and 
enormous capacity for detaU subsequently took him from a leading 
position in the coastal Labor movement to high office in the national 
government, but at twenty-four he had not yet completely matured and 
the programme of the league was a routine collection of the usual radical 
ideas of the time including the referendum, adult suffrage, payment of 
members, taxation of unimproved land values, etc. It was obvious, of 
course, that because of the weakness of the Labor movement in the colony 
there was nothing to be gained by a too radical programme and the only 
real dispute arose over education. Although Baker was a Protestant, he felt 
constrained as foreman printer for the Catholic diocesan paper, the West 
Australian Record, to oppose advocacy of free secular education on the 
ground that it would cause dissension and, with the help of the CathoUc 
Rowe, succeeded in deferring the subject at the irutial meeting." When 
accused by the West Australian of being under sectarian influence. Baker 
replied vigorously that he sought only to avoid the sectarian dissension 
which the West Australian obviously wished to provoke. At the next meet-
Uig, however. Baker was overruled by more advanced members and free 
secular education was duly adopted. 
The phenomenal gold discoveries at Coolgardie in September 1892 and 
at Kalgoorlie in June 1893 brought a sudden Uiflux of unmigrants to 
Western Australia. In 1893, 8,298 people arrived, but in 1894 there were 
25,858, most of whom went to the goldfields. The PPL saw its oppor-
tunUy and fonned a Coolgardie branch in Febmary 1894,'^ which 
nominated the liberal Dr. Davies for YUgarn in the next general election. 
The North Fremantie branch nominated George Chitty Baker for North 
Fremande.'^ The campaign was a disaster. Davies withdrew before the 
election, whUe Baker, opposed by a popular liberal and accused of being a 
nominee of the Catholic Church, was soundly defeated.' 
As the gold frenzy increased, it became more and more difficult to keep 
organizations together on the coast, and by the beginrung of 1895 both 
the PPL and the TLC had virtually coUapsed. Baker made one further 
attempt to enter parliament in AprU 1895, but the sectarian label ruined 
his hopes' ^ again and he finaUy disappeared from the Labor movement. 
Between 1894 and 1896 the gold fever reached its peak and immigrants 
poured in: 25,858 in 1894; 29,523 in 1895, and 55,215 in 1896. Then the 
rush began to subside and the upward trend was not resumed tUl 1901. 
Because of the predominance of migrants on the goldfields and because of 
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envuonmental differences, the coastal and goldfields wings of the Labor 
movement now began to move along divergent paths. The population of 
the goldfields was cosmopoUtan. Most of it came from other colonies but 
there were some Europeans and Americans and many Asiatics. Of the 
Australians, the majority were from Victoria, with South Australia Ui 
second place, and smaUer contingents from New South Wales, Queensland, 
and Tasmania. It was an almost exclusively mascuUne society in which the 
young, the restless, the discontented, and the enterprising formed the 
social eUte. In such a society the rebels were soon prominent. 
Coastal society on the other hand rested on a firm foundation of native 
Western AustraUans, whose parochial distaste for the outsider extended 
even into the working class. This foundation was overlaid by a large immi-
grant deposit, consisting not of the restless and enterprisUig, but of the 
safe and steady who saw that the real profit in the goldrush would be 
secured by the man who sold the work of his hands to the fortune-seekers. 
After the initial disruption caused by the goldrush, urUonism began to 
pick up rapidly on the coast. The TLC was active again by late 1895' ^ and 
by 1896 there were probably about twenty coastal unions. Physical proxi-
mity to the colonial parliament dictated a faith in political action rather 
than strikes, a faith which was strengthened by the sober, respectable, 
nonconformist tradesmen who constituted the leadership. With the aid of 
liberal friends in parliament, such as Walter H. James, who frequently 
attended meetings of the TLC's parliamentary committee,'^ some useful 
social legislation was secured. Much of this progress was due to the intel-
ligently pragmatic government of John Forrest who was always prepared 
to concede moderate demands which had some show of poUtical backing. 
By 1896 smaU unions, some of which were probably branches of the 
Victorian Amalgamated Miners' Association (AMA), existed in at least 
fourteen goldfields towns. They were, however, fundamentally different to 
the craft unions of the coast. Most workers on the goldfields were pros-
pectors at heart who only took paid employment to finance participation 
in the next rush. The mining laws of the colony were an extraordinary 
muddle*^ designed primarUy to encourage rapid capital investment, and 
the main objectives of goldfields unionism were the protection of the 
riglits of alluvial diggers. Ordinary industrial objectives only became im-
portant later. Because of the absence of other uruons and the influence of 
a few radical leaders, a number of these organizations decided to take Ui 
not only miners, but anybody who beUeved in the union ideal. 
The leaders included such men as George Taylor, a romantic follower of 
WUliam Lane, who had suggested setting up a commune at Barcaldine 
during the Queensland shearers' strike of 1891 and had subsequently 
served a prison term; Hugh De Largie, a Scot who had been a leading 
unionist on the New South Wales coalfields; Jabez Dodd, who had been 
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particulariy active in the Broken HiU strikes of the 1890s; and 
J. B. Holman from the Broken HiU Defence Committee of 1892. Someone, 
probably Taylor, was in touch with the Australian Labor Federation 
(ALF) in Queensland,'^ and late in 1896 a proposal emerged for amal-
gamating aU mining unions. On 7 January 1897 a conference at Coolgardie 
of six unions established the Amalgamated Workers' Association 
(AWA),'^ '' a federation with a hierarclUcal organization of branches, 
district councUs, and a central executive like the ALF, and a partly 
poUtical platform based on that of the coastal TLC. For nearly ten years 
this organization dominated the Labor movement in Western Australia. 
By 1896, there were two sympathetic Uberals, W. H. James and 
A. J. Diamond, in the colonial pariiament and the coastal leaders began 
once again to think of a Labor party. In September, a meeting in Perth 
established the PoUtical Labor party,^' which souglit electoral 
reform, payment of members, abolition of the stock tax and import duties 
on necessities, taxation of unimproved land values, and free, secular, and 
compulsory education. Branches were free to nominate candidates who 
could however be rejected by the executive, and for the first time candi-
dates were asked to accept a solidarity pledge.'^  ^ 
Since members were still unpaid it was difficult to find candidates. 
Charles Oldham, a builder who had once been president of the TLC, was 
nominated for North Perth and sympathetic liberals were endorsed in six 
other electorates. The Kalgooriie branch nominated R. F. Norman, a miner 
from the new Kalgooriie and Boulder TLC, for East Coolgardie, but other 
electorates were more difficult. In North East Coolgardie, Frank Vosper, a 
popular radical journalist who had been Unprisoned in Queensland as a 
republican, sought endorsement but was rejected when he refused to sign 
the pledge. George Waite, a radical unionist who was eventually selected, 
was found ineligible and had to withdraw. In North Coolgardie there was 
an acrimonious dispute in which Hugh Mahon, proprietor of a Menzies 
newspaper, was accused of manipulating the local union to secure his own 
endorsement over William Kerr, a prospector. 
Oldham was successful, but only two of the endorsed liberals were 
elected, including James, who had held the seat previously. In North East 
Coolgardie, Vosper, who had been rejected by the party, was elected in 
triumph. The debacle was due partly to disputes^ ^ and partly to 
cumbersome electoral procedures which disfranchised many potenrial 
Labor voters. The West Australian saw other reasons: " . . .avowed pro-
tectionists declare themselves on the free trade side . . . men are seen 
urging forward a policy of pure free trade, all the while proclaiming them-
selves protectionists . . . So long as these inconsistencies exist it is im-
possible that Labor politics . . . can unite Us forces or command the 
attention of the working man."•^^ 
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During the election campaign two small suburban papers, the Subiaco 
Pioneer and the Suburban Standard, were a great help in Oldham's 
campaign, but this was no substitute for a permanent propaganda organ. 
There was little overt press hostility to Labor and much of the goldfields' 
press, led by the influential Hocking papers in Kalgooriie, devoted a good 
deal of space, some editorial, to Labor affairs. The coastal leaders, how-
ever, souglit a permanent vehicle for educational work and late in 1898 
Fred Davis, a bricklayer who had been elected secretary of the coastal 
TLC, secured for the councU permanent rights over the last page of a new 
paper, the Sunday Chronicle.^^ The space was devoted to the reporting of 
Labor occasions and to reprinting selected items from the international 
Labor press. Wliile the arrangement lasted it undoubtedly did some good, 
but unfortunately the Sunday Chronicle collapsed before the end of 1898. 
The venture was, however, one sign of increasing maturity. In April 
1898 the secretary, Fred Davis, became the first full-time, paid official in 
Western Australia,^^ and in March F. J. Rawlings was appointed to 
attend the Intercolonial Trade Union Congress (ITUC) in Melbourne as 
delegate for Western Australia.'^ ^ The AWA leaders decided that the time 
had come for a united Labor movement and called a general conference to 
coincide with a big exhibition at Coolgardie eariy in 1899. The delegates 
met at Pearce's athletic hall on 11 April.^^ Hugh De Largie, alleged by his 
enemies to be a rabble-rouser, who had been general president of the AWA 
since its establishment, was elected to the chair, with Fred Gilbert, 
secretary of the AWA, as secretary. WiUiam SomervUle, a blacksmUh from 
the Amalgamated Society of Engineers in Fremantle, was elected a vice-
president. He had arrived from New South Wales in 1895 and had rapidly 
become prominent in the coastal movement. His main interest was always 
in industrial welfare and his lively inteUigence and broad general know-
ledge served effectively to counterbalance the often wooUy radicalism of 
the AWA men. Nine of the twenty delegates represented AWA branches, 
whUe Richard Blamire, also of the AWA, represented the Kalgooriie and 
Boulder TLC, and Tom Bath of the AWA represented the John BaUance 
Assembly of the Knights of Labor, the first of a long series of ginger 
groups working withui the goldfields unions which had been imported 
from New Zealand with Frank Kelsall, a printer. Only six of the twenty 
delegates represented coastal organizations because the goldfields con-
tingent also included delegations from the Alluvial Riglits and Democratic 
Association and the Australian Natives' Association. 
From 11 April to 1 5 AprU the congress worked its way through a heavy 
agenda and set out clear lines of policy on most of the important issues of 
the day. Socialism was accepted in principle as a desirable end, and a firm 
declaration of support for Australian federation was made. As regards 
future organization of the Labor movement, plans were made to establish 
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a division of the ALF, to seek direct representation in both state and 
federal pariiaments, and to establish a permanent Labor newspaper. Under 
the proposed scheme of poUtical organization, each constituency was left 
free either to run a direct candidate or to support other democratic candi-
dates who subscribed to the foUowing fighting platform: 
Payment of members; 
Redistribution of seats according to population; 
A compulsory arbitration act on New Zealand lines. 
To implement this programme. Congress directed the appointment of a 
joint pariiamentary committee wUh sections both on the coast and on the 
goldfields, to manage elections untU the formation of district councUs 
under the Labor Federation scheme. 
By this time, federation was the biggest of aU political topics and both 
wings of the Labor movement became deeply involved. The Forrest 
government was already extremely unpopular on the goldfields, and, when 
it began to seem in June 1899 that goverrunent conservatism might keep 
the colony out of the Commonwealth, a movement developed in 
Kalgoorlie seeking creation of a new goldfields colony which could 
federate independently.''^ Two of the twelve executive members of the 
Separation for Federation League were Hugh De Largie and John Reside 
of the Certificated Engine Drivers' Association, whUe two others, Hugh 
Mahon and Dr. H. A. EUis, became Labor members of parliament within 
the next four years. UrUike the goldfields Labor movement, the coastal 
Labor movement was not unanimously in favour of federation, but the 
executive of the Westem Australian Federal League nevertheless included 
five Labor representatives, Davis, Diver, Doheny, Pearce, and SomervUle, 
whUe Davis and Diver were invited to put the Labor point of view to a 
Joint Select Committee of Parliament on the Federation BUl.^' 
When the colony was finaUy commuted to federation. Labor leaders 
were free to devote their attention to the establishment of a viable 
poUtical organization. The first objective was to secure payment of state 
members. Although Forrest and some of his ministers disliked the idea, 
there was already a strong movement in the Legislative Assembly in favour 
of payment. Pearce and his Labor coUeagues sought to force Forrest's 
hand by threaterUng to oppose B. C. Wood, commissioner for raUways, in a 
ministerial election. Forrest, who had probably decided already to pass the 
biU, gave way gracefuUy,^^ and the most serious obstacle to the establish-
ment of a PLP was thus easUy overcome. 
The second Trades Union and Labor Congress met Ui Perth from 13 to 
16 August 1900 wdth Pearce and J. W. Croft of the TLC as president and 
secretary respectively. The mam work of the congress was discussion of a 
programme for poUtical activity in both federal and state spheres. The 
state programme proposed that 22 electorates should be contested at the 
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next general election and that Ui eleven others the decision whether or not 
to nominate candidates should be made by the local party members. Party 
branches were to be created, governed on the goldfields by an executive 
consisting of the president of the TLC and all union presidents. The 
equivalent coastal organization was to consist of two delegates from each 
party branch and three delegates from the TLC. Voting in selection baUots 
was confined to union members on the goldfields and to party members 
on the coast. 
This curious arrangement demonstrated clearly the way in which the 
two wings of the Labor movement had diverged. On the goldfields, the all 
embracuig poUcy of the AWA had led to the admission of aU sorts of 
people, some of whom had Uttle real sympathy wdth Labor ideals; this 
policy had already generated a puritan reaction emphasizing the import-
ance of the uruon. On the coast, the effectiveness of poUtical action had 
been so clearly demonstrated that the estabUshment of a political party 
presented no real problems, but on the goldfields the path was beset with 
pitfalls. By 1900, the AWA was no longer the popular force that it had 
been. Craft unionists objected to the one big union ideas of its leaders; 
there were aUegations of administrative incompetence or worse, and a 
strong nonconformist group of miners led by Jabez Dodd believed that it 
was dominated by a Catholic cabal associated with De Largie.^ ^  The 
opposition was centred in the goldfields TLC. In October 1900 the AWA 
began organizing poUtical branches in accordance with the congress pro-
gramme, but at a political conference on 13 October determined but un-
successful efforts were made to exclude the only poUtical branch repre-
sented on the ground that it was not a trade union.^ "^ A goldfields Political 
Central Committee was created, but at the second of two further confer-
ences on 28 October the opponents of political branches tried unsuccess-
fully to rescind the minutes of the previous meeting because they had been 
rejected by a majority of unions. The protagoiUsts of political branches 
argued that with only 3,000 uniorUsts in 20,000 to 25,000 workers it was 
absurd to restrict selection to unionists only. Their opponents argued that 
political branches provided an easy entry into politics for "little fellows 
with an axe to grind," and that any sincere believer in Labor ideals could 
join a uruon.^^ 
Early in November, J. W. Croft, secretary of the coastal TLC, secured a 
short-lived agreement restricting the federal ballot to unionists but permit-
ting league members to vote in the state baUots.^^ HostUUy between the 
factions, exacerbated by some sectarian feeUng, was too strong however, 
and the AWA finally seceded from the TLC.^^ In January 1901 the con-
fusion became more profound when a conservative group, led by Jabez 
Dodd and WiUiam D. JoUnson, seceded from the AWA to form the AMA 
as a craft union for miners"'* pledged to avoid politics except when Us 
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own members could be directly benefited. The AWA was able to survive 
the split because it had already commenced a massive organizing campaign 
among timber cutters and unskiUed workers on the coast. 
The senate selection ballots provided the first test for the new political 
arrangements - a test which, because of political inexperience, almost led 
to a fiasco. Although the coastal ballot could not be completed in the 
aUotted time, the withdrawal of W. H. Diver left Pearce to be selected 
unopposed. On the goldfields, however, only one of the three candidates 
withdrew, whUe there was obviously no time for a baUot. The selection of 
Hugh De Largie was finaUy made by a committee of three coastal leaders 
- a quUe unconstitutional expedient which was widely criticized and was 
used to justify the AMA breakaway.^^ The malcontents had begun to 
establish Union Political parties^^ but the apostles of reason seemed to 
have won the day when all the warring factions, including the Political 
Labor Leagues (PLL) and the Union Political parties, attended a meeting 
of the goldfields' Political Central Committee. In spite of this apparent 
agreement, however, there was further trouble. Shaw of the TLC had 
agreed to support John Kirwan, editor of the Kalgoorlie Miner for the 
federal seat of Kalgooriie. When the AWA faction invited WiUiam 
Ferguson, the Broken HiU strike leader, to stand, Shaw withdrew the TLC 
from the federal campaign, and Ferguson, deterred by tales of dissension 
in Kalgoorlie, withdrew at the last moment, leaving the party wdthout a 
candidate.^' Coolgardie and Fremantle seats were convincingly won, how-
ever, by Hugh Mahon and James M. Fowler respectively. 
The bitterness generated by this squabble was then transfened to the 
state election campaign and the selection procedures Ui both Kalgoorlie 
and Hannans were chaUenged by the Political Central Committee. When 
the committee threatened to interfere, however, its authority was 
questioned on the ground that it had been appointed only for the federal 
elections.'*'^ 
In spite of these disputes, the candidates selected ui thirteen goldfields 
and nine coastal electorates went to the poUs on 24 AprU advocating: 
Electoral reform, including redistribution on a population basis and 
payment of members; 
One adult, one vote, with every facUity suppUed for registration; 
CompiUsory industrial arbitration, with necessary amendments in 
the present act; 
A Factory Act; 
Tax on unimproved land values; 
Amendment of the mining laws to protect alluvial miners. 
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Of the twenty-two candidates, six were elected. They were Henry DagUsh, 
Fergie Reid, George Taylor, WiUiam D. Johnson, Robert Hastie, and John 
Reside. In Kanowna, Hastie poUed particulariy weU with a lead of 800 
votes over his nearest opponent, whUe Reside in Hannans led by over 
1,000 votes. The resuU was particularly encouragmg in view of an out-
rageously gerrymandered electoral system in which electorates ranged Ui 
population from 108 to 5,805, with a heavy bias in favour of rural com-
munities. The 9,658 votes requued to wm the six seats compared more 
than favourably with the 7,549 votes requued by the ministerial party to 
win 19 seats. 
Although the Labor party had thus been successfuUy launched. Us 
poUtical platform demonstrates clearly that it stiU had neither a unique 
nor a very coherent body of poUtical ideas. Many of the leaders were 
prepared to talk socialism in a general way but the Social Democratic 
Federation, established in 1900 by the veteran radical, Monty MUler, 
attracted few influential members and was virtually moribund after 1902. 
There had been some vague fluting from time to tune wdth the single tax 
and co-operative movements also, but most members saw the policy of the 
Labor movement as a pragmatic response to practical problems. Because 
major strikes in the metropoUtan area in 1897 and 1899 had seriously 
damaged the unions involved, the movement sought a compulsory arbUra-
tion system and got it by political lobbying.^'^ Beuig convinced that 
political action would pay more dividends than strUces, they sought to 
facUitate Labor poUtical action by every possible means, and being 
primarily a miners' party they sought to protect the rights of miners. All 
these ideas were part of the common currency of nmeteenth-century 
democracy and were not pecuUar to Labor. 
The same was true of other leading ideas not mcluded in the platform. 
There were few Chinese in Western Australia, but the racist ideas generated 
Ui the east found a target in Indian and Afghan camel drivers and Japanese 
laundrymen. Ever since the introduction of camels in 1893, the Labor 
movement had taken a prominent part in a virulent anti-Asiatic 
campaign,"*^ initiated and led by the journalist Frank Vosper. When 
Commonwealth legislation removed the Asiatic target, attention was 
duected to the influx of Italian and Slav peasants seeking work on the 
mines. Within a few years there was a commonly held belief that these 
men were being imported by a mysterious organization which guaranteed 
their employment over the heads of native workers. Although several 
official investigations, launched m response to uiUon demands, faUed to 
find any trace of such an organization, the idea has remained part of the 
folklore of the goldfields ever since, and the ever present hostUUy has 
generated riots on several occasions. 
Among the leaders there were a few who read widely, thought deeply. 
352 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
and saw it as part of theu function to educate their members to accept a 
somewhat wider range of poUtical ideas. Sponsored by this group, the 
Westralian Worker commenced publication in Kalgooriie on 7 September 
1900 with Thomas H. Bath, a 25-year-old miner from New South Wales, as 
edUor, and WUliam D. Johnson, a New Zealand-born carpenter, as 
manager. In his first editorial, Bath defined his objective "We recognise 
that the salvation of the workers depends on measures and a party pledged 
to carry such measures uito effect, and U is the province of the Labor 
paper to so mould public opinion that the uresistible Unpulse wUl be to 
sweep away all obstacles to proved and desirable reforms. This is the why 
and wherefore of our existence." Though plagued by financial troubles in 
its fust few years, Bath's facUe pen and his wUlingness to hU out at almost 
anything got the venture off to a sound start, and wdth the importation of 
WaUace Nelson, a trained journalist from Queensland, as editor in August 
1901 the paper began to fulfil the educational role dreamed of by its 
founders. 
II 
The newly elected Labor members, only one of whom represented a 
coastal constituency, took their seats early in May 1901 and were immedi-
ately faced by an utterly confused poUtical situation. With the departure 
of John Forrest to the federal parliament, the ministerial party which had 
been held together by aUegiance to him, disintegrated, lost its majority, 
and resigned. F. C. Dlingworth was then caUed for as leader of the opposi-
tion, but, when George Leake, who had led the coastal federation 
campaign, refused to join him, lUingworth stepped down, leaving Leake as 
premier with twenty supporters in a House of fifty. Since there were five 
uidependents and an opposition of nineteen, the support of the Labor six 
was a prize worth concessions and caucus argued with some justice that 
the ministry would only be prepared to grant concessions in return for 
guaranteed support. Radicals in the party who believed that it could only 
preserve its soul by preserving its independence saw this as the first 
betrayal.'*^ Hastie of Kanowna was elected leader of the Labor party wdth 
Daglish of Subiaco as whip, and the party seemed to be well launched; but 
trouble was not far ahead. Shortly after taking office the new government 
received a demand for wage increases in the raUways. The claim was 
generaUy conceded to be just, but the presentation of an ultimatum to a 
new minister, foUowed by an unmediate strike, was generaUy condemned. 
The PLP, anxious to present a responsible image, jouied the choms of 
condemnation, and when the strike coUapsed on 10 July was uretrievably 
compromised in the eyes of union enthusiasts. At the thud state congress 
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which met at Kalgooriie in August, it was aUeged that Johnson and Reside 
had advised the Kalgoorlie men not to join the strike, that the Labor party 
had supported the Leake government against the union, and that George 
Taylor had written a letter used as propaganda for the government. The 
action of the party was finally endorsed by fifty-five votes to eleven, but 
the tone of debate suggests that some hard talkUig in hotel bars may have 
been requued to secure this result.^^ 
Although the parliamentary party had thus survived its first serious 
storm, new squalls were already on the horizon. The conflict between the 
two mining uruons on the goldfields had become very bitter. The AMA 
accused the AWA leaders of maladministration.'** The AWA leaders 
accused the AMA of sectarian bias,'*^ and the AMA retaliated by securmg 
recognition from the registrar of the Arbitration Court as the sole mining 
union entitled to registration under the Act.^ '* Since W. D. Johnson was 
general secretary of the AMA whUe George Taylor and other members 
belonged to the AWA, friction in caucus was always latent and in 1902 U 
became dramaticaUy obvious. 
The Leake govemment was defeated in November 1901, but a month 
later the succeeding conservative govemment of A. E. Morgans was 
defeated in its turn, and Leake, though stUl leading a minority party, took 
office again. George Taylor beUeved that Labor should not tie itself to any 
other party and, defyuig a caucus decision to support Leake, sat firmly on 
the opposition cross-benches. He was mUdly and apologeticaUy censured 
both by caucus and his own district councU. Leake died on 24 June 1902, 
and when he was succeeded by Walter H. James, who had been a firm 
friend of the uifant Labor movement in the '80s and '90s, the question 
arose again. Taylor stUl refused to conform and there was a bitter ex-
change of personalities between him and his coUeagues in the House.^' 
Taylor's enemies ascribed his obstinacy to a personal feud with the 
minister for raUways, whUe his supporters saw heresy Ui alliance wdth any 
other party. The 1902 Congress conducted a general investigation of the 
behaviour of members but, faced by a general refusal of the politicians led 
by Daglish to concede the right of congress to judge them, finaUy 
exonerated everyone including Taylor. Congress ruled in fact that caucus 
solidarity should only apply to platform questions,^ •^  but Taylor was 
nevertheless temporarUy expelled from caucus. In the meantime, the party 
had improved both in quantity and quality when J. B. Holman won a 
by-election in December 1901 and Bath replaced the deceased Reside in 
October 1902. The gams were counterbalanced, however, by the defeat of 
one of the few Labor legislative councUlors, J. M. Speed. 
The 1902 congress represented fifty-six organizations of some 7,000 
members, but political organization was stUl quite haphazard, with 
political branches forming hastUy just before elections and vanishing just 
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as hastUy soon afterwards. In principle, there was little opposition to the 
idea of a co-ordinated organization but in practice it always broke down 
because the small unions distrusted the big ones, the coast distrusted the 
goldfields, unions distrusted leagues, and nobody was prepared to delegate 
an atom of real power to a central body. The thud congress of 1901 had 
actually created a formal stmcture for a political Labor party, in which aU 
unions were ipso facto party branches whUe independent branches could 
also be formed. The organization was to be governed by a district councU 
in each of four districts to adjudicate disputes but otherwise merely offer 
advice. With no immediate prospect of an election, nothing was done to 
unplement the scheme and the lack of any real desire for uruty was 
emphasized when the 1902 congress decided that future congresses would 
be held trienniaUy instead of annuaUy, and that congress decisions were 
not binding on the constituent organization. 
Proposals for a political party were also confused by parallel proposals 
at both the 1899 and 1901 conferences for Labor federation. The schemes 
of Labor federation propounded in the east had envisaged the establish-
ment of a co-ordinated organization for aU Labor bodies in the state which 
would eventually join a national organization. Consequently, Labor federa-
tion seems to have been viewed in Western Australia, initiaUy at least, as 
something quite different from the state organization. The committee 
formed at the 1901 conference to consider the Labor federation scheme 
did not report to the 1902 Congress as was intended and the whole scheme 
seemed to have coUapsed. 
Early in 1903, the approach of a federal election stimulated action 
again. Political Labor party branches were hastUy re-formed,^ ^ and 
Senator Pearce arrived from the east advocating the adoption of a Labor 
federation scheme proposed by the Commonwealth Trade Union Congress 
of 1902. '^^  The scheme was launched on 3 April by a meeting representing 
existing executive bodies such as the general executive of the AWA, the 
TLC, and the executives of a number of large unions.^ ^  DurUig the federal 
election campaign, enthusiasm for the scheme remained higli and there was 
some talk of allowing the federation to function as a permanent executive, 
but vested interests in the PoUtical Labor party were too strong^ ^  and 
after the federal election, although the organization remamed in existence, 
it was virtually moribund. 
The coUapse of the ALF scheme was only one symptom of a funda-
mental disunity within the party, much of which was due to the stUl 
festering dispute between the AWA and the AMA - originaUy a question 
of principle, but now a highly personal faction fight in which most 
members of the parliamentary party were more or less involved. Wide-
spread disenchantment wdth the poUcy of support for the James govern-
ment was reflected in bitter personal feuds between protagonists of the 
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two sides. Julian Stuart, another prisoner in the Queensland shearUig 
strikes, who had edited the Westralian Worker since January 1903 and was 
a strong AWA man, saw Johnson as "a capitalistic tout . . . neither more 
nor less than a jackal for the James government", wdth "an insane hatred 
of the A.W.A.", and spoke of the "Anti labor antics" of Bath. George 
Taylor believed that Hastie had been bought by the government with a 
promise of employment. Under this sort of pressure the policy of support 
for the James government began to break down and was abandoned in 
August 1903." 
Although the parUamentary party seemed by now to have lost touch 
with its grass-roots organization, there were some reasons for expecting to 
gain support in the general elections to be held m 1904. The 1901 
elections had been conducted by a stiU tiny organization wdth no political 
experience but, partly because of the need to register under the Industrial 
ConcUiation and Arbitration Act, union members had increased from 
8,974 in 1901 to 15,015 in 1903.^* A stronger machine was thus avaUable 
which, because of the diversification of AWA activities, was already 
expanding in areas hitherto sacred to conservative candidates. Some 
political branches had also been estabUshed. 
As the remnants of the old Forrest party slowly began to seek a united 
front against Labor aggression, the James party began to seem more con-
servative and some liberals might be expected to drift in the opposite 
direction.^ ^  Finally, the Electoral Act and the Redistribution of Seats Act 
of 1904 had removed some of the more glaring anomalies in the parlia-
mentary machinery of the state. Early in February, a conference of unions 
and leagues in Perth resolved on a nine-point fighting platform which 
contained most of the usual Labor aims, including nationalization of 
monopolies and the creation of a state bank.^ *^ The campaign thus com-
menced seemed to inhibit dissensions. Taylor, having issued one 
tremendous blast against the party leaders, then feU sUent, while the AWA 
and the AMA at last began a serious attempt to settie their differences.^' 
The result of the poU of 28 June astounded everyone. Five of the 
sitting Labor members were unopposed, and of the twenty-eight other 
seats contested seventeen were won with 42.57 percent of the total vote. 
Labor was thus the biggest single party in the House, but with nineteen 
ministerialists and six opposition members U was stiU unable to form a safe 
government. At the first caucus meeting of the new session, Hastie, unwiU-
ing to renominate as leader, was replaced by Henry Daglish of Subiaco. 
Daglish, a civil service clerk, had entered the parliamentary party through 
George Pearce's Subiaco Labor League. He was not without ability but had 
been known in Melbourne as a diligent espouser of radical causes including 
theosophy, spiritualism, and temperance. He had been a Primitive 
Methodist lay preacher and had unsuccessfuUy contested a Victorian seat 
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in 1894. He presided over a motley crew of whom twelve represented 
goldfields seats, six the metropoUtan area, and one the CoUie coal miners, 
whUe three others were lucky and obviously temporary holders of agricul-
tural constituencies. Most were unionists, but the party included also 
Daglish himself, C. C. Keyser of Albany, a clerk who had come through a 
league, A. J. H. Watts of Northam, a land agent, WaUace Nelson, a joumal-
ist, and Dr. H. A. EUis of Coolgardie, who had dabbled in a wide variety of 
progressive activities aU over Australia. 
At a victory social in Leederville on 25 July Daglish made his first 
mistake by delivering a keynote speech wdthout consulting his party.^ •^ He 
was careful to damp down any suggestion of radicalism and stressed the 
need to assist struggling manufacturers. He condemned the land policy of 
the James government and advocated a land tax, but specifically denied 
any thought of confiscation. To party enthusiasts who saw the millennium 
within reach, the speech was almost an insult and all the old doubts, 
temporarUy forgotten in the frenzy of campaigning, revived. 
When the House met, James decided to force the issue at once, and 
included in the governor's address an expression of confidence in the 
government. There was some apprehension in the party about taking 
office, but the ambitious Daglish, supported probably by Johnson, was 
able to sway a generally inexperienced caucus.^"' WUh only twenty-two 
votes in a House of fifty, however, extra support had to be found. By 
1904, the once powerful Forrest party had been reduced to four members 
known as the Independents, who usuaUy foUowed a common line. Having 
secured a promise of support from this group, the address in reply was 
amended, the government resigned, and Daglish was called for on 10 
August 1904.6 "* 
Although still able to select his own ministry, Daglish faced one diffi-
cuU problem. The Constitution required a minister in the Legislative 
CouncU but, since the defeat of B. C. O'Brien and J. M. Speed in 1902 and 
the subsequent defection of J. A. Thomson, Labor was not represented in 
the Council. TUe only possible candidate was John Michael Drew, a West 
Australian Catholic journalist from Geraldton, who had been editorially 
sympathetic to the cause, and on 10 August Daglish announced the 
appointment of Hastie to the Department of Justice and Mines, HoUnan to 
Labor and RaUways, Drew to Lands, Taylor as colonial secretary, Angwin 
as minister wdthout portfolio, and hUnself as premier, treasurer, and 
minister for education. Only Angwin and Taylor were over forty, whUe 
both Johnson and Holman were only thirty-two. 
Tlie ministerial elections foUowing the change of govemment were the 
next disaster. In his policy speech deUvered at Subiaco on 23 August, ^ an 
obviously unhappy Daglish declared that, because of the condition of state 
finances, the government must retrench and "mark time" — an unfortun-
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ate figure of speech which obscured promises of reform in the constitu-
tion, the electoral laws, and elsewhere. The disUlusionment of his foUowers 
was completed when on 20 August, in his policy speech at Geraldton, 
Drew announced that he had refused to sign the pledge, would not support 
aboUtion of the Legislative CouncU or redistribution on a population basis 
and disapproved strongly of any proposals to stop alienation of Crown 
land.^^ The statement may have been a tactical move to placate an 
intensely conservative electorate but U naturaUy deepened the existing 
atmosphere of suspicion. 
SomervUle of the coastal TLC expressed the endemic suspicion of the 
government by forming what he called a joint parliamentary committee, 
based on the Fremantle Trades HaU, which was intended to provide a 
forum for discussion between members of parliament and union leaders.^^ 
The scheme coUapsed when members saw it as impertinence and the gold-
fields TLC saw it as attempted metropolitan domination of the party. 
Honorable members were thus left to their own devices and the dissidents 
saw little to be proud of in their performance. Reform of the Legislative 
Council was proposed, but the ministry saw no better way of tackling the 
problem than a bill for a referendum which first had to pass the CouncU. A 
scheme for a land tax was saddled wdth inordinately high exemptions. In 
open defiance of party policy, the construction of a railway in the far 
north was entrusted to private enterprise and, worst cut of aU, Mr. Justice 
Parker, who was considered a hostUe judge, was reappointed to the 
Arbitration Bench. 
The first serious crack in the party appeared when A. J. WUson, 
member for Forrest, responded to the premier's poUcy speech by publicly 
assailing the government in the columns of the West Australian, but the 
crack was papered over with the support of the goldfields' organization. 
When James was appointed agent-general in October, however, 
J. J. Curran, secretary of the coastal TLC, faUed to win his predominantly 
working-class seat in East Perth. 
The government managed to get safely into recess on 24 December, but 
ministers were now subjected to attack over their departmental administra-
tion. George Taylor, tactless as ever, had antagonized the party's main 
power base in the mining unions by refusing to provide an emergency 
hospital near the mines, and had also incurred the bitter enmity of the 
influential West AustraUan Truth. Johnson, equally tactless, greeted a dele-
gation seeking preference to uruonists by refusing to accept dictation, even 
from his own supporters. When he announced that this was his last word, 
an angry unionist replied, "TUen you'U be damned". Holman's perform-
ance was even worse. He flatly refused to receive a delegation of union 
secretaries. 
Writing in the recently established coastal Labor paper. The Democrat, 
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in March, WaUace Nelson, member for Harmans, thought it time the Labor 
govemment did something, and on 18 March Nelson and two coUeagues, 
F. F. Wilson and A. A. WUson, publicly announced in Kalgoorlie that they 
were prepared to upset the government if the line of policy developed in 
the recess did not improve matters.^^ 
DagUsh returned late in March from two months in the east at a 
premiers' conference and found the party almost entirely alienated from 
its supporting organization. Hoping to save the situation, he reshuffled his 
cabinet, replacing Holman and Taylor by Thomas Bath and Patrick J. 
Lynch, an eloquent Irish engine driver from Leonora.^° The changes 
might well have improved a cabinet in a secure position, but at such a time 
they were disastrous. The govemment, which was already in difficulties, 
had merely made two more enemies, one of whom had an enormous 
personal foUowing as a Labor hero, while the independent supporters of 
the government saw clearly that there were to be no plums for them. 
The opposition was quick to see the possibilities in the situation, and, 
as soon as the House reassembled on 6 July, moved a no-confidence 
amendment to the address-in-reply.^' Moran, leader of the independents, 
was prepared to make hay while the sun shone. The opposition offered 
him two portfolios for a vote against the goverrunent, but Moran had 
greater ambitions and proposed to Daglish that there should be a coalition 
between Labor and the independents, wUh himself as premier.^ ^  Although 
some Labor members would have been delighted to get rid of Daglish, 
Moran's reputation on the goldfields made hun a political liability, and the 
offer was rejected. The desperate Daglish then seriously investigated coaU-
tion with the opposition but, finding no common ground, abandoned that 
idea also.^^ Moran, however, now saw that the chance of profit was gone, 
and when it came to the point, the independents voted wdth the govern-
ment.^^ 
The respite was temporary. On 17 August, Daglish innocently sought 
the opinion of the House on a cabinet scheme to purchase aU the assets of 
the privately owned Midland RaUway Company for £1,500,000 
($3,000,000). Most of the Labor back bench joined the opposUion in a 
concerted roar of protest at the size of the offer, and Daglish suffered a 
humiliating defeat on the voices without a division.^ ^  The government 
resigned on 22 August, and three days later, while waiting to hand over the 
premier's office to C. H. Rason who had succeeded James, Daglish wrote 
on the blotting pad — "In the midst of (ministerial) Ufe we are in death." 
His successor, whose position was just as precarious, hastUy pushed the 
sheet into a drawer.^ ^  
SomervUle's condemnation of the Daglish government in a letter to 
Walter James would undoubtedly have been endorsed by most Labor men: 
"Why should these men be so anxious to smooth out and obliterate any 
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distinctively labor features in their proposals? I ask why, as if I did not 
know the present mirustry are hanging on to place and pay by the grace of 
Moran, Connor, Butcher and Co. . . . Daglish of course I never could have 
imagined as a militant labor man."^^ SomervUle's bitter conclusion was 
oddly endorsed from the other side of the poUtical fence. In a letter of 22 
March 1905 to ex-premier WaUer H. James in London, John Winthrop 
Hackett of the conservative West Australian said: " . . . the bulk of the 
government are not merely incompetent, they do not beUeve in them-
selves. They could be put out immediately pariiament meets only U is hard 
to see where we could improve on Johnstone [sic] and Daglish."^* 
With only eighteen supporters facing twenty-two Labor members, 
Rason, the new premier, had troubles of his own. He secured five weeks' 
adjournment for ministerial elections and, when the House met again on 3 
October, moved immediately to discharge from the notice paper the bill 
for a referendum on the Legislative Council. The strategy succeeded, and, 
when the motion was duly defeated by a concerted Labor vote, he had an 
indisputable argument for a dissolution. The ensuing general election was 
aptly described by SomerviUe as "Our Waterloo". Labor won only four-
teen of the twenty-six seats contested and secured only 35 per cent of the 
total vote, while Johnson lost his seat. The few new members elected, 
however, included the flamboyant Thomas Walker, sometime member of 
the New South Wales pariiament and spiritualist lecturer, and Philip 
CoUier, a newly arrived Victorian socialist who became, in time, an out-
standing premier. 
Ill 
The coUapse of the Daglish government coincided with the onset of an 
economic recession which compUcated the task of party reconstruction 
between 1905 and 1909. For the first time since 1888 there was a net loss 
in population and the value of manufacturing output feU from £4,116,000 
($8,232,000) in 1905/6 to £3,925,000 ($7,850,000) in 1907/8. The 
decline was reflected in union membership figures which feU from 16,330 
in 1904 to 14,544 in 1907. The slow reconstruction dictated by these 
economic hazards was probably a factor in the final success of the parlia-
mentary party. 
As goldfields leaders, elected to parliament, settled on the coast, gold-
fields suspicion of the coast began to disappear, and the idea of a unUed 
party became more acceptable. The 1905 congress which met in July, in 
the gloomy last days of the Labor goverrunent, was therefore ready for the 
first time, to give some serious attention to party organization. Congress at 
last agreed to make its own decisions binding. The vexed question of 
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voting in congresses was settled by a compromise in which delegates voted 
by heads on poUtical questions, and by the membership they represented 
on industrial matters. Finally, the congress adopted a new constitution 
which expanded some of the crude ideas adopted earlier into a 
sophisticated and comprehensive scheme. The party was to consist of 
unions and political branches organized into six districts, each governed by 
a district councU. For the first time, the district councUs were given a real 
role in organizing and assisting branches, arranging for joint action, and 
selecting, endorsing, and financing candidates. 
The congress also agreed to the revival of the 1901 scheme for a Labor 
federation, and the exponents of reform saw their opportunity to secure 
something larger than the existing party organization. At a meeting m 
Perth on 17 February 1906 the ALF was formally reconstituted^^ with 
F. J. Ware, member for Hannans, as president and John Scaddan, member 
for Ivanhoe, as secretary. The organization thus established, at first to 
manage federal elections only, was able to secure from the 1907 confer-
ence the pre-eminent position in a new constitution which served the West 
Australian Labor party with minor variations untU 1963.*^ The Westem 
Australian division of the ALF was governed by a general councU, meeting 
every three years. Between councU meetings, the business of the federation 
was conducted by a permanent executive of president, two vice-presidents, 
secretary, treasurer, three trustees, two auditors, and one delegate from 
each affiliated district councU. The scheme was financed by a levy of U/dd. 
(1.25 cents) per month per member, on affiUated organizations, one-thud 
of which went to the executive, and the remainder to the seven district 
councUs, which carried out the functions granted in the 1905 constitu-
tion.*' 
In the meantime, the PLP, numericaUy weaker but unproved in qualUy 
by the loss of some feUow traveUers, had been reconstructed. Daglish 
withdrew from the Labor party entirely after 1905, fought the next 
election as an independent, and by 1910 was minister for works in a 
conservative goverrunent. His successor, Bath, elected after the faUure of 
efforts to induce Pearce to return from federal politics, had an impeccable 
uruon background and was widely respected both in the party and outside, 
while his personal investment in a farm at Tammin was a valuable asset m 
dealing with the farming community. There was a small fiurry when in 
1906 A. J. Wilson of Forrest was expeUed from the party for undertaking 
a paid commission from the hated timber combine, but otherwise the 
parliamentary party now seemed to be over the worst of its troubles. 
There was a further obstacle yet to be faced, however. In 1905 the 
registrar of the Arbitration Court had been impressed by arguments used 
in the debates on the Commonwealth ConcUiation and Arbitration Act 
against the use of union funds for political purposes. Throughout 1906 he 
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had been fighting a running battle with a number of unions, particularly 
the newly formed Federated Miners' Union, to delay or prevent registra-
tion of those whose rules included political objects, whUe pressUig the 
government for legislation on the subject.*^ A major strike in the timber 
industry early in 1907 induced some of the more conservative members of 
the government to act and on 24 July 1907 an amended ConcUiation and 
Arbitration BUl was introduced into the Legislative CouncU.*^ It penalized 
those advocatUig strikes or helping strikers; made special arrangements by 
which non-uniorusts could enter the Arbitration Court; altered the con-
stitution of the court to give the president greater power; prohibited the 
appearance of members of parliament before the court as advocates, and 
prohibited the use of union funds for poUtical purposes. Many uruonists 
saw some justice in the registrar's attitude, and Jabez Dodd of the Federa-
ted Miners' Union was prepared to fight for Uisertion of a conscience 
clause Ui the rules,*^ but the introduction of the bUl brought a united 
protest from all union leaders. Some unions spoke of abandoning the court 
entirely in favour of direct action, and when the critical choms was joined 
both by some members of the Legislative CouncU and by the main metro-
poUtan daUies*^ the biU was quietly shelved. 
The moral victory achieved by Labor in this struggle represented a big 
step along the road to recovery, a road which was made somewhat 
smoother by a change in the economic pattern of the state. The mining 
industry had reached a peak in 1904 and had then begun to decline. 
Anxious not to lose population, Newton Moore, who had succeeded Rason 
as Liberal leader and premier in 1906, met the chaUenge by a vigorous 
programme of agricultural expansion. As a result the new wheatgrowing 
districts east of Northam were settled by men who had spent their 
politically formative years in the orthodox Labor citadel of the goldfields. 
The fusion of the National and Liberal Leagues in May 1907, together 
wdth the ludicrously ineffective attempt at a secessionist movement Ui 
federal poUtics, no doubt also swung some support to Labor and in the 
general election of September 1908, nineteen of the twenty-nine seats 
contested were won, wdth 37.8 per cent of the total vote. The new 
members included a chastened W. D. Johnson, now member for Guildford. 
The triumph was marred when Richard Buzacott, who had narrowly 
defeated the unpopular Harry Gregory at Menzies, was unseated by an 
electoral petition, but there were nevertheless some reasons for satis-
faction. 
The new party constUution accepted at the 1907 congress came into 
operation on 1 January 1908, wUh John Scaddan as general secretary of 
the executive. The coastal TLC formally became the MetropoUtan District 
CouncU of the ALF on 9 March 1909,*^ and for the next few years the 
two bodies shared a common office and the part-time services of a 
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common secretary. Ever since its foundation, the TLC had led a wandering 
Ufe in various rented rooms, and the first objective of the new executive 
was to seek a permanent home. Land had actuaUy been granted for a 
Trades Hall in 1897 but the site was unsatisfactory and after complicated 
negotiations the present site in Beaufort Street was secured in 1903. 
E. L. Lobstein, a goldfields unionist who had been appointed first workers' 
representative on the Arbitration Court, had quarreUed with coastal 
leaders, but was nevertheless asked to manage the legal side of the trans-
action and, without the knowledge of the tmstees, had the grant made to 
the Eight Hour Demonstration Committee, on which he and his fiancee 
constituted a majority. His relations with the Labor movement broke 
down completely when he successfully sued J. W. Croft, secretary of the 
TLC, soon after. The legal tangle over the grant was finaUy settled in 
1905*^ but the financial strain of paying Croft's damages left the TLC 
unable to firush the buUding. However, Scaddan took up the matter again, 
debentures were issued, and the first executive meeting was held in the 
new buUduig on 4 January 1910.** 
The Labor party now possessed what seemed to be a potentiaUy 
efficient party machine, but the propaganda medium avaUable stUl left a 
good deal to be desired. Two attempts to capture a wider audience with 
the Sunday Figaro on the goldfields, and the Democrat in the city, had 
coUapsed rapidly, leaving the Westralian Worker to represent the Labor 
viewpoint supported only by occasional Labor columns granted by the 
commercial press. The Worker was controlled until 1905 by the AWA, 
when it was taken over by an executive board dominated by Jabez Dodd. 
It was always heavily goldfields-oriented and, under the editorship of 
Julian Stuart, was deeply involved in the faction warfare of the period. In 
March 1906, Stuart was succeeded by WiU. Jones, an English socialist who 
had worked for some time in Queensland.*^ Jones helped to revive a 
Social Democratic Association in Kalgooriie^'' and sought to make the 
Worker a vehicle for sociaUst propaganda; but, after fourteen months of 
strugglUig wUh what he saw as the apathy of the workUig class, he found a 
more congenial milieu and departed for Broken HiU,^' leaving the Worker 
under the joint control of Bath and Stuart, both busy members of pariia-
ment. Nobody was happy wdth this arrangement. In October 1910 a new 
English editor, E. S. Emerson, took over the paper^^ but he too only 
lasted a few months, being replaced by W. L. Bodley in May 1911.^^ 
The first general councU of the reformed party at Bunbury in June 
1910 was presented wUh a scheme to follow the lead given in the east by 
establishing a Labor daUy. Jabez Dodd on behalf of the Worker board 
thereupon announced the board's intention of converting the Worker to an 
evening daily in about six weeks. The inception of such a scheme in a 
declining goldfields town was obviously risky and the Congress persevered 
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wUh an independent organization, the People's Publishing Co., to raise 
funds for the Labor daily proposal. At the same time, however, the state 
executive began pressing the Worker board to move the paper to Perth. 
Since the main supporters of the paper were the Eastern Goldfields 
District CouncU with 600 shares, and the Federated Miners' Union wdth 
650, the board refused to consider the proposal untU at least 1,800 shares 
were held on the coast.^'* FoUowing a high-pressure seUing campaign by 
the state executive, the condition was duly met and the first metropoUtan 
issue of the Worker appeared on 3 May 1912. On legal advice, a scheme for 
amalgamating the People's Printing and Publishing Co. wdth the Worker 
board was abandoned and the two organizations carried on independently. 
Bath's efforts to run both the party and the Westralian Worker had 
wom him out, and in 1909 he spoke of resignation because he had lost 
confidence in himself. He was persuaded to defer a decision but decided 
finally to resign as party leader in July 1910.^^ Holman, Scaddan, Walker, 
Johnson, and M. F. Troy, member for Mount Magnet, nominated in the 
baUot on 3 August. Walker and Troy withdrew, but Scaddan secured an 
overwhelming majority over the other two candidates.^^ 
The new leader was a 34-year-old mine engine driver from South 
Australia who had been educated in Bendigo. He was a vigorous optUnist, 
generaUy known as "Happy Jack", but was nevertheless earnestly deter-
mined on his own inteUectual improvement under the guidance of the 
widely read Bath. He was universaUy popular, and m his own constUuency 
could do no wrong. With fresh leadership, a new party orgaruzation and a 
swing to Labor apparent, both in the Commonwealth and New South 
Wales, the party was now in a strong position. Late in 1910, the govern-
ment sought to halt the drift by a gerrymandering redistribution bUl which 
reduced the number of goldfields seats by two and the number of metro-
politan seats by one, but the scheme backfired. A superbly organized 
Labor campaign based on a campaign newspaper conducted by HoUnan 
and Hugh Mahon, federal member for Coolgardie, carried the day. At the 
general election in October 1911, Labor won twenty-four of the thuty-
rune seats contested wdth 52.54 per cent of the total vote and was un-
opposed in ten seats. The new departure was not confined to the Legisla-
tive Assembly, however. In May 1910, Jabez Dodd became the first duect 
Labor representative in the Legislative CouncU since 1902, being joined ui 
November 1911 by J. A. Doland and Fred Davis. 
IV 
In accordance with a decision of the 1910 congress, the new mirustry 
was elected for the first time by caucus.^ ^  Scaddan was unanimously 
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elected leader, whUe the other posts went to Bath, W. C. Angwin, Johnson, 
CoUier, Walker, Jabez Dodd, and Drew. Since Drew had stiU not formaUy 
joined the party, his admission to caucus brought some criticism. The state 
executive, having sought and received assurances of Drew's loyalty from 
his district councU, decided not to press the objections, but made it clear 
to the pariiamentary party that six months' membership should hence-
forth be a prerequisite for admission.^* 
With only Angwin and Drew representing coastal districts, the new 
ministry apparently fulfUled dismal pre-election forecasts by the Liberals 
of goldfields domination, but it was nevertheless widely recognized as the 
best team avaUable from the Labor party. The good natured Scaddan made 
friends easUy; Bath was, by now, virtually a farmer; Drew, Dodd, and 
Angwin were known as men of principle, whUe Walker already had a wide 
reputation as an inteUectual and as a character. Only four of the eight 
lacked previous experience, and aU of these had other advantages. On the 
whole, the auspices seemed most favourable. 
After a short post-election session, in which legislative approval was 
given for a workers' homes scheme and a land tax, the new government 
began immediately to make good use of its opportunUy. In seven months 
it established a state shipping service and a government dairy, began the 
construction of a state sawmUls, initiated negotiations for the purchase of 
the metropolitan tramways and drew up plans for a state agricultural 
implement works and a comprehensive state-owned meat industry 
designed to defeat the operations of an existing meat ring. In the process, 
over £100,000 ($200,000) was spent without pariiamentary sanction, but 
the government argued with some justice that it had used only money 
allotted for unforeseen contingencies, a course justified by the existence of 
a hostUe Legislative CouncU. 
The pouit was emphasized when the Legislative CouncU kUled twenty 
of the seventy-nine government biUs in the session of July to December 
1912, leaving the government with only improvements to the Industrial 
ConcUiation and Arbitration Act and the Workers' Compensation Act to 
show for its sessional programme .^ ^ 
The aggressive implementation of government policy by executive 
action was continued in subsequent sessions by the construction of a city 
electricity plant, acquisition of a river ferry service, and estabUshment of a 
co-ordinated fishing industry to match the meat Uidustry. 
Shortly before his election as party leader, Scaddan had resigned as 
general secretary of the ALF."' ' ' His successor, Alexander McCaUum, a 
33-year-old bookbinder from South Australia, had been associated with 
the coastal TLC since 1900 and had proved himself a dedicated and 
militant battler for the cause. He held office for nearly ten years and soon 
became the most influential man in the party. Backed by a smaU elite 
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group of activists, many of whom were associated with a revived Metro-
poUtan Socialist League'°' domUiated by Montaigne O'Dowd, son of the 
Victorian socialist poet, and by Don Cameron, later senator, McCaUum 
kept the executive firmly and enthusiasticaUy behind the government. 
There were, therefore, few of the open attempts at industrial dictation 
which embittered the politics of Labor in New South Wales, although both 
Johnson and CoUier feU foul of the unions in respect of their depart-
ments."'^ 
The term socialism was freely used by the opposition but none of the 
government's ventures were in fact motivated by any consistent scheme of 
state planning. The idea of state enterprise was nothUig new in Western 
Australia. Long before 1910, the government already owned rock-crushing 
batteries in many mining towns, a state sawmUl, and state hotels. All of 
these ventures were provided in response to a public need, which was not 
being provided or was being provided Uiadequately by private enterprise. 
The activities of the Scaddan government simply carried this process to its 
logical conclusion and its correct assessment of the public need was cleariy 
demonstrated by the number of state enterprises which survived under 
subsequent hostUe governments. 
Partly because of Scaddan's free spending, which eventually earned him 
the sobriquet of "Gone a mUlion Jack", both the 1911/12 and 1912/13 
budgets showed deficits and, during the recess early in 1913, he spent four 
months in England seeking loan money, a step which was severely 
criticized as a negation of party principles. Blessed by a record wheat 
harvest, however, the government could still afford to ignore this sort of 
criticism. Soon after Scaddan's return, the third session of parUament 
opened wdth a head-on collision between the government and the Legisla-
tive CouncU in which seven government bUls, some controversial, intro-
duced on the one day, were all defeated. Although the CouncU's attitude 
was widely criticized even in the metropolitan daUies, it was merely one 
symptom of a general marshaUing of the opposing forces which was re-
flected in the events outside the House. 
Before 1911, the farmers had usually voted solidly for the Liberal 
party. The swing of some rural electorates to Labor in 1911 was an aber-
ration produced by effective Labor organization and the normal swing of 
the pendulum, and the establishment in 1912 of a Farmers' and Settlers' 
Association (F and SA) signalized the end of the brief courtship. The rift 
was seen to be permanent when a conference of the association in May 
1913 decided to establish a political wing, copyUig some of the organiza-
tional features of Labor.'"^ 
Besides this looming political threat, the government now began to run 
into economic difficulties. The wheat crop of 1914 was a disastrous 
faUure, and the consequent contraction of business activity soon brought 
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mounting unemployment. By August, the accumulated deficU had risen to 
£644,093 ($1,288,186). On top of these problems came the outbreak of 
the First Worid War. An Income Tax (War Emergency) BUl was Uitroduced 
to relieve the financial strain, accompanied by an Industrial Arbitration 
BUl, designed to cope with unemployment, but both were rejected by the 
Legislative CouncU. 
Steady losses due to maladministration in some of the state enterprises, 
deficit financing, and an attempt to introduce income tax, constUuted a 
dangerous record with which to face an impending general election, and 
the government approached the campaign apprehensively. Its fears were 
justified. At the poll on 21 October 1914, Labor won orUy half of the 
twenty-eight seats contested whUe the Liberals won fifteen and the new 
Country party won seven. With its twelve uncontested seats, the govern-
ment stiU had a majority of one after appointing a Speaker, but its fate 
hung in the balance for over a month whUe the results came in from the 
far northem seats. The result was clearly due in part to the advent of the 
Country party, but the ministry, embittered by what U saw as ingratitude, 
became progressively cooler about the expansion of state enterprise. 
Pressed by party enthusiasts to expand the field, they argued that the first 
requuement was to make existing enterprises more efficient.'"'* 
On 23 November 1914, Bath retired, devoted himself to farming, and at 
length drifted away from Labor into a co-operative marketing organiza-
tion. He was replaced af Lands and Agriculture by Johnson, whUe Angwin 
took over Public Works, and R. H. Underwood, member for PUbara, 
entered tUe nunistry without portfolio.'"^ There was no cessation of the 
economic difficulties, however. Prices were rising rapidly; by February 
1915 there were over 3,000 unemployed and by the end of January the 
accumulated deficU had reached one mUlion pounds (two mUlion dollars). 
Fortunately, the Country party, led by the moderate James Gardiner, 
voted with the government on most divisions, but the government back 
bench proved less complaisant. 
E.B.Johnston, a Western Australian-born land agent, who held the 
rural seat of WiUiams-Narrogin, had, during the election campaign, induced 
Scaddan to promise a reduction in the price of Crown lands to 15s. 
($1.50) per acre. When the necessary legislation was introduced in 1915, 
Johnston, shocked to find a proposed price of 25s. ($2.50), accused 
Scaddan of a breach of faith and, with the support of A. A. WUson of 
Collie, voted against the government.'"^ 
In the meantune, another backbencher had made an even more drastic 
protest. J. P. Gardiner, from the northern pastoral and mining seat of 
Roeboume, spoke rarely but was usuaUy critical of the government. On 27 
January 1915, he spoke for four minutes attacking the grant of a whaling 
licence to a Norwegian company and thenceforth virtually ceased to 
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attend parliament. On 30 September he was declared to have vacated his 
seat as an unauthorized absentee, and the ensuing by-election was won by 
the Liberals. 
WhUe Gardiner's intentions were stUl in doubt, difficulties arose in the 
state enterprises. Staff friction in the agricultural implement works, 
generated aUegations of serious maladministration, which were confirmed 
by a royal commission.'"^ Late m 1915 an even more serious scandal was 
revealed. The constmction of a meatworks at Wyndham was the keystone 
of the meat supply enterprise and, in AprU 1915, Johnson and Scaddan, 
without consulting cabinet, let the contract to a financier, S. V. Nevanas, 
overmlUig public service advice. They then entered into shipping agree-
ments which made performance of the contract difficult and, reaUzing at 
last the complexities they had created, granted Nevanas an extraordinarUy 
generous inducement to abandon the contract.'"* 
When Parliament met in July, the story had leaked. E. E. Heitmann, 
member for Cue, at once resigned as government whip. Taylor gave notice 
of a no-confidence motion which he subsequently withdrew, and the 
opposition succeeded in securing a select committee which included 
Taylor.'"^ In the debate on the report early in November, Heitmann, 
Taylor, and E. B. Johnston aU attacked the government but refused to 
vote with the opposition." " 
At a special caucus meeting on 9 December, W. H. Carpenter, member 
for Fremantie, moved that the proposed resignation of the mUiistry was 
undesirable, but found no seconder. Scaddan then spoke of his desue for 
relief because of UI health and refused to continue without support. 
George Foley, member for Mount Leonora, moved that the resignations be 
accepted, but A. A. WUson and Heitmann both deplored talk of conuption 
and pointed out that the govemment had been unlucky through drought 
and war. W. L. Thomas, of Bunbury, agreed that there was no evidence of 
dishonesty but would leave poUtics rather than continue to support 
Johnson, whose blunders had brought defeat in 1905 and the present 
difficulties. Troy admired Johnson, but couldn't take his word, because he 
was always ready to get out of a tight corner by a half-truth. S. W. Munsie, 
member for Hannans, felt that defeat would certairUy follow a cabinet 
reshuffle. E. B. Johnston felt that faUure of caucus to accept the resigna-
tions would amount to a double-cross.''' The government was saved by 
ten votes to eight but, two days later, Johnston resigned his seat, leaving 
the government in a minority of one. 
When Johnston announced his intention of contesting WiUiams-
Narrogin as an independent, he challenged Scaddan to stand against 
him and the premier rashly accepted. On the advice of the local 
Labor organization, however, he decided not to nominate"'^ and on the 
day of the election he was on hoUday witU his famUy in the southwest. As 
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had been expected, Johnston won handsomely. At a hostUe caucus meet-
Uig on 3 February 1916 Scaddan agreed that the seat should have been 
contested, but said he was tired of the impossible demands made by his 
supporters and expressed his eagerness to resign if required."^ The offer 
was not accepted, but his days as premier were numbered ui any case. 
When James Gardiner resigned as Country party leader early in 1916, it 
was decided to withdraw support from the Labor party. As soon as parlia-
ment met in July, Frank WUson, who had succeeded Moore as Liberal 
leader Ui 1910, took advantage of the Country party decision and moved 
an adjournment which was carried by twenty-four votes to twenty on 25 
July.""* As a last hope U was decided that Scaddan should contest 
CanrUng against R. T. Robinson, Wilson's Attorney general, in the ensuing 
ministerial elections. Don Cameron, endorsed candidate for the seat, 
obligmgly gave way but, after a long bitter campaign, Scaddan was crush-
ingly defeated on 19 August and the last hope was gone.'' ^ 
WhUe the government was thus slowly expiring, the curtain was 
beginning to rise on the great conscription drama. In October 1915 there 
had been a debate on conscription in the Legislative Assembly, and ui 
November the state executive had deferred consideration of a manifesto 
from an anti-conscription league in Sydney untU the party congress at 
Kalgoorlie, on 31 May 1916, had given a ruling. In the meantime, a 
constant flow of Uterature and correspondence from the east stimulated 
controversy, and, when the congress met, the factions were already begin-
ning to emerge. The opponents of conscription were led by Don Cameron, 
whUe E. W. Walsh of the Barmaids' and Barmen's Union advocated support 
for conscription provided that wealth was also conscripted. After two days 
of surprisingly calm debate, it was resolved by forty-one votes to twenty-
six that Western Australia would tmst the Hughes government and support 
conscription if the goverrunent thought it necessary.'' ^  
Prime Minister Hughes passed through Perth on 31 July, on his way 
back from Europe, and spoke to party members, but his Uitentions were 
not finally clarified untU he announced on 30 August that a referendum 
on conscription would be held on 28 October. The cleavage in Western 
AustraUa then became more pronounced. An anti-conscription league was 
initiated by an eastern delegate in August and led by Don Cameron,'' * 
who was kept in touch with eastern developments by correspondence wdth 
McCaUum, on sick leave in Sydney." When the referendum was 
announced, the district councUs began to declare themselves. The Unport-
ant Midland and Eastern Goldfields' councUs and the less Unportant 
Albany CouncU opposed conscription whUe the Metropolitan, Fremantie, 
and North Coolgardie councUs declared Ui favour.'^" 
In spite of numerous attempts to capture the state executive, however, 
it clung rigidly to the ruUng given by the Kalgoorlie congress, but a series 
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of abortive efforts during September to secure satisfactory assurances from 
the federal government about conscription of weafth began to turn the 
scale. On 16 October a motion advisUig a "no" vote was only defeated by 
14 votes to 12 but, at the same meeting, a second motion to support the 
federal members opposing conscription was carried by 14 votes to 13. 
James CorneU, Labor member of the Legislative CouncU and a convuiced 
conscriptionist, who was acting as general secretary in the absence of 
McCaUum on sick leave in the east, immediately resigned, and in an eamest 
attempt to avoid bitterness the meetmg at once resolved that aU officials 
should be given a free hand on the question. Although many Labor leaders 
in Western Australia were prepared to behave very positively on one side 
or the other m the conscription controversy, the consensus was that the 
subject did not warrant the risk of a split and, partly because of this 
apparent uncertainty in the party which was the centre of opposition in 
the east. Western AustraUa voted in favour of conscription by 94,069 votes 
to 40,884. 
Scaddan's defeat in CanrUng had left the PLP without a leader, but m 
spite of everythmg faith in Scaddan seemed undunUiished. J. T. Lutey, 
who had won Scaddan's old seat of BrownhUl-Ivanhoe, obligingly agreed 
to resign, thereby virtuaUy assuring Scaddan of re-election. When CoUier 
declUied election as leader at a caucus meeting on 19 September, Walker 
suggested that a decision should be deferred untU Scaddan's retum. Heit-
mann then pointed out that this would infer a lack of talent, and Johnson 
was elected, but Scaddan, who was present, sought permission of caucus to 
attend a conference of premiers and opposition leaders. His confidence 
was not misplaced. In spite of some opposition, he duly won the by-
election for BrownhiU-Ivanhoe and once again became leader of the party. 
CoUier's announcement in the caucus meeting of 19 September that he 
intended to speak agauist conscription was the first sign of the inevitable 
split in the PLP — rendered inevitable by events in the east. The dramatic 
withdrawal of the Hughes group from the federal caucus on 14 November 
precipitated a general heresy hunt which McCaUum, stiU in the east on sick 
leave, heartUy supported. Though weU aware of the feeling in the east, the 
state executive stUl reUed on the freedom of opinion granted by the Kal-
goorlie conference and dispatched to an interstate conference in Mel-
bourne, on 4 December, a delegation consisting of three conscriptionists, 
CorneU, Lynch, and R. J. BurcheU, federal member for Fremantle, and 
three anti-conscriptionists, McCaUum, Lutey, and H. C. Gibson of the 
Certificated Engine Drivers' Association. All attempts to make the east see 
the Western Australian point of view were in vain, however, and in spite of 
protests from the state executive, Cornell, Lynch, and BurcheU were 
refused admission to the conference.' •^ ' 
The increasing hysteria of the campaign at last defeated the advocates 
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of reason. On 20 November the preselection of the five senate candidates, 
who included three conscriptionists, was cancelled; anti-conscription 
unions and branches began to withdraw from the ALF; the North Cool-
gardie CouncU substituted George Taylor for its anti-conscriptionist dele-
gate, and the Australian Workers' Uruon (AWU) expelled Thomas 
Walker'^'^ for supportUig conscription. The same meeting, however, 
refused to expel Taylor. At the same tune, Heitmann and Underwood took 
an active part in establishUig the new National Labor party (NLP). 
John HUton, who had edited the Westralian Worker since Bodley's 
death in 1913, had opened the paper impartiaUy to both parties in spite of 
his personal support for conscription, but on 1 January 1917 he was given 
a month's notice, and in the fust issue for 1917 the position of editor was 
advertised. On 19 January the embUtered HUton joined J. Slocombe Ui 
establishing a "Labor Solidarity Committee" which eventually formed the 
metropoUtan nucleus of the NLP.''^^ Soon afterwards, an opposUion 
group was established caUed the "Industrial VigUance Committee" which 
not only opposed conscription but represented a general industrial, anti-
political position.'^^ 
The last hope of the moderates on the state executive was an appeal to 
the wandering sheep to return to the fold,'^^ but, when this faUed, aU 
hope of reconcUiation was abandoned. At a special congress on 20 March 
1917, the six federal renegades who had foUowed Hughes were declared to 
have put themselves outside the pale and the executive was empowered to 
disciplme anybody defying congress decisions. The Labor Solidarity Com-
mUtee was declared bogus, and power was taken to discipline organiza-
tions defying congress. Heitmann had already been expeUed by his own 
Geraldton CouncU for joining the NLP and had compounded his sin by 
resigning his seat to oppose Hugh Mahon in Kalgoorlie. He did not attend 
the congress but Underwood did and resolutely refused to recant.'^^ 
Hitherto Scaddan had successfuUy sat on the fence, thereby earning some 
scorn. He assured the congress that he intended to remain in the working-
class movement but, on 5 AprU, suddenly announced that he could no 
longer support the official Labor party.'^ Soon afterwards he was jouied 
by CorneU, Dodd, and Ardagh from the CouncU, and Thomas, Taylor, 
Carpenter, Foley, MuUaney, Hudson, Bolton, and Price from the 
Assembly. Drew, WaUcer, Angwin, and Troy alone of the conscriptionist 
group made theu peace with the party. 
As Robertson points out, however, the Western AustraUan Labor move-
ment never formaUy prohibited support for conscription, and one con-
scriptionist, A. A. WUson, successfuUy clauned his right to freedom of 
opinion, continued to support conscription, fought with the A.I.F., and 
retired as a Labor member in 1947. The final breach ui Western Australia 
was not over conscription at aU but over the support of rival senate 
teams.'^* 
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In the middle of October 1916 the conscription campaign was en-
livened by a dramatic side-issue. The propaganda of the Industrial Workers 
of the World had begun to appear in Western Australia by about 1913, and 
in 1914, IWW locals were organized in Fremantie, on the goldfields, and 
on the trans-Australian raUway. In September 1916 indiscreet letters from 
Western Australian members were seized Ui a raid on the Sydney head-
quarters, and twelve men were charged Ui Perth with seditious conspiracy. 
They included Mick SawteU, ex—state-Executive member, Monty MUler, a 
famous left-wing carpenter. Jack O'NeUl, a journalist, and four Europeans 
of various nationalities. Two were discharged after the preliminary hearing, 
and the remainder were committed for trial. MUler and Saw e^U, at least, 
were prepared to volunteer for martyrdom but they were disappoUited. 
Though aU the accused were found guUty, Judge Burnside very uitel-
ligently recognized their sincere, though perhaps misguided, idealism and 
released aU the prisoners on recognizances.'^^ 
Although conscription seemed to be a dead issue, tension remained high 
throughout 1917, flaring occasionally into violence, as when Don 
Cameron, speaking on the Esplanade, was forced to take refuge from an 
angry mob in the conservative Weld Club. Scaddan joined the Lefroy 
nunistry and his ministerial election in BrownhUl-Ivanhoe was of course a 
vicious personal clash between him and his old coUeague, John Lutey, m 
which Lutey won. With the aid of Hugh Mahon, the Worker trustees 
secured a new editor to replace HUton. John Curtin, who had been active 
in the Victorian anti-conscriptionist movement, took the chair early in 
1917 and trumpeted a new sort of defiance at the enemy, but in the 
prevaUing atmosphere of war hysteria the opponents of conscription had a 
hard fight. The extent of theu difficulties was manifested at the general 
election on 29 September. With five parties in the field and eight indepen-
dents. Labor won orUy fifteen of the twenty-five seats contested with only 
24.8 per cent of the total vote, whUe W. D. Johnson once again lost his 
seat at GuUdford. Even the death on active service of B. J. Stubbs a few 
months later faUed to change public hostUity, and his seat in Subiaco was 
also lost to a Nationalist. The one bright spot was the defeat of Scaddan at 
Albany, though not by a Labor candidate. 
Rumours that conscription was not dead began to appear about the 
middle of the year and on 7 November a second referendum was 
announced for 20 December. The state executive stUl declined to make a 
firm policy decision binding members, but issued a quite unequivocal 
recommendation for opposition to the government's proposals.'^" AU 
ordinary executive business was suspended, and in the next three months 
only two ordinary meetings were held, even the election of officers being 
deferred. 
The ruthless determination of the govemment to carry the referendum 
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was emphasized when Philip Collier, the new party leader, John Curtin of 
the Westralian Worker, and other Labor leaders were successfully prosecu-
ted under the War Precautions Act for utterances Ukely to cause dis-
affection. By an amazing and suspiciously convenient coincidence, a 
second IWW plot was uncovered a few weeks before the referendum and 
nine men were arrested. However, the plot, if plot it was, misfired. The 
trial was deferred because of the Ulness of the jury foreman and when the 
hearing was resumed in January only one of the nine was convicted.' •" 
Western Australia once again voted for conscription, but there was a 
sharp declUie of nearly 10,000 in the supporting vote and a corresponding 
rise in the "no" vote from 40,884 to 46,522. The change may have been 
due in part to sUnple war weariness, but the fact that the Labor movement 
was able on this occasion to give a clear lead undoubtedly affected the 
issue. 
VI 
By the beginning of 1918 the smoke of battle had cleared, and the 
official Labor party was able to survey the damage. With only fifteen seats 
in a House of fifty, the PLP clearly faced a long period of opposition, and 
recovery obviously depended on an active programme of extra-
parUamentary canvassing which could only be organized by the general 
secretary. Since 1915 the office had been operating as a fuU-time job, but 
the strain was stiU considerable and because of McCaUum's indifferent 
health he already had an assistant in Andrew Clementson,'^'^ who had 
carried much of the weight during the conscription crisis. Johnson's 
eviction from parliament made another expert assistant avaUable and on 
21 January 1918 he was given a short-term appointment as a paid 
organizer.'3 3 
The effects of the spUt were evident all over the state. In Bunbury, 
W. L. Thomas, the local member, had supported conscription and had 
carried with hun the Bunbury Lumpers and the TaUy Clerks. In Fremantie, 
a Nationalist Lumpers' Union existed side by side with the official union. 
In the metropoUtan area, a number of small craft unions and the RaUway 
Employees' Union had left the ALF, whUe the defection of George 
Taylor's foUowers had virtuaUy destroyed the North Coolgardie District 
CouncU.'^'* On the eastern goldfields, rune dissident craft unions, includ-
ing the powerful Engine Drivers and Firemen, had re-established a 
TLC, ^ and moves were afoot for a National Labor Miners' Union. With 
the exception of Fremantle, most of the coastal dissidents retumed to the 
fold rapidly, disUlusioned by incompetence in the NLP, but the position 
on the goldfields remained confused for years. 
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The loss of so many moderate leaders and the influence of eastern 
delegates to the first interstate conference held ui Perth late in 1918 had, 
of course, put the left wing firmly m the saddle and from late 1917 the 
ideas of the OBU movement, which had previously been rejected, now 
received serious consideration. On 7 January 1918, the state executive 
appointed a five-man committee to draft a proposal. The next five months 
were spent coUecting information about developments in the east, and a 
conference on 21 AprU 1918 decided to launch the scheme by groupmg 
existing organizations into industry federations.'^^ In August, however, 
the New South Wales Labor CouncU published a much more radical pro-
posal to form a completely new organization enroUing members into Ui-
dustrial departments. For a while this scheme held the centre of the stage. 
In the meantime, the AWU, which had organized rural and unskUled 
labour in Western Australia since 1907, had arranged to absorb the Feder-
ated Miners' Union,' ^^ thus becoming by far the largest Uidustrial orgaru-
zation in the state. The eastern leaders of the AWU were already urging its 
claims to be a ready-made nucleus for the OBU, and Western Australia was 
faced with a choice between the two ideas. E. H. Barker of the Amal-
gamated Society of Engineers, Edward Corboy, member for Swan, Senator 
Needham, and H. C. Gibson represented the state at the Melbourne OBU 
conference in January 1919 and Barker's letters began to dampen Westem 
Australian ardour for the New South Wales scheme. He was openly critical 
of the preamble which he said could be interpreted in various ways, and 
was particularly worried about the eUmination of state representation. The 
complex arrangements for election of officers would, he thought, absorb 
most of the organization's energies whUe he found the authoritarian ideas 
of the new leaders disturbmg.' ^^ 
After the conference. Barker spent some time in Sydney. He described 
J. S. Garden as the brains of the movement, but such a wowser that he 
would not aUow his wife and chUdren to see a picture show. "Judd, the 
next prominent man gets on everybody's nerves as he will persist in talking 
whether he has anything to add to the discussion or not. The Victorian 
men . . . are very second class. . . " ' ^^ 
Since the AWU held a commanding position in Western Australia, 
McCaUum saw that it was politic to back the AWU claim and, encouraged 
by Barker's reports, brought his considerable influence to bear against the 
Sydney scheme. In May 1919, he told a conespondent that the only way 
to create an OBU was to link existing organizations and added: " . . . those 
who advocate the formation of an O.B.U. by enroUing individual members, 
are the enemies of the Trade Union movement . . . in my opituon the 
A.W.U. has a basis on which we can buUd . . . People who are out after this 
new fangled idea are . . . doing somethmg which is not in the interest of 
trade unionism . . ."' "*" Opposed by the AWU and McCaUum, the OBU 
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never reaUy got off the ground in Western Australia, but it did provide a 
badly battered Labor movement with a concrete and apparently attainable 
objective which may well have facUitated reconstruction. 
As the war ground slowly to a close. Labor leaders began to see the 
enormous problem in reabsorbing the servicemen and the poUtical 
advantage to be gained by capturing the retumed-soldier vote. In July 
1917, a deputation from the state executive objected to government plans 
for massive post-war unmigration because repatriation must have priority. 
In January 1918, the executive appointed a standmg committee on 
returned soldiers, while McCaUum spent more and more time as party 
representative on various repatriation committees. 
PoliticaUy there was a determmed attempt to capture the disenchanted 
veteran. The most important prize was Captaui Hugo Throssell, V.C, son 
of an ex-Liberal premier, who horrified rural Northam by a public declara-
tion of socialist faith, and with his wife, Katherine Susannah Prichard, 
became an active member of the revived SociaUst League.'^' In the 
Returned Soldiers' Association, a heresy committee appeared objecting to 
ex-officers on the executive. A meeting of the committee on 5 January 
1919 was chaired by ex-sergeant Alex Pan ton of the state executive. 
On the goldfields, simUar efforts made to capture the Returned 
Soldiers' Association proved less successful. The Kalgoorlie and Boulder 
Association feU rapidly under anti-Labor control, and became an extra 
complication in what was already a highly confused political situation. The 
AWU had organized the Italian and Slav firewood cutters at Kurrawang 
and Lakeside, and staged a series of strikes to improve theu conditions. 
These men had never been popular among Australian miners and a six 
weeks' firewood strike m June 1919, which tied up the whole mining 
uidustry and caused considerable hardship in Kalgoorlie and Boulder, 
brought tension to a head. The death of a retumed soldier in a fight wdth 
an Italian set off several days of serious rioting.'^•^ Left-wing elements in 
the unions seized the opportunity to talk revolution and the Returned 
Soldiers' Association interfered frequently in defence of law and order. 
MeanwhUe the NLP had succeeded in having its own mining union 
registered by the registrar of the Arbitration Court.'''^ The Federated 
Miners' Union appealed successfuUy to the president of the court,''*'* 
whereupon the NLP revived the defunct Coolgardie Union which was stUl 
registered. In November 1919, the leaders of what was now the AWU 
(Minmg Division) realized what was going on, and declared the Coolgardie 
branch black. When some Nationalists were roughly handled, the state 
government enroUed and armed 680 special constables, including most of 
the Returned Soldiers' Association, and arrested eleven strikers.'"*^ The 
arrogant behaviour of some special constables finally ruined any chance of 
rapprochement between the Labor movement and the official Returned 
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Soldiers' Association on the goldfields.''*^ 
The amalgamation of the Federated Miners wdth the AWU was a 
disaster for the extremist element among the miners who supported the 
Sydney OBU scheme. Early in 1920, when they were expelled Ui a power 
struggle, they induced the firewood cutters to withdraw from the AWU 
and formed what purported to be a branch of the Workers' Industrial 
Union of Australia. The few Australian cutters stayed wdth the AWU''*^ 
but in December 1920 the new union once again went out on strike, 
thereby tying up the uidustry again. The Retumed Soldiers' Association 
once again began breathing chauvinistic threats and the Italian consul 
induced the men to retum to work,''** but the woodUnes continued to be 
a source of trouble for some time. 
The fourth general councU held in Perth early in June 1919 demon-
strated many of the preoccupations of the Labor movement at the time. 
The three main themes were pacifism, the cost of living, and the OBU, and 
the greatest of these was the OBU. For several days the protagonists of the 
AWU fought the protagonists of the Sydney scheme, demonstrating 
thereby to impartial observers the futility of adopting any scheme depend-
ing on immediate unity. Minor sidelines of the congress were the adoption 
of the title Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the abortive attempt by the 
gentle W. C. Angwin, who had been in the Daglish government and had 
reluctantly bowed to majority rule in 1917, to start a movement for 
healuig the conscription breach.' '*^  
In his annual report for 1919, the commissioner of police spoke of 
prevalent social unrest "due largely to the present high cost of Uving, to 
the lack of employment and also to the condition of affaus brought about 
as a result of the war". Regardless of Labor protests, the state government 
set out to absorb both retumed soldiers and a flood of British unmigrants 
by land settlement in the southwest. Inept administration of the schemes, 
strained an already creaking post-war economy. The retaU price index, 
which had been faUing steadily throughout the war, took a sudden 15 per 
cent dive in 1919 and continued to sag drastically through 1920 and 1921. 
Unemployment figures, on the other hand, began to rise dramatically at 
the beginning of 1921 reaching a peak of 11.4 per cent Ui the second 
quarter of 1922. Although Labor had obvious reason for confidence in the 
general election of March 1921, the result was disappouiting. The aggre-
gate vote rose by 12 per cent, but the party strength increased by only 
three members, whUe Kalgoorlie and Fremantle, both working-class areas, 
were lost. The result was probably due in part to a 38 per cent faU in 
goldfields population and a corresponding Uicrease of 32 per cent in the 
three Fremantle electorates.'^" John Curtin and others, however,blamed 
union apathy. 
WUh general depression growdng worse and the pendulum swdnging 
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SteadUy against the government, the setback was obviously temporary, 
however. In the words of John Curtin: "For aU that comes to the com-
munity in these days ahead, upon Nationalism and those who voted for 
Nationalism wiU the justification devolve."'^' The faUure of Nationalism 
to justify itself was the main reason for the triumphant return of Labor to 
power Ui 1924. 
VII 
By 1921, the alien movement of 1884 had thus become a recognized 
part of Western Australian society, but in the process of absorption had 
Uself suffered a sea-change. The early union leaders had seen themselves as 
missionaries, carrying the word from theu enlightened homeland in the 
east to the barbarous "Swan River Colony". They were usuaUy young, 
frequently idealists, and the struggle against what must have seemed in-
superable odds assumed, at times, an almost spiritual qualUy. 
The ageing of leaders, the relaxed tempo of Western Australian life, and 
the absence of profound class distinctions at length cooled much of the 
old ardour and by 1921 the movement consisted of a tightiy knit group of 
hard-headed, practical politicians controUing an efficient political machine 
capable of keeping a Labor government in power for twenty of the 
twenty-three years between 1924 and 1947. 
Operating in a small community separated from its neighbours by a 
thousand mUes of desert, the Western Australian Labor movement was 
necessarUy a foUower rather than a leader but, because of local peculi-
arities, it nevertheless developed its own pecuUar local flavour. UrUike 
some of the eastern movements, its main power base lay, not in a metro-
politan proletariat but in the immigrant minuig communUies of the gold-
fields, the widely scattered and highly mobUe raUway unionists, and the 
mraUy oriented workers of the timber camps. Of these three elements, the 
miners were by far the more important. Between 1904 and 1911 Labor 
never held less than eleven of the thuteen goldfields seats, and in 1911 and 
1914 won aU thuteen, whUe even ui the black year of 1917 seven survived. 
In aU parliaments except that of 1911, therefore, more than half of the 
Labor party was drawn from the goldfields — a fact which helps to explain 
some of the special attitudes of Labor in Western Australia. 
The constant friction between industrial and pohtical leaders, which 
was so characteristic a feature of eastern movements, was almost entirely 
absent in Western Australia because the mming communities saw their 
members almost as ambassadors to the aUen metropolis who must be 
supported at aU costs. Class-consciousness could make little headway 
because of the strong influence in the mining commurUties of respectable 
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Cornish nonconformists and because most miners were weU aware that 
successful Sunday prospecting could easUy turn the poorest man into a 
capitalist overnight. The most important aspect of goldfields influence on 
the Labor movement is, however, the most difficult to define precisely. 
The general easy-going tolerance of other peoples' sins, which is such a 
characteristic feature of goldfields life even today, undoubtedly helped to 
mould the western attitude towards conscription, an attitude which 
demonstrated western Uidividualism more obviously than any other 
incident in the period under discussion. 
Given this sort of climate, it is not hard to understand why theoretical 
socialism made Uttle real impression in Western Australia. A Monty MUler, 
a WiU Jones, or a Monty O'Dowd could always find some foUowing for a 
socialist league but once the driving force was removed such movements 
invariably faUed rapidly. In spite of a good deal of Up service to socialism 
by party leaders, there were few who had any real conception of what the 
word meant, and the policies of the party reflected these confusions. Even 
in the first enthusiastic flush of the Scaddan govemment, the aUegedly 
socialistic policies of the government represented nothing more than a 
radical extension of the theory — widely accepted in Western Australia 
since the inception of responsible government — that the state had a duty 
to protect the public interest even if it involved ventures in state capital-
ism. The application of these ideas by the Labor movement was un-
doubtedly coloured by the generally humanitarian and reformist ideas of 
contemporary Labor thought in Australia, but was in no sense a departure 
from what had gone before. 
The Western Australian Labor movement before 1921 was thus a mildly 
reformist body, wdth no profound feeUng of class-consciousness, which 
was only lightly touched by the more radical currents generated in the 
east. It nevertheless produced some very effective leaders, and as the one 
real channel for the importation of progressive ideas was an important 
dynamic element in the growth of the state. 
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I 
GeographicaUy and climatically Tasmania is an anomaly amongst Aus-
traUan states. Her temperate oceanic climate, comparatively abundant rain-
fall, and mountainous profile have much in common with New Zealand. 
Moreover, of all Australian states, Tasmania has been most dominated by 
her early history as a convict settlement. From the 1820s, at the peak of 
the convict period, much of the best land in the island, that lying along the 
central axis between Hobart and Launceston, was alienated in large blocks. 
Subsequent attempts, after the 1860s, to open up the more marginal areas 
for close settlement, were not entirely successful Ui creating profitable, 
smaU-scale farming. There was, however, something of a land boom in the 
prosperous years after 1900. The development of a refrigerated export 
trade in the 1880s, by encouraging dauy farming in the northwest and 
orcharding ui the southeast, reduced dependence on the old unreliable 
staples of wool and wheat. The mineral discoveries on the west coast, 
beginning with the finding of tin at Mount Biscoff and culminatUig in the 
success m the late 1890s of the Mount LyeU copper mine at Queenstown, 
created an important new uidustry and brouglit fresh blood to the com-
munity. Since the 1850s Tasmania had lost large sections of her working 
population to other colonies, and this process, in spite of a lugh buthrate, 
has lasted to the present day. Industry in the nineteenth century, thougli 
not negligible, was on too small a scale and too decentralized to develop a 
strong, class-conscious urban proletariat. Even today Hobart, in com-
petition with Launceston and growing northern towns Uke Burnie and 
Devonport, is less economically dommant than the capitals of other Aus-
tralian states. It took, moreover, the exploUation of the state's hydro-
electric potential after the first world war to bruig heavier industry to 
Tasmania.' Why was Tasmania, which has now experienced more Labor 
government than any other Australian state, so slow to estabUsh an effect-
ive Labor party? 
The lethargy and inertia of Tasmania in the nuieteenth century is 
usuaUy attributed to her convict legacy. This tradition manifested itself in 
two ways. In the first place, the Tasmanian upper classes represented the 
free settlers, who, having obtained estates worked by convict labour, 
demanded the cessation of transportation in the 1850s, and established 
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themselves as a patriarchal society with full control over the political and 
economic institutions of the community.^ There was no pushful 
emancipist class Uke that of New South Wales. Manhood suffrage was 
delayed in Tasmania tiU after the establishment of the Commonwealth. 
The working classes tended to lack spuit and resolution. This phenomenon 
may have been due partly to an inherited convict servUity,^ and partly to 
the more rapid development of other colonies: gold-rush Victoria in the 
1850s, New Zealand later in the century, and finally Western Australia, 
which drew off the more energetic Tasmanians.'* Massive emigration from 
Tasmania in the fifty years before 1919 was beUeved to have kept wages 
low.^ The rural working classes thus represented a timid and conservative 
force, vutuaUy impervious to union organization tiU the early years of the 
present century.^ In the cities the almost total absence of a developed 
factory system also helped to inhibit the development of Labor tiU after 
the turn of the century. 
There were, however, other factors retardUig the development of 
Tasmanian Labor. Unlike mainland Australian states, the island lacked a 
single dominant urban nucleus. Launceston has traditionaUy shown a 
reluctance to yield the supremacy to Hobart, whUe the west coast, after 
the mineral discoveries of the 1870s an obvious area for the growth of 
organized Labor, was almost entuely cut off from the Tasmanian capital. 
No raUway has ever connected Hobart and Queenstown and a road was 
opened only in 1932. West coast sea communications were as easy with 
Melboume as with Hobart. Not unnaturally there was for a time a demand 
that the Tasmanian west coast should form part of Victoria or the Aus-
tralian Capital Territory.' Sectional differences of this sort proved an 
exceptionally serious obstacle in the path of a pledge-bound unified Labor 
party. 
It would, however, be exaggeratuig to claim that there was no signifi-
cant unionism in Tasmania before 1900. Unions were estabUshed in the 
1870s and did something to raise the standards of raUway workers, 
mechanics, and other artisans. In 1883 Hobart formed a Trades and Labor 
CouncU (TLC), evincmg some interest in polUics but for the most part 
content to reply on the influence it could exert on the relatively 
sympathetic premier. Sir Plulip Fysh.* The CouncU's secretary, Hugh Kirk, 
an energetic man wdth a smaU goatee beard and hau perpetuaUy on end, 
became the first worker to try for a seat in the Assembly when he un-
successfuUy contested West Hobart in 1886. 
Though unrepresented at the Intercolonial Trade Union congresses 
(ITUCs) of 1879 and 1884, two relatively sUent Tasmanian delegates 
appeared at Sydney in 1885. By 1886, however, Hugh Kirk, die sole 
Tasmanian representative at the Adelaide congress was able not orUy to 
report some progress but to make an unsuccessful bid for a Hobart meet-
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ing. Kirk claimed that the Hobart TLC had helped to achieve an extension 
of the franchise and a reduction of the working hours of bakers. A 
campaign had also been mounted in favour of the taxation of land values 
and against state-aided immigration. Unions, aU in Hobart, representing 
700 members, were affiliated to the Hobart TLC.^  Though stiU a lone 
Tasmanian representative at the Brisbane conference in 1888, Kirk was 
successful in having Hobart declared the venue for the 1889 congress. He 
reported attempts by Labor sympathizers in the Tasmanian Assembly to 
restrict subsidized immigration, and to tax both Chinese residents and land 
values.'" 
The 1889 Hobart congress though it undoubtedly gave a fillip to the 
movement, also demonstrated Labor weakness in the island by focussing 
on Tasmanian problems. Richard Burt, president of the Hobart TLC, as 
chauman of the conference, outlUied an ambitious political programme, 
including protection, WhUe Australia, compulsory arbUration, land 
nationalization, and free, secular, and compulsory education. But the 
antiquated conspiracy laws made a premier's dispensation necessary before 
the congress could assemble. A somewhat gmdging legalization of trade 
unionism in Tasmania was a result of the conference. Tasmanian delegates 
at the congress showed concern at the lack of local progress. Hugh Kirk 
apologized for the barrenness of his report, and W. P. McMahon from 
Launceston, the sole representative of northern Tasmarua, complained of 
being "surrounded here by trades which had become a wreck through 
want of organization. The jealousy that existed between the north and 
south of Tasmania was greater than that between Victoria and New South 
Wales." Though Kuk had frequently come north to organize a TLC, he 
had faUed on account of the "diffidence about anything down south". 
North Tasmanian unions tended too often to be dominated by Melbourne 
and had little contact with theu local counterparts. Even in the south 
there were complaints that uruon members were reluctant to pay their 
dues. It was pointed out that only seven Tasmanian trades sent repre-
sentatives to the Hobart conference, though twice as many were affiliated 
to the TLC. Burt's bland statement that relations between labour and 
capital were good ui Tasmania seems a recognition of impotence.'' 
In such CUcumstances Tasmanian response to the strU<es of 1890 was 
ineffectual. "Free" labour was abundant and Tasmanian unions 
surrendered after a few weeks.'^ At the 1891 BaUarat congress, H. 
Chappie of the Hobart TLC admitted that "federation was the only thing 
that would help the cause of uniorusm in Tasmania". His attempts to argue 
that the great strUce had shown the thorough organization of Tasmanian 
uruons was less convincing. Hopes for the formation of large new urUons 
were soon dashed.' 
Exaggerated claims were indicative of the uneven development of Tas-
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manian Labor Ui the 1890s. On the one hand attempts were made, as 
promised by Chappie at BaUarat, to run, in both Hobart and Launceston, 
pro-Labor poUtical candidates, eventually supported by weekly radical 
newspapers. On the other hand, depression added to existing weaknesses 
reduced Hobart and launceston unionism to a mere facade. By 1897 the 
Hobart TLC had simply petered out, and in the following year its Launces-
ton counterpart, which W. P. McMahon had established m 1890, albeU 
with only three affiliated unions, followed it into oblivion.''* When 
Premier Richard Seddon, the New Zealand Liberal leader, visited Tasmania 
ui 1897, he lectured his local admirers on the need for Tasmaiuan unions. 
W. A. Woods, an experienced and traveUed poUtical journalist from 
Victoria, who had played an ambiguous part in the formation of the 
Australian Workers' Union (AWU) and the New Australia scheme, insisted 
in 1895 that "in no colony of the Australias has the combination of the 
workers sunk so low as Ui Tasmania".'^ Woods beUeved that in view of 
the small number of operatives in each Tasmanian trade the oiUy remedy 
was a takeover by the AWU. In the next thuty years Woods was to have an 
important though controversial role in the organization of Tasmanian 
Labor. 
Several reasons have already been advanced for the backwardness of 
Tasmanian uniorusm at this tune. Unionists tended to be conservative as 
Tasmanian industries were too smaU to demonstrate clear lines of division 
between workers and bosses. Labor, moreover, lacked adequate leaders. 
Hugli Kuk's dismissal by his employers for unionist activism in 1889, and 
his subsequent three-year gaol sentence for forgery in 1892, not only 
removed one of the most vigorous Hobart Laborites but must have done 
much to demoralize the whole movement. Financial weakness, the small 
craft unions' lack of concern for unskUled labour, the deep ideological 
divisions amongst urban workers, and the tardy development of class con-
sciousness amongst miners before 1900 were additional reasons for Tas-
manian apathy in the 1890s. 
On the west coast, later to provide the nucleus for a real Labor party, 
the Amalgamated Miners' Association (AMA) was far from mUitant in its 
early years, acting mainly as a friendly society and faUing to enrol more 
than a large minorUy of workers. The vicissitudes of the mining companies 
which attempted to exploit the rich LyeU copper ores created a constant 
fear of unemployment amongst the miners and inhibited an aggressive 
attitude towards the employers. Union leaders encouraged hard work and 
the purchase of mining shares.'^ Thougli the managers of the Mount LyeU 
company, which after absorbing its competitors caught the eye of specula-
tors throughout the worid and overshadowed the Tasmanian government, 
may not have been so benevolently despotic as Blainey appears to suggest, 
the company did in fact adopt the role of universal provider to its em-
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ployees. The sternly patriarchal aspect of the mine manager's mansion as it 
lowers down from its eminence upon Queenstown symbolizes this fact. 
Zeehan, the sUver mining centre, not Queenstown, was to take the lead in 
Labor organization. 
The relative backwardness of the mining community in the years before 
1900 should not, however, be allowed to obscure the fact, demonstrated 
by Coghlan, that the whole face of Tasmanian political life was ultimately 
changed by miners migrating from other states to the Tasmanian west 
coast in the great days of copper, zinc, and t in . " Many of the future 
leaders and rank-and-file members of Tasmanian Labor learnt their politics 
elsewhere. To the employers such men were insidious agitators, deter-
mined to disturb the blissful serenity of the island colony, whUe to Labor 
advocates they appeared as crusaders bringing to the apathetic Tasmanian 
masses somethmg of that cohesion and class consciousness so necessary for 
the uplifting of deplorably low living standards. 
In spite of the extreme weakness of Tasmanian unionism in the 1890s, 
Tasmania, like the mainland colonies, attempted to achieve social reform 
by political action. A number of short-lived political leagues were 
established in Hobart and Launceston.'* Though Hobart had set the pace 
in the 1880s, it was Launceston which achieved greater political success Ui 
the next decade. The imprisonment of Kirk created a leaderslup vacuum Ui 
Hobart which was not fUled by the exuberance of an Anglican minister, 
the Reverend Archibald TurnbuU, whose efforts to organize the un-
employed and pressurize the legislature resulted in a breach not only witli 
his bishop but eventually with other radicals.'^ Launceston was more 
fortunate in its possession of an able group of radicals led by McMahon, 
who after forming a Launceston TLC in 1890, helped Ui the foUowmg year 
to launch the Tasmanian Democrat, the island's first Labor weekly. The 
Democrat was particularly inspired by the example of the New Zealand 
Liberal-Labor (Ub-lab) government which in 1891 took office under John 
BaUance and reached the peak of its uiternational reputation for legislative 
experimentation under BaUance's successor, Richard Seddon (premier, 
1893-1906), R. W. Smith, who edUed the Democrat for a time, was a 
New Zealander who claimed the acquaintance of Seddon himself. As a 
result, Tasmanian radical programmes tended to have a distinct MaorUand 
flavour. Moreover, Tasmanians began to assume that the tactics adopted 
by the New Zealand Labor representatives who threw tiieir support behind 
the BaUance and Seddon administrations were necessarUy correct. Thus, 
when Joseph Cook in New South Wales "ratted"by joining the non-Labor 
government, his action was applauded by tlie Tasmanian Democrat.^^ 
This, however, turned out to be a blind aUey for Australian Labor as a 
whole. Similarly, the apparentiy radical Tasmanian political successes of 
the nineties lacked the vital concept of the pledge which was to prove so 
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important in the future. 
In 1893 the election of Allan Macdonald for North Launceston was 
heralded as a "brUUant" democratic victory.'^' Macdonald has always been 
regarded as Tasmania's first Labor member. But Macdonald, as Coghlan 
pointed out, was neither a working man nor a new political candidate.'^ '^  
The chief plank of the Progressive Liberal Association which the radical 
member. Colonel Windle St. HiU, introduced to Launceston, apart from 
franchise reform and the adequate payment of members of parliament, 
was the New Zealand system of land taxation aimed at breaking up the 
great estates.^ ^  One promising feature of Macdonald's success was the 
support received from the Catholic Morning Star, in spite of the former's 
antagonism to the principle of separate schools. The continuing education 
debate, which resulted in free education in 1908, made Catholic author-
ities less wUling to compromise on this issue. 
Macdonald was soon forced by Ul-health to retue from politics. The 
next radical success demonstrated the ideological fluidity of the move-
ment. The victory of the butcher, Jonathan Best, over the landowner, 
Norman Cameron, in the DeloraUie election of 1894 was again applauded 
as a landmark in Tasmanian democracy. Nevertheless Best in parliament 
showed scant sympathy for most working-class demands. The promising 
Tasmanian Democratic League which functioned in both north and south 
Tasmania was no more consistent. R. W. Smith, its president, won a brief 
term in the Assembly, but Edward Mulcahy, the Irish owner of a taUoring 
business and other interests, who became the first secretary of the Demo-
cratic League, emerged, soon after election to the House of Assembly, as a 
tough and authoritarian minister of lands in a conservative government. 
Such men tended to justify the subsequent complaint from the west coast, 
whose own record was not exceptionally pure in the 1890s, that the city 
leagues never "had a good backbone" and that the men they helped to 
elect soon "kicked away the ladder by wliich they mounted the 
pinnacle".'^'* The election, to the first Commonwealth parliament, of the 
flamboyant King O'MaUey, apparently a Scotch-Irish-American, but 
perhaps a mere Hobartian, who was regarded by friends as a "jagged thom 
in the buttocks of fossildom"^^ and by enemies as a "blatant mounte-
bank",^^ represents an analagous if reversed process. Before winning the 
election to the South Australian parliament Ui 1896, O'MaUey had been 
interested in standing for Deloraine as a supporter of the not very liberal 
Tasmanian opposition of 1892.^' Though O'MaUey's election in 1901 as a 
Tasmanian representative was also trumpeted as a great radical victory, U 
demonstrates the weakness of Tasmanian Labor even on the west coast. It 
was O'MaUey's colourful if nebulous rhetoric, his organizing pertinacity, 
and his abUity to spend, perhaps, £700 ($1,400), that won hun sufficient 
votes on the west coast to ensure his election.^* O'MaUey arrived in 
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Melbourne pledged to no one and, as he explained later, would have joined 
Labor's opponents had they been prepared to support his idea for a 
Commonwealth bank.'^^ The victory did contribute to the development of 
the Tasmanian Labor party. Apart from O'MaUey's subsequent influence 
as a member of the state movement, it showed the miners on the west 
coast that with a little organization they miglit secure several seats in the 
Tasmanian House of Assembly. WhUe only 23 per cent of Tasmanian 
voters before 1900 had been working class, 67 per cent of west coast 
electors came from this section of the community.^" O'MaUey, who 
suffered from no false modesty, subsequenfly described hunself as "not 
only the father of the Commonwealth Bank but the father of the Labor 
party in Tasmania".^' This claim was not acceptable to Tasmanian 
Labor.^^ 
An effective Labor movement required at least one newspaper as a 
vehicle for its propaganda. In the 1890s the Launceston Democrat 
(1891-97), controUed by McMahon and Smith, sometUnes assisted by the 
experienced Woods, advocated mUdly left-wing opinions. More important, 
however, was the Hobart Clipper, which after its inception in 1893 
espoused a simUarly moderate Christian SociaUst or Henry Georgean 
policy. The ruin by a libel action in 1902 of the previous editor enabled 
W. A. Woods to replace him at a timely moment. Woods was thus able to 
turn the Clipper into an effective instrument in the hands of a pledged 
Labor party.^^ 
Sometimes associated with the Labor cause was the Catholic press. 
Though the Irish Nationalist and Labor leader, Michael Davitt, who was 
touring Australia in 1895, considered Tasmaruan Catholics very backward 
in Labor organization,^^ the Launceston Catholic Monitor, edUed by Dr. 
JoUn O'Mahony was established in 1894. Assisted by the appointment of 
Dr. Patrick Delany as co-adjutor bishop, it helped to inaugurate a new 
policy. Delany and O'Mahony campaigned strongly for the break up of the 
great Tasmanian estates and the settlement of small farmers. They 
responded favourably to the ideas of Henry George and fuUy endorsed the 
state socialism of the contemporary New Zealand Liberal government. 
Education, nevertheless, proved a distracting influence. Tasmanian 
radicals, believing that local conservatism based its authority on the low 
educational standards of the Tasmanian people, placed free education high 
in its Ust of priorities. Tlie CathoUc authorities, however, opposed free 
education unaccompanied by a grant to denominational schools. As a 
result, though support was usually given to Labor policies, the Catholic 
periodical refused to back Labor candidates at certain critical elections. 
The passage of the Free Education Act of 1908 did not remove the issue 
from politics. The 1914-16 Labor govemment was embarrassed by the 
educational demands of the Catholic Federation. During subsequent con-
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troversy Catholics clauned that their church had provided vital support for 
Labor in its early years of weakness. ^ 
By 1901 it was obvious that Tasmania would be compeUed, if only by 
the pressure of outside forces, to join other Australian states in the forma-
tion of an effective pledge-bound Labor party. Tasmanian radicals were 
encouraged to campaign for Commonwealth unUlcation rather than feder-
ation. According to Ben TUlet, the English trade unionist, the resultant 
federal constitution with Us senate incorporated some of the worst 
features of the backward Tasmanian regime where the Legislative CouncU 
with its limited franchise proved ej^ceptionaUy vicious in its rejection of 
progressive legislation.^^ In spite of its limitations, however, the coming of 
AustraUan federation meant greater pressure from mainland Labor on Tas-
manian workers. It was feared that certain mainland employers were 
planning to transfer their industries to Tasmania where wages were low 
and the workers virtually impotent. Furthermore, the federal Labor party 
was looking for representation in Tasmania. 
The stimulus of the recent federal election was obvious in September 
1901 when G. M. Burns, secretary of the Queenstown AMA, succeeded in 
convening a Labor conference at Zeehan. The conference, consisting of 
officers of AMA branches with two representatives of the Engine Drivers' 
Association, was chaued by the future Labor premier, John Earle,'^ ^ ex-
president of the Zeehan AMA and such an ardent opponent of the Boer 
War that he is reputed to have said: "I hope the first voUey wUl lay the 
Australian soldiers low."^* The conference revealed that there were a 
number of west coast towns entirely devoid of unions and large numbers 
of workers who refused to take advantage of union facUities when offered. 
It was hoped, however, that visiting federal Labor members would improve 
the situation. 
After discussion, the usual detaUed but extremely moderate platform 
was drawn up and an executive elected. The Hobart Qipper was scornful 
of the platform's length — "more varied than a Japanese bric-a-brac" -
and lack of socialist underpinning. A scheme of propaganda and organiza-
tion would, it believed, have been more useful, "whUe the workers are 
disorganized units - and the disgrace of it, hundreds of them mere 
traffickers in bribes and cheap beer". One of the planks had sought the 
closing of public houses on election day. Other items included adult 
suffrage, adequate payment of members, a factory and workshops act, an 
eight-hour day, a progressive land tax, and state control of the Uquor 
trade.^^ Free education was adopted, but the conference, fearful of the 
churches, faUed by one vote to insist on secularity. In view of his sub-
sequent difficulties as premier it is significant that Earle supported the 
decision to require only an extension of the Legislative CouncU franchise 
and not its abolition.'*" Some years later, however, Earle was demanding 
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"total abolition or nothing".'*' 
In spite of the misgivings of the Hobart Qipper, the movement on the 
west coast made undoubted progress. The announcement of the Political 
Labor League's (PLL's) seventh demonstration at Gormanston forced the 
Qipper to admit that "the Western miners have done weU". King 
O'MaUey's rhetoric had been distinctly useful at a Queenstown meeting. 
The Catholic Monitor supported the general programme, minus free educa-
tion. On the union side, however, the situation was less promising. The 
Queenstown AMA, "little better than benefit society", reduced Burns 
from organizing secretary to secretary at a nominal payment, and was 
accused, when contrasted with the liberality of the AWU, of political 
negativism. "Sulphur town", "a one horse show" was, because of its 
dependence on the Mount LyeU Comapny, difficult to organize. On the 
west coast generaUy, the existence of four large electorates posed serious 
problems for the infant Labor organization. 
In early 1902 radicalism began to stir itself in the cUies as weU as on the 
west coast. Sir NeU ElUott Lewds's conservative government was losing 
popularity through its attempt to deal with economic difficulties by 
resorting to income tax wdth a low rate of exemption. Though parties were 
StiU nebulous, the opposition in the House of Assembly, led by 
W. B. Propsting, took advantage of the situation, and offered an attractive 
radical platform which included repeal of the income tax act, rigid 
economy in the public service, abolition of the Legislative CouncU, old age 
pensions, land value taxation, and compulsory acquisition of the great 
agrarian estates.'*^ The Qipper, complaining that the programme was too 
Umited in scope, had to admit that it was the most far-reachuig policy ever 
submitted to the Tasmanian electors. Propsting, had he succeeded, might 
have delayed for a considerable period the development of a strong 
pledged Labor party. 
Hobart Labor, however, received a fiUip in early 1903 from the visit of 
the mUitant English socialist, Tom Mann. Mann's lecture resulted in the 
formation of a Hobart Workers' PoUtical League.'*^ Though Woods, who 
had recently taken over the Clipper, played a prominent part in this 
development, the platform was not only long but as far removed from 
socialism as the Zeehan platform of 1901. The most radical suggestion was 
the abolition of the state government in toto. The Hobart League, how-
ever, won the contempt of the west coast when it withdrew its chosen 
candidate for the 1903 state elections on hearing that the expected federal 
Labor members would not reach Hobart in time to canvass.'*'* This 
contretemps iUustrates not only the dependence of early Tasmanian Labor 
on outside support but also the fact that, apart from the pledge. Labor 
offered little more than the Liberals. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the nature of activity on the west 
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coast. Pre-elections were held for the four constituencies and Labor candi-
dates nominated. But in such a working-class area all candidates, save one, 
professed radicaUsm and opposition to the government. Moreover, the 
west coasters had the support of King O'MaUey, one of the best platform 
orators in AustraUa. The pledge was therefore the line of demarcation 
between Labor and non-Labor. Borrowed from New South Wales, this 
pledge bound each candidate to "do my utmost" in carrying out the 
platform and to vote with the caucus majority "on all questions affecting 
the fate of the government".'*^ 
The state election in April 1903 resulted in victory for the Propsting 
Liberals and humiliation for the government. Lewis and his chief minister, 
Mulcahy, both lost their seats. The Qipper greeted the advent of Propsting 
with enthusiasm and had relatively little to say on Tasmania's first parlia-
mentary Labor party. On the west coast three of the four Labor candi-
dates had been successful. The future leader, John Earle, lost by only four 
votes and his opponent at Waratah, Crosby Gilmore, who supported the 
Labor platform minus the pledge, offered to join the Labor party.^^ 
Nothing came of this suggestion. The disparities wdthin this infant party, 
consisting of J . J .Long (LyeU), G.M.Burns (Queenstown), and 
W. Lamerton (Zeehan), were demonstrated by the fact that whUe Lamer-
ton was a mine manager,'*'' Long, as a result of his poUtical activities, was 
summarUy dismissed by the Mount LyeU manager from his pre-session job 
as an underground worker.^* According to the Mercury, the nature of 
Lamerton's support was highly equivocal. The Zeehan AMA, which had 
previously backed the radical lawyer, D. C. Urquhart, remained neutral. 
Lamerton beat Urquhart in a three-cornered fight. Though Earie had also 
been blacklisted by the west coast employers, after his defeat in 1903 he 
managed to secure a job as a South LyeU engine driver. According to one 
who had taken part in the 1903 Waratah campaign, workers were dis-
missed for supporting Earle, who was smeared as a disloyaUst. "It was a 
capital crime to mention union."'*^ In view of this tough attitude on the 
part of employers it is not surprising that Lamerton soon dissolved his 
connection with the Labor party and became a noted reactionary. In other 
west coast centres besides Waratah, many miners fearful of the discrimina-
tory tactics of the employers, were afraid to identify publicly with 
Labor.^" The Monitor denounced "the autocratic manner in which the 
Mount LyeU M and R Company is now treating Us helpless employees. 
Conscious of their power and the weakness of the men, the heads of that 
company have dictated terms to its employees that no self-respecting men 
could accept."^' In 1904 Labor complained in the House of Assembly 
that Mount LyeU miners were being sacked for being union members.^ ^  
The newly elected Labor members found it difficult to obtain susten-
ance aUowances from the AMA.^  ^ As Long had promised to make do with 
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the £100 ($200) payment to members which had been granted following 
agitation by the Hobart TLC in 1890, certain Gormanston miners objected 
to a ballot for a three-shUUng (thirty cents) levy to cover his additional 
expenses. The Qipper pointed out that Long would need at least £200 
($400) to function efficiently.^ "* This shortage of money appears to have 
stimulated the next development in Tasmanian Labor organization. In 
AprU 1903 the Zeehan Labor League wrote to the Hobart League asking 
for an aU-Tasmanian conference which would co-ordinate preparations for 
the December federal election and arrange for the estabUshment of a 
parliamentary fund based on a penny (one cent) a week levy on all 
workers.^ ^  After correspondence with Zeehan and the newly formed 
Launceston League, a conference in Hobart was arranged for June 1903. 
The experienced Woods represented the Hobart League. 
II 
Of the seventeen delegates at the Hobart conference, ten were trade 
unionists and six of these were members of the west coast AMA. Not for 
many years were union delegates to have such strong representation at a 
Tasmanian Labor conference. The federal party was represented by its 
leader, J. C. Watson, who provided a good example of mainland Labor's 
attitude to Tasmania. Before O'MaUey "flashed comet-like across the 
island's destiny" and D. J. O'Keefe was elected to the senate, other states, 
said Watson, had Uttle hope for Tasmanian Labor. The recent election, 
however, "did her proud", and mainlanders were ready to help. But 
Watson also indicated that this help would not be entuely altruistic when 
he declared that Tasmania "should not become the sweating ground of the 
Commonwealth". Tasmaruan Laborites owed U to theu mainland brethren 
to deal with the "greedy sweaters" who "had let U be known that they 
intended to come to Tasmania to take advantage of the unorganized help-
lessness of Tasmanian Labor". 
Watson, preaching to the converted, advised Tasmanian Labor to 
proceed cautiously wdth piecemeal reform and to remember that the 
majority of the people were politically ignorant. He insisted that Tas-
manian Labor must avoid antagonizing the farming community and offer 
it New Zealand reforms such as land value taxation, advances to settlers, 
and repurchase for close settlement wluch "had worked wonders" in 
Maoriland. Watson, who had spent most of his early life in New Zealand, 
also beUeved that its industrial concUiation and arbitration system was 
ideal for preventing strikes. Labor he declared, does not "seek privUeges 
for one section of the community at the expense of another". These views 
were not lost on John Earle, now elected president of the first Tasmanian 
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Labor executive. Tasmania had already heard much of New Zealand 
experunental legislation,^^ approval or disapproval of which was often the 
main dividing line between the state's conservatives and radicals. 
In settUng the organization and platform of the Tasmanian Labor party, 
the delegates demonstrated the truth of Watson's view that Tasmania 
would be able to buUd on the twelve years' experience of mainland parties. 
Only in relatively minor matters involving local conditions did Tasmania 
exhibit differences. The platform placed the usual emphasis on the 
aboUtion of the Legislative CouncU, the break up of great estates, and 
compulsory industrial arbitration. The rules of the organization were 
borrowed from fnainland parties. Each league member was required to pay 
an annual sum of four shiUings (forty cents), whUe union members paid 
two shUlings (twenty cents). According to Woods, "the object of the rule 
is to permit large bodies of men to join at small expense to their union -
sort of wholesale price for a quantity". This provision caused much future 
debate. Three-quarters of the finances were to be held by the executive, 
for organizational and electioneering expenses. The remainder was 
returned to the branches.^' The pledge was adopted and the executive was 
given the right to exclude unsatisfactory candidates. J. A. Jensen, an 
orchardist recently elected for George Town, attended the conference, and 
after taking the pledge began the Labor career which was to bring him 
eventuaUy to the federal cabinet. On the vexed tariff question the state 
party aUowed its federal candidates freedom of action. 
After the conference the new AngUcan bishop, J. E. Mercer, deUvered a 
weU-attended special address at St. David's Cathedral. Mercer, a product of 
the infiuential English Christian Social Union, was determined to support 
the just rights of Labor, and, though he never joined the party, gave 
Tasmanian Labor strong support before liis retirement in 1914. Less im-
peded by a divergent education policy, Mercer demonstrated that, in spite 
of the bitter hostility of some members of his denomination, Anglican 
churchmen could rival the CathoUcs as advocates of social reform. Though 
the Catholic Monitor had previously criticized the social policies of the 
I^wis-Mulcahy government, Mulcahy's support of denominational educa-
tion as opposed to the Propsting-Labor policy of free education, won 
Lewis Catholic support in 1903.^* The Monitor, however, normaUy 
supported Labor at this time. 
Behind the promising facade of the new party, serious fissures were 
aheady apparent. In Tasmania the perennial conflict between Labor parlia-
mentarian and grass-roots supporter was reinforced by geography. In a 
querulous article in June 1903, the Zeehan and Dundas Herald complained 
that, while fourteen of the twenty conference members came from the 
west coast, Launceston and not Zeehan had been chosen as the location 
for the next conference. "The home of Democracy is on the West Coast"; 
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Hobart as a Labor centre inspired no confidence; "untU Hobart proves 
herself to be more energetic and persevering than she has been Ui the past, 
we have to confess we have little faith in any movement which has its 
headquarters there."^^ Thus physical barriers, even in the smaUest state, 
were added to the psychological barriers separating Labor leaders and theu 
foUowers. The radicalism of the west coast should not, however, be 
exaggerated. The new Tasmanian Labor movement was compeUed to 
manoeuvre in an environment which contained two rival cities, a depressed 
and ignorant rural class, and a mining area looking more to Melbourne 
than Hobart. Wood's view that "each section of the Island's workers now 
felt that they could trust each other" was, as his correspondence reveals, 
mere wishful thinking.^" In the circumstances great militancy was hardly 
to be expected. When the Sydney Bulletin suggested that Tasmania was 
mistaken in founding a Labor party instead of a Democratic party, the 
Qipper mUdly repUed that a Democratic party was only feasible when 
there was already in politics a leader of the calibre of New Zealand's 
Liberal premier, John BaUance.^' 
The weakness of the new party in late 1903 is cleariy demonstrated in 
the efforts of Woods, the general secretary. The immediate need to fight a 
federal election placed a great strain on the infant organization. Woods was 
forced to send a "cry from Macedonia" to Frank Tudor, secretary of the 
federal party: 
In the chief centres of population — Hobart, Launceston and the 
West Coast — we consider our chances particularly good. But to 
prevent the dead weight of the way-back vote completely swamping 
the more advanced city and mining vote it wiU be necessary for us to 
get our candidates out among the viUages. 
But we haven't got the money. As you know, we have only just 
fought a general election: we are bound to supplement in our state 
Labor members inadequate £100 [$200] a year; the formation of 
new branches and other educational work necessarily costs some-
thing. Our West Coast unions have suffered a wage-reduction and 
dread a strike; our city unions are — weU, the only one with money, 
the wharf laborers cannot be got into the organized political move-
ment. Perhaps if Hughes or O'Keefe urged these Hobart Wharf 
Laborers on they would wake up a bit, but oiu local league officials 
have tried untU disgusted. 
In 1903 Woods was struggling with every section of the Tasmanian 
movement. The northerners were slow Ui organizing C. Metz's candidature 
for the senate. As Woods told Symonds, the secretary of the Launceston 
Workers' Political League (WPL): "I am afraid your northern chaps are not 
putting their best work into the organization. They should wake up a bit. 
Wliat about your contributions to the Executive?"^ ^ Woods had earlier 
sent a circular to all branches complaining that "many branches have not 
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paid their dues therefore it should be cleariy understood that the Execu-
tive is not in a position at present to guarantee any financial assistance to 
candidates".^'* 
Woods's letters at this time also suggest that, contrary to the impression 
given in his letter to Tudor, it may not have been only financial reluctance 
which kept the unions away. Replying to J. E. Ogden then an organizer at 
Zeehan, Woods said he was sorry to hear that interest had sagged so much 
of late; but suggested that perhaps U could be restored by a few more visits 
of the Labor members to Zeehan and other storm centres. Though the 
Gormanston AMA had paid its dues, the Queenstown and Zeehan AMAs 
remamed unaffiUated in late October 1903.^^ Even in Gormanston, 
Woods feared that J. J. Long's delay of the AMA affiUation might "have a 
rotten effect on branches".^^ In July Woods had argued that "just now 
the most Unportant thing is to get all the Leagues and Unions into the 
W.P.L."^' His appeal to the secretary of the Zeehan AMA appears to have 
evoked no response: 
1 think it is rather a pity that your Branch did not formally resolve 
to stand in with us — even if it was not deemed advisable to eiuol 
members at the reduced rates. 1 am afraid that the AMA standing 
out wUl have the effect of keeping other unions from casting in with 
us for poUtical purposes. Some of them are always glad of an excuse. 
Could your branch not — just for the sake of appearances — pass a 
resolution accepting the constitution and rules, allowing the 
financial inducements to remain in abeyance? You might have this 
proposal considered as we aU look to Zeehan to encourage the 
others.^^ 
The Labor movement was poUticaUy unconvincing at this time. In 
Queenstown the league, inspired by Zeehan's prior action, attempted a 
boycott, not of employers, but of Chuiese laundrymen,^^ justifying 
Blainey's view that "the main bias of the miners was agamst the Chuiese 
rather than the comparues".'" Though Tasmanian Labor was backward Ui 
many respects it yielded to none in the fervour of its hatred for the 
Oriental. On this subject west coast miners and city leaguers were 
absolutely at one. ' ' Racism did not, however, help in the federal election 
of December 1903. King O'MaUey, whom Woods suspected of not signing 
the pledge,'^ won the west coast electorate of Darwin but Andy Kirk, a 
Hobart Labor stalwart, was unsuccessful in Denison, the Hobart electorate, 
and the three Senate candidates were beaten. Woods thought that the west 
coast should protest against its inclusion in the Darwin electorate alongide 
dairy farmers of the northwest coast. He feared that the Toryism of the 
Table Cape "teat-puUers" might unseat O'MaUey.'^ Furious at the 
election of Mulcahy to the Senate, the Qipper attributed his victory to 
CathoUc sectarianism.'^ The Monitor, however, pointed out that U had 
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supported the Labor candidates, not Mulcahy, and that the Labor 
organization needed unprovement.'^ Education was not then a federal 
issue. Before the previous state election the Monitor had commented on 
the reluctance of the newly enfranchised workers to register. 
In state poUtics the tiny Labor party of four, which had some difficulty 
in reaching majority decisions according to the pledge,'^ was at first over-
shadowed by the Liberal Propsting government's attempt to carry through 
a New Zealand-style legislative programme containing Uems like industrial 
concUiation and arbitration, compulsory purchase of great estates, and the 
much vaunted idea of self-assessment for land tax wUh government right 
of purchase at the owner's valuation. In its eariy stages there was some 
confusion as to the membership and functions of the Labor party. Not 
only did men Uke Crosby GUmore, soon to become attorney general in 
Evans's government, and H. J. M. Payne, a successful candidate of the con-
servative Reform League, talk of joirung Labor, but the Labor members 
apparently demanded seats Ui the Propsting cabinet." LUce most progress-
ive premiers of the period, Propsting was totaUy thwarted by the Tas-
manian Legislative CouncU. His difficulties evoked new memories of New 
Zealand premier, John BaUance, who had inaugurated the period of 
Liberal legislation by establishUig his right, in the face of an hostUe 
governor, to flood a recalcitrant upper house with government supporters. 
Tasmania had an elecrive CouncU but, as Holman was later to demonstrate 
in New South Wales, it was almost as difficult to discipline a nonunated 
upper house. Propsting not only faUed to emulate John BaUance Ui break-
ing upper-house resistance but aUowed hunself to be outmanoeuvred by 
the opposition which formed a new government in 1904. Subsequently ui 
a spectacular piece of non-Labor "ratting", Propsting not only acquired a 
Legislative CouncU seat, but two years later took office in the very govem-
ment that had supplanted him. As a final uony, in 1914—16, Propsting, as 
a piUar of the Legislative CouncU, played an important part in neutralizing 
the efforts of Earle's Labor ministry. 
The blatant faUure of the Tasmanian Liberals to carry through their 
legislation simplified the situation for Tasmanian Labor. Though fusion of 
the Liberal and conservative groups in an anti-Labor aUiance was delayed 
tiU 1909, the possibiUty of an effective non-Labor radical party was con-
siderably reduced by Propsting's debacle. Before the 1909 state elections 
left Labor the only effective alternative goverrunent, a number of 
"Liberals" shared the opposition. There was co-operation between Labor 
and the Liberal remnant which was strongly opposed to the new 
ministry,'* but Labor, as a result of the government's overaU majority, 
was spared the necessity of working out the terms of an alUance with one 
party or of devising the best means to exploit the balance of power. After 
the 1906 Tasmanian election, the mUdly conservative government of John 
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Evans held a majority of two over Labor and Liberals combined. 
The pragmatic Evans government made some gestures in the duection 
of progressive legislation. School fees were aboHshed in 1908. Evans visited 
New Zealand in 1907 but returned wdth the opinion that the New Zealand 
radical legislation was not the main reason for the Dominion's prosperity. 
Nor did he beheve it entirely suitable for Tasmania. The Tasmanian taxa-
tion commissioner was, however, sent to New Zealand to investigate the 
possibUity of amending Tasmanian agrarian laws on New Zealand lUies. His 
report argued that New Zealand and Tasmarua were fundamentaUy differ-
ent but conceded the need for expanding closer settlement in Tasmania.'^ 
After Labor had become the official opposition, a system of wages boards 
was established in 1910 but not fuUy implemented tiU 1915. Thanks to 
the Legislative CouncU, the Tasmanian reforming legislation Ui this period 
was extremely lUnited in its scope and by no means acceptable to Labor. 
In the years between the 1903 and 1906 Tasmanian elections, the 
growth of the poUtical Labor movement was far from spectacular. The 
Launceston conference of April 1904 was attended by only ten delegates, 
who included neither the president, Earle, nor a sUigle representative, apart 
from the parliamentarians, from the west coast.*" The 1905 Beaconsfield 
conference, attended by eleven delegates, was little better.*' The fears of 
the Zeehan and Dundas Herald in 1903 had thus been partly justified. 
Most of the vigour and continuity of the movement was provided by 
Woods, who not only edited the Clipper but acted as general secretary 
between 1903 and 1907. Woods tried manfuUy to provide union backing 
for the movement even when it requued the manufacture of new unions. 
In 1905, following a resolution of the last conference, he attempted, under 
the auspices of the Hobart WPL, to form a Tasmanian Workers' Union 
open to aU workers with trade sections to control particular industries.*^ 
Woods also wished to raise the subscriptions and was disinclined to aUow 
the unions further financial concessions. The membership dues were in 
1904 equated with those of the leagues, and subsequent conferences tried 
to make membership of the political movement more attractive for the 
unions. Not unnaturaUy, in view of poor representation at the early con-
ferences, there was a demand for an aUocation of more resources to the 
branches as opposed to the executive. In 1904 a fifty-fifty division was 
estabUshed, but a proposal in 1905 for the retention of 80 per cent of 
subscriptions by the branches was voted down. Of much greater ultimate 
significance was the development of AWU interest in Tasmarua. On hearing 
of the advent of AWU organizers from the mainland, the Mercury 
lamented that shearers who had previously worked harmoniously with 
their employers would now be mn by leaders from Sydney who "are 
absolutely without any proper conception of right and wrong".*^ 
The poverty of the movement made it almost impossible to hue paid 
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organizers for any significant period. There was indeed a school of thought 
represented by John Earle which believed that members enthused only by 
the oratory of an organizer were hardly worth havmg and that every 
member should be his own organizer. '* The movement, however, became 
over-dependent on the visits of federal parliamentarians and on 
sympathetic churchmen Uke Bishop Mercer, whose eloquence was in much 
demand from early Tasmanian Labor. John Palamountain, when dismissed 
on account of his Labor activities from his lay ministry in the Presbyterian 
church, was employed in 1905 for a few months as a Labor organizer. His 
west coast and northwest Tasmania lectures on industrial arbitration, the 
churches, and Labor and White Australia indicated the priorities of the 
Tasmanian movement. He succeeded in forming several branches, but, as 
he himself pointed out, branch strength was little indication of voting 
potential Ui Tasmania. Palamountain correctly anticipated that seven seats 
would be won at the next election. In 1905 Labor supporters were 
estimated at 2,000, but unionists at only 1,500. Three hundred of these 
were west coast AMA members.*^ It was stiU felt that many Tasmanian 
workers were afraid to identify openly with political Labor though wUling 
to vote for its candidates at an election. In spite of the efforts of Woods 
and the AWU, orUy in 1912 did the Labor conference resolve in favour of 
a permanent organizer, whose appointment, however, was left in the hands 
of the executive.*^ 
The 1906 election saw a more determined effort by Tasmanian Labor 
to elect a real parliamentary party. It was stiffened by an imposing battery 
of mauiland supporters, Uicluding J.C.Watson, W. G. Spence, Frank 
Anstey, and the inevitable King O'MaUey. "What motive", asked the 
Mercury, "prompts those perambulating phUanthropists?"*' Once again. 
Labor placed great emphasis on the success of New Zealand radical legisla-
tion and the need for free education in Tasmania. Woods, standing for 
North Hobart, cited his New Zealand experience as a qualification. Other 
Labor candidates adopted a similar approach. Tlie ministerialists and 
Liberals havuig few coherent poUcies appeared to differ Uttle Ui their 
attitudes. Propsting's acceptance of a portfolio after the election was, as 
the Monitor pointed out, a blameworthy action but one which might help 
to liberalize the ministry.** The Labor party of seven was thus almost the 
official opposition. C. Metz, previously a Labor candidate for the Senate, 
was returned as an independent Labor member. Metz, a fervent Catholic, 
appears to have balked at Labor's free education policy. After free educa-
tion had been passed over Metz's dissentient vote in 1908 and he had lost 
his seat in the subsequent election, he rejoined the Labor party but stood 
again as a Liberal before retuming to the Labor fold after conscription. 
The Monitor's claim that Metz "is Labor all through from his toe tip to the 
crown of his head"*^ was belied by Metz's voting record in the Assembly. 
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As a soap and candle manufacturer, Metz was not often found on the 
Labor side in divisions relating to factory acts and workers' conditions. 
GeneraUy, however, the Monitor, playing down the importance of free 
education, supported the Labor party in 1906.^" In this election Labor 
had to give serious consideration to the liquor question. The en-
franchisement of women and the growth of a temperance movement had 
compelled the party ui 1905 to adopt a new plank demanding state owner-
ship and local option. In the election, however. Woods tried to evade the 
issue by emphasizing the priority of the "tucker question" over the drink 
question. At this tune liquor interests tended to support the government, 
backed by the National Association, organized in 1905 as a reply to Labor, 
whUe the Liberals attracted the temperance party. 
The return of a pledged Labor party of seven in a house of thuty-five 
marked the beginning of Labor as a serious force in state politics. As the 
hostUe Mercury, complaUiing of the danger to the weU-being of the state, 
lamented, Tasmania had joined the majority of Australian states whose 
Labor parties were squeezing concessions out of their governments. "This 
is the beginning, where the end wUl be, no one can say." The Mercury also 
began to stress the menace of Labor's formidable orgarUzational 
machine.^' Though it was frankly admitted at the next conference that 
the assistance of campaigners from other states and the recent success of 
the English Liberals and their Labor aUies had played a large part in the 
final result, the Tasmanian Labor bandwaggon was observed to move 
almost immediately after the election. New branches were formed and 
many Tasmanians became aware that Labor was a potential government. 
The fact that most of the unofficial Labor candidates, including Lamerton, 
had been defeated demonstrated the effectiveness of the pledge. 
PropstUig's apostasy was used by the Qipper to prove the uselessness of 
voting for independent radicals. On a minute scale Tasmania was repeating 
the experience of New South Wales Labor. Lamerton, who had Uisisted on 
a restricted interpretation of the pledge, became a Tasmanian Joseph 
Cook. Nevertheless the pledge question was one of the chief poUits at issue 
in the early conferences. 
Though the Mathinna conference of AprU 1906, where it was possible 
to accommodate aU the delegates "around the parlour table in a small 
room",^'^ foUowed too closely after the election to be representative, the 
year marked the end of the series of mini-conferences which gave the 
impression that Tasmanian Labor was a mere junta of officers without an 
army. The absurd predicament when a conference of nine members was 
unable to elect a president because three members tied for the position^ ^ 
was remedied by a slightly more representative special conference at 
Hobart in July. At the next two conferences before the 1909 election, 
twenty-six and twenty-seven votUig members attended — by Tasmanian 
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Standards, very respectable numbers. The additional seats won at the 1909 
election resulted in a large increase ui delegates to the Longford confer-
ence which, apart from the executive, numbered thirty-six. Numbers 
declined with the outbreak of war, in spUe of the fact that Labor was then 
in office. 
After the first conference there were no trade union delegates tiU 1912. 
The unsuccessful attempts to affiliate trade unions provided much of the 
discussion at successive conferences. To a considerable extent, therefore, 
Tasmania's Labor development, as has often been demonstrated, reversed 
the process in other states. It began with a parliamentary party requuing 
an ad hoc organization which in turn encouraged the growth of unions. 
Though many of the early leaders were west coast AMA members, these 
men were in fact reactuig against the non-political tendency of their 
union.^'' Tasmania's very backwardness ensured the success of a Labor 
party as soon as the working classes became aware of theu poor 
condUions, learnt the value of poUtical action, and gained sufficient 
confidence to resist the propaganda and threats of their employers. Main-
land campaigners and expatriates like Bishop Mercer from England and 
Archbishop Delany from Ireland might play a significant part Ui the first 
and second of those developments - Earle was able to cite both prelates as 
proof that his movement was not opposed to Christianity^^ — but the 
value of political action could only be demonstrated by the effectiveness 
of the local party. However, the very existence of a sizeable group of 
Labor parliamentarians made a cavalier attitude to working-class organiza-
tions less easy for employers to maintain. 
After the 1906 elections the new Labor party could no longer shelve 
the leadership question. For many reasons Woods appeared the obvious 
choice. His experience was considerable and he had done more than 
anyone else to buUd the Tasmanian party. InteUectuaUy he was the out-
standing representative of Tasmanian Labor. His contributions in both 
prose and verse to the Sydney Bulletin were weU known, he possessed a 
quick wit and the gift of repartee, and the Monitor believed that his 
election was assured. He was "a very able fellow, whole-souled in his work, 
and has abundant tact, courtesy and determination, and should therefore, 
make an admirable leader".^ ^  The consequent elevation of John Earle, 
who had at last narrowly won Waratah, came as a great surprise. If a west 
coaster were preferred, "what heinous sins have Messrs. J. J. Long and 
G. M. Burns been guUty of?"^' On a sectional basis, Woods's defeat was 
inevitable. In caucus there were four representatives of the west coast, one 
from Launceston and one from George Town. Woods alone represented 
Hobart. Earle was a Tasmanian by birth, an ex-president of the Zeehan 
AMA, and a nomUial Catholic. Woods, however, had been born in Mel-
bourne and Uved a cosmopolitan life. Moreover, he had a reputation as a 
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left-winger and was probably an agnostic m religion. In spite of the 
Monitor's eulogy he made many enemies and had been largely responsible 
for the withdrawal of Lamerton from the party.^* Apathetic trade 
unionists disliked Woods's attempt to instUl vigour and political determina-
tion into the unions and to organize them on a large scale. Woods's control 
of the Qipper also earned him abuse, and there were several attempts at 
censure motions at conference. The fact that Woods had changed his name 
in Tasmania from Walter WiUiam Head^^ made him appear a man of 
mystery, and there were attempts to prove hUn guUty of embezzling the 
funds of the "New Australia" settlement in Paraguay. Nevertheless, Woods 
throughout this period was behind most exhibitions of energy on the part 
of the Tasmanian Labor party. His position was strengthened by the 
election of Ben Watkins, "his faithful squire" and subsequent brother-
in-law, to succeed Burns at Queenstown in late 1906. It is possible that 
Earle, fundamentally very moderate, was a more suitable leader than 
Woods for the Tasmanian Labor party. However, after Earle's secession 
over conscription Woods was able to give vent to the misgivings he had 
always felt about Earle's leadership. Earle, for his part, had always dis-
trusted Woods. 
Woods and his aUies were not members of an informal discussion group 
which appears to have emerged in the early years of the century and which 
was centred round L. F. Giblin, an orchardist and Cambridge-trained 
economist, whose father had been premier of Tasmania, and Newham 
Waterworth, an optician. Both were comparative late-comers to the Labor 
party, standmg unsuccessfuUy as Liberal Democrats in 1909. Theu group, 
however, was patronized by men Uke John Earle, who eventually opened a 
socialist and Labor bookshop in Elizabeth Street, Hobart; Andrew 
Needham, father-in-law of John Curtin, who also attended when in Tas-
mania representing the Timber Workers' Union; GUbert Rowntree, an 
English socialist who was a bitter opponent of Woods; Henry Reynolds, a 
raUway employee; J. R. Palamountam; J. A. Lyons, then a schoolteacher; 
and a number of other regulars. Apart from social activities such as sports 
meetings and picnics, the group organized lectures on current affairs and 
socialist theory. It was particularly influenced by the ideas of Robert 
Blatchford's Clarion, to which many members subscribed. Though not 
necessarily more radical than Woods, this group provided an alternative 
source of ideas and helped to secure Earie's leadership. 
In the 1906—09 parliament, the Labor party fought more vigorously 
for their platform and attempted to drive the government towards New 
Zealand-style agrarian legislation and free education. Labor moved un-
successfuUy for industrial concUiation and arbitration. When the Legisla-
tive CouncU rejected the mUdly reformist bUls of the government. Woods 
proposed its abolition.'"" The effectiveness of Labor's pariiamentary pro-
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paganda was neutralized by the Mercury's reluctance, in the absence of a 
Hansard, to pubUsh Labor speeches in fuU. Woods's proposal for a state 
Hansard was voted down.'"' 
The pledge held fairly weU and Labor was the oiUy group in parliament 
apart from the inner core of government men, to exhibit a voting pattem 
of any consistency. Education, that traditional battle-ground between 
Protestant and CathoUc sectariarusm, caused some division. When Earle 
voted for opening all state scholarships to private-school pupUs, he eamed 
the plaudits of the Mercury and the condemnation of a Clipper columnist, 
who accused him of "breaking the spuit of the Labor platform". The 
embarrassing position of the Labor party when compeUed by the platform 
to support a pro forma vote of no confidence proposed by an opponent, 
was used to justify the reintroduction of a suggestion, defeated at the 
previous conference. This had demanded the removal of the section Ui the 
parliamentary pledge requiring that, "on aU such questions toucliing on 
platform principles and affecting the fate of a Government", members 
must vote as a caucus majority decides. It was shown that Queensland had 
dropped this provision. Jensen demonstrated his lukewarm approach when 
he urged that, as there were some good unpledged democrats in the 
assembly, the words should be deleted. After Woods had argued the un-
wdsdom of making election promises outside the platform, the matter was 
referred to the 1909 conference. 
This 1909 conference exhibited a startUng diversity of opinion on the 
important issue of the pledge, which, according to Dr. P. M. Weller, was 
more significant as a cohesive agent in Tasmania than in New South Wales. 
The parliamentary party was divided six all on the question of excision. 
Jensen now favoured retention of the pledge, whUe Long and Ogden 
moved over to the idea of flexibUity. On the one hand an unsuccessful 
parUamentary candidate and general maverick, J. H. Smythe, insisted that 
a Labor member "ought to be an automaton in a sense", whUe on the 
other, W. E. Shoobridge, an emdite landowner and future parliamentarian, 
believed that members should be trusted in small thmgs. James Guy, a 
member of the lower house, who demanded rights of conscience in matters 
like drink and gamblmg, forgot the expUcit platform provisions for these 
questions. King O'MaUey, believing that the federal party should have a 
stricter pledge, put the issue Ui characteristic fashion: "The road to 
political Gehenna was strewm wdth the bones of unpledged 'good as Labor' 
men. These were men like Dawson, Glassey, Kerr, Cook, Kidston, etc., 
etc." The proposal was negatived, thuty votes to eigliteen,'"'^ but the 
issue was to re-emerge in other forms. 
Even at the relatively smaU conferences of 1907 and 1908 significant 
differences of opinion on poUcy began to manifest themselves. In the early 
days of Tasmanian Labor, Hugh Kirk and other delegates to interstate 
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conferences had supported protection wUh considerable vehemence. Now 
Launceston stiU demanded that Tasmania should take a strong Une on 
tariffs and pledge her federal representatives to the "new protection". At 
the 1907 Burnie conference a resolution in favour of protection was 
passed, fifteen to eleven, but as this did not constitute a two-thuds 
majority the proposal was referred to the next conference at Devonport 
where it was lost on the voices. Woods and Earle took diametricaUy 
opposed positions on the issue. Earle, moreover, accused the Clipper of 
garbling his arguments in the conference report. Supporters of protection 
insisted that it would encourage Tasmanian industry — the case of the 
Burrue mine closed as a result of imports of foreign iron was cited -
prevent dumping and be popular with the Tasmanian electors. Opponents 
either denounced the principle or, Uke Senator RusseU of Victoria, who 
spoke at Burnie, insisted that a definite pledge would be disloyal to the 
federal Labor party, which contained a number of brUliant free traders 
such as Hughes, Pearce, and Spence. The party required such men to fight 
free-trade seats. This argument appears to have proved conclusive at 
Devonport. It was supported by King O'MaUey, who had originally stood 
as a protectionist. Woods, Watkins, and some others were, however, pre-
pared to denounce the whole idea of protection ui spite of its electoral 
value. Woods argued that the growth of huge trusts had transformed the 
situation. In the absence of competition, tariff walls could not benefit the 
worker and would certauUy antagonize the farmer. To Watkins, coUective 
ownership was the only remedy. 
Another general issue which exhibited considerable diversity of opinion 
in the movement was Australian unification, discussed at conferences in 
1908 and 1909. Before federation the Qipper had strongly advocated the 
aboUtion of state governments in the new Commonwealth as the best 
antidote to the reactionary Tasmanian regime. Tasmania, its editor 
shrewdly pointed out, was a natural unit which would retain its identity 
under any alternative system of local govemment. Removal of the Legisla-
tive CouncU was stiU the major attraction of unification in 1908 and 1909. 
Earle, wdth the scent of victory in his nostrUs, somewhat irotucaUy as it 
eventuaUy transpired, demanded that a state Labor govemment should be 
given an opportunity to deal with the local CouncU. On the motion of 
Woods, who professed himself a believer in unification, the matter was 
referred ui 1909 to the federal conference. At the 1912 federal Labor 
conference in Hobart the Tasmanian representatives Watkins and I>vyer 
Gray moved for unification but were voted down. Earle and Woods 
campaigned dutifuUy for Fisher's federal powers referenda which the 
former claimed would prove beneficial in issues Uke White Australia, new 
protection, land legislation, control of monopolies, and Uidustrial arbitra-
tion. The Mercury, however, insisted that Tasmanian Labor, m the face of 
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the farmers' reluctance to become dependent on a sociaUst federal govern-
ment, was divided on the question. The eloquent O'MaUey, it believed, had 
been brought over to encourage the doubtfuls. 
A more pressing local issue concemed sectarianism. As has already been 
demonstrated the CathoUc church's education policy sometimes clashed 
with the Labor party. The Hibernian Australian Catholic Benefit Society 
was not only committed to Catholic education but as a benefit society 
might compete with the early AMA. Metz, for example, was a prominent 
Hibernian. On the other side, the Tasmanian Orange Order was renowned 
for its hostUity to Labor as well as to Catholicism. The visit of the New 
South Wales anti-Catholic leader, DUl Macky, to Tasmania in 1906 was 
part of a vigorous anti-Labor campaign and resulted in the formation of 
local branches of the Protestant Defence Association. The Qipper 
denounced the growdh of Orangeism on the west coast and the Monitor 
complained that the anti-Catholics were using dissident Labor member 
lamerton, who had unsuccessfuUy attempted to make secular education a 
plank of the Labor party, against the endorsed candidate.'"^ The Labor 
conference accordingly passed a resolution against the compUation of 
sectarian lists at election time and the question of debarring from the 
movement applicants oath-bound to an organization with aims Uicom-
patible wdth those of Labor was discussed. This proposal was aimed mairUy 
at Orange groups but the question was reopened by the estabUshment of 
the Catholic Federation in 1914. As late as 1920 there was an unsuccessful 
attempt to debar freemasons.'"^ In 1907—8, as later, no action was taken. 
The executive already had the power to remove undesirables from the 
movement. 
Associated wdth sectariarusm were the drink and gambling questions. 
Labor had a definite policy of state control for the liquor trade, but 
experience in other states demonstrates that the brewers were often 
surreptitious Laborites. In 1908 an attempt was made to advance in the 
direction of temperance by prohibiting the sale of alcohol to youths under 
twenty and abolishing the tied-house system. O'MaUey, however, 
considered the existing platform sufficient. Another delegate decried 
attempts to make "this a Sunday School body". One of the complaints 
agauist Woods in 1909 was the fact that the Qipper had carried brewers' 
advertisements. According to Woods's friend, W. G. Spence, the Cascade 
Brewery was one of the main interests which govemed Tasmania. The 
1909 conference, in spite of the expostulation of King O'MaUey that 
"TattersaU is dead but his ghost runs in Tasmania", also dealt tenderly 
wdth another of the vested interests condemned by Spence. The issue of 
Tattersall's lottery, legal only Ui Tasmania, was deemed inessential, though 
in effect an instance of "blackleggmg" on the Commonwealth. 
Labor's disposition to treat vested interests gently was partly due to the 
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growing vision of the treasury benches. Though Labor senator O'Keefe lost 
his seat at the December 1906 election. Labor's total Senate vote of 30 per 
cent was 4 per cent better than the state election result of the same year. 
In his presidential address at the 1907 conference, James Guy, one of the 
unsuccessful Labor Senate candidates, claimed that if Labor strength 
continued to increase at this rate the state would have a Labor government 
withui five years. The Senate campaign had, moreover, convinced Guy of 
the need for "sweet reasonableness" and a "step by step" policy.'"^ The 
same caution was also in evidence at the next conference, which 
estabUshed a system of divisional councUs in each of the five six-member 
electorates organized under the new Hare-Clark proportional repre-
sentation system. Ironically, the Hare-Clark system had originaUy been 
devised by conservatives with the intention of Uihibiting, by the encour-
agement of individualism, the organization of a pledge-bound party. 
Though the Clipper had once been strident in denunciation,'"^ U was 
realized by 1908 that the system would give Labor a splendid and com-
pletely fortuitous opportunity to gain power. 
MeanwhUe the government was on the verge of disintegration. Captain 
Evans, never a dynamic leader, discovered, as his critics delighted in point-
Uig out, that it was as difficult to steer the barque of state safely between 
political shoals and quicksands as it had earlier been to keep afloat the two 
ships which had sunk under his command.'"' The Legislative CouncU, the 
Monitor argued, could lay a fair claim to being the real ruler of the 
state.'"* The education issue had reached crisis proportions. While Evans 
was uncomfortably balanced on a raU between teachers demanding better 
salaries and land speculators demanding tax reductions, a side issue 
emerged in the form of the controversy over W. L. Neale, the new educa-
tion duector. Neale, a South Australian, Ui his attempts to introduce the 
"new education" to Tasmania, infuriated the local teachers — including 
the future Labor premier and anti-Labor Commonwealth prime minister, 
J. A. Lyons, who was first elected to the House of Assembly Ui 1909 — by 
his autocratic methods and introduction of more efficient South Aus-
tralian pedagogues. The teachers were represented by N. K. Ewing, a 
brUliant lawyer, once a senator for West Australia and now hoping to 
become a power in Tasmanian politics. Various commissions faUed to 
reach agreement and Neale was eventually eased out with compensation. 
Though the Labor party was divided on the propriety of payUig compensa-
tion to Neale, the issue was a greater embarrassment to Evans. 
The 1909 election, by increasing Labor's strength from seven in a house 
of thirty-five to twelve out of thuty, was ostensibly a resoundUig victory. 
The Mercury, considering Labor's success "the outstanding feature" of the 
election, professed itself satisfied that, as an official opposition. Labor 
would no longer be in a position to dictate from the cross-benches. The 
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Monitor beUeved that the next election would retum a Labor govemment 
because Labor was in close touch wdth "the greater mass of the com-
munity". Us "organization is complete", and the fidelUy of members to 
the platform assured. Beneath the surface, however, aU was not weU. It 
was argued'"^ that the increase Ui parUamentary strength was due almost 
completely to the Hare-Clark system and that the Labor poU was 3,000 
less than in the 1906 senate elections, whUe the anti-Labor vote had in-
creased by 4,000. Many were the explanations. "Labor's boasted 'organiza-
tion' was virtually non-existent." The movement denied the Mercury's 
contention that in a 61.5 per cent poU Labor had brought aU its supporters 
to vote and would have been reduced to one seat if its opponents had been 
as efficient. In Denison there was "no systematic canvass and no 
methodical arrangement for bringing voters to the poU". The opposition 
had cars and organizers galore. Moreover, the Denison electorate was the 
scene of a dispute between Woods and the Wharf Labourers' Union which 
backed a dissident Labor candidate, GUbert Rowntree. The Qipper was 
accused of paying non-union wages, Woods's attempts to organize trade 
unions were repudiated as harmful rather than beneficial, and it was 
claimed that the unions were denied a real voice in the Labor party. This 
dispute was not orUy an electoral liability, but pinpoUits some of the 
difficulties facing Tasmaruan Labor. As Woods demonstrated, for the last 
four years unions had been encouraged to affUiate at the rate of fifty 
shiUings ($5) for fifty members. Woods was saved from possible defeat by 
the strong endorsement of Spence who led the usual battery of mainland 
campaigners. "The man", said Spence, who 'shied off the pledge was a 
'rotter', "and a traitor to trade unionism.""" In the end Woods headed 
the Labor poll and his opponents were annihilated. The miners of 
northeast Tasmania, however, were accused of having a predUection for 
unpledged Labor men. 
Throughout Tasmania many workers stUl faUed to enrol. The closure of 
the poU at 6 o'clock may have kept others away. There was considerable 
criticism of the working of the divisional councUs. In May, Duncan 
Murphy summed up the general position in the Qipper: "The analysis 
shows a splendid advance in Franklin, a sUght decrease Ui Darwin, an 
enormous decrease in Bass, a heavy decline in Denison, WUmot remaining 
praticaUy stationary." Labor's total vote had, however, risen from 10,583 
(26.59 per cent) in 1906 to 19,067 (28.94 per cent) in 1909. 
Though the first result had helped Labor, it was obvious that the Hare-
Clark system posed problems for a pledge-bound radical party. Tasmania 
was now divided into five large, six-member electorates. As the Mercury 
argued. Labor candidates in multi-member constituencies were forced to 
bid against each other; "strange doctrines" were thus sometimes heard 
from Labor platforms. In Denison, where only two of the four Labor 
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candidates had a reasonable chance, "aU four are no doubt loyal enough to 
their party, but it is a case of cut-throat". Two of the I^bor candidates in 
Denison, Woods and Smythe, were strongly opposed to each other. 
Certainly, when powerful pressure groups demanded alterations in liquor 
or education laws a considerable strain was placed on aU Labor candidates. 
The Hare-Clark system tended also to create a political balance. 
Denison and Bass, containing Hobart and Launceston, were potentiaUy 
strong Labor areas, but under proportional representation (PR) it was 
difficult for the party to do more than share the representation wdth Us 
opponents. Darwin likewise saw the mining areas of the west coast 
balanced by "teat-puUers" in the northwest. The growth, however, of 
towns like Burnie did somethmg to help Labor. The large rural electorates 
of WUmot and FrankUn appeared to pose difficulties for Labor organizers, 
though in the latter some surprisingly good results were obtained amongst 
smaU farmers and orchardists. In 1909 Labor won two out of six seats in 
every electorate save Darwin, where they won four. The subsequent 
decUne in west coast mining, however, made it necessary to look for 
additional support elsewhere. 
As a result of the ambitions of N. K. Ewing who had just been elected 
to the House of Assembly, the Lewis government which, after a "fusion" 
of anti-Labor forces, backed by a new Liberal League, had replaced the 
Evans ministry, was beaten in October 1909 on a vote of no-confidence. 
Consequentiy John Earle, the blacksmith and engine driver once black-
listed by employers as a dangerous agitator, was invited to form the first 
Labor ministry in Tasmania's history. He had, however, barely time to 
distribute the portfolios to the ministers elected by caucus'" — 
J. A. Jensen, J. E. Ogden, and J. J. Long — before his opponents composed 
their differences and Labor was deposed after a week of nominal office, 
the governor refusing to grant Earle a dissolution. Earle was to wait four 
and a half years before another opportunity in equaUy difficult circum-
stances, arose. 
ni 
In spite of increasing intemal confUct the Labor organization made 
fairly rapid outward progress. It was realized that the proximity of the 
party to the goverrunent benches would attract ambitious men in search of 
seats, and conference sought expedients for deterring such men. 
L. F. Giblin, the economist who had shared a study at Cambridge with 
J. M. Keynes, was, however, accepted wdth alacrity though not with un-
animity, after his defeat in the 1909 election. Giblin's explanation that 
though a socialist virtuaUy from birth he had felt that his best chance m 
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1909 lay in candidature as an independent Democrat was neither flattering 
to the Labor organization nor a convincing demonstration of Giblin's 
sincerity. His socialism, though never his intelligence, was always open to 
question. Metz, also defeated in the 1909 election was readmitted to the 
party. At the 1910 conference Giblin annoyed the Woods group by 
helping to defeat a proposed probation period of two years for Labor 
candidates. Giblin attended orUy as a proxy representative chosen by the 
executive. Those who considered Metz's return premature were justified 
when he fought the next election as a Liberal."'^ Metz's comparative 
wealth was, however, vitaUy important when Labor launched its daUy 
newspaper, and his wife — alongside other Labor women like Mrs. Ben 
Watkins, Mrs. Holt, the tireless canvasser, and Mrs. O'Shea Peterson, an 
energetic Irishwoman - was a party stalwart. 
The conferences between 1909 and 1913 exhibUed a considerable 
increase in branch representation though it was constantly complained 
that many league secretaries omitted to send returns to the executive. The 
period 1909-10, which saw the formation of forty branches, was rightiy 
regarded as a boom year. In 1912 and 1913a handful of unions like the 
brickmakers, bootmakers, carters and drivers, and Launceston waterside 
workers sent representatives, usually pariiamentarians. Nearly aU these 
unions came under the limited scope of the new Wages Board Act. 
GeneraUy, however, unions proved reluctant to affiliate. For the 1910, 
1911, and 1912 conferences, in answer to an opponent's sneer that the 
Labor party was run by "self-appointed and irresponsible carpenters, 
bricklayers, and other tradesmen", Earle compiled a list of the occupations 
of conference delegates. Farmers and orchardists were always the largest 
single group and increased from one-sixth of the total in 1910 (nine) to 
over a quarter (seventeen) in 1913. Many of the other delegates were 
decidedly middle class, whUe the genuine workers tended to be skUled 
rather than unskUled. The compUation of such statistics may weU have 
helped to encourage Earle and others in the belief that the party was a 
national rather than a class party. 
To summarize the detaUs, the 1912 annual report announced the affilia-
tion of the Launceston waterside workers and the foUowing Hobart 
unions: brickmakers, carpenters and joUiers, general labourers, jam makers, 
carters and drivers, bricklayers, clothuig trades, coachmakers and wheel-
wrights, bootmakers, gas workers, bakers and pastry cooks. The confer-
ences were as foUows: CampbeU Town, 25, 26, and 28 March 1910 (fifty-
two delegates); New Norfolk, 14, 15, and 17 AprU 1911 (forty-eight dele-
gates); Launceston, 28, 29, and 30 June 1912 (fifty-five delegates); 
Latiobe, 17, 18, 19, and 20 June 1913 (forty-eight delegates); Wynyard, 
16—18 June 1914 (thuty-four delegates). In 1912 two unions were repre-
sented; in 1913, three; in 1914, none; in 1915, four;and in 1916, seven. 
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Another factor making for greater moderation was the replacement of 
Woods's Qipper, "the little red-wing", by the Daily Post Ui early 1910. 
Money as usual was in short supply. King O'MaUey, believed to be the 
richest man in the Tasmanian Labor movement, rejected, on the ground 
that he had not even 500 pence ($4.20) to spare, a demand that he provide 
£500 ($1,000) to underwrite the new paper. O'MaUey contemptuously 
dismissed Belton's threat that the divisional councU might as a result 
decide to dispense with the Kuig's services."^ In response to an urgent 
appeal in 1907, O'MaUey had offered £2 ($4) if absolutely necessary."'* 
It was not tiU 1912 that, after a vigorous campaign to beat an advertisers' 
boycott. Labor gained a controUing interest in the Post and was able to 
instaU its own editor, E. Dwyer Gray,"^ who had once controUed the 
Irish Nationalist DublUi Freeman's Journal. There had been a determined 
attack on Woods and the Clipper at the 1909 Longford conference. 
Though most was stimulated by a disappointed Hobart parUamentary 
candidate, J. J. Long's opinion, that if the Clipper was made more repre-
sentative all the AMA miners would subscribe, appears to indicate that 
sectionalism was involved. Woods, who clauned to have held an AWU card 
since the union's inception, was supported by Hector Lamond of the 
AWU's Sydney Worker, but he must have been glad to reUnquish his duect 
responsibUity in 1910. The Daily Post, attempting to appeal to a wider 
public, lacked the argumentative punch of the Clipper. It appears to have 
been financially backed by Hemy Jones, the jam manufacturer, and 
Charles Metz. When it faUed in 1918 it was replaced by the World, directly 
owned by the AWU. 
The influence of the AWU, after the 1909 establishment of its head-
quarters at CampbeUtown in central Tasmarua, was a vital factor in the 
development of Tasmanian Labor. M. D. McRae has shown how hard 
Tasmanian leaders worked for the extension of mainland unions to the 
island state — another demonstration"^ of Tasmania's dependence. 
Unlike the non-poUtical AMA, the AWU appomted D. J. O'Keefe, after his 
defeat in the Senate election, organizer for Tasmania. At the 1909 confer-
ence Earle thanked the union for placing him at the top of the Franklui 
poU. ' " Earie's old west coast seat of Waratah had been merged in 
Darwin, and Labor approached farming areas with some trepidation. 
During the 1909 election the secretary of the Tasmanian AWU wrote to 
Woods that: "C. Towners are going like HeU. Making every post a 
winner.""* The AWU was able to make some inroads on the conserva-
tism of the Tasmaruan rural worker and give him some feeling for political 
action. The 1910 CampbeUtown Labor conference report expressed its 
gratitude to the AWU for the "unmense assistance in organizing the Labor 
cause", and ft certainly appears that many of the forty new branches, 
especially those in central Tasmania, were formed through AWU influence. 
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The 1911 and 1912 conferences also praised the AWU. The AWU was not, 
however, duectly represented at conference, though its agents, like 
D. E. Dicker, D. J. O'Keefe, and its general secretary, James Mooney, 
often appeared as delegates for league branches and some also sat in the 
House of Assembly. 
The difficulty of bringing in other unions was a perennial problem for 
Tasmanian Labor. In the early years, U had been argued that the union 
movement, apart from the AMA, was virtually non-existent. However, 
Labor parUamentary pressure in the 1910 had helped to secure the passage 
of a Wages Board Act. Though warmly denounced for its lunitations,'' ^ U 
helped not only to encourage trade unionism but to raise wages, thus 
preventing observers Uke the Frenchman Albert Metin from usUig Tas-
mania as an example of the harmful effects of the absence of an industrial 
concUiation system.'^" Labor men who, Uke W. E. Shoobridge, argued 
that the poUtical Labor movement had largely preceded the trade union 
movement, and Woods, who claimed that Labor's "svray and power" had 
ended a situation where workers subjected to employers' boycotts were 
forced to lie low, emphasized trade union dependence. Woods sub-
sequentiy described the situation more bluntly. In other states the Labor 
party was an offshoot of unionism which controUed the movement, "but 
in Tasmania that was not the case, the unions had not formed as a prelude 
to the political movement but had grown as a result of the Labor move-
ment, and the Trades and Labor CouncU had not come into existence untU 
1909. It was not untU they were able to get 12 Labor members into 
Parliament that unionism took any sort of boost at all, and it was not untU 
they had wages boards that more than a dozen or so unions could be 
formed at aU. That the two sections were not combined in Tasmanian was 
merely an accident of birth."'^' 
Tension reached a climax in 1913 wUen the long-awaited fruits of office 
were again denied to Labor by the electors. Tlie union problem miglit be 
solved either by aUowing unions to affUiate at very low fees or adopting 
the revolutionary expedient of other states wluch had unified political and 
industrial Labor in one organization. The conference, however, rejected 
both these possibUities. Earle and Woods again represented opposing view-
points. Earle believed that there was already sufficient inducement for 
unions to join poUtical Labor. Was it wise to encourage the adhesion of 
lukewarm or conservative unionists? Tliough he approved of industrial 
unionism, he disliked the idea of fee discrimination against other members 
of the movement. The amalgamation proposal Earle considered too revolu-
tionary for immediate action. The strong support for Earle's opinion 
iUustrated the sectional cleavages in the movement. In a simUar debate at 
the 1911 conference Giblui had declared that the party did not need men 
who were concerned only wdth wages. Woods now supported lower fees as 
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a first step towards union, arguing that the Labor executives and the 
Hobart and Launceston TLCs re-established by 1910, should combine. 
"Unless these two movements could unite. Labor would, in the near 
future, receive a nasty bump just when it should be marching along 
triumphantly." Tlie current Australian tendency of industrial unions to 
dissociate themselves from the political organization was "suicidal". 
Opposing Earle, who had attacked conservative unionists. Woods asserted 
that "there were members in the leagues who were not in favor of prefer-
ence to unionists. This indicated that there was not that close sympathy 
between the organizations that should exist. The only way to overcome 
this was to rub shoulders."''^^ 
Unionists at the conference argued that their members were too poor to 
pay double fees. They promised a great influx of AMA members if con-
cessions were made. A league delegate in 1911, however, had claimed that 
in the Avoca area his members were on starvation wages of twelve to 
fifteen shUlings ($1.20 to $1.50) a week. It was demonstrated that a 
union, with 199 members, had only the voting power of the smallest 
league. The problem was accentuated by the fact that m 1913 it was 
estimated that there were 9,000 unionists in Tasmania as opposed to 1,500 
in 1 9 0 5 . ' " 
These issues surfaced again when the Earle Labor government took 
office. Committees for greater unity met little response from uniorUsts tiU 
the conscription issue forced both sections to work together in the short-
Uved Tasmanian Labor Federation of 1917 and 1918. The federation 
broke up when the unions proved reluctant to subsidize, in addition to 
their own expenses, an apparentiy hopeless poUtical party. 
The same forces that had voted down concessions to unionists also gave 
short shrift to GiblUi's proposal for a step-by-step approach to land 
nationalization wliich the sanguine economist admitted would be un-
popular at first.'•^'* As experience Ui other states has demonstrated, the 
AWU in organizing rural workers did not always distinguish too clearly 
between employers and employees. Thus AWU influence was not in-
compatible wdth rural conservatism. Such conservatism in the Tasmanian 
Labor movement also neutralized the attempts to adopt a "socialization" 
objective in the years after 1910. The question was raised regularly after 
the 1910 conference when only five voted for the socialization of the 
means of production, distribution, and exchange.' ^ ^ Earle was opposed to 
any change in the old nebulous objective, borrowed from New South 
Wales, which restricted collective ownership to monopolies. Some confer-
ence delegates, arguing that most members were sociaUsts, beUeved Ui a 
forthright statement. They were decisively voted down by others who 
claimed that it would have a bad effect on the electors. Woods adopted a 
middle or "Blackburn interpretation" position, asking for sociaUzation 
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where exploitation existed. Though not far from the original formulation, 
this was also rejected. At the Hobart federal Labor conference in 1912, 
Shoobridge and Giblin had spoken against the establishment of a more 
socialistic objective. 
In Tasmarua the "iron law of oligarchy" in the Labor movement is not 
hard to discover. Though origUiaUy the leadership had lacked a movement, 
it was not long before critics of the executive appeared at conferences. 
There were the usual attempts to restrict the uifiuence of pariiamentarians 
in the conference itself, and, on the executive, to prevent double voting 
and membership of more than one branch. Little success was achieved in 
the reduction of poUticians' influence.' ^ ^ 
In 1910 Woods's supporters complained bUterly that the executive was 
giving proxy votes to supporters who had been defeated in theu own 
branches: "Eddington and that waster J. A. Smythe who were beaten by 
Teddy O'Brion [E. J. O'Brion] in their own branch [Queenborough] were 
there and had as much to say as the rest of them, and the same thing 
happened with C. Thorn who after being beaten by Palamountain went 
out to New Town and offered his services there, but which were refused." 
Thus Giblin [Glenora] , E. B. Waterworth [Zeehan], Nettleford 
[Franklui], Eddington [PeUiam], Smythe [Stowport], and Thom 
[Crotty], by application to the executive were able to make use of proxies 
given by other branches.^^"^ Moreover, two other delegates represented 
only eighteen members between them: Smythe, a bitter opponent of 
Woods, "toddled off to CampbeUtown on the off chance and got the 
executive to hand him out a credential".'^* Such conditions made it easy 
for the Mercury, shortly before the 1910 CampbeUtown conference to 
claim that "the Labor party is undemocratic, is an oligarchy, a government 
of cliques and committees" and "more concerned about getting seats for 
its promoters — than work and wages for the people in whose name it 
acts".'^^ Even Woods's friends were not blameless. Ben Watkins provides 
a good example of the sort of influence a politician could exert. Though 
party secretary and whip, he was elected to the executive only twice in 
this period and required appointment as a branch representative to attend 
conference. Watkins appeared as delegates for not only Hobart branches 
but New Norfolk (1908), Strahan (1909), Bumie (1911), EUendale 
(1912), Ulverstone (1914 and 1915), Brickmakers Union (1916), Wynyard 
(1918), and SmUhton (1919). In this period Watkins sat in the assembly 
for Queenstown, Darwin (west coast), and Franklin. He was fundamentaUy 
a Hobartian and a "Qipper" man, subsequently managing director of the 
Daily Post. It is true that many of the leagues represented by Watkins were 
in his large Darwin electorate, but Watkins poUed few first preference 
votes outside Queenstowm. His "screeching to the heathen outback"'^" 
was obviously not appreciated. The repeated but unsuccessful demands for 
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the abolition of the system of pre-selection of Labor candidates by 
divisional councUs indicate the desire of potential candidates to escape the 
control of an oligarchy.^^i Under the Hare-Clark system it would have 
been possible for an indefinite number of candidates to be endorsed by the 
party wdthout splitting the vote, but such a procedure would have resulted 
in intense rivalry and competitive bidding between Labor candidates. 
In the midst of their difficulties Tasmanian Laborites argued that 
though the workers might not always join the organization they could be 
trusted to vote Labor. The Commonwealth election of 1910, as part of a 
general swdng to Labor, resulting in the election of Labor representatives 
for three (Darwin, Bass, and Denison) out of the five Tasmanian elec-
torates and three Tasmanian senators greatly increased Labor confidence. 
Nearly 54 per cent of the House of Representatives' voters were Labor and 
55 per cent of Senate voters. A Tasmanian Labor govemment appeared an 
inevitable outcome of the 1912 state election. 
But the Hare-Clark system, like most forms of PR, mUitated against 
decisive results. In Tasmanian history it has created numerous situations 
where a volte face by even one member can bring down a govemment. 
Moreover, in late 1911 a 56-day strike at Mount LyeU costing £1,000 
($2,000) a week* ^^ resulted in some gains for the men but left the unions 
wdthout resources for political action. The strike Uself was a godsend to 
the Tasmanian conservatives who tenaciously resisted theu prospective 
deposition from power. The Daily Post complained of an advertisers' boy-
cott against it and denounced opponents' use of the sociaUst bogey. 
Election meetings were disorderly. An enraged landowner attempted to 
horsewhip J. A. Lyons on an election platform; Ben Watkins offered to 
satisfy his critics by personal combat; another Labor candidate was 
accused of knocking down an old man; and Earle met what the Post 
believed to be organized opposition at some of his meetings. At Sandfly he 
talked far into the night to avoid a hostile motion. The Mercury claimed 
that Labor supporters had denied their opponents free speech in the 
Hobart Town HaU. Labor was not entirely successful in insisting that 
Liberals who refused an adequate system of concUiation and arbitration 
were responsible for strikes, that the anti-Labor "fusion" had no poUcy, 
and that U was borrowing excessively. The Mercury was wrong ui its beUef 
that the publication of the AWlTs rural workers' log, which laid dovm 
minimum wages for farm labourers, would alienate the small farmers Ui 
Franklin, but King O'MaUey agreed that the log may have cost a seat in 
Darwin. AddUional seats were won in Denison, Bass, and FrankUn, but the 
vital fourth seat was lost in Darwin. Labor was left with only fourteen out 
of thirty Assembly members. In aU electorates save rural WUmot there was 
an equal division of seats between Labor and Liberal. Though Labor had 
now poUed 45 per cent of the vote, as the Mercury said, it had been held 
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"m check". 
King O'MaUey's optUnism was inaccurate: "I have been to Tasmania 
taking part in the State Elections and considering the odds we have had a 
great victory. We gained four seats and lost one through the departure of 
so many workers from the Mining centre of Tasmania owing to that 
unfortunate strUce which occurred last year. Otherwise we would have had 
a Labour ministry in Tasmania. I had great meetmgs and the Christians 
roUed up from every corner to shake the foundations of fosseldom 
[sic]."'^^ The aimual conference report was bitter: "almost every 
conceivable kind of falsehood was stated about the party. Money was 
spent lUce water. Paid agitators scoured the country spreading misrepre-
sentation and falsehood, and almost the soUd press of the state was in the 
hands of our opponents, and poured out every momUig a daUy budget of 
calumny."* ^ '* The Mercury was convinced that "the Labor organization 
was this time more perfect than before" and could only explain Earle's 
very large vote in Franklin (3,662 or 22.55 per cent on first preference) by 
assuming some secret promise to the smaU farmers. 
The closeness of the result encouraged Earle to attempt to win by 
negotiation what the poUs denied. In December Earle reached an agree-
ment with the same Donald Cameron whose defeat in 1894 had been 
advertised a great victory for democracy. The Speaker, however, resigned; 
Labor was denied its majority and Cameron renounced the agreement. He 
wished, it appears, to exact a pledge committing Labor against aU legisla-
tion tUl the next election. Though the ministry, now led by A. E. 
Solomon, was saved, it obtained a snap election on 23 January 1913. 
Labor was furious. Not only was there little time to campaign, but, as it 
was the holiday season, many workers were engaged Ui seasonal employ-
ment outside their constituencies. The governor in granting the dissolu-
tion, was accused of partisanship. After the election, however, the Mercury 
claimed that the fallUig off of the Liberal vote was due to the smaU 
farmer's inabUity to leave his harvesting. 
The Daily Post correctly forecast that "the new House wUl be a replica 
of the old", minus Cameron. Labor increased its proportion of the poU to 
48 per cent but poUed 2,000 fewer than Ui 1912. In spite of the precipita-
tion of the election, the Post laid the blame on "the inefficiency of Labor 
organization". Two, possibly three, electorates were weak. Labor should 
have been able to profit from Catholic fury at the government's recent 
appointment of an Orangeman as governor,* ^ ^ but Edward Mulcahy, 
minister of lands and special target of the Catholic Monitor, increased his 
majority by 260 votes. Labor was agaUi assisted by its "gladiators from 
across the Straits", including on this occasion the future prime minister, 
John Curtin. 
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IV 
Cameron left a worthy successor in the person of J. T. H. Whitsitt, an 
eccentric Irishman whose facUity for repartee and whimsical eloquence 
enUvened the proceedings of the Tasmanian Assembly. Towards the end of 
1913 WhUsitt, "who at no time made any secret of his utter abhorence for 
the Labor platform and methods", grew disgusted wdth the Solomon 
goverrunent, especiaUy in its faUure to persuade other states, fearing the 
Irish blight, to accept Tasmanian potatoes. Furthermore, in January 1914 
a by-election occurred in Denison. It was won by Labor in spite of a small 
Liberal majority at the previous election. Earle's policy speech, empha-
sizing closer settlement and drawing a distinction between landed and 
other property, showed that Henry George stUl lived in Tasmania. Earie 
was criticized by Labor mUitants for approving of industrial arbitration 
rather than union power. As Earle's policy was roughly simUar to that of 
the 1890 BaUance Liberals in New Zealand, it was appropriate that WiUiam 
Sheridan, the new Denison member, had previously campaigned on the 
basis of his thirteen years in that Dominion. When subsequently recom-
mending the adoption of the New Zealand system of afforestation, 
Sheridan declared that "aU Tasmania had to do was to copy New Zealand 
methods, as the climates of the two countries were simUar".' ^^ 
Secure in Whitsitt's determination on "bumping the present traitors 
out", Earle lost no tune in putting pressure on the goverrunent. The 
controversial Woods was elected Speaker, and Labor won its no-confidence 
motion. The governor, however, attempted to impose conditions on the 
aspirant premier. Earle was required to call for a dissolution immediately 
after forming his ministry. He applied to the Assembly which voted to 
refer the issue to the colonial office. The appeal eventually resulted in a 
ruling against the governor. Though Earle was later to boast of having 
written a page in the history of constitutional law,'^' it was an inauspi-
cious beginning for the first effective Tasmanian Labor government. The 
opposition naturally attacked Earle's breach of agreement with the 
governor, though Labor counter-attacked by suggesting improper coUusion 
between the govemor and Solomon. Some of Earle's own foUowers, 
including the highly inteUigent GiblUi, had serious reservations about the 
wisdom of Earle's acceptance of office in the circumstances.'^^ On the 
other hand, Ogden subsequently claimed that it was only the pressure of 
Lyons and hUnself that had prevented Earle from accepting the govemor's 
terms.'^^ In any case the Labor position was extremely weak. In the 
House of Assembly, as Woods said later, Labor depended "on the elevation 
of Whitsitt as a 'candle-stick' on the see-saw". Whitsitt was opposed not 
only to aU Labor policies but even to the principle of party government. In 
the Legislative CouncU Labor had never had a single representative. The 
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equivocal nature of Earle's accession to power gave distinct colour to the 
Legislative CouncU's claim when discardUig the Labor government's legis-
lation to be acting as a cautious house of review. Except as a preparatory 
exercise in administration — and here serious differences wUh the Labor 
movement were Ukely — the Earie Labor government appeared to have 
little future. 
Like Labor leaders in other states Earie was also faced, especiaUy in the 
by-elections which virtuaUy decided the fate of the government, by the 
knotty problems of Catholic education and temperance. In an ominous 
coincidence, the foundation of the Tasmanian Catholic Federation was 
almost simultaneous with Labor's accession to office. The Liberals took 
fuU advantage of Labor's attempt to uphold the anti-denominational 
principle and at the same time to make concessions to Catholics in the 
form of bursaries for secondary pupUs tenable at state and private schools. 
Catholic Labor leaders Uke Earle, Lyons, Dwyer Gray, and even the 
nominal Catholic, Ben Watkins, who appeared a strong secularist, found 
themselves ground between the mUlstones of growing Portestant anti-
Catholicism and the menacing statements of Catholic clergy demanding 
state aid. The tension between the Labor party and Catholicism in Tas-
mania never, however, became as serious as in Victoria.*'*° 
On the Uquor question, though the Liberals attempted to take 
advantage of the rigidities of the Labor platform, they were themselves 
divided. N. K. Ewuig, who succeeded Solomon as opposUion leader in late 
1914, was no temperance fanatic, and was for a time opposed by members 
of his own party who believed that Labor's promise of a referendum on 
closUig hours would be placed in jeopardy by the Liberal leadership. TTie 
referendum held wdth the 1916 election resulted in a victory for 6 o'clock 
closing. The Tasmanian liquor interests, unlike theu counterparts in other 
states, may have backed the Liberals in 1915. W. H. Lee, who succeeded 
Ewing as leader late that year, being a Methodist lay preacher appeared a 
more determined temperance advocate. Some Labor men like Dwyer Gray 
and the future premier, Robert Cosgrove, campaigned hard for 6 o'clock 
closing. In general, while Labor may have lost by its education policy the 
votes of some CathoUc supporters, it probably gained sUghtiy through the 
temperance issue in 1916. The growth of sectarian feeling subsequent to 
1915 was to reserve this alignment. 
After the conscription split it was easy for Laborites to blame the 
faUures of the Labor government on the defecting Earle. The problems he 
faced and his efforts to deal wdth them are, however, too similar to those 
of contemporary maitUand premiers, and indeed Labor leaders in general, 
to support an explanation based on character defects or the Tasmanian 
version of "the aristocratic embrace".*'** The smaU Labor ministry was in 
fact reasonably strong. Though Earle was regarded by the Mercury as a 
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nomUial leader who had recentiy faced a strong chaUenge to his authority, 
he was an effective speaker with a fine platform presence, and, except m 
times of particular stress, a concUiatory and tactful manner. Without legal 
training, he proved a useful attorney general. Nor was he a cultural boor, 
but a man who read deeply and sought relaxation from his political duties 
with a vioUn. The treasurer and minister for education, Lyons, the future 
Commonwealth prime minister whom the Mercury considered the real 
head of the mUiistry, was given an early opportunity to prove his prag-
matic abUity, and was backed ui the house by Giblin, one of Australia's 
outstanding economists and future adviser to many Commonwealth 
governments.*^^ Ogden, chief secretary and minister for irunes, was the 
first ex-miner to hold the latter position and dealt not unsuccessfuUy with 
a serious crisis. Ogden was subsequentiy a strong supporter of poUtical, as 
opposed to duect, industrial action. James Belton, a Victorian who after 
minuig and farming experience elsewhere had bought a bacon factory in 
Northern Tasmania, appeared impressive as minister of lands at a time 
when the Labor party was emphasizing its agrarian policy. 
Though the Labor govemment was Unmediately faced by a serious 
economic crisis, threatening to force the closure of many mUies and create 
widespread unemployment, in its first hundred days it took prompt, if not 
ultimately effective, action. Zeehan, the cradle of the Tasmanian Labor 
party, at the end of 1913 was "sinking fast" as ore became virtuaUy 
unprocurable. The stUl valuable smelters were taken over by the Labor 
government, which also presented an ultimatum, demanding the develop-
ment of the adjacent Argent Flat, to the British Zeehan company. It was 
hoped that a deep shaft might save the Zeehan mines. The outbreak of war 
in August 1914, cutting off the vital German market for Australian copper 
and zinc, meant ultimate ruin for Zeehan. The Labor government did, 
however, succeed in keeping open for six months the Beaconsfield gold 
mine and hoped to assist the coal miners of the northeast coast.''*^ Ogden 
obtained most of the credit for the govemment's mining policy. The 
Mercury, however, considered his approach quixotic. Support for Zeehan 
was helping "an extremely lame dog faced wdth an excessively high 
stUe."*'*^ MeanwhUe Lyons transferred the state govemment's account 
from the Commercial to the Commonwealth Bank, for whose foundation 
King O'MaUey had been able to obtaui some credit. According to the Post, 
Lyons had "done more Ui one day for Tasmania and Australia" than the 
previous treasurer would have done in a hundred years. 
The most loudly acclaimed achievement of the Labor government in its 
early period was the prompt purchase of the assets of the company con-
structUig a hydro-electric scheme at the Great Lake. Labor had been 
uiterested in the possibUities of this scheme for some time. The plans for 
the purchase and a report on the feasibUity of the enterprise by the 
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inevitable New Zealand expert'"*^ had been the work of the previous 
government which supported the purchase Ui the House of Assembly. 
Indeed, the only real criticism was that Labor was paying excessive com-
pensation to a virtuaUy bankrupt company. When the Legislative CouncU 
duly reduced the sum, Ogden remarked phUosophicaUy, "a good job we 
didn't do U".'''^ 
An' attempt by the government to achieve a spectacular purchase for 
closer settlement of the great Malahide estate of Fingal in northeast Tas-
marua just faUed to come off. The closer settlement's board established by 
a previous government returned an evasive report which Belton was at first 
reluctant to accept. The owners, unUke the proprietors of the New 
Zealand Cheviot estate whose purchase created the legend — often quoted 
m Tasmarua — of New Zealand Liberal infallibUity, refused to seU. A 
myth-making opporturuty was lost which might have given the Labor 
government a new standing in the eyes of the poorer farmer and aspuant 
smallholders. 
Nevertheless, by July Earle was able to claim wdth some justification 
that the government "had accomplished a great deal". A month eariier the 
Tasmanian correspondent of a mairUand paper declared that "the Labor 
Government is showing rare activity for Tasmania". The government vras 
now to face even more serious dangers. When war was declared on 4 
August there was an immediate metals crisis resulting from the loss of 
German markets. Not orUy Zeehan, but Roseberry, Renison BeU, and even 
Mount LyeU appeared likely to close down for good. Earle, promising to 
do his best, implored Tasmanians not to aUow patriotic fervour to obscure 
the need to keep industry alive. The government's attempt to keep the 
mines open by paying 50 per cent of the tin price was applauded by 
Labor. When Earle aimounced to parliament the necessity for taking 
action agauist war profiteers, Ewing, as opposition leader, promised that 
there would be "no umeasonable or unfair criticism" of the government's 
measures. The Legislative CouncU was not so amenable and promptly 
rejected seven bUls which had received general support Ui the House of 
Assembly. The most important were measures permitting the fixing of 
maximum prices on foodstuffs, aiding farmers in planting crops, and seek-
ing information on food supplies, aU of which had been urged by other 
state premiers. The public works vote was reduced from £214,000 
($428,000) to £78,000 ($156,000). The Legislative CouncU, the repre-
sentatives of the comfortable, weU-to-do classes, said in effect, according 
to the Post, "No, you must not spend so freely; there may be un-
employed, but raUway construction wUl have to be delayed; mines may be 
closing, but your conditions for the purchase of ore must be restricted; a 
drought may be facing Australia, and the Motheriand caUing out for 
supplies, yet the farmers are not to be encouraged to cultivate idle acres 
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though the result would be to give needful employment."' ^ ' 
The Mercury and the conservatives, seemingly obUvious of the war 
crisis, attacked Labor for the spendthrift policy of rewarding its friends at 
the expense of the state. But to workers experiencing "semi-starvation" Ui 
Launceston the Earle government's relief works had justified its existence. 
At the Commonwealth election on 5 September Tasmanian Labor had, 
wdth a slight lead in the total poU won three of the five Representatives' 
seats and four of the six Senate seats. At this stage, however, the Tas-
manian Labor government found itself in a virtual stalemate. At two by-
elections (Bass and WUmot) in late 1915 it faUed to win a seat from the 
liberals though Federal Labor had just captured Bass. War apathy, the 
farmers' fear that wheat prices would be pegged, and the Catholic school 
issue, aU played a part in these disappointUig results which gave a virtual 
mandate for Legislative CouncU intransigence. 
By the end of the parliamentary session in early 1915 the government 
was in fuU retreat. The Legislative CouncU mauled Lyons's inteUigent 
budget which, inspued by Lloyd George,''** attempted to introduce some 
redistributive taxation. Ewing was able to sneer that the ministers, who 
with "the most terrible record any government ever had", were content to 
cUng to office as the slaves of the Legislative CouncU.''*' Not unnaturaUy 
discontent began to show itself in the Labor movement. There was talk of 
the uselessness of poUtical action. Clifford HaU, of the Hobart United 
Labourers' Union, later kUled on the front as an anti-war stretcher-bearer, 
believed that Labor had done "nothing" towards "easing the burdens of 
those who elected them to place, pay and position". The Legislative 
CouncU was no excuse.' ^" HaU had a lively exchange wdth Earle when the 
latter refused a uruon deputation seeking preference to unionists. To Earle 
in 1915 this basic Labor pruiciple was "spoUs for victors". He advocated a 
stronger system of industrial concUiation and arbitration Uistead of wages 
boards.* ^ * HaU asserted a belief in the Marxian class struggle and "spoUs 
for victors". He did, however, attempt to dissuade more militant union 
colleagues who wanted to run a new workers' party. Earle, on the other 
hand, was congratulated by a Liberal in parliament's next session for 
abandoning preference to unionists, the first plank on the Labor platform. 
It was suggested by another member of the opposition that Earle had 
chosen to please Whitsitt rather than the electors. Though Earle bore much 
of the brunt of uruon antagonism, according to the not very reliable Ogden 
after the latter's own expulsion from the Labor party, Earle's cabUiet had 
been united in opposition to the granting of preference to uniorUsts.' ^^ 
At a meetUig of the East Hobart WPL in September 1915 Woods and 
Dwyer Gray attacked Earle for flouting the 1914 conference decision on 
preference to unionists and accused the goverrunent of taking the 
CouncU's rejection of the food biU "as if they really rather liked it. There 
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was no protest whatever."'^"' In the Daily Post, Gray accused Earle of 
defying the resolution of the 1915 conference demanding that the Tas-
manian government approach the federal attorney general to obtain a 
referendum on the aboUtion of Legislative CouncUs.*^^ Such criticisms 
may have encouraged Earle to think in terms of a coalition wdth his 
opponents. As Marilyn Lake has argued, by the end of 1915 Labor was 
becoming divided on the priority of the German war over the class war. In 
early 1915 the government had retained a seat in a by-election at Bass but, 
in spite of a vigorous campaign, had achieved no success in a contest for a 
Legislative CouncU seat. In early August Earle apparently refused a feeler 
from Ewing for a war coalition. However, in October, after the ministry 
had appointed Ewuig to the bench where he became an eminent judge,* ^^ 
Earie brought in, as part of a pohtical truce, a bUl for the prolongation of 
parliament. While he claimed that 80 per cent of Tasmanians favoured the 
idea of wartime unity, three Labor members. Barker, Giblin, and Sheridan, 
voted against the bUl which, though passed by a large majority in the 
Assembly, was duly rejected by the Legislative CouncU - as the World said 
later, "smashed to smithereens amidst the plaudits of the whole state".' ^^ 
The CouncU's action was based on the belief that supporters of both 
parties were opposed to the biU.' ^ ' 
After this rebuff parUament was reduced to temporary deadlock. The 
opposition dropped aU idea of a truce, and Labor introduced some bUls to 
appease its supporters. The controversial Commonwealth Powers BUl, as 
Earle said, never had a chance in Tasmania. It was attacked by a strong 
group in the Assembly before ever reaching the CouncU. Without a clear 
Labor majority the bUl, which was not pressed, could not have passed in 
the Assembly. An attempt, however, was made to Uistitute a system of 
initiative and referendum which might be used against the Legislative 
CouncU. A Wages Boards Amendment Act promised some measure of 
preference to unionists. The resultant Assembly debate was interesting for 
several reasons. The Liberals in theu condemnation of unionist preference 
and backhanded complUnents to Earle suggested a danger to existing 
awards after a change of govemment. Moreover, two Labor unionist and 
later AWU members, J. McDonald and D. E. Dicker, showed the growth of 
mUitancy by questioning the value of preference to unionists.* ^ ^ They 
desired a union movement sufficientiy strong to enforce its own prefer-
ences. 
In the 1916 election campaign Liberals stressed Labor's aUegedly 
spendthrift policy. Lee argued that the govemment's massive wheat 
purchase, which Labor sources claimed had saved the state from famine, 
was little more than a wasteful subsidy to miUers and bakers who had 
refused to drop their prices. EventuaUy Labor accepted this criticism and 
used it against Earle, who, according to Ogden, was, on this occasion solely 
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responsible.'^' Lee also attempted to steal his opponents' clothes by 
promising a wages board to the raUway workers who had been refused by 
the Labor government. Lyons's later justification for this lapse, that the 
government did not want to see the measure defeated by the Legislative 
CouncU, was not altogether convincuig. The New South Wales premier, 
Holman, campaigning for Tasmanian Labor, pointed out that his govern-
ment had also been accused of excessive expenditure. Labor's general reply 
to Liberal critics was to claim that good work had been done in saving the 
state from depression. Workers were warned of the probable consequences 
of Liberal government. It was argued with some justification that Labor's 
humiliation in the Assembly and the CouncU was due to apathetic workers 
who refused to supply the necessary mandate. 
The result of the election was very close; Labor poUed its highest total 
vote to date (36,118 or 48.47 per cent) but was stUl beaten by the Liberals 
and independents who retumed with sixteen seats to Labor's fourteen — 
the same position as in 1912 and 1913. The efforts to halt west coast 
declUie did not recover the vital fourth Darwin seat which included the 
conservative northwest. Earle's gamble that Labor by administrative effici-
ency could extract,a real majority from the Tasmanian people had not 
succeeded. 
Administratively Labor had done reasonably well. Even the bitterly 
hostUe Mercury was constrained to admit "that Labor in office was less 
disastrous, both to the country and to itself, than many people had 
expected. Considering theu lack of experience in affairs, Mirusters rose 
very firmly to their responsibUities and acquitted themselves wdth a degree 
of capacity and dignity which certainly did not disgrace the state.' 
Ogden had done his best to prevent large-scale unemployment in the 
minmg areas; Belton had worked hard on behalf of agriculture and 
established Tasmania's national park; Lyons, "cautious yet not unimagina-
tive, partly reorganized government finances, gave increased assistance to 
farmers, levied taxes more equitably, and aimed to Umit government 
spending and to balance the budget. He reUed considerably on federal 
assistance."'^' In retrospect it appears that the 1914—16 Tasmanian 
Labor goverrunent, though it did little to implement its platform or satisfy 
its party, probably handled the problems of drought and war depression 
with considerably more sensitivity than would have been shown by the 
opposition. The bitter declaration of the World in 1919, that, apart from 
the hydro agreement and admirustration, "the least-said about the record 
of the Earle goverrunent the better", is too severe. 
Labor's fall increased the criticism of parliamentarianism in the 
workers' movement.' ^^ Men like Woods, Robert Cosgrove of the United 
Grocers' Union, and Matt O'Brien worked hard for union between the two 
wings of the movement, but by May 1916 only four unions had accepted 
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the idea of a fusion of the two existing bodies into a federation. Mean-
whUe the position of the workers grew worse. There was a steady erosion 
of living standards which the new government was less Uiclined to main-
tain. Hobart unions were "at present really 'a disorganized rabble' ".'^^ 
Master buUders attempted to lock out buUders' labourers demanding 
award wages. The raUway workers went on strike and there w^s trouble at 
Mount LyeU. The Labor conference in July 1916 showed some tension 
between the party and the parliamentary leadership. Preference to union-
ists became a definite plarUc, and the Labor executive was ordered to 
approach the federal prime minister about the Legislative CouncU refer-
endum. The late Tasmaruan government barely avoided censure. A remit 
proposing support for conscription was heavUy voted down in spite of 
Earle's adhesion. A subsequent critic linked Earle's support for con-
scription and opposition to preference for unionists.'^'* 
When Hughes announced the conscription referendum, one other state 
Labor member foUowed Earle into the "yes" camp, and only two Labor 
branches supported Earle. Of the federal party, Jensen and Laud Smith 
became conscriptionists, whUe O'MaUey tried to sit on the fence.'^^ In 
general, the Tasmanian Labor campaign against conscription foUowed the 
pattern of other states. The Catholic clergy, however, were on the whole 
supporters of conscription and the Irish issue was usuaUy invoked only by 
opponents.'^^ Though many Tasmanian Labor leaders like Lyons and 
Dwyer Gray had Irish connections, the latter as an old Nationahst was 
strongly opposed to the 1916 Irish rising. Gray was also an ardent cam-
paigner for voluntary enlistment. Lyons, moreover, was probably correct 
in his assertion that there was no Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) 
influence on Tasmanian Labor.'^' The anti-conscription campaign not 
only showed the value of union and parUamentary Labor co-operation but 
demonstrated the power of political action which, U was argued, had 
nearly succeeded in enslaving the workers.'^* However, the fact that 
Tasmania Ui both referenda was a "yes" state uidicates Labor weakness. In 
some areas the results were distinctly disappointUig. In 1916 Darwin had 
an overaU "yes" majority, and some of the chief mining administrative 
districts such as Queenstown, Waratah, Zeehan, and Strahan, took the 
same side. The poorer areas of Hobart and Launceston generaUy voted 
"no". '^ ' In the second referendum Ui December 1917, the "no" cause 
did considerably better, neariy winning the Bass (uicludmg Launceston) 
and actually winning the FrankUn division and the four lost strongholds on 
the west coast. In Denison, Queensborough and New Town voted "yes" 
both times."" 
Earle, claiming that conscription was not part of the Labor platform, 
was deposed by the parliamentary Labor party immediately after the first 
referendum. He refused to attend the 1917 special conference on the 
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ground that Us decisions were a foregone conclusion. In a highly over-
wrought letter, Earle denounced the selfish and disloyal uniorUsts who, 
worse than the Hun, were attempting to enslave the Labor movement.'" 
Privately he blamed Lyons for driving hun from the party. He need not 
have worried. Far from establishing a tyranny, the unions, integrated into 
the new Tasmanian Labor Federation by fear of conscription, could Ui 
many cases hardly wait tiU the 1918 annual conference gave them the 
opporturuty to return to pure union activities. The scheme had merged the 
TLCs in divisional councUs containUig both unionists and political 
Laborites, but friction soon developed between the movement's two 
wingg. 
At the beginning of the War, Woods was one of the few Labor leaders 
to indicate some initial opposition. Labor supporters were by no means 
totally immune to the war-fever which swept the state; the local WPL 
demanded to have the name of Bismarck changed to CoUinsdale and 
Premier Earle was easUy convinced of the necessity. The conscription crisis 
encouraged a more critical attitude. At the 1917 special conference, dele-
gates were almost evenly divided between those opposed to all con-
scription and those prepared to tolerate it for home defence. A com-
promise amendment was passed demanding conscription of mcomes in 
excess of £300 ($600) p.a. before conscription of life. This conference also 
saw a demand for a negotiated peace. The 1918 conference showed further 
signs of developuig Labor pacifism. Such attitudes led to accusations of 
defeatism and placed the parliamentary party in difficulty. 
Though Labor lost only two members of the parliamentary party m the 
conscription split, the blow was as serious as if half the party had 
departed. Earle's uifiuence as an ex-premier was probably greater than that 
of his immediate coUeagues. The new leader, Lyons, had considerable 
leeway to make up. When Earle's irregular appointment to the Senate to 
succeed the apparently anti-conscriptionist Senator Ready resulted in a 
Commonwealth election, not only was the ex-premier retumed at the head 
of the Senate poU but Labor was defeated in every seat. King O'MaUey, 
who had been very slow in declaring his anti-conscriptionist feelings, lost 
in Darwin, and, though he stood for Denison in 1919, had in fact finished 
his colourful parliamentary career. Very unwisely, two state Labor 
members, Watkins and Woods, stood for Commonwealth seats and ended 
by losUig their state seats also. Reduced to ten, the state party was 
pUifuUy weak and subject to smears of Romarust aggression, Sinn Feinism, 
Bolshevism, and pro-Germanism. As even states wdth "no" majorities had 
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returned Nationalist ministries, there was Uttle hope that Tasmanian Labor 
would improve its situation. When Dicker, a mUitant unionist and Labor 
member, was fined for an alleged declaration that he would as soon live 
under German as British rule, the Liberal party, in spite of Dicker's 
repeated assertion that he had been unjustly penaUzed, took fuU advantage 
of the situation and boycotted the public works committee on which 
Dicker served. Nor was Labor able to achieve success by running 
J. A. Hurst, a disabled soldier and ex-parliamentarian against W. G. Spence 
ui King O'MaUey's old seat of Darwin. After this 1917 federal election the 
Daily Post, complaining of absenteeism and the loss of Labor voters in the 
army, admitted that "Labor is not strong enough just now to outvote the 
conservative vote plus the rebel Labor vote", especiaUy when the party 
had never won a majority in a state election. Two years later, Ui elections 
noted for the virulent sectarianism of the anti-Labor and anti-Catholic 
Loyalty Leagues and their fellow traveUers, Tasmanian Labor received two 
more serious reverses. As King O'MaUey put it, "already politics in Aus-
tralia are beginning to produce an odor stronger than the fumes from a 
Texas traU buzzard on a Mexican sewer waggon".' '^ In the federal battle, 
Labor lost all the seats contested. At the state election where Labor's poU 
feU from 48 per cent in 1919, only the Hare-Clarke system prevented 
annUiUation. Though Catholics had supported Labor in this election, the 
temperance party was now definitely opposed. With thuteen seats the 
party was only one member below its 1916 strength. In 1922, when 
Labor's vote again dropped almost 5 per cent, only one more seat was lost. 
By a huge irony, the disintegration of the anti-Labor forces and the con-
cUiatory disposition of J. A. Lyons enabled Labor to take office in 
1923."^ Since that time Labor has used PR to retain a dominant position 
in Tasmanian politics. 
Though time and Hare-Clark were with Tasmanian Labor, the condition 
of the party in the years after the conscription split was parlous. The 
weakness of the parliamentary party naturally gave rise to much criticism 
of the leadership and encouraged Tasmaruans to give ear to mainland 
debates on industrial action, the One Big Union (OBU), and socialization 
objectives. Moreover, the issue of Catholic education stiU had to be faced. 
Concessions short of straight aid were offered and seized on by anti-
Catholic and anti-Labor opponents. Divisions of opinion also occurred on 
the legitimacy of giving written answers to Catholic pre-election question-
naires and on the old issue of membership of incompatible organizations. 
Tasmanian Labor, perhaps wisely, never laid down hard and fast rules on 
the latter question and several Laborites had a foot in both Catholic. 
Federation and socialist camps. Nevertheless, expulsions and re-admissions 
were common in this period of Labor weakness.* '''* 
Now that parliamentary Labor was payUig few dividends, attention 
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naturaUy centred on trade uniorusm. The union of political and industrial 
Labor in 1917—18, Uitended to improve the relations between the two 
wdngs of the movement, probably had the reverse effect."^ It was argued 
that the Tasmanian cost of living was the highest in Australia, whUe wages 
were the lowest. The craft unions belonging to the Hobart TLC, which had 
amalgamated for a tune with the political party, were incapable of ener-
getic action, but, the AWU colossus after its absorption of the Federated 
Mining Employees' Association (FMEA) (the old AMA) Ui 1917 looked 
more promising. James McDonald, first Tasmanian Labor legislative 
councUlor and president of the FMEA, was instrumental in bringing about 
the amalgamation. Especially after the death of James Mooney in 1918, 
McDonald was a dominating figure in the union. WUh the stormy Dicker, 
McDonald attempted to organize workers throughout Tasmania,"^ 
always seeking opportunities for swaUowing up smaUer urUons. In July 
1918 the AWU's World, stiU edUed by Dwyer Gray, replaced the Daily 
Post. Gray, once a strong supporter of political action, soon found himself 
at loggerheads with parUamentarians such as Ogden and Lyons. Though 
the AWU in its organizing campaigns was studiously moderate, approving 
arbitration, evolutionary methods, and parliamentarianism, disputes grew 
bitter on the interpretation of the 1918 conference's decision against con-
scription, pre-election pledges to Catholics, and above aU the party's 
attitude,*" discussed at the 1919 conference, to the OBU idea. 
At both the 1919 and 1920 conferences, Ogden delivered a presidential 
address denouncuig the idea of duect action as a betrayal of Labor. Such 
vehemence hardly appears to have been warranted in a community lUce 
Tasmania. Many delegates were obviously alienated by Ogden's remarks. 
Ben Watkins attacked the 1919 executive report for not teUing "confer-
ence that there was practically no organization at the present time, or that 
the organization was in a rotten state"."* Later the conference was called 
on by Kaye and McDonald to endorse the OBU principle which was pro-
voking so much controversy on the mainland.'" The conference, reaUz-
ing the existence of the division on the mainland between J. S. Garden's 
OBU scheme and the views of E. Grayndler of the AWU,' *" did not want 
to take sides, to adopt the revolutionary preamble of the OBU, or to 
antagonize Tasmanian electors. As Lyons said, it was absurd to ask confer-
ence on the eve of an election to say that present methods were futUe: "if 
any of them thought that way, then for God's sake let them get out of the 
contest and go home (applause)."'*' This, in spite of his subsequent 
socialistic utterances, appears to have been Lyons's basic attitude. The 
conference agreed with Lyons, and the vendetta between Dwyer Gray, 
backed by Grayndler of the AWU, and the parUamentarians gathered 
strength in 1919. The World was accused of disloyalty to the Labor party 
and excluded, like the capUalist press, from the 1920 conference, which 
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rejected yet another attempt to put "sociaUzation" on the platform. 
In 1921, a surprising swing to the left estabUshed the sociaUzation 
objective, and even Lyons, after the defeat of his 1919 attempt to enter 
the federal parliament, began to talk of socialism and the OBU, wdthout 
reaUy understanding theu UnpUcations.'^^ Tasmanian delegates, including 
Cosgrove and McDonald, were recorded as voting for the Brisbane "social-
ization" resolution but later claimed that they had not been present when 
the vote was taken. Lyons was careful not to allow socialism to come 
before the Tasmanian electors m 1922. Once he had achieved power in 
1923 the issue was forgotten, and the socialization plank at the 1926 and 
1927 congresses was nearly replaced by the old objective. Many Tasmanian 
Laborites would probably have agreed with King O'MaUey's 1922 view 
that the party had "committed poUtical suicide through marching from a 
Russian lunatic asylum through a Soviet slaughter house to an open 
cemetery".'*^ The Examiner's claim that Tasmanian Laborites were "not 
free agents", but were "expected to foUow the lead set by theu bosses on 
the mauiland" was slightly hysterical but may have contained an element 
oftmth.'84 
It is difficult to beheve that the conflict in Tasmania relating to unions 
and direct action versus leagues and parliamentarianism vras more than a 
pallid reflection of the mairUand dispute, unportant orUy because it gave 
Laborites an opportunity to find scapegoats amount their coUeagues for 
the party's weakness. In the top-heavy Tasmanian Labor party, dividing 
Unes were indistinct. As was pointed out in conference debates on 
politician uifiuence Ui the party, it would be foolish to make restrictions 
when the critics of today might be the parUamentarians of tomorrow. The 
AWU influence, moreover, had always been exercised through the leagues. 
On the other hand some of the smaUer Hobart trade unions had been buUt 
under the Uifiuence of obvious politicians like Woods. As Woods himself 
had said, aU Labor politicians were unionists and "some of them could 
show more union tickets than those who had attacked them".'*^ On the 
question of socialism it is noteworthy that Cosgrove and OgUvie, both 
Catholics and associated with Catholic societies, appeared strong advocates 
of the advanced objective. 
The fate of some of the chief players in the early drama of Tasmanian 
Labor is instmctive. Lyons took office in 1923 in circumstances very 
sunUar to those of the Earle govemment. Though he Ukewise refused 
preference to unionists, Lyons did succeed Ui winning Labor's first 
election victory in 1925, but his proportion of the total vote, 48.4 per 
cent, was exactly the same as Earle's in 1916. Like Earle again, Lyons 
ended his career in a non-Labor federal cabmet. Ogden, who also went into 
federal poUtics, was expeUed from the party in 1928. His rival, Dwyer 
Gray, was expeUed but readmitted to become, eventually, treasurer and 
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for a time Labor premier of Tasmania. Woods and Watkins sat in parlia-
ment in the 1920s and, though the former achieved a second term as 
Speaker, neither obtained cabinet rank. Watkins, like so many others, 
eventually left the party. James McDonald, the focus of Tasmanian union 
duect action, ultimately held the post of attorney general for six years, an 
Uiteresting outcome for a man who had once insisted on the uselessness of 
politics. Personal rivalries, ambitions, and divergent views on practical 
problems, rather than distinct ideological differences, appear to explain 
the careers of these men. 
Gordon ChUde's bitter conclusion in 1923 that "the Labor Party, start-
ing with a band of inspired Socialists, degenerated uito a vast macUine for 
capturing poUtical power, but did not know how to use that power when 
attained except for the profit of individuals",'^^ if true in any state, is 
hardly applicable to Tasmanian Labor. It is extremely dubious, for 
example, whether many original Laborites, in spite of the Giblin-
Waterworth discussion group, were sociaUsts or seriously influenced by the 
idea.'^' 
Yet the Mercury was not unfair when it declared that "there has been a 
great deal of shufflmg Ui this matter" of socialism. Henry George and 
vague forms of Christian socialism appear to have been the chief intel-
lectual staples. Even the emdite Woods advocated only Blackbum inter-
pretation socialism. In the second place the Tasmanian organization never 
appeared formidable. In spite of the poverty of the state. Labor did not 
poll a majority tUl 1937. The very backwardness which Labor was com-
mitted to removing made organization extremely difficult. From its in-
ception the Tasmanian Labor party was heavUy dependent on support 
from tUe mainland, both for uruon organizers and political campaigners. In 
1917 the special conference establishing a Tasmanian Labor Federation 
required a £50 ($100) subsidy from Victoria.**^ Tasmanian Labor was 
certainly regarded by opponents as an offshoot of the "vast machine" in 
New South Wales and Victoria. The Mercury in its constant denunciations 
of "Unported agitators" talked of "this great conspiracy which is using a 
Naysmith hammer to kiU a snaU". FuiaUy, in the consistency of their 
adherence to the party, Tasmanian Laborites were neither better nor worse 
than their brethren elsewhere. The reactions of Earle and Lyons appear to 
have been simUar to those of Hughes or Holman. However, though no 
pledge can contain a ruthless and determined leader, the Tasmanian lack of 
interest in clear distinctions appears, as frequent conference discussions on 
the subject indicate, to have provided a particularly happy hunting ground 
for several ambitious small-time poUticians. In the 1903-20 period the 
weakness of the party ensured that such men were usuaUy disappoUited Ui 
their ambitions. Subsequentiy, however, Tasmanian Labor was to hold 
office longer than any other state party. The Tasmanian party's late start. 
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as was suggested in 1903, undoubtedly helped it to buUd on the experi-
ence and support of its mainland alUes. Ogden's presidential prophesy of 
1912 was substantially correct: "He was quite confident that Tasmania 
would eventually be the first state in the Commonwealth to hold the reins 
of Government continually when once it got control of them, (Applause). 
He believed this because Tasmania had moved along slowly, and members 
of the party had been content to wait."* ®' If this slow development was 
the result of weak trade unions and a lack of mUitancy, it may, by 
establishing an ideal of co-operation rather than class mterest, have eased 
the evolution of Labor from a suspect extremist group to the normal 
government of the state. 
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NOTES 
1. For an excellent survey of Tasmanian geography and economics, see 
J. L. Davies, ed.. Atlas of Tasmania. The contributions by Professor P. Scott 
and Dr. R. J. Solomon are particularly useful. 
2. See G. Rimmer, Two Early Views of Van Diemen's Land, p. 20, and also 
R. M. Johnston, government statistician, "The Vote in Tasmania", in Daily 
Post (Hobart), 25 August 1916. 
3. For a fuU discussion of this topic, see Heiuy Reynolds, "That Hated Stain". 
4. T. A, Coghlan, Labour and Industry in Australia (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1918), 3: 1580, 
5. According to J, E, Ogden's presidential address to the 1919 Tasmanian Labor 
conference, low Tasmanian wages were due to the "long continued excess of 
departures over arrivals". He calculated that Tasmania had lost 30,000 in the 
last fifty years. In 1903 able-bodied men were receiving only 22s, 6d, ($2,25), 
World (2 May 1919), 
6. Henry Reynolds, "The Island Colony: Tasmania", p. 196. 
7. W, P, Reeves, State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand (London, 
1923), 1: 83, 
8. Reynolds, "The Island Colony", pp. 200-202. 
9. Official Report of the Fourth Intercolonial Trades Union Congress (Adelaide, 
1886), pp, V, VI1,7,100, 
10. Official Report of the Fifth Intercolonial Trades Union Congress (Brisbane, 
1888), pp, 12 and 105, 
11, Official Report of the Sixth Intercolonial Trades and Labor Congress (Hobart, 
1889), pp, 1,2, I I , 16,42, 
1 2. Reynolds, "The Island Colony", pp, 200-202, 
I 3, Official Report of the Seventh Intercolonial Trades and Labour Union Congress 
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of Australia (BaUarat, 1891), pp. 64-65 . 
14. M. D, McRae, "Some Aspects of the Origins of the Tasmanian Labor Party," p, 
23, Walch's Tasmanian Almanac shows the disappearance of the Hobart TLC 
after 1896 and the Launceston TLC after 1897, 
15. Tasmanian Democrat (Launceston), 1 March 1895. 
16. G. Blainey, The Peaks of LyeU, p. 199. 
17. Coghlan, Labour and Industiy in Australia, 4: 1950, "The political Ufe of the 
country gradually passed from the control of the native-born element, in 
Tasmania a highly conservative body, to the democratic section now largely 
reinforced by new arrivals." 
18. McRae, pp. 23-24, Usts six leagues between 1892 and 1901: the Hobart 
Electoral Reform League and the Launceston Liberal Progressive League 
(1892), the Hobart Political Association (Trades and Labor CouncU auspices, 
1893), Liberal and Labor Political League (TurnbuU, Hobart, 1894), Demo-
cratic League, 1896, Tasmanian Workers' Political League, 1901. 
19. See P. R, Hart, "The Reverend Archibald TurnbuU, Agitator", pp. 44-55 . 
20. Tasmanian Democmt, August 1894. For a detaUed consideration of New 
Zealand's influence, see R. P. Davis, "New Zealand Liberalism and Tasmanian 
Labour, 1891-1916", pp. 24-25 . 
21. Tasmanian Democrat, 19 May 1894. 
22. Coghlan, Labour and Industry in Australia, 4: 2315, 
23. A copy of the League's manifesto is found in the Catholic Morning Star, 
Launceston, 18 November 1893 (Tasmanian State Archives). 
24. Zeehan and Dundas Herald, 28 September 1903, 
25. Clipper (Hobart), 30 March 1901, For O'MaUey's aUeged background, see 
Dorothy Catts, King O'MaUey. Mrs. Catts uncritically swaUowed the entire 
O'MaUey legend. 
26. E. Mulcahy to Mahon, 20 October 1911 (Hugh Mahon papers, MS 937, 
National Library of Australia), 
27. Morning Star, 1 3 August 1892. 
28. Catts, King O'MaUey, p. 142. O'MaUey, however, later claimed that he had 
never been able to spend more than £250 ($500) in a campaign. See King 
O'MaUey papers. (MS 460/5121, National Library of Australia). 
29. Dailv Post, (Hobart) 24 AprU 1917. 
30. Reynolds, "The Island Colony", p. 245. 
31. O'MaUey papers (MS 460/5121, National Library of Australia), 
32. See Devonport conference, Clipper, 2 May 1908, where a delegate said to 
O'MaUey: "We ran Labor candidates in both Hobart and Launceston before 
you left South Australia." 
33. For a useful account Woods's career, see M. L. Lalce, "W. A. Woods and the 
Clipper, 1903-1909". 
34. Clipper, 6 July 1895. 
35. See R, P, Davis, State Aid and Tasmanian Politics, 1868-1920, pp, 53 and 71, 
36. CUpper, 3 September 1899, "The funny part about the bosses of this Tasmania 
is that their wretched ideas are forced into the new Commonwealth BiU," 
37. For a short account of Earle's life, see John Reynolds, "John Earle 
(1865-1932); Tasmanian Labor's First Leader", Service (Hobart: February 
1954), pp, 33-37. Earle received much of his poUtical education as a member 
of the Hobart Debating Club in the 1880s. He profited from his association 
with A, J, Taylor, the city Ubrarian, 
38. Hobart. World, 10 December 1919, 
39. Clipper, 5 October 1901, 
40. Zeehan and Dundas Herald, 27 September 1901. 
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42. Ibid,, 19 February and 7 March 1903, 
43. Monitor, 23 and 30 January 1903, Mann also gave addresses on Irish Home 
Rule, 
44. Clipper, 28 March 1903, 
45. Ibid., 28 February 1903. 
46. Ibid,, 11 April 1903, GUmore apparently attended the first Labor caucus, 
47. Daily Post, 9 May 1918, 
48. Blainey, The Peaks of LyeU, pp. 202-94. 
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52. Clipper, 16 April 1904; Mercury. 9 April 1904. 
53. The Victorian AMA had in 1902 passed a resolution against political levies. See 
M, D, McRae, "The Tasmanian Labor Party and Trade Unions, 1903-1923", p. 
26. 
54. Clipper, 18 April 1903. 
55. Ibid., 25 April 1903. 
56. On 24 January 1903, the Clipper had published a comprehensive comparison to 
demonstrate New Zealand's progress and Tasmania's backwardness in social 
legislation. "It sets one thinking. Maoriland is only about 1000 miles east of 
Tasmania; the general conditions of both countries are not very dissimUar." 
57. Ibid., 6 and 13 June 1903. "The annual contribution to the T.W.P.L. (Tas-
manian Workers' Political League] is fixed at Is. |10 cents] per quarter for 
males and 6d. ]5 cents] for females. Members of Unions are to be entitled to 
full membership in the League on payment through their union of'/z ordinary 
contributions. Three-fourths of the amount of contributions collected to be 
remitted to the Executive, Vi to be retained by the Branches," Woods made the 
"wholesale price" statement in an attempt to persuade the secretary of the 
Uiunceston Amalgamated Society of Engineers to join as a union after seeking 
a ruling from the Australian Council of the society on political work, Gorman-
ston and Queenstown AMAs liad already joined as units, while smaller unions 
were encouraging their members to join as individuals, (Woods to James 
Dunken, 21 August 1903, W, A. Woods papers, NP I 39/8/4.) 
58. Clipper, 20 June 1903. Monitor, 1 April 1903. lor development of this 
question, see R. P. Davis, "Christian Socialism in Tasmania", pp. 5 I - 68 . 
59. Zeehan and Dundas Herald, 9 June 1903. 
60. Clipper, 20 June 1903. 
61. Ibid. The Monitor, though it had previously demanded the establishment of a 
Labor party (16 January 1903), now agreed with the Bulletin (29 May 1903). 
62. Woods to Tudor, 24 October I 903 (Woods papers, NP/1 39/8/4). 
63. Woods to A. Symonds, 9 October 1903 (ibid., 41). 
64. Circular, I 1 September 1903 (ibid., 38). 
65. Woods to Ogden, 22 October 1903 (ibid., 47). 
66. Woods's Horse Racing Book, p. 25 (ibid.). 
67. Woods to R. Horsham, 24 July I 903 (ibid., 27). 
68. Woods to S. Ford, 30 July 1903 (ibid., 30). 
69. Clipper. 4 July 1903. 
70. IWamey .The Peaks of Lvell. p. 198. 
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a white artisan remained disfranchised (7 February 1903). 
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he must do so." Woods to Ogden, 15 October 1903 (Woods papers, 
NP/1 39/8/4, 43). 
73. Woods's Horse Racing Book, p. 25. 
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Mulcahy, merely because Mulcahy happens to be a Catholic, deserves to be 
disfranchised." 
75. Monitor, 18 December 1903. In its previous issue, 11 December 1903, it had 
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J. J. Mahoney, and C. Metz for the senate, and O'MaUey and Andy Kirk for the 
House of Representatives. 
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77. Mercury, 1 April 1903, 
78. P. M. WeUer, "Non-Labor Parties 1894-1912", pp. 107-9. 
79. "Systems of taxation existing in New Zealand and New South Wales: Report 
by Mr. H. E. Downie, Commissioner of Taxes, Tasmania", in Tasmania: 
Journals and Papers of Parliament (Hobart: Government Printer), no. 30. 
80. CUpper, 9 January 1904, 
81. Ibid,, 29 April 1905, 
82. Ibid., 18 March 1905. According to Woods, "several attempts had been made 
to start unions for different individual trades in urban Tasmania, but the popu-
lation was so small and the number of employees in each branch so limited that 
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Association was far from mihtant. Its object (ibid., I April 1905) was "to 
improve the relations between employers and workmen". The Launceston con-
ference (ibid,, 9 April 1904) had set up a committee to discuss this question, 
83. Mercury, 9 February 1905, 
84. Ibid., 2 May 1908, 
85. Lake, "W, A. Woods and the C/;pper, 1903-1909", p. 40. 
86. Daily Post, 1 July 1912, 
87. Mercury, 27 March 1906. 
88. Monitor, 11 May 1906. 
89. Ibid., 25 March 1906. 
90. Ibid., 28 March 1906: "A compact Uttle Labour Party in the House of 
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91. Mercury, 30 March, 12 April, and 31 May 1906, 
92. J. E. Ogden In Daily Post, 28 June 1912. 
93. Clipper, 21 April 1906. Each received three votes. 
94. In 1908 an AMA vote rejected by a large majority the proposal that the union 
should affiUate with the PLLs. See Lake, "W. A. Woods and the Clipper", p. 
55, 
95. Mercury, 1 April 1909. 
96. Monitor, 4 May 1906, 
97. Ibid., 1 June 1906, 
98. Lake, "W, A, Woods and the Clipper", 49-50, 
99. Ibid., p. 1; Gavin Souter:/I Peculiar People (Sydney, 1968), p. 126. 
100. Clipper, 28 November 1908. 
101. Tasmania House of Assembly, Votes and Proceedings 56 (1907): 56 (5 
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102. Clipper, 12 June 1909. 
103. The Orangemen were opposing all federal members who had voted for the 
recent Irish Home Rule resolution in the Commonwealth parliament. These 
included O'MaUey and O'Keefe, 
104. World, 15 May 1920, 
105. Clipper, 6 April 1907, 
106. Ibid., 15 August 1896, As late as 1915, N, K. Ewing, leader of the anti-Labor 
opposition, was claiming that the Hare-Clark system prevented Labor from 
obtaininga satisfactory majority (seeDaily Post, 10 AprU 1915), 
107. F, C, Green, ed,, A Century of Responsible Government in Tasmania, p. 213, 
108. Monitor, 23 November 1906. 
109. Clipper, 8 and 15 May 1909, for analysis. 
110. Ibid,, 1 May 1909, 
111. This mode had been laid down with Earle's support at the Hobart special 
conference of 1906. See Clipper, 4 August 1906. At Campbell Town in 1910 
(Daily Post, 28 March 1910) it was proposed to replace the system of an 
exhaustive caucus ballot for ministers by individual nominations. Both Earle 
and Woods opposed this change. For N. E. Lewis's position, see A, B, Keith, 
Responsible Government in the Dominions, 2nd ed. (Oxford), 1: 265. See also 
p. 167 for discussion of governor's refusal to grant Earle a dissolution. 
112. Daily Post, 22 April 1912. Metz, however, was a delegate for the Denison 
League at the 1919 conference. 
113. Horse Racing Book, p. 24 (Woods papers, NP 1 39/8/8). 
114. James Belton to O'MaUey, 16 September 1909, and O'MaUey to Belton, 18 
September 1909 (O'MaUey papers, 460/4960-1). Belton could not "under-
stand how it is that those who get the least from our movement are ready to 
sacrifice the most". 
115. See M. Kozak, "E. Dwyer Gray, Labour Journalist". 
116. McRae, "The Tasmanian Labour Party and Trade Unions", pp. 4 - 5 , 
117. Clipper, 19 July 1909, Both Woods and King O'MaUey strongly supported the 
AWU. 
118. E. Evans to Woods, 20 March 1909 (Woods papers, NP/1 39/8/1), 
119. DaUy Post, 13 March 1911, It was argued that the Legislative CouncU had only 
allowed the bill through in order that this inferior system might distract worker 
attention from the more comprehensive federal arbitration system. The main 
Labor criticisms were; the absence of compulsory arbitration, the relatively 
small number of trades covered, the non-recognition of industrial unions, the 
excessive penalties for striking, and the lack of protection for worker repre-
sentatives against victimization. The system was attacked at the 1913 con-
ference (ibid., 21 June 1913). 
120. Albert Metin, Le Socialisme Sans Doctrines (Paris, 1910), p. 178. 
121. Daily Post, 11 AprU 1917. 
122. Ibid., 20 June 1913. 
123. Ibid., 28 June 1913. 
124. "Eventually it would liave to be faced, explained, and expounded to the small 
cultivators of the land whose salvation it would be" (Daily Post, 20 Jime 
1913). I^nd nationalization was again overwhelmingly defeated in 1914 (ibid., 
19 June 1914) and 1915 (ibid., 6 May 1915). 
125. Daily Post, 28 March 1910. Also ibid., 18 April 1911. 
126. In 1920 six of the eight executive members were members of parliament. In 
1919 three of the eight-man executive were not members, but less than a 
month after the'conference two of these were elected to the Assembly. 
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